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1
How to ‘See’ Great Policy Successes
A Field Guide to Spotting Policy Successes in the Wild
Mallory E. Compton and Paul ‘t Hart
Shifting Focus
For those wanting to know how public policy is made and how it evolves from
aspirations and ideas to tangible social outcomes, the 1970s produced some classic
accounts, which became established in academic curriculums and part of the
canon of academic research world-wide. The two best known works from this
era are Pressman and Wildavsky’s Implementation (whose iconic epic subtitle
inspired ours) and Peter Hall’s Great Planning Disasters (the inspiration for our
book’s main title). Pressman and Wildavsky wrote a book-length intensive case
study revealing how a federal employment promotion policy, which was launched
with a great sense of urgency and momentum, played out on the ground with very
limited effect in Oakland, California. Hall presented gripping accounts of public
policy failures from around the Anglosphere: ‘positive’ planning disasters (plan-
ning projects that ran into cost escalation, underperformance, withdrawal of
political support, or unintended consequences so big as to completely dwarf the
intended aims), and ‘negative’ planning disasters (instances where plans made in
response to pressing public problems never got off the drawing board due to
political stalemate).
Taken together, these studies were emblematic of an era in which the alleged
‘ungovernability’ of Western societies and their welfare states was a dominant
theme (Crozier et al. 1975; Rose 1979; Offe 1984). Having seized a much more
prominent role in public life following the Second World War, Western govern-
ments were ambitious to achieve planned change, but internal complexities and
vagaries of democratic political decision-making often thwarted those ambitions.
Generations of public policy and public administration students were steeped in
pessimistic diagnoses from these classic studies. Waves of similar studies in the
1990s (Butler et al. 1994; Bovens and ‘t Hart 1996; Gray and ‘t Hart 1998) and the
2010s (Allern and Pollack 2012; Crewe and King 2013; Light 2014; Schuck 2014;
Oppermann and Spencer 2016) followed. These works further imply that govern-
ments are up to no good, incompetent, politically paralysed, and/or chronically
risk overreach much of the time (e.g. Scott 1998; Schuck 2014).
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And yet in many parts of the world, across many public policy domains, the
bulk of public projects, programmes, and services perform not so badly at all, and
sometimes even quite successfully (Goderis 2015). These realities are chronically
underexposed and understudied. Major policy accomplishments, striking
performance in difficult circumstances, and thousands of taken-for-granted
everyday forms of effective public value creation by and through governments
are not deemed newsworthy. They cannot be exploited for political gain by
oppositions and critics of incumbent office-holders. Curiously, academic students
of public policy have had almost nothing to say about them (cf. Bovens et al.
2001; McConnell 2010; Moore 2013), despite vigorous calls to recognize the
major and often hidden and unacknowledged contributions of governments to
successes claimed by and widely attributed to now revered companies like Google
(Mazzucato 2013).
We cannot properly ‘see’, let alone recognize and explain, variations in gov-
ernment performance when media, political, and academic discourses alike are
saturated with accounts of their shortcomings and failures but remain nearly
silent on their achievements. Negative language dominates: public and academic
discourse about government, politics, and public policy is dominated by disap-
pointment, incompetence, failure, unintended consequences, alienation, corrup-
tion, disenchantment, and crisis (Hay 2007). On the contrary, the manner in
which we look at, talk about, think, evaluate, and emotionally relate to public
institutions risks creating self-fulfilling prophecies. The current ascent of ‘anti-
system’ populists speaks volumes, and the message is hardly reassuring. The
‘declinist’ discourse of the current age has permeated our thinking about govern-
ment and public policy. It prevents us from seeing, acknowledging, and learning
from past and present instances of highly effective and highly valued public
policymaking.
With this book we want to shift the focus. We aim to infuse the agenda for
teaching, research, and dialogue on public policymaking with food for thought
about what goes well. We do this through a series of close-up, in-depth case study
accounts of the genesis and evolution of stand-out public policy accomplishments,
across a range of countries, sectors, and challenges. With these accounts, we
engage with the conceptual, methodological, and theoretical challenges which
have plagued and constrained researchers seeking to evaluate, explain, and design
successful public policy.
There are many ways to ‘get at’ these questions. Existing conceptual and
comparative studies of public policy success (Bovens et al. 2001; Patashnik 2008;
McConnell 2010) suggest that achieving success entails two major tasks. One
entails craft work: devising, adopting, and implementing programmes and reforms
that have a meaningful impact on the public issues giving rise to their existence.
The other entails political work: forming and maintaining coalitions of stake-
holders to persuasively propagate these programmes. This political work extends
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to nurturing and protecting elite and public perceptions of the policy’s/pro-
gramme’s ideology, intent, instruments, implementation, and impact during the
often long and tenuous road from ideas to outcomes. Success must be experienced
and actively communicated, or it will go unnoticed and underappreciated. In this
volume, we aim to shed light on how these two fundamental tasks—programme and
process design; and coalition-building and reputation management—are taken up
and carried out in instances of highly successful public policymaking.
Following in the footsteps of Pressman and Wildavsky and Hall, this volume
contains in-depth case studies of prominent instances of public policymaking and
planning from around the world. By offering insight into occurrences of policy
success across varied contexts, these case studies are designed to increase aware-
ness that government and public policy actually work remarkably well, at least
some of the time, and that we can learn from these practices. Before we get into
these cases, however, it is necessary to equip readers of this book and future
researchers of policy success with a guide on how to go about identifying and
analysing instances of policy success. The chief purpose of this chapter is to offer
researchers, policy-makers, and students a field guide to spotting great policy
successes in the real world—in the wild—so that we can begin to analyse how they
came about and what might be learned from them.
How Do We Know a ‘Great Policy Success’When We See One?
Policy successes are, like policy failures, in the eye of the beholder. They are not
mere facts but stories. Undoubtedly ‘events’—real impacts on real people—are a
necessary condition for their occurrence. But in the end, policy successes do not so
much occur as they are made. To claim that a public policy, programme, or project
X is a ‘success’ is effectively an act of interpretation, indeed of framing. To say this
in a public capacity and in a public forum makes it an inherently political act: it
amounts to giving a strong vote of confidence to certain acts and practices of
governance. In effect it singles them out, elevates them, validates them.
For such an act to be consequential, it needs to stick: others must be convinced
of its truth and they need to emulate it. The claim ‘X is a success’ needs to become
a more widely accepted and shared narrative. When it does, it becomes performa-
tive: X looks better and better because so many say so, so often. When the
narrative endures, X becomes enshrined in society’s collective memory through
repeated retelling and other rituals. Examples of the latter include the conferral of
awards on people or organizations associated with X, who then subsequently get
invitations to come before captive audiences to spread the word; the high place
that X occupies in rankings; the favourable judgements of X by official arbiters of
public value in a society, such as audit agencies or watchdog bodies, not to
mention the court of public opinion. Once they have achieved prominence,
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success tales—no matter how selective and biased critics and soft voices may claim
them to be (see Schram and Soss 2001)—come to serve as important artefacts in
the construction of self-images and reputational claims of the policy-makers,
governments, agencies, and societal stakeholders that credibly claim authorship
of their making and preservation (Van Assche et al. 2012).
We must tread carefully in this treacherous terrain. Somehow, we need to arrive
at a transparent and widely applicable conceptualization of ‘policy success’ to be
deployed throughout this volume, and a basic set of research tools allowing us to
spot and characterize the ‘successes’which will be studied in detail throughout this
book. To get there, we propose that policy assessment is necessarily a multi-
dimensional, multi-perspectivist, and political process. At the most basic level we
distinguish between two dimensions of assessment. First, the programmatic
performance of a policy: success is essentially about designing smart programmes
that will really have an impact on the issues they are supposed to tackle, while
delivering those programmes in a manner to produce social outcomes that are
valuable. There is also the political legitimacy of a policy: success is the extent to
which both the social outcomes of policy interventions and also the manner in
which they are achieved are seen as appropriate by relevant stakeholders and
accountability forums in view of the systemic values in which they are embedded
(Fischer 1995; Hough et al. 2010).
The relation between these two dimensions of policy evaluation is not straight-
forward. There can be (and often are) asymmetries: politically popular policies are
not necessarily programmatically effective or efficient, and vice versa. Moreover,
there is rarely one shared normative and informational basis upon which all actors
in the governance processes assess performance, legitimacy, and endurance
(Bovens et al. 2001). Many factors influence beliefs and practices through which
people form judgements about governance. Heterogeneous stakeholders have
varied vantage points, values, and interests with regard to a policy, and thus
may experience and assess it differently. An appeal to ‘the facts’ does not neces-
sarily help settle these differences. In fact, like policymaking, policy evaluation
occurs in a context of multiple, often competing, cultural and political frames and
narratives, each of which privileges some facts and considerations over others
(Hajer and Wagenaar 2003). It is inherently political in its approach and impli-
cations, no matter how deep the espoused commitment to scientific rigour of
many of its practitioners. This is not something we can get around; it is something
we have to acknowledge and be mindful of without sliding into thinking that it is
all and only political, and that therefore ‘anything goes’ when it comes assessing
the success or otherwise of a policy (Bovens et al. 2006).
Building upon Bovens and ‘t Hart’s programmatic–political dichotomy,
McConnell (2010) added a third perspective, process success, to produce a
three-dimensional assessment map. We have adapted this three-dimensional
assessment for our purposes (see also Newman 2014) and added an
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additional—temporal—dimension. Assessing policy success in this volume thus
involves checking cases against the following four criteria families:
Programmatic assessment—This dimension reflects the focus of ‘classic’ evalu-
ation research on policy goals, the theory of change underpinning it, and the
selection of the policy instruments it deploys—all culminating in judgements
about the degree to which a policy achieves valuable social impacts.
Process assessment—The focus here is on how the processes of policy design,
decision-making, and delivery are organized and managed, and whether these
processes contribute to both its technical problem-solving capacity (effectiveness
and efficiency) and to its social appropriateness, and in particular the sense of
procedural justice among key stakeholders and the wider public (Van den Bos
et al. 2014).
Political assessment—This dimension assesses the degree to which policy-
makers and agencies involved in driving and delivering the policy are able to
build and maintain supportive political coalitions, and the degree to which policy-
makers’ association with the policy enhances their reputations. In other words, it
examines both the political requirements for policy success and the distribution of
political costs/benefits among the actors involved in it.
Endurance assessment—The fourth dimension adds a temporal perspective. We
surmise that the success or otherwise of a public policy, programme, or project
should be assessed not through a one-off snapshot but as a multi-shot sequence or
episodic film ascertaining how its performance and legitimacy develop over time.
Contexts change, unintended consequences emerge, surprises are thrown at
history: robustly successful policies are those that adapt to these dynamics through
institutional learning and flexible adaptation in programme (re)design and delivery,
and through political astuteness in safeguarding supporting coalitions and main-
taining public reputation and legitimacy.
Taking these dimensions into account, we propose the following definition of a
(‘great’) policy success:
A policy is a complete success to the extent that (a) it demonstrably creates widely
valued social outcomes; through (b) design, decision-making, and delivery pro-
cesses that enhance both its problem-solving capacity and its political legitimacy;
and (c) sustains this performance for a considerable period of time, even in the
face of changing circumstances.
Table 1.1 presents an assessment framework that integrates these building blocks.
Articulating specific elements of each dimension of success—programmatic, pro-
cess, political, endurance—in unambiguous and conceptually distinct terms, this
framework lends a structure to both contemporaneous evaluation and dynamic
consideration of policy developments over time. All contributing authors have
drawn upon it in analysing their case studies in this volume.
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Studying Policy Success: Methodological Considerations
Now that we have a working method of ‘seeing’ policy success in operational
terms, the next step is to apply the concept in studying governance and public
policymaking. Before we do so, however, it is important to point out that there are
range of methods which researchers have employed in this task. These efforts can
be grouped into three types of approach.
At the macro-level, studies of overall government performance usually take the
form of cross-national and cross-regional comparison of indicators published in
large datasets. Some researchers focus on the inputs and throughput side of
government. A prominent example is the Quality of Government dataset that
captures cross-national difference in the trustworthiness, reliability, impartiality,
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incorruptibility, and competence of public institutions (Rothstein 2011). Of more
direct relevance from a policy success point of view are datasets and balanced
scorecard exercises focusing on aggregate governance outputs, outcomes, and
productivity in specific domains of government activity, performed and propa-
gated by e.g. the World Bank, the OECD, and many national audit offices and
government think tanks (Goderis 2015).
At the meso-level, social problems, policy domain, and programme evaluation
specialists regularly examine populations of cases to identify cases and areas of
high performance. For example, common areas of focus include crime prevention
programmes, adult literacy programmes, refugee settlement programmes, and
early childhood education programmes. With this method, scholars examine
‘what works’ and assess whether these programmes or key features of them can
be replicated and transferred to other contexts (e.g. Light 2002; Isaacs 2008;
Lundin et al. 2015; Blunch 2017; Weisburd et al. 2017).
Finally, at the micro-level, researchers probe deeply into the context, design,
decision-making, implementation, reception, assessment, and evolution of single
or a limited number of policies or programmes. Both Hall’s and Pressman and
Wildavsky’s seminal studies are examples of micro-level studies.
Each of these three approaches has a distinctive set of potential strengths and
weaknesses. Macro studies offer a view of the big picture, with a helicopter
perspective of linkages between governance activities and social outcomes. They
lend insight into the social and economic consequences of institutional design and
the effect of public spending patterns. This approach generally offers little or no
insight into what occurs in the ‘black box’ in which these linkages take shape.
Meso-level studies, on the other hand, drill down to the level of programmes and
come closer to establishing the nature of the links between their inputs, through-
puts, outputs, and outcomes. Structured and focused comparative case designs
which control for institutional and contextual factors can yield richer pictures of
‘what works’. A limitation of these population-level comparisons is the conse-
quence of parsimony, which limits the depth of attention paid to context, chance,
choice, communication, cooperation, and conflict within each unit in the sample.
As a result, it often proves difficult for meso-level studies to convincingly answer
why things work well or not so well.
The latter is the main potential strength of micro-level, single, or low-n case
study designs. This approach offers the greatest leverage in opening the black box,
and examining the stakeholder interests, institutional arrangements, power rela-
tionships, leadership and decision-making processes, and the realities of front-line
service delivery involved. This gives analysts in this tradition a better shot at
reconstructing the constellations of factors and social mechanisms that are at
work in producing policy successes. The chief limitation of micro studies of policy
success lies in the limited possibilities for controlled hypothesis testing and the
impossibility of empirically generalizing their findings. This volume is set in the
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micro tradition. We hope to deliver on its potential strengths while responsibly
navigating not only its inherent limitations but also its methodological challenges.
Case Selection
Conceptual definition of the outcome of interest—policy success—is just the start
of the battle for valid inference. With defined concepts in hand, a researcher
must next choose an appropriate sample from which to draw conclusions. If the
first lesson in any undergraduate research methods course is that ‘correlation is
not causation’, the second is sure to be in the spirit of ‘thou shalt not select on
the dependent variable’. Though criteria for sample selection vary across the
quantitative–qualitative divide (Mahoney and Goertz 2006), it is agreed that
‘the cases you choose affect the answers you get’ (Geddes 2003). The message is
hammered into the minds of young scholars that, for well understood reasons,
selecting cases based on the value of the dependent variable can profoundly bias
statistical findings, fouling generalization and average effect estimation (Heckman
1976). And yet, how a researcher selects their cases should be principally driven by
the research question. Case selection should be a deliberate and well-considered
procedure tailored to the specific research question at hand and type of explan-
ation sought (Brady and Collier 2010; King et al. 1994). There are defensible
reasons to violate the dependent variable rule and select only or mostly ‘positive’
cases (Brady and Collier 2010). In this multiple-cases project, we are not seeking
causal explanation or formal comparison. Nor do we endeavour to arrive at
universal (or even external) generalizability or estimation of average effects, let
alone aim to identify (probabilistic) empirical regularities. We are, instead, inter-
ested in documenting, understanding, and problematizing the actors, contexts,
ideas, and institutions that interact to produce the outcome of (intrinsic and
theoretical) value: successful public policy. Our case selection decisions were
made with that chief goal in mind.
Our main concern was that each case be identified as a ‘great policy success’ by
expert scholars in the relevant policy domain along more than one but preferably
all of the four success dimensions distinguished above: procedural, programmatic,
political, and endurance assessment. Complete success on all four dimensions is
unusual; these are the truly exceptional accomplishments. We sought cases of seen
successes, which are not only successful (which we might posit is a more common
condition than is popularly acknowledged), but also recognized as such. To find
these gems, we as editors consulted with experts and academics in a range of
policy domains (environmental, public works or infrastructure, social welfare,
healthcare, technology, and economic policy) to identify cases meeting our criteria
for ‘policy success’. In the event of disagreement between experts on a case’s level
of success, the case was removed from our long list.
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We also paid attention to both the policy domain and diversity of national
institutional context in finalizing our set of cases. Though our sample is quasi-
homogeneous in terms of the ‘dependent variable’ (success), we explicitly aimed
for variation in the factors which might play an important explanatory role—
including, but not limited to problem types policy sectors/subsystems, nature and
strength of political institutions, levels of economic development, and adminis-
trative capacity (Bovens et al. 2001; Lodge and Wegrich 2014). Because this
research project is primarily pedagogical and exploratory rather than explanatory
and predictive, we do not test hypotheses or conclude with any certainty about the
causes of success. Our aim is to bring to life cases of unusual policy success and get
readers to consider (a) the dimensions along which each case is most and
somewhat less successful; (b) how and why success was achieved in each of
these instances, taking into account the context in which they arose and evolved,
and the roles of particular institutions, actors, and practices in bringing them
about.
Temporal Complexity
In assessing policy outcomes, what you see often depends upon when you look,
and with what kind of temporal perspective in mind. With the passing of time,
public and political perceptions of the processes and outcomes of a public can
shift. A case in point is the construction of the Sydney Opera House (1954–73).
During the conflict-ridden and traumatic implementation phase of this highly
adventurous architectural project, it was considered a major fiasco. Construction
took ten years longer than initially planned and the costs exploded from the 1954
tender of 7 million A$ to well over 100 million A$ upon completion in 1973.
Significantly, the architect had walked out midcourse following a series of con-
frontations with the minister of public works whose party had won the New South
Wales election that year promising to rein in the ‘out of control’ Opera House
project. Not surprisingly, Hall dutifully included the Opera House project in his
Great Planning Disasters, published in 1981.
This perspective of failure was short-lived, however. During the 1980s the
unique design of the Opera House became a global architectural icon and tourist
attraction. Its growing fame and the cash it generated eclipsed the original budget
overruns, political controversies, and functional limitations of the building com-
plex. The fact that most of the building costs had not come from the public purse
but from a series of designated public lotteries, long wilfully overlooked in the
political debate, made a comeback. Over time, the weight accorded to ‘project
management’ criteria—where success is defined as delivery according to specifi-
cations, on time and within budget—receded. The dominant evaluative lens
became strategic, macro-economic, and symbolic.
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This is an example of how policy assessment can be fundamentally shaped by
variation in time horizons and the realization of various policy effects over time.
Policy objectives may vary in temporal scope (in economic policy planning, a
differentiation between short-term, medium-term, and long-term policies is
quite common) and temporal quality (unique/non-recurrent versus permanent/
iterative policies). This affects the timing and nature of assessments of their effects.
Policy-makers are in fact continuously vacillating between different time horizons
in setting priorities, allocating budgets, and making decisions. At the same time,
many elected officials and others subject to the vagaries of the electoral cycle will
be predisposed to judge policy proposals or feedback about past policies first and
foremost in terms of their short-term political implications.
Short-term effects are also more easily registered than long-term effects,
which are likely to become intertwined with other phenomena in complex and
often unintended ways. Moreover, short-term and long-term effects may in
some cases be at odds with one another, the latter reversing or neutralizing
the former. In general, the longer the time frame used for the assessment of
policy outcomes, the bigger the scope for controversy about their meaning and
evaluation is likely to be. Similarly, the processes and outcomes of one-off
policies (such as the construction of a building, the security measures surround-
ing a global summit conference, or the response to a natural disaster) tend to be
more easily grasped than those of policies with iterative objectives which are
constantly being renegotiated and adapted by different participants and in the
face of changing circumstances (such as urban planning strategies, fiscal and
monetary policies, or social security policies). In evaluating efforts to signifi-
cantly change the behaviour of large numbers of people (such as reducing
smoking, drunk driving, or domestic violence) in particular, a limited time
frame is inappropriate because it neglects both the severity of the initial admin-
istrative problems and the possibility of learning by doing. For example, US
president Franklin Roosevelt’s resettlement programme for black agricultural
labourers failed to meet its short-term political objectives, yet it had the latent
effect of generating a black middle class which later would become the backbone
of the civil rights movement (Salomon 1979).
Conversely, consider the example of the American energy policy, which shows
yet another way in which time horizons can considerably change the evaluation of
outcomes. In many respects this policy was very successful in the 1960s. Through
price controls, allocation schemes, and the non-inclusion of external costs, con-
sumers were provided with inexpensive petroleum products. But seen from
the perspective of what happened in the next decade, the picture became less
sanguine: ‘These benefits created incentives to rely on the automobile for trans-
portation, and oil and natural gas for heating, while ignoring mass transit and
coal. The success of one policy has now led to the realisation of its harmful
consequences: a nation shackled to oil and natural gas and unprepared to pay
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the real costs that such dependence demands, i.e. subservience to foreign
producers and the costs they impose’ (Ingram and Mann 1980: 14).
And then there is what Wildavsky so aptly called the paradox of time: past
successes lead to future failures. To illustrate this, he provides the example of
the ironies of achieving success in public healthcare which come to haunt policy-
makers a decade or so later. The essay’s title reflects the sense of despair
policy-makers may feel when they understand the paradox of time. It is called
Doing better, feeling worse: ‘As life expectancy increases and as formerly disabling
diseases are conquered, medicine is faced with an older population those disabil-
ities are more difficult to defeat. The cost of cure is higher, both because the easier
ills have already been dealt with, and because the patients to be treated are older.
Each increment of knowledge is harder won; each improvement in health is more
expensive. Thus, time converts one decade’s achievements into the next decade’s
dilemmas’ (Wildavsky 1987: 283).
There is no hard and fast, universally applicable way of dealing with temporal
complexity in policy evaluation. Overall, however, analysts are probably best off if
they consciously employ both short-term and long-term perspectives, and empir-
ically examine if and how the (mix of) criteria which policy-makers, stakeholders,
and the public employed to ascertain the performance of a policy changed over
time in the case they study. This is the principal reason for including an endurance
dimension in the policy assessment framework depicted in Table 1.1.
Outline of This Volume
Since the mid-1990s there has been a strong interest in tracking ‘good/best’
practices with an aim towards customizing and transplanting them to other
contexts. The literature on policy transfer shows that this has met with limited
success. Much of this work lacks a systematic analysis of the constructed, poten-
tially contested, and dynamic nature of these ‘best practices’. Nor has it drilled
down deeply and methodically into the roles of chance and choice, structure and
agency, institutions and people, politics and professions in producing these
performances.
In this volume, we try to address both these limitations by offering a series of
grounded, in-depth, and reflective case studies. It features cases deliberately
chosen to cover a broad range of issues and policy sectors. These include cases
of different modes (from top-down central steering to open, deliberative, and
collaborative processes) and levels (from urban to the global) of governance.
Though somewhat skewed to countries consistently ranking among the best
governed in the world, the volume includes cases of federal and unitary, parlia-
mentary and presidential, and Westminster and consensual systems of govern-
ment. Short descriptions of the fifteen cases are included here.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 25/7/2019, SPi
  ‘’    11
Great policy successes: cases in this volume
Brazil’s Bolsa Família scheme—How Brazil built the world’s largest conditional
cash transfer scheme to lift millions out of extreme poverty.
Remarkable healthcare in Singapore—How policies have been continuously
calibrated to adapt to new challenges while keeping costs low in Singapore.
Cutting waiting times in the NHS—How classic top-down political leadership
and judicious policy analysis got Britain’s revered but monolithic National
Health Service to process its millions of clients much more quickly.
The transformation of UK tobacco control—How the UK designed and imple-
mented innovative policies which framed tobacco as a health concern to
successfully build support around the initially unpopular tobacco ban.
The GI Bill—How the United States provided social support to soldiers return-
ing from the Second World War to ensure macro-economic security, and had
the unintended consequence of building social capital.
Finland’s education system—How a small nation on Europe’s northern per-
iphery built a school system that became a global brand in ‘how to do public
education’.
Estonia’s digital transformation—How a post-communist state forged a global
reputation as a leader in digital government.
The Alameda rail corridor project—How through balanced governance and a
creative financing arrangement a tangled web of rail lines was transformed into
a single corridor that relieved traffic congestion and reduced air and water
pollution in the Los Angeles region.
‘Marvellous Melbourne’—How the once staid and struggling state capital of
Victoria, Australia, transformed itself into a cosmopolitan metropolis named
‘TheWorld’s Most Liveable City’ six times in a row (from 2011 to 2017) by The
Economist’s Intelligence Unit.
The new Dutch Delta strategy—How a nation in which two-thirds of the
population live below the current sea level secures its future by reinventing
its famed water management strategy so as to enable proactive and creative
adaptation to the effects of climate change.
Copenhagen’s Five Finger Plan—How the Danish capital successfully avoided
urban sprawl and overly dense and chaotic urbanization through early adop-
tion and sustained adaptation of a comprehensive urban planning regime.
Norway’s Petroleum Fund—How Norway’s policy-makers purposefully
dodged the bullet of the ‘resource curse’ and channelled its oil revenues into
what has become the world’s biggest national pension fund.
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These case studies provide readers with an insight into ‘how successful the policy
really was’ and ‘how success happened’ in each of these instances. We ask
readers—as we did our fellow researchers when we commissioned the case
studies—to consider the following guiding questions when working their way
through each case:
1. What is this case about and to what extent can it be assessed as a ‘great
policy success’ (in terms of the definition and the assessment above)?
2. What was the social, political, and institutional context in which the policy
(programme, project, initiative) was developed?
3. What specific challenges was it seeking to tackle, and what if any specific
aims did it seek to achieve?
4. Who were the policy’s main drivers and stewards, and how did they raise
and maintain support for the policy?
5. How did the policy design process—the progression from ambitions and
ideas to plans and instruments—unfold, and what (f)actors shaped it most?
6. How did the political decision-making process leading up to its adoption—
the progression from proposals (bills, proposals) to commitments (laws,
budgets)—unfold, and what (f)actors shaped it most?
7. How did the implementation process unfold, and what (f)actors shaped
it most?
8. How did the legitimacy of the policy—the political and public support
garnered—unfold, and what (f )actors shaped it most?
9. How did changes over time in the operating or political context (such as
government turnover, fiscal positions, critical incidents) affect:
a. the policy’s central features
b. levels of popular support, or perceived legitimacy?
New Zealand’s economic turnaround—How a country at the brink of economic
collapse in the 1980s transformed its fortunes through a radical, consistent,
and impactful suite of reform strategies.
Germany’s labour market reforms—How Europe’s biggest but notoriously rigid
and sluggish post-reunification economy was lifted into the economic power-
house it has since become.
The Montreal Protocol—How the world managed to negotiate and implement
a global regulatory regime that helped the stratospheric ozone layer recover
from the damage sustained by decades’ worth of ozone depleting substances.
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10. What, overall, can policy analysts and policy actors (of different ilk) learn
from this instance of policy success?
a. How likely is this case to remain a ‘success’ in the future? What are
potential future problems with this policy case, or a similar class of cases?
b. What unique factors may limit how broadly the lessons from this case
can be applied (in terms of political, social, or economic context, or
policy domain, etc.)?
The authors of the case studies you are about to read have all worked with these
conceptual tools. That said, authors have come to this project with their own
preconceptions, and they have relied on textual and human sources in their
research that are part of the political fray of the case at hand. We advise readers
therefore not to take any of the labels and interpretations concerning a policy’s
alleged ‘great success’ and its key drivers for granted, but to constantly question
what frames—and whose frames—are at work here and examine by what evidence
they are underpinned.
Exploring Policy Successes: Pointers about
the Landscape Ahead
While providing a detailed template for assessing the success or otherwise of a
policy, we do not offer a similarly general framework to explain policy success. No
such framework currently exists, and it is unlikely that one singular framework
will ever be able to do so comprehensively, given the number of (f)actors involved
and the complexity of their interactions (see also McConnell 2010). General
frameworks of public policymaking which do exist are either primarily descriptive
or are designed to explain the content and timing of policies or the occurrence of
policy stability and change over time (Weible and Sabatier 2017). Progress in
explaining policy success is more likely to occur through middle-range theories
focused on explaining the presence and absence of policy success in specific
clusters of cases, such as particular types of governance challenges and policy
domains (Bovens et al. 2001; Patashnik 2008) or in particular jurisdictions (Light
2002; Scott 2014).
It may be possible to treat our fifteen cases as such a cluster and use pattern-
finding techniques such as Process-Tracing and Qualitative Comparative Analysis
to tease out configurations of factors that may explain common or different
outcomes. This will be a complicated endeavour given the limited size of our
sample and the profound temporal, sectoral, institutional, and contextual differ-
ences between the cases. In keeping with the purpose and design of this volume,
we will not venture down this path. Instead we draw upon the case studies as well
as existing research to offer a few themes for classroom discussion and,
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possibly, more focused future research—these are our pointers about the land-
scape ahead.
Opportunity and Necessity
What triggers policymaking activity may matter. Quite a few of the cases in our set
were driven by the desire to move away from problems: existing or impending
adversity, danger, or disadvantage. This is where the Melbourne and Singapore
cases align, along with several others such as the Dutch Delta programme
(preventing potentially devastating impacts of sea level rises), Brazil’s Bolsa Família
scheme (reduction of abject poverty), the German labourmarket reforms (reigniting
a stagnant economy), and the Montreal Protocol (restoring dangerous damage to
the ozone layer). By contrast, Norway’s Petroleum Fund was triggered by a windfall
(the discovery and subsequent exploitation of considerable oil reserves); Estonia’s
digital strategy was born out of zest and drive to modernize on the wings of the
country’s liberation from Soviet rule. Finnish education policy was quietly built not
in response to some felt problem but in fulfilment of pedagogical aspirations.
Pro-action and Re-action
The Dutch, Danish, and Norwegian cases are the exemplars of governing by
foresight and for the long range. The essence of their success is about bringing
about desired futures through pro-active policy planning. To some extent, the GI
Bill fits this mode as well, although much of its initial time horizon was much
shorter and much of its impetus was provided by the desire to avoid repetition of
the failure of the country’s return to peace following the end of the First World
War. In contrast, some of the policy successes were fundamentally reactive, driven
by events producing cumulative negative consequences that eventually created
political windows of opportunity: recession-busting in New Zealand, stagnation-
busting in Germany, poverty-busting in Brazil. Problems had already occurred
and government responses to them were expected if not already overdue.
Concentrated and Shared Power
The drive to reduce NHS waiting times provides a classic instance of top-down
leadership, in this case provided by an activist prime minister supported by an
equally activist (and controlling) group of enforcers of his will at ‘Number 10’. The
sheer depth and consistency of New Zealand’s economic reform programme was
another case of unilateral imposition by a united and institutionally unfettered
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government, as were Singapore’s healthcare reforms. In countries and sectors
where the institutional rules of the game are predisposed towards power-sharing
between multiple parties, such top-down policymaking is politically infeasible and
culturally inappropriate. As the German, Dutch, Danish, and both US cases show,
success in these systems is to be achieved through extensive consultation, bar-
gaining, and negotiation: painstakingly massaging different actors’ moods and
stances, cobbling together societal and parliamentary coalitions for policy initia-
tives, and creating platforms where collaboration can be stimulated and solidified.
Making Progress: Miles and Inches
Pacing the work of change is a fine art. Looking at the speed of policymaking, we
again can identify big differences between the cases in our set. The Dutch
are taking fifty years to ‘climate proof ’ their water management arrangements.
Copenhagen’s urban planning regime has evolved over half a century. Britain’s
successful efforts to curb smoking were the product of a protracted war of attrition
against the tobacco industry. The revitalization of Melbourne took shape over
two decades. German governments dithered for many years before defying the
unions’ veto-playing propensities and finally tackling the country’s ossified labour
markets. The Bolsa Família scheme took about as long to rise up to the federal
level and become the law of the land. In contrast, in institutionally simpler
jurisdictions such as pre-MMP (mixed member proportional representation)
New Zealand and post-communist Estonia ambitious policies were largely
conceived and executed within the life of one government.
Politicization and Depoliticization
Tony Blair’s public commitment and personal resolve to reduce waiting times for
NHS patients provides a clear example of politicization of the status quo in a policy
domain providing momentum for change. What the system had previously nor-
malized and expected its clients to bear, had now become exposed and problem-
atized. Likewise, the move to comprehensive schools in Finland was not just a
pedagogical endeavour but part of the Left’s ideological project of a universal welfare
state. The fragmented suite of conditional cash transfer programmes in Brazil could
only be galvanized into the national Bolsa Família scheme on the wings of the Lula
government’s firm political commitment to the Workers’ Party’s long-standing but
hitherto largely symbolic Zero Hunger Strategy. At the other end of the spectrum,
the Dutch government turned depoliticization of a potentially fractious wicked
problem—how to ensure there is still a country left to inhabit as sea levels rise
and the rivers swell—into an art form by appointing and empowering a studiously
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non-political authority figure to operate as a ‘consensus architect’. In other cases,
such as New Zealand economic reforms, the key to success lay in the firm alliance
between strong political leadership by the tandem of prime minister and treasurer
and equally strong policy leadership from the ‘econocrats’ at the Treasury.
Inclusion and Exclusion
In consensual democracies such as Denmark and the Netherlands, creating
‘big tents’—inclusive structures and processes of consultation, deliberation,
and co-design—is second nature to its public policy-makers and in the cases
presented here was considered a key building block to success in what otherwise
could easily become political deadlocks. But even in not traditionally consultative
political systems such as Australia, it was the astute incorporation of grassroots
voices and initiatives into the Melbourne regeneration policy mix that enriched its
substance and helped broaden its support base. In contrast, in the Alameda corridor
project the ‘big boys’ (the cities of Los Angeles and Long Beach) took legal action to
remove the veto-playing six mid-corridor cities from the Authority running
the project: using hard power to narrow the decision-making arena and thus
rob smaller players of their blocking power enabled the corridor’s main supporters
to keep the showon the road. Likewise, realpolitik in theUSCongress resulted in aGI
Bill whose administration was left to the states. The price paid was the exclusion of
minority veterans from the pool of beneficiaries, especially in the Southern states.
If nothing else, these fifteen cases show that there are many pathways to policy
success. Consider the instances where the policymaking process came close to the
rational-synoptic ideal type, such as Singapore’s health policy: evidence-based,
meticulously designed, carefully executed, and systematically evaluated. And then
consider contrasting cases where success emerged out of the synergistic conflu-
ence of a number of seemingly disparate initiatives across different domains, such
as Melbourne’s revitalization. The key challenge for both students and practi-
tioners is to figure out what combinations of design practices, political strategies,
and institutional arrangements are both effective and appropriate in the context at
hand. We hope that the case studies presented in this book prove to be a good
place to inspire their thinking.
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Brazil’s Bolsa Família Programme
Luis Henrique Paiva, Tereza Cristina Cotta,
and Armando Barrientos
Introduction
In October 2004, a popular television news show in Brazil reported cases of
leakages and frauds in Bolsa Família, a cash transfer programme enacted the
previous year. In subsequent weeks, several different newspapers followed the lead
and published similar stories. The focus of their criticisms was not on the
programme’s design, but on what appeared to be significant shortcomings in its
implementation (Lindert and Vincensini 2010). Exactly one year after its inaug-
uration, Bolsa Família was facing a crisis of legitimacy threatening to turn it into a
serious political liability for the federal government.
In October 2013, the Brazilian federal government celebrated Bolsa Família’s
tenth anniversary, after having just accepted the Award for Outstanding Achieve-
ment in Social Security from the International Social Security Administration
(Associação Internacional de Seguridade Social—AISS) for the programme. One
year later, opinion polls conducted on the general elections (IBOPE 2014) showed
that three out of four voters were ‘in favour’ of Bolsa Família. Approval was above
50 per cent across all age, sex, race, religion, school and regional groups.
In the intervening decade the programme developed its structure of
governance, produced relevant policy outcomes, and overcame critical political
hurdles. An interesting policy design, that initially was plagued with implemen-
tation problems became a highly successful social policy. The aim of this chapter is
to explain the nature of this success.
This chapter discusses Brazil’s Bolsa Família programme, the world’s largest
conditional cash transfer (CCT) in number of beneficiaries. CCTs¹ are anti-
poverty transfer programmes defined by the following features: delivery of
cash—as opposed to in-kind—transfers; a focus on households rather than on
individuals; the inclusion of targeting mechanisms to limit transfers to impover-
ished households; and conditioning transfers to specific conditions to be fulfilled
by beneficiary households (typically, school attendance by children and/or
periodical health visits)—known as ‘conditionalities’. They aim to reduce con-
sumption poverty in the short term and to improve the productive capacity of
low-income households in the medium and long term.
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The CCT model was first implemented in Brazil in 1995, at the local level, as an
innovative anti-poverty intervention. Soon, this approach to combat poverty spread
to other municipalities. In 2001, a set of federal CCTs was finally launched,
including the programmes Bolsa Escola (school grant), Bolsa Alimentação (food
assistance), and Auxílio Gás (cooking gas subsidy), managed by different ministries.
In 2003, Bolsa Família was created to overcome the conceptual and operational
fragmentation of the myriad federal cash transfer programmes. It currently
reaches over 20 per cent of the Brazilian population and has achieved significant
results. Bolsa Família is widely recognized as a major policy success.
This chapter provides an insider’s discussion of the emergence and consolida-
tion of the programme, as well as a critical assessment of its accomplishments. It
comprises six sections. Section one argues that Bolsa Família can be considered a
policy success; section two discusses the historical context of the emergence of
CCTs and explains their main features; section three details the development of
Bolsa Família and its design; section four examines the challenges faced during its
implementation, from 2003 to 2018; and section five assesses the sustainability
and resilience of the programme. Finally, section six reflects on the main lessons
learned and concludes the chapter.
Why is Bolsa Família a Policy Success?
Bolsa Família fits the definition of a success developed in Chapter 1 of this volume:
it created and sustained valued outcomes through a coordinated policymaking
process. It was the first social protection benefit in Brazil to reach the working-age
poor population and their children. Many independent studies concluded that the
programme has relatively precise targeting and produced significant impacts in
terms of poverty and inequality reduction and the improvement of educational
and health indicators. These valuable outcomes were achieved thanks to an inter-
sectoral and decentralized structure of governance that has proven to be innova-
tive and effective in terms of providing appropriate responses to implementation
issues. These outcomes also seem to be associated with relatively high levels of
public support and the resilience that the programme has been demonstrating
over the last fifteen years. We will briefly examine these points.
Bolsa Família is by far the most progressive public transfer maintained by the
federal government (see, for instance, Ipea 2012) and has proven a programmatic
success in reducing poverty and inequality. In the absence of Bolsa Família trans-
fers, extreme poverty in the country would be one-third higher (Soares et al. 2010).
It accounts for just above 15 per cent of the fall in the Gini coefficient during the
first decade of the twenty-first century (cf., among others, Hoffman 2013).
Two rounds of impact evaluation demonstrated positive effects on school
attendance (Brazil 2007) and school progression (Brazil 2012). Several health
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 25/7/2019, SPi
22   
outcomes improved as a result of the programme, including under-5 mortality
rates (Rasella et al. 2013). Finally, concerns about adverse effects on labour supply
and fertility were shown to be misplaced (see, for instance, Oliveira and Soares
2012 and Simões and Soares 2012), although expectations that the programme
would lead beneficiary households permanently out of poverty have proven
overambitious.
These results are related to the administrative capacity that was built over the
period—the programme was a process success. As further discussed in the following
sections, the programme was kept free of political interference. Permanent civil
servants occupied key administrative positions and programme implementation
was impersonal and transparent. The programme also employed appropriate
mechanisms of coordination between different government areas and levels. Its
decentralized architecture was considered ‘innovative’, promoting ‘incentives for
quality implementation’ (Lindert et al. 2007). In other words, its structure of
governance became progressively more capable of responding to technical imple-
mentation challenges, which eventually led to measurable policy outcomes.
Progress towards a more effective programme was met with growing political
support—the programme was a political success. After being attacked for problems
during the first years of implementation, the programme’s administration im-
proved and this was reflected in positive assessments from evaluation studies.
Lindert and Vincensini (2010) stress the interplay between policy effectiveness
and political support: technical elements that worked well—sound technical
management and positive policy outcomes—fed back into political support.
Positive policy outcomes led scholars and multilateral organizations to support
the programme as an efficient tool in the fight against poverty in Brazil. This was
relevant both domestically, where this support influenced relevant political and
media sectors, and internationally, where Bolsa Família became an example of a
highly successful policy. By mid-2014, approval rates for the programme were
relatively high. There is also evidence that the programme had positive impacts on
political support for incumbent candidates across three presidential elections
(Zucco Jr. 2015). In the last two presidential elections, all relevant candidates
declared support for the programme.
The programme has also demonstrated resilience in the face of recent political
events—the success of the policy has endured. With the political turmoil resulting
from the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff (in August 2016) and in face
of one of the most critical fiscal crises in the country’s history, rumours about the
retrenchment of the programme began to surface. Nevertheless, in February 2018
there were 14.1 million beneficiary families—one of the highest figures ever—and
in July 2018 benefits were adjusted at above-inflation rates.
The Bolsa Família programme has succeeded despite continuing to face sig-
nificant operational and political challenges. Its administrative structure still
suffers from some weaknesses. A few conservative politicians insist on defending
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the view that the programme ‘enslaves its beneficiaries’,² perhaps based on
unfounded arguments that it would generate ‘growing dependence of Brazil’s
poor on income transfers’ (Hall 2012). However, the mounting evidence about
its impacts and the resilience demonstrated by the programme so far suggests that
it can continue to be the basic pillar of the Brazilian social protection system.
The Emergence of CCT Programmes
The rise of CCTs in the mid-1990s in Brazil constitutes a break with the con-
tributory, and clearly pro-elderly biased, social protection system. The first social
insurance scheme was set in place in the 1920s, initially covering railroad workers
and rapidly expanding to cover other professional categories.
The first semi- and non-contributory targeted social benefits in the country
were adopted only in the mid-1970s, aimed at poor older people (aged 70 or
older), poor people living with disabilities, and smallholder farmers (Schwarzer
2000; Brumer 2002). The 1988 Constitution, which was enacted as a result of the
country’s re-democratization following a period of military dictatorship, intro-
duced an element of universalism in the provision of social protection (public
health services stopped being delivered through social insurance and became
universal) and boosted the existing semi- and non-contributory pension schemes
(Schwarzer and Quirino 2002). Despite these advancements, however, the model
of social protection contained in the 1988 Constitution remained strongly based
on social insurance (a common feature across Latin American countries) and still
presented a clear pro-elderly policy bias.
Nevertheless, democratization and the new Constitution ignited far-reaching
changes. First, the new Constitution established an explicit commitment to the
‘eradication of poverty’ and the ‘reduction of social inequality’. From this per-
spective, a new social contract reflecting an emerging consensus on the import-
ance of addressing historically high levels of poverty and inequality would provide
the underpinnings of social policy. Second, the new Constitution emphasized
administrative decentralization and gave way to policy experimentation at the
local level, which proved essential for the emergence of CCTs in the country
(Barrientos et al. 2014). Finally, a reform of the Brazilian public service was carried
out after the process of re-democratization (Brazil 1995). Among several reforms,
new career paths were made available at the federal level, which eventually had an
impact on the implementation of Bolsa Família ten years later.
Even so, the historical bias of the Brazilian social protection system towards
older people had a silver lining: from the mid-1990s onwards, the country
achieved nearly universal old-age coverage (Van Ginneken 2007; Ansiliero and
Paiva 2008). In the first half of the 1990s, the headcount poverty rate for people
aged 65 and older was 20 per cent of the headcount poverty rate of the entire
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population (Paiva 2016). In no other Latin American country were older people so
underrepresented among the poor (Barrientos 2006).
However, the Brazilian labour market remained highly segmented between the
formal and informal sectors, as most other countries of the region (Cruz-Saco
2002). This system was unable to provide social protection to workers in the
informal sector, led to low coverage levels of the working-age population, and—
not by chance—was defined as a ‘radical form of conservative welfare regime’
(Barrientos 2004). By the mid-1990s, there was an increasing consensus that its
success was at best ‘limited’ (Levy and Schady 2013). Health services remained an
exception in a system where no other form of social protection was extended to
poor working-age adults and their families.
Children were particularly affected. In the first half of the 1990s, poverty among
those aged 0–15 was almost twice as high as the overall poverty rate and almost
ten times the poverty rate among older people (Paiva 2016). Despite high poverty
rates among children and widespread concern, policy initiatives developed at the
federal level in the 1990s did not look very promising.
Comunidade Solidária, the main anti-poverty strategy adopted during the first
term of the Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration (1995–8) was limited to
the delivery of compensatory measures, such as the distribution of food baskets in
regions affected by severe shocks, and the coordination of relatively sparse social
initiatives conducted by local governments, civil society, and the private sector
(Camargo and Ferreira 2000).
There was, in fact, a significant reduction in poverty between 1993 and 1995
(as noted by Paiva 2016). However, most of it probably took place in 1994, as
a consequence of the end of hyperinflation in the country.³ In the following
years, poverty rates remained unchanged. By the midpoint of its second term
(1999–2002), the Cardoso administration did not have much to celebrate in terms
of improvements in social indicators. It was clear that better policy initiatives
would be necessary to promote poverty reduction. By then, an option was already
available: a new social protection benefit had been debated, developed, and
implemented at the local level.
CCTs emerged from a debate in the first half of the 1990s. A group of scholars
and politicians championed the discussions on how best to fight poverty in Brazil.
Negative income taxes and universal basic income proposals dominated the public
debate back then. A bill sponsored by former senator Eduardo Suplicy introduced
a basic income programme in 1991.⁴ Some scholars advocated cash transfers to
reduce poverty and lift liquidity constraints preventing household investments in
child education. Redistribution through income transfers could increase invest-
ments in human capital, but such transfers were expected to be particularly
efficient if they targeted poor families. Moreover, the effectiveness of income
transfers to families living in poverty could be maximized if made conditional
on school attendance by school-age children⁵ and periodic visits to health clinics.
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Cash (as opposed to in-kind) transfers; targeting; the focus on households; and
conditionalities—the core ideas of CCTs—had been consolidated.
The 1988 Constitution’s emphasis on administrative decentralization left room
for these new ideas to be initially adopted at the local level, in the municipality of
Campinas and in the Federal District, both starting in January 1995 (Lindert at al.
2007). The model spread to other municipalities in the following years, but the
transition to a national policy took a relatively long time, to the point where
Mexico, after sending a delegation to Brazil in 1996 to study these programmes,
enacted Progresa in 1997.⁶
In Brazil, the federal government had launched a programme in 1998 to
co-finance the spread of local initiatives introducing CCTs, but with poor results.
To improve its short-term political prospects, in 2001, just one year before the
presidential election, the federal government launched two broad initiatives. The
first was Projeto Alvorada. Its objective was to drive investments in infrastructure
and human capital in municipalities with below-average human development
indexes. The second initiative was a set of national-level cash transfers, including
Bolsa Escola Federal (school grants under the purview of the Ministry of Educa-
tion), Bolsa Alimentação (food assistance under the purview of the Ministry of
Health) and Auxílio-Gás (a targeted, unconditional cooking-gas subsidy), all
enacted in 2001. These programmes were collectively termed the Network of
Social Protection (Rede de Proteção Social).
From a conceptual and operational perspective, the Network of Social Protec-
tion was a piecemeal initiative. The constituent programmes had different eligi-
bility criteria and conditionalities. Although Cadastro Único (the Single Registry
for Social Programmes) had been enacted by mid-2001, and its use made man-
datory for all targeted programmes with nationwide coverage, these cash transfers
were based on parallel systems of administrative records. This situation would not
change until 2003, with the creation of Bolsa Família.
The Challenge in Integrating Federal Cash Transfers:
The Origins of Bolsa Família
The fragmentation of federal cash transfer programmes was diagnosed in 2002 in
a document released by President Luis Inácio Lula da Silva’s campaign team
before the elections. After the elections, the new administration’s transition
team confirmed the same assessment. Thus, expectations were high that Lula
would propose the unification of the existing sectoral cash transfer programmes as
the administration’s core social strategy.
Surprisingly, however, this was not what happened in the beginning of 2003.
The new administration opted for an alternative—the Zero Hunger Strategy
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(Estratégia Fome Zero)—as its main social policy initiative. It was originally
formulated in 1991 and was restructured several times over the following years.
The concept of food and nutrition security—the basis for Zero Hunger—was part
of the platform of the Workers’ Party in the campaigns for the presidential
elections of 1994, 1998, and 2002. The historical commitment to this agenda
might explain Lula’s decision to opt for the Zero Hunger Strategy and to create a
new ministry, the Ministry of Food Security and Fight against Hunger—Minis-
tério Extraordinário de Segurança Alimentar e Combate à Fome—MESA) to
manage it. Another decision was to introduce a new cash transfer programme—
the National Programme for Access to Food, known as Cartão Alimentação,
which added to the fragmentation of cash transfers.
Very soon it became clear that this choice was a mistake. The Zero Hunger
Strategy would demand unrealistically high levels of coordination across different
government agencies, the three government levels, civil society and the non-profit
sector. It was too complex to be viable in a timely manner or to be fully
understood by the media and the general public. In early 2003, it received an
avalanche of criticisms from both within and outside the federal administration.
This led to the reactivation of the Council Office for Social Policy, originally
created in 1996 and reformulated in 2003 with the task of devising strategies for
social policy. Its members should find ways to overcome the conceptual and
operational fragmentation of federal cash transfers. However, the ministries
charged with this task were the ones responsible for existing cash transfer pro-
grammes (ministries of Education, Health, Energy, Social Assistance, and MESA)
and it was no accident that they failed to adopt a viable strategy to integrate them.
In comparison to merging programmes into one large unified system, fragmented
cash transfer programmes made more political sense for each ministry involved.
By this time, the Presidency had already decided to unify all cash transfers and
created a working group drawn from the Council Office for Social Policy, with
sufficient political power to enforce integration. This group worked from March
to October 2003 on the design of a new, unified CCT spanning the entire national
territory. The programme would be implemented in a federative context and
would involve at least three government sectors (Social Assistance, Education,
and Health), demanding strong coordination between different government levels
and agencies.
In a continent-sized country such as Brazil, good targeting and adequate
monitoring of conditionalities could only be achieved if programme design was
kept as simple as possible. Capacities at the local level vary considerably and not
all municipalities would be able to perform excessively complex administrative
tasks. Community-based targeting mechanisms, for instance, might sound very
attractive and inclusive, but they would make the practical implementation of
Bolsa Família virtually impossible. The limited social assistance staff at the local
level would also advise against the use of any other highly personnel-demanding
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form of means test. Thus, the decision was made to select beneficiaries based on
their self-reported income.
It was important that the value of the transfer to be received by households—
with priority given to an adult woman of the family—could be easily understood
by beneficiaries and the public at large. It was set as the sum of two components.
The ‘basic benefit’ was to be paid to all extremely poor families (with a per capita
income of up to R$50 in 2003⁷). The basic benefit was set at R$50. A ‘variable
benefit’ was to be paid to both extremely poor and poor families (with a per capita
income of up to R$100), conditional on the presence of children in the household,
for each child up to three (to avoid any possible fertility-increasing incentives).
The amount for this additional variable benefit was set at R$15. Therefore,
beneficiary households could receive between R$15 and R$95, depending on the
family group and poverty status.⁸
Monitoring conditionalities can be very demanding. An alternative option in
this context might have been an unconditional cash transfer. However, the
perception at the time was that conditionalities could not only increase the impact
of the programme, but also contribute to its legitimacy.⁹ The decision was to adopt
a minimal set of conditionalities: school attendance for children and visits to
health clinics for timely vaccination, and prenatal/postnatal care.
After a six-month deliberation period regarding these challenges, Bolsa Família
was finally enacted¹⁰ with three main objectives: (i) immediate poverty alleviation
through income transfers; (ii) mid- and long-term poverty reduction, achieved by
increasing the demand of households for education and health services; (iii)
improved labour market prospects for adult members of beneficiary households
through job training, microcredit, and other initiatives aimed at avoiding negative
dependence.¹¹
Political support from the Presidency was decisive in ensuring that Bolsa
Família would be adequately funded in the following years. The decision to
integrate the existing cash transfers was politically difficult but correct from a
technical point of view. However, the most challenging aspect was yet to come: the
actual construction of an effective programme.
Challenges in the Implementation
of the Bolsa Família Programme
The first managers of Bolsa Família faced the task of creating a new CCT that
deviated significantly from previous nationwide programmes. The limited and
fragmented scale of pre-existing programmes led to large coverage gaps while, at
the same time, their different rules and administrative records allowed for over-
laps (Cotta and Paiva 2010). In the same neighbourhood, it was possible to find
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families with similar socio-economic conditions with markedly different access to
transfers. Bolsa Família was meant to unify the target population, the eligibility
criteria, and the administrative structure of these transfers.
When the programme emerged, it was a political imperative to rapidly increase
coverage. In December 2003, 3.6 million households were already enrolled in the
programme, most of them after migrating from previous CCTs. By the end of
2004, this figure climbed to 6.6 million households. Nonetheless, the programme
inherited a delicate administrative situation. Several isolated administrative regis-
tries had to be merged into the Single Registry. The operational structures to be
used in monitoring conditionalities were yet to be established. Effective targeting
mechanisms needed to be developed. Proper arrangements between the federal,
state, and local governments and across different government sectors, defining
clear roles and responsibilities, were virtually non-existent. The programme faced
what Lindert and Vincensini (2010) called the ‘scaling-up dilemma’, where
expansion takes place at the same time as critical governance structures are
under construction, leading to shortcomings in implementation.
At that point, Bolsa Família could have turned out to be either a political asset
or a liability. In 2004, the programme suffered a great wave of criticism. The team
heading the secretariat responsible for the programme and for the Single Registry
was composed of academics and people connected with the Workers’ Party. Their
academic and political credentials could have been an asset during the policy
formulation phase, but their lack of administrative experience was becoming a
problem during implementation.
This crisis of legitimacy led to a major change in the secretariat’s board of
directors. The new management team was essentially composed of civil servants,
most of them coming from career paths created or recovered by the administrative
reform of the mid-1990s. Their job was to provide expertise related to the
public policy cycle (design/formulation, implementation, and evaluation of public
policies). This group of civil servants lacked the academic credentials and political
connections of the first managers, but had the professional experience needed to
address critical points of the programme’s implementation. These included poor
quality data in the Single Registry, gaps in the normative basis of Bolsa Família
and the Single Registry, and deficits in inter-sectoral and federative coordination.
Federal and local coordination was vital for the implementation of Bolsa
Família and the Single Registry, both dependent on the work performed at the
local level.¹² A formal commitment between the federal and local governments,
defining clear responsibilities for both sides, was signed by all 5,570 Brazilian
municipalities. Executive orders were used to establish the role of different
government agencies and the role of Caixa Econômica Federal, a state-owned
bank that provided the IT platforms for registering low-income families in the
Single Registry and for paying out benefits across the country.
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Municipalities that had their own CCTs could continue to run them norm-
ally after the introduction of Bolsa Família, since no government level has a
constitutional prerogative over this type of programme. However, the federal
government developed an attractive option for local governments: associating
their programmes with Bolsa Família, an agreement that could increase coordin-
ation between both levels of government and lead to lower administrative costs for
the municipality, as well as higher benefit levels for beneficiary households. Local
governments could take advantage of the IT platforms developed for Bolsa
Família and the Single Registry provided by Caixa, whose costs would be fronted
by the federal government. Although several agreements were signed, the massive
presence of Bolsa Família eventually had a crowding-out effect and most local
governments dropped their own programmes.¹³
Later, the federal government introduced specific incentives for municipalities
to improve the quality of data in the Single Registry. These incentives were
eventually turned into a performance-based transfer to co-finance activities con-
ducted by local administrations. The Index of Decentralized Management (Índice
de Gestão Descentralizada—IGD) is both a measure of the performance of local
administrations and a weight that regulates the increase or decrease of these
transfers. At the federal level, strong political commitment to Bolsa Família
ensured an adequate budget and bureaucratic insulation from everyday politics.
The actual monitoring of conditionalities only started in 2006. The ministries of
Education and Health, in close coordination with their counterparts in local
governments, were responsible for verifying the compliance of households. This
monitoring was electronic and did not represent any transaction costs to the
households themselves. Bolsa Família went for a ‘soft’ approach in the monitoring
of conditionalities: sanctions for non-compliance started with a warning letter and
a beneficiary household could only be excluded from the programme after four
rounds of non-compliant behavior.
In 2006, a more resilient Bolsa Família met its coverage target of reaching 11.6
million households (roughly 45 million people). Over the following years, both
the programme and the Single Registry went through several improvements in
their design and implementation. In 2007, for instance, the programme was
expanded to cover adolescents aged 16 and 17, a critical age for school drop-outs
and early entrance in the labour market. Legal and operational improvements of
the Single Registry also took place during this period. A new executive order
regulating the Single Registry was published in 2007 and there was a consider-
able increase in the number of social programmes using it. Finally, systematic
cross-checks between the Single Registry and other administrative registries from
the federal government started to take place, preliminarily in 2005 and period-
ically from 2007 onwards, to assess inconsistencies and improve the quality of
the data.
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In 2009 and 2010, the programme’s reach was reassessed. Up to that point, the
target number of beneficiary households—11 million—was based on an estimate
of households living below the eligibility criteria threshold, based on the PNAD
survey conducted by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (Instituto
Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística—IBGE), a general-purpose cross-section
survey. However, the number of potentially eligible households in the Single
Registry was becoming significantly larger than the estimates indicated. A pot-
ential explanation for this discrepancy, posited by Soares (2009), was that a
cross-section survey captures those living in poverty at a given point in time—
the last week of September in the case of PNAD—while a potentially large number
of low-income households, which depended on very volatile labour income, could
be marginally above the poverty line at the time the survey was conducted.
Considering a longer period of time, using panel data from the Monthly Employ-
ment Survey (Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego—PME), also conducted by the IBGE,
Soares showed that the number of eligible households was considerably larger
than point-in-time estimates. By the end of 2010, the programme expanded to
reach almost 13 million households.
Also in 2009–10, from an operational perspective, the realization that many
beneficiaries experienced volatile labour income led to ensuring that participant
households would receive transfers for two years, even if in the intervening two
years their monthly per capita income was above the eligibility threshold. House-
holds would be excluded from the programme only if their income remained
consistently above the eligibility criteria after two years, which could be inter-
preted as a signal of a stable income.
Finally, a new version of the Single Registry was introduced in 2010, encom-
passing both a new questionnaire form, closer to those used in official household
surveys, and a new IT solution. This new solution was planned to operate online
with nationwide coverage, so as to avoid the inconsistencies typically found in
offline solutions. The obvious challenge was to have operational internet connec-
tions across all Brazilian municipalities, including those in the Amazon. Both the
new version of the Single Registry—version 7.0 or V7—and the old version
coexisted until all municipalities had migrated to the new system in 2013.
From 2011 onwards, Bolsa Família and the Single Registry became the main
instruments of a broad policy and political initiative to overcome extreme poverty
in the country—the Brazil Without Extreme Poverty Plan (Brasil sem Miséria—
BSM). The emphasis on actively reaching low-income households led to an
increase in the number of households in the Single Registry: in 2014, it contained
up-to-date information on 24 million households—around 40 per cent of the
Brazilian population. With the new questionnaire form, it became possible to
identify households from groups who frequently suffered from prejudice and
cultural and linguistic barriers.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 25/7/2019, SPi
’  ́  31
In 2011, benefits were adjusted at above-inflation rates, with substantial
increases in the variable benefit paid to families with children up to 15 years
old. The maximum number of children per family covered by the additional
variable benefit was increased from three to five following initial evidence that
the programme had no impact on fertility. These benefits were also extended to
families with pregnant or breastfeeding mothers.
In 2012, the number of potential beneficiary households of the programme
increased to 13.8 million and a new top-up benefit, the Benefit for Overcoming
Extreme Poverty (Benefício para Superação da Extrema Pobreza—BSP) was intro-
duced as part of Bolsa Família. During the first phase, only households with
children aged from 0 to 6 years old were eligible for the BSP, but in February
2013 all extremely poor beneficiary households became eligible.
Also in 2012, monitoring of conditionalities was reoriented. The new aim of
monitoring was to use data about non-compliance to ‘activate’ social assistance
staff at the local level. Exclusions from the programme due to non-compliance
became very rare. They could occur only after one year of monitoring by a social
worker. The number of benefits cancelled for non-compliance was reduced from
17,500 in May 2012 (0.13 per cent of the beneficiary families) to 241 households in
May 2014 (0.002 per cent of the beneficiary families).
Benefits and eligibility criteria were adjusted in March 2014, in June 2016, and
in May 2018. In May 2018, the extreme poverty line was set at R$89 (or US$36,80,
using the PPP conversion factor for private consumption for 2011, updated to
May 2018) and the poverty line set at double the extreme poverty line (R$178, or
US$73.60).
In October 2018, Bolsa Família celebrated its fifteenth anniversary, a significant
achievement in the Brazilian context. In January 2018, the programme paid
benefits to 14 million households, at an average level of R$178 (or US$74.16,
using the PPP conversion factor for private consumption updated to January
2018). These households include more than 13 million students aged between
6 and 17 years old, whose school attendance is monitored. They also include
5.7 million children up to 6 years old, whose health status is also monitored.
Virtually all pregnant women monitored by the programme have their prenatal
schedule in order. Roughly 28 million households are covered by the Single
Registry and have access to many other social programmes.
Sustainability and Resilience
Bolsa Família faced two major crises of legitimacy. The first occurred early in the
history of the programme, mostly driven by implementation issues. The second
was a by-product of the transition to a new administration, after the impeachment
of President Dilma Rousseff in 2016.
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As previously mentioned, the programme faced significant challenges during
2003 and 2004. First, the unification of pre-existing federal cash transfers into
Bolsa Família was not exactly smooth. Actors identified with these programmes
resisted integration throughout the policy design phase and for some time after
that. They lost power as a result of the unification of the federal cash transfers and,
although this process was a clear step forward for the government and the country
as a whole, from the perspective of these sectors it could be viewed as a loss of
political power.
However, political resistance was not the only problem. During this period, the
normative, administrative, and managerial structures of Bolsa Família had not been
completed and several implementation problems emerged. The team responsible
for the programme’s administration in 2005 was successful in implementing man-
agement and policy improvements, which eventually had a positive impact on both
policy indicators and on its legitimacy and political support. The programme would
soon be considered a global reference case on how to implement a cash transfer in a
diverse federal country of continental size. Bolsa Família became the largest CCT in
the world and, together with Mexico’s Prospera, has been considered a model for
countries which had already adopted or are interested in adopting CCTs.
More recently, after the impeachment of President Rousseff in June 2016, the
programme faced a different crisis of legitimacy. Despite its programmatic suc-
cess, it was clearly associated with the administrations of the Workers’ Party. After
her re-election in 2014, President Rousseff rapidly lost popular support, which in
turn affected the political support for the programme. Data collected by Cesar
Zucco Jr., kindly shared with the authors, indicates a drop in the share of the
population that approved the programme in 2015, compared with 2014. From the
perspective of the new administration, criticizing aspects of the programme’s
design and implementation was an obvious way to attack their predecessors.
Most of the criticism was directed at targeting accuracy. This was largely based
on anecdotal evidence, since Bolsa Família continues to be one of the best targeted
CCTs in Latin America (Soares et al. 2017).
This criticism led to more robust cross-checks of data from the Single Registry,
including beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, against other administrative regis-
tries available to the federal government. However, the overall strategy was not
substantially different from the one adopted in 2005 and maintained systematic-
ally from 2007 onwards.
Concerns that the new administration would embark on a retrenchment of Bolsa
Família, fuelled by rumours about the purge of millions of benefits due to budget
constraints, were lifted as these cuts did not materialize. The programme remains
largely the same in terms of beneficiary household eligibility and the budget remains
relatively unchanged, even under very challenging fiscal conditions.
What is the source of the programme’s resilience? As argued by Lindert and
Vincensini (2010), there seems to be a connection between Bolsa Família’s
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increasing effectiveness and the political support that the programme eventually
garnered. Its scale and positive outcomes help explain why it has been resilient,
especially in recent years defined by a troubled political environment and a deep
fiscal crisis.
The trajectory of Bolsa Família corroborates the hypothesis by Pierson (1996)
about the resilience of social protection programmes in general. A significant
retrenchment of a programme of this kind would only be possible in scenarios of
severe fiscal crisis and under very specific political conditions. Even in such a
context, governments would tend to be cautious, due to the possible political costs
of decreasing benefit levels or strongly reducing the number of beneficiaries.
Changes tend to be limited and incremental.
This seems to be the case for Bolsa Família. The country faced a severe
economic downturn and underwent a fiscal crisis in 2015–16, a period during
which President Rousseff, from the leftist Workers’ Party, lost political support
and was eventually impeached. The political group that took over the federal
government can be defined as much more conservative, which raised concerns
about how the programme would be conducted. However, a significant retrench-
ment would be difficult. With 14 million beneficiary households, any large
cutbacks in the programme would come at dire political cost. This is especially
true given that the World Bank (Skoufias et al. 2017) and the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 2018), among other relevant
international and domestic actors, are openly advocating for larger investments
and the expansion of CCTs.
Therefore, after a short critical period, the new administration has started
taking credit for the administrative improvements made in 2016–18, such as:
adjustments in the benefit level (in 2016 and in 2018); the use of new admin-
istrative records to cross-check against the Single Registry; and the public
commitment that all eligible households would immediately become beneficiaries.
However, there remains some ambiguity. Given a choice, current decision-makers
would probably prefer to prioritize initiatives aimed at ‘teaching the poor how to
fish instead of giving them a fish’. As this is not politically feasible, they have come
to accept the advantages of Bolsa Família, while seeking to effect changes to its
targeting and management.
The same analysis applies to other countries in Latin America and the Carib-
bean that have also experienced a shift towards more conservative administra-
tions, while still facing the economic consequences of the 2008–9 great recession.
They have adjusted their CCTs, marginally reducing their coverage from a peak of
22.7 per cent of the population in 2010 to 20.2 per cent in 2016. They have also cut
the average expenditure of 0.38 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2014
to 0.33 per cent of GDP in 2015 (Cecchini and Atuesta 2017). Nonetheless,
considering the economic and political contexts that these countries have experi-
enced, our main conclusion is that these adjustments are a sign of resilience rather
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than of weakness. In many of these countries, CCTs remain the only layer of social
protection available to those outside the formal sector.
From a political perspective, however, Bolsa Família is still in a delicate
position. While developed countries offer a broad range of public policies to
address poverty, unemployment, and vulnerability, Bolsa Família bears the
responsibility of being the only layer of social protection for low-income groups
and for workers in the informal sector and their families. Public expectations of
what the programme can accomplish are perhaps too high. The mistaken idea that
it should single-handedly and permanently eradicate poverty often surfaces in the
media and among policy-makers.
It is important to acknowledge the limitations of the programme in its capacity
to address the multi-dimensional nature of poverty and vulnerability, including
highly volatile and unequal labour market conditions. The programme will re-
main an imperfect tool to address the range of social risks faced by its beneficiar-
ies. A more comprehensive and sophisticated set of redistributive policies would
probably be necessary to reduce the pressures on the programme.
Conclusion
CCTs emerged in Brazil in the mid-1990s from local governments’ innovative
policies and experiences. In Mexico, Progresa was implemented in 1997 at the
federal level. These programmes have gradually become the first and only social
protection layer for low-income groups and those dependent on informal employ-
ment in several countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. They represent a
break from the prevailing social protection systems in these countries, which were
historically based on social insurance and with a clear bias towards older people,
leaving large sections of the population unprotected.
In 2003, Bolsa Família unified various pre-existing nationwide CCTs in Brazil,
which were based on different eligibility criteria and relied on independent
administrative registries. This was a substantial administrative challenge to over-
come, and it speaks to the procedural success of the policy. Strong political
commitment pushed the programme towards a rapid expansion, in a period
when critical mechanisms of governance were still under construction (Lindert
and Vincensini 2010). The programme faced a crisis of legitimacy just one year
after its enactment. The main staff were replaced and a series of administrative
developments followed.
Over the years, national and international experts and agencies have conducted
evaluations of the programme. These evaluations have found effective targeting of
low-income groups, positive effects on the reduction of poverty and inequality,
and improvements in educational and health outcomes. Bolsa Família has very
low administrative costs and in terms of transfer budgets. It has received strong
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support from multilateral institutions and from social protection specialists, both
domestically and abroad. Evidence points to an expressive programmatic success.
Political success emerged over time. Initial political resistance to the pro-
gramme eventually abated: what worked technically eventually started working
politically. In a poll conducted in August and September 2014, a strong majority of
voters—75 per cent—declared to be ‘in favour’ of the programme. Across all age,
sex, race, religion, education, and regional groups, approval was above 50 per cent.
All the relevant candidates for that year’s presidential election also declared their
support for the programme. A first important lesson to be learned relates to the
interplay between policy effectiveness and political support. Effectiveness, as
demonstrated by robust evaluation, though not the only factor in boosting
political support, seems to be quite relevant.
More recently, with the economic downturn, the impeachment of President
Rousseff and the election of Jair Bolsonaro, Bolsa Família—symbolically linked
with the Workers’ Party—has lost some of its political support. The country’s
post-impeachment political and economic context was challenging: the new
administration was certainly more conservative, and the country faced one of its
worst fiscal crises ever. One could fear a strong retrenchment, with a significant
cut in number of beneficiaries and in the budget. However, the programme has
remained strong even through this difficult period. The number of beneficiary
households is at an all-time high, relevant stakeholders such as the World Bank
and the OECD have reinforced their support, and the programme’s budget has
been reduced only marginally in real terms.
A second lesson is that large social protection programmes tend to be resilient,
even in difficult times. Pierson’s explanation for the resilience of welfare state
programmes against retrenchment is that redistributive programmes are more
likely to develop under left-wing administrations, with the support of strong
unions, but they do not necessarily depend on them when facing adverse
contexts. This is simply because, once established, they create a decisive group
of supporters—their own beneficiaries. Cutting these programmes implies polit-
ical costs, and even administrations inclined to adopt these cuts must reconcile
their ‘policy preferences’ with their ‘electoral ambitions’ (Pierson 1996).
From a short-term political perspective at the time of writing, the election of
Bolsonaro in the October 2018 presidential ballot could present a major challenge.
In previous elections, viable moderate candidates have opted to declare their
support for the programme, but Bolsonaro’s position is far less clear. During the
campaign, he suggested that ending the programme would be inhumane, but on
the other hand he also stated that the state should be less supportive of certain
groups, including those who could be considered disadvantaged. There are clear
political costs in producing a major change in the programme, but they might
seem affordable to an unconventional politician who is also determined to rewrite
the rulebook in other areas of policy.
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Even if these immediate challenges are overcome, from a medium- to long-term
perspective, the tendency is that the programme will remain under close scrutiny
as it is the only layer of social protection for those in the informal sector. CCTs are
subject to excessive expectations. Only a comprehensive and inclusive set of social
policies and programmes can ensure the eradication of poverty and the reduction
of vulnerability.
The good news is that the CCT model has already proven to be extremely
flexible, able to fit and thrive in different regional contexts. Twenty-three years
after their emergence in Brazil, CCTs have become an anti-poverty policy widely
acknowledged as effective. Many countries have been developing original solu-
tions to the many challenges faced by such programmes, from how to deliver
transfers in remote areas to how to effectively target the poor without producing
large exclusion errors. Sharing these international experiences has been extremely
fruitful for national teams to increase the effectiveness of their own programmes.
Of course, criticisms of CCTs still persist. From the conservative side, there are
those who insist that these programmes reduce labour supply and increase fertility.
However, evidence from impact evaluations has to date rejected this claim, and they
have not become so politically damaging as to put CCTs at risk. From the Left, some
will say that targeting and conditionalities inevitably result in the exclusion of some
groups from their right to social protection. Yet even these critics should recognize
that CCTs are the only configuration of social protection that reaches low-income
groups and workers in the informal sector and their families. Such programmes
have made social protection more likely to reach these groups, not less.
Notes
1. CCTs are one of the main instruments of social safety nets (SSN)/social assistance (SA)
programmes, defined as ‘non-contributory interventions designed to help individuals
Additional version of this case
The case study outlined in this chapter is accompanied by a corresponding case
study from the Centre for Public Impact’s (CPI) Public Impact Observatory—
an international repository of public policies assessed for their impact using
CPI’s Public Impact Fundamentals framework. CPI’s framework provides a
way for those who work in or with government to assess public policies, to
understand why they were successful, so key lessons can be drawn out for
future policy work. The case can be easily located in the CPI repository at www.
centreforpublicimpact.org/observatory.
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and households cope with chronic poverty, destitution and vulnerability. SSN/SA
programmes target the poor and vulnerable’ (World Bank 2018: 5).
2. Statement from Rodrigo Maia, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, available
at https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/maia-afirma-que-bolsa-familia-escraviza-as-
pessoas-22296779.
3. Inflation in 1993 was upwards of 2,000 per cent per year. It dropped dramatically, from
almost 50 per cent in May 1994 to 1.9 per cent in July of the same year. However, it is
impossible to know exactly what happened with poverty between 1993 and 1995, since
the National Household Sample Survey (Pesquisa Nacional por Amonstragem de
Domicílios—PNAD), the main source of information regarding poverty in the country,
was not conducted in 1994.
4. Senate Bill no. 80/1991. Available at http://www25.senado.leg.br/web/atividade/
materias/-/materia/1270. The bill was approved by the Senate but was never brought
to a vote in the House of Representatives (Lindert et al. 2007; Cotta 2009).
5. See, for instance, Buarque (1993) and Almeida and Camargo (1994).
6. Progresa was later relabelled Oportunidades and, more recently, Prospera. It was
initially implemented in marginalized rural areas but was later scaled up to have
nationwide coverage.
7. Or US$45.88, using the PPP conversion factor, private consumption, 2011, adjusted for
October 2003.
8. That is, from US$13.76 to US$87.17, using the PPP conversion factor, private con-
sumption, 2011, adjusted for October 2003.
9. It seems that these perceptions were correct. There is growing evidence about the
impact of conditionalities per se (cf. Baird et al. 2013 and, for the Bolsa Família
programme specifically, Paiva et al. 2016). Zucco Jr. et al. (2016) suggest that the impact
of conditionalities on the overall political support for Bolsa Família is modest, but
‘considerably larger’ among groups that are less inclined to support the programme.
10. First as Provisional Law no. 132, from October 2003, then converted into Law no.
10,836, from January 2004.
11. In social policy, ‘negative dependence’ can be defined as a situation where ‘current
needs are met at the cost of reducing the recipient’s capacity to meet their basic needs in
the future without external assistance’ (Lentz et al. 2005).
12. The 1988 Constitution bestowed the federal government, the states, and local govern-
ments in Brazil equal decision-making power.
13. Partnerships with states were also signed, especially after 2011. Currently, a few
agreements are still operational (four with states and two with municipalities). For a
recent evaluation about the post-2011 agreements, see Licio et al. (2018).
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3
The Remarkable Healthcare Performance
in Singapore
M. Ramesh and Azad Singh Bali
Introduction
Singapore’s healthcare system ranks among the best in the world in terms of
various commonly used criteria such as infant and maternal mortality rates, life
expectancy, and disability adjusted years, prompting Business Week magazine to
rank it as the healthiest country on the planet. What is even more remarkable is
that the fine outcomes are accomplished at less than half the costs in comparable
countries. Policy reformers around the world have taken note of its achievements
in recent years and have explored emulating it, though most observers admit that
the social and political conditions in the island state are too different to allow
emulation. Yet there are lessons to be drawn from the case that would be relevant
to most countries.
While the specific factors underlying the achievement of high healthcare out-
comes at relatively low costs in Singapore are rooted in the country’s rather unique
economy and politics, it is undeniable that the government has been the main
architect of the system and a key driver of the reforms. In this chapter, we will
chronicle and analyse the evolution of the policy measures and their performance
since Independence. For the sake of simplicity, we will classify the vast and diverse
range of factors that shape the performance of the healthcare sector under three
categories: socio-economic development, policy tools, and political conditions.
As will see in the chapter, there is no grand health ‘policy’ in Singapore. Rather,
there are a range of policy tools targeting specific problems that work in tandem
and need constant fine-tuning in response to policy learning and technological,
demographic, and economic changes. The constant changes of varying magnitude
are possible due to clarity of purpose on the part of the government, backed by
strong political and administrative commitment, and the absence of a credible
political opposition. Policy-makers and implementers know what they want and
constantly experiment and fine-tune measures in order to achieve them. A range
of heterodox policy tools working in concert, learning and being willing to change
course, unhindered by political opposition, are what contribute to Singapore’s
health success.
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In terms of assessing different dimensions of Singapore’s health policy success
(see Chindarkar et al. 2017; Bali et al. 2019), our analysis suggests that the gov-
ernment enjoys considerable success across programmatic and political dimen-
sions. Sustained policy performance, political legitimacy, and the electoral dominance
of the ruling party allowed the government to remain indifferent to process
outcomes or inequities in the delivery of policy. For instance, Singapore
stands out as one of the few high-income societies where historically more
than 50 per cent of healthcare expenditure was financed without any societal
risk-pooling (Table 3.1). However, increasing democratization, economic and
social contestability, and a rapidly ageing population will make the ruling
government sensitive to such inequities.
Anatomy of Healthcare Success in Singapore
Ongoing debates on healthcare in many countries, particularly the United States,
have precipitated unprecedented interest in Singapore’s healthcare system and the
reasons behind its admirable performance (Carroll and Frakt 2017; Ehrenfel
2018). This is unsurprising given its impressive headline numbers regarding
healthcare. Singapore’s infant mortality rate of 2.1 per 1,000 live births in 2015
ranks sixth best in the world (behind Iceland, Slovenia, Finland, Japan, and
Luxembourg) while its life expectancy (83 years at birth) ranks the ninth highest
in the world (behind Hong Kong, Japan, Macao, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, Iceland,
and France) (World Bank 2018). Between 2003 and 2013, life expectancy
increased by 3.5 years for males and 2.9 years for females, compared to the average
increase of 2.5 and 2.0 years respectively for OECD countries (MOH Singapore
2016). The gain in life expectancy has been driven by declining mortality rates in
cardiovascular diseases among those aged 50 years and above.
Singaporeans are not just living longer, but are also enjoying healthier life, as
evident from the city’s rising Healthy Life Expectancy (HALE). According to the
2013 Global Burden of Disease (GBD) study covering 188 countries, males
(females) in Singapore spend the equivalent of 70.75 (73.35) years of their life
free of disease and/or injury, which is the second (third) highest in the world
(Murray et al. 2015).
While Singapore’s health status indicators are good, it is the low cost at which
they have been achieved that stands out among other high performing countries.
As Table 3.1 shows, its total healthcare spending—5 per cent of GDP—is less than
half of the average for high-income countries and the European Union. Another
remarkable feature is the small share of the total formed by public spending:
42 per cent, compared to the average of 62 per cent for high-income countries.
Not only is the private share of spending large, 55 per cent of it comes from out-
of-pocket (OOP) and not private insurance. While the low total spending is
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desirable, the large share of OOP is a matter of ongoing concern, as we shall later
in the chapter.
The international community first took notice of Singapore’s high outcomes at
low cost in 2000 when the World Health Organization (WHO) ranked it sixth
out of 191 countries for ‘overall health system performance’ (WHO 2000). Such
accolades became more frequent in the following decade. The Bloomberg Health-
Care Efficiency Index 2014 ranked Singapore second out of fifty-five countries
(Hong Kong was first). The index is a composite of ‘Relative health expenditure’
(total health expenditures as percentage of GDP), ‘Absolute health expenditure’,
and ‘Life expectancy’ (which accounted for 60 per cent of the index). Similarly,
according to the Economist Intelligence Unit’s study of 166 countries, Singapore
ranked second in healthcare outcomes (behind Japan) but achieved its outcomes
at considerably lower costs (Economist Intelligence Unit 2014). We now turn to
describing the evolution of health policy in Singapore followed by an examination
of the reasons for its performance.
Policy History: Incremental Reforms
The healthcare system in Singapore is rooted in Great Britain which ruled the
island until 1959. Healthcare was a low priority for the colonial government and it
built only a basic health system. In the final years of colonial rule, however, the
government became increasingly involved in the provision of free inpatient care
through public hospitals, partly reflecting the development of the National Health
Service in Britain. The People’s Action Party (PAP) government that took office
in 1959 retained and gradually expanded the arrangements while introducing
modest reforms. The expanding role of the government was reflected in its
Table 3.1 Healthcare expenditures in selected countries
1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
Health expenditure, total
(% of GDP)
European Union 8 8 9 10 10
High income 9 10 11 12 12
Japan 7 8 8 10 10
Singapore 3 3 4 4 5
Health expenditure, public
(% of total)
European Union 78 77 76 78 78
High income 63 59 60 63 62
Japan 82 81 81 82 84
Singapore 50 45 27 35 42
Out-of-pocket health
expenditure (% of total
expenditure on health)
European Union 14 15 14 14 14
High income 15 16 15 14 13
Japan 14 16 16 14 14
Singapore 49 53 69 61 55
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spending: public expenditures on healthcare formed 50 per cent of total spending
on health in 1965 (Lim and Lee 2012).
During the 1960s and 1970s, the government expanded public health clinics
(called ‘polyclinics’)—entirely owned and operated by the government and pro-
viding basic outpatient services—throughout the island. It also expanded School
Health Services and compulsory free immunization against a range of diseases. At
a broader level, the government worked on improving sanitation, housing, and
education which together with expanded public health measures played a major
role in improving the population’s health.
The financial implications of publicly provided healthcare nearly free of charge
became increasingly apparent as trends of population ageing and epidemiological
transition emerged, prompting the government to search for alternative mechan-
isms for providing and financing healthcare (Aw and Low 1997). It was within the
context of these broader changes that the government announced the National
Health Care Plan in 1983 outlining a strategy for meeting the demands of a
growing, ageing, and increasingly affluent population.
The 1983 plan rejected social insurance for financing on the grounds that third-
party payment would lead to over-supply by producers and over-use by consumers.
It instead proposed a range measures to improve the efficiency of hospitals coupled
with higher user charges for patients. In 1984, the government initiated efforts to
make public hospitals more efficient. Reflecting the privatization trend sweeping
the world at the time, it ‘corporatized’ public hospitals as private legal entities—
though fully owned by the government—and encouraged them to compete for
paying patients. To enable them to compete, it granted them full autonomy in
strategic and operational matters. The enhanced competition was expected to lead
to greater efficiency, lower costs, and higher service quality, though in reality these
effects remained elusive (Ramesh 2008).
Medisave, established in 1984, was the first of many new healthcare funding
initiatives to be launched during the period. The compulsory scheme covers the
entire resident workforce and requires saving between 6 and 8 per cent of
individual monthly income (subject to a wage ceiling) to be used to pay for
hospital care of the account-holder and their immediate family. However, it limits
the range of services and the total amount that can be spent. The exclusions and
ceilings are intended to allow accumulation of funds to pay for expensive inpatient
care when needed. Since savings in Medisave accounts are individuals’ own
money, the government expected that people would spend it cautiously.
In 1990, the government established a publicly organized but privately financed
voluntary health insurance scheme called MediShield. It covered hospitalization
expenses for surgery and outpatient treatment for specified ‘serious’ illnesses. Its
establishment, despite the government’s opposition to social insurance, was in
response to the realization that most Medisave accounts were insufficient for
treatment of major illnesses. Premiums were kept low by imposing a large number
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of exclusions and a cost-sharing requirement to avoid the moral hazards associ-
ated with insurance. As a result, MediShield typically paid only for a small part of
the hospital bills, with the remainder paid out of pocket.
The realization that there was a segment of the population that could not afford
even highly subsidized healthcare led the government to establish a public assist-
ance scheme called the Medifund in 1993. It is an endowment trust fund built on
an initial US$59 million contribution from the government. To prevent depletion
of the fund, only income from the fund is used to pay bills of those unable to
afford hospital care. Under the scheme, patients in the lowest class wards at public
hospitals and outpatients needing expensive services may apply for complete or
partial waiver of their bills. Medifund accounts for a negligible share of total
healthcare expenditure as citizens have to pass a stringent means test to receive
any benefits. In 2014, S$133 million were distributed amongst 766,000 applicants,
an average of about S$170 per applicant.
The results of the reforms—increased autonomy and competition amonghospitals,
and establishment of Medisave, MediShield, and Medifund—were not what govern-
ment had expected. While the service quality improved, costs and fees increased
rapidly. It also came to realize thatMedisave,MediShield, andMedifund—collectively
described as 3M—even together paid for less than 10 per cent of total health expend-
iture, imposing a significant burden on household finance (Asher and Nandy 2006).
The government eventually established a high-level Ministerial Committee which
published its reportAffordable Health Care: AWhite Paper in 1993. The report stated
five operating principles, of which three were notable:
• Promote individual responsibility for one’s own health and avoid overreli-
ance on state welfare or third-party medical insurance.
• Engage competition and market forces to improve service and raise efficiency.
• Intervene directly in the healthcare sector when necessary, where the market
fails to keep healthcare costs down.
The combination of market competition and enhanced state intervention
spelled out in the White Paper was audacious and counter-intuitive but displayed
remarkable astuteness in recognizing the challenges that characterize the sector.
Contrary to the dominant thinking in favour of the market at the time, it asserted
that competition should be promoted under government stewardship, arguing
that market forces alone would not suffice to hold down medical costs to the
minimum and that the government had to intervene directly to structure and
regulate the health system (MOH Singapore 1993: 3). It called for direct measures
to control costs while promoting competition. In the following years, the govern-
ment imposed controls on introducing new technology and specialist disciplines
in government hospitals, introduced price caps, excluded expensive treatments
from public hospitals, and tightened overall supply of doctors (Barr 2001: 714).
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The direction set by the White Paper continues to frame the government’s
policy to this date, with reforms consisting largely of changing the specific
combinations of market and state control.
While the government began to actively manage the health sector in the 1990s,
senior cabinet ministers of the government routinely reminded citizens that
it had no intentions of setting up a publicly funded health system or even
elaborate welfare programmes. The 1998 Budget stated bluntly: ‘We believe that
extensive welfare programmes damage the fabric of our society as they discourage
individual responsibility, self-reliance, community support and the work ethic’
(cited in Tang 2000: 42). Unsurprisingly, most healthcare continued to be paid
through OOP payments and yet the government was under constant political
pressure to increase public spending and expand the 3M programmes.
The government was forced to act after the 2011 general elections in which the
long-serving PAP received its lowest share of votes cast. It dramatically expanded
the scope of MediShield, renaming it MediShield Life (ML). The revised pro-
gramme is mandatory and covers all pre-existing illnesses and has no age-limit.
The government has also increased public funding for hospitals, offers subsidies to
cover the premiums of MediShield, and injected S$3 billion into the Medifund
endowment fund.
Socio-Economic Context
Healthcare outcomes are not solely determined by health policy. They are also
fundamentally shaped by conditions and actions outside the sector. Indeed,
income levels, sanitation, education, and housing are important determinants.
In this regard, health policy in Singapore has benefited greatly from a number of
favourable conditions that promoted improvements in health status. Singapore’s
GDP per capita in 1960 was US$430, which was a third of that of OECD
economies, but in recent years it has been over US$55,000 which is 50 per cent
higher than the OECD average. The higher income allowed households to take
better care of their health.
This economic success is in part attributed to a growth strategy has relied on
attracting foreign firms and portfolio investors and utilizing foreign workers
across the skill spectrum (Asher et al. 2015). The overarching policy goal was to
ensure that Singapore remained internationally attractive for businesses which
meant keeping income taxes low. Such a growth strategy required an inflow of
foreign workers, and a tolerance of a high level of income inequality.¹ Lacking
political voice, it has been easy to ignore the social welfare needs of foreign
workers. The government maintains a significant presence in the economy by
direct participation, state-led planning, and the use of interventionist policies (Lim
2016). Government-linked and government-owned companies, and statutory
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boards, play a strong role in Singapore’s approach to economic management.
These are pervasive across most areas of service delivery including health, educa-
tion, waste management, transportation, infrastructure, etc.
While Singapore’s population is ageing rapidly, the city-state has had a rela-
tively young population for a high-income economy. For example, in the 1960s
when its per capita income was about four times that of middle-income countries,
its population above 65 years of age was substantially lower. More recently, its
population above age 65 (11 per cent) is much lower than the average in OECD
economies (17 per cent) (World Bank 2018). This is changing, however, and the
population is ageing rapidly due to declining fertility rates coupled with sustained
increases in longevity. This in turn has implications for health spending as
consumption increases disproportionately with age.
In addition to a relatively young population, Singapore has benefited from
concomitant policy efforts in housing and education. Just after a year of coming
to power in 1959, the PAP set up the Housing and Development Board, a
statutory body with comprehensive responsibility for public housing and
urban development. In the early 1960s only 10 per cent of Singaporeans lived
in public housing. In 1964 the government announced its goal of creating a
‘home-owning democracy’ in which 90 per cent of the population would live in
homes they owned. The objective of 90 per cent home-ownership was reached in
the late 1980s through subsidies, grants, and the large-scale public provision and
financing of homes (Ramesh 2004). Similarly, Singapore has made significant
advances in education attainment. In 1980 more than four-fifths of residents had
not completed any secondary education and only 3 per cent had a university
degree (Pang and Lim 2015). The highest qualification attained has since
improved significantly with more than half the resident population having
completed a university degree, diploma, or a professional qualification by 2015
(Waring et al. 2018).
The combined impact of a relatively young population, and conducive com-
plementary policies—focused on improving education attainment, home owner-
ship, and public amenities such as clean drinking water, solid waste disposal, and
management systems—has shaped Singapore’s public health outcomes. For
instance, public housing with clean drinking water allowed the government to
contain the widespread of malaria and tuberculosis (Phua 1987). Singapore’s
housing policy gradually transitioned households that lived in ‘overcrowded
pre-war shophouses, slums or tenements’ in the 1950s to public housing with
access to electricity, gas, clean water, and toilets, which in turn helped manage
water-borne and other infectious diseases that confront most societies in their
economic and epidemiological transitions (Phang and Kim 2013). In turn,
Singapore’s sustained economic prosperity and growth in real incomes (except
for the bottom deciles of the distribution) tempered the impact of high OOP
payments (the dominant instrument to finance healthcare).
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Policy Tools: Multiple Tools, Concerted Use
Conducive as the socio-economic conditions were in Singapore to improvements
in health outcomes, their potential would have remained unrealized in the absence
of appropriate government policy. Singapore’s health policy is characterized by a
range of policy tools targeting specific problems while keeping an eye on the
linkages among them. To make the combination of tools work effectively, the
government has had to target and guide behaviour of all key stakeholders:
providers, payers, and users (Wu and Ramesh 2014; Bali and Ramesh 2017).
Using Christopher Hood’s NATO schema, we classify the tools into four groups
as shown in Table 3.2.
Organizational tools work by establishing new organizations or altering exist-
ing organizations to achieve desired outcomes. Thus, instead of regulating or
financing healthcare, governments can establish a new public hospital to provide
desired services or, conversely, privatize an existing private facility. The purpose of
authority tools is for the state to employ its sovereign authority to prohibit
undesired behaviour and, conversely, require desired behaviour. Treasure tools
come in a variety of forms, including direct transfers to providers or users,
subsidies to the insured directly or through their insurers, tax incentives, and
tax penalties. The most common fiscal tools in healthcare are fiscal transfers to
providers (public or private) or the insurers or insured individuals as well as
mandated savings for healthcare and retirement income. The core purpose of
nodality tools is to reduce the information asymmetries and especially the ability
of any particular agent to exploit its information advantage. The tool is particu-
larly useful for empowering users and third-party payers vis-à-vis providers who
are in an advantageous position in the presence of information asymmetry.
Not only are there a large number of policy tools available for use in health-
care, but they also need to be used coherently if they are to address complex
Table 3.2 Policy tools in Singapore’s healthcare system
Organization tools
Public ownership of hospitals and polyclinics
Incorporation of public facilities as private
companies
Regional clusters of hospitals
Treasure tools
Subsidy to public hospitals
Medisave, Medifund, and MediShield
Out-of-pocket payments
Fee for Service and Casemix payments
Authority tools
Certification of all healthcare professionals
Regulation of all significant aspects of
providers’ and insurers’ operations
Regulations of drug supplies
Nodality tools
Public health campaigns
Publication of median bill sizes and clinical
outcomes
Collection and dissemination of
information on healthcare utilization
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problems. Overcoming the conflicting goals and divergent interests among
stakeholders amidst vast information asymmetry in the sector requires an
appropriate combination of these tools. The challenge, however, remains how to
harness synergies and complementarities in using these tools. Far too many reform
efforts in healthcare have resulted in failures or caused more harm than good due to
the inadequate or contradictory use, not to mention misuse, of these tools
(Blumenthal and Hsiao 2005; Bali and Ramesh 2015; Nguyen et al. 2015; Powell-
Jackson et al. 2015). In Singapore, however, the government met this challenge,
and was able to develop a policy mix of tools that harnessed these synergies and
complementarities (Howlett et al. 2015).
Organizational Tools
Singapore has many of the same tools as most other countries, with certain
interesting twists. Prominent agencies are discussed here. The Ministry of Health
(MOH) has overall responsibility for healthcare, including needs assessment,
services planning, manpower planning, system governance and financing, fee-
setting, cost control, and health information technology (Liu and Haseltine 2015).
The Health Promotion Board is responsible for promoting public health awareness
and practices. To realize economy of scale and higher price bargaining capacity,
there is the Group Purchasing Office to consolidate purchases of drugs, medical
supplies, equipment, and IT services at the national level. To further enhance
information effectiveness, the Agency for Care Effectiveness (ACE) was set up in
2015 to conduct research on treatments that provide the best value for money.
A unique entity in Singapore is MOH Holdings Private Limited (MOHH)
which is registered as a private company though fully owned by MOH. As
suggested by its name, it is a holding company which owns all of the government’s
healthcare assets, including all public hospitals which are also registered as
separate private companies with their own separate management and CEO. As
an owner of all government healthcare assets, MOHH provides systems-level
strategizing and coordination, and facilitates collaboration across healthcare clus-
ters and institutions.
A distinct feature of Singapore’s health system is the extensive government
ownership of hospitals and how it manages them. Public hospitals account for
nearly three-quarters of all hospital beds in the country and employ three-fifths of
all specialists (Lim and Lee 2012). However, public hospitals in Singapore are
exposed to market competition and hospital managers are given broad autonomy
in operational matters. Public ownership of what are legally private firms allows
hospitals the autonomy they need to operate in a competitive environment while
remaining within the government’s direct reach (Ramesh 2008). As an owner, the
government can shape hospitals’ behaviour without having to resort to onerous
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regulations or purchase negotiations that would be necessary if they were truly
private firms. This has been particularly useful for controlling user charges,
physicians’ remunerations, and the number of hospital beds in different ward
classes, for instance.
Unlike hospital care, primary care in Singapore is mostly delivered at private
clinics that account for 80 per cent of outpatient visits while the remaining 20 per
cent is provided by eighteen public polyclinics that provide subsidized services
especially for low-income residents and the elderly. Similar to many countries, the
public healthcare system in Singapore is divided into regions which have changed
over the years. In 1999 two similarly sized ‘clusters’ of vertically integrated public
hospitals and clinics were established with the purpose of promoting economy of
scale, coordination and planning of resources, integration of inpatient and out-
patient services, and a more effective patient referral system within each cluster.
Inspired by the success of two competing clusters, and seeking to further enhance
competition, in 2015 all public hospitals and associated polyclinics were reorgan-
ized as six regional clusters spread across the island. As of 2018, the six clusters
were reorganized into three clusters to enhance economy of scale while maintain-
ing regional access. MOH conducts annual surveys of patient satisfaction and
expectations which indicate high favourability rating: the 2012 survey showed that
77 per cent of respondents were satisfied with services at public facilities (Liu and
Haseltine 2015). The government has established a Public Acute Hospital Score-
card system for assessing performance of polyclinics and community hospitals.
Financial Tools
Singapore is unique in its heavy reliance on OOP expenditure, which forms 55 per
cent of total health expenditure, compared to the average of 13 per cent for high-
income countries (Table 3.1). This is the result of a deliberate policy choice
inspired by the thinking that households must bear the primary responsibility
for healthcare expenditures (Barr 2001;Asher and Nandy 2006). The adverse
effects of OOP are in part mitigated by low levels of total spending, and lower
prices at public hospitals and polyclinics which receive government subsidies and
offer frugal cost-effective services. Government financing accounts for 42 per cent
of total health spending in Singapore, mostly in the form of subsidies to public
hospitals. Subsidies are based on the number of patients admitted to different
wards. There are five classes of wards in public hospitals—A, B1, B2+, B2, and C—
providing different levels of privacy, amenities, and choice. Patients in C-class
wards are subsidized up to 80 per cent of the costs while those in A-class wards
receive no subsidy.
There are also other schemes financed from the government’s general budget.
The Community Health Assistant Scheme, for instance, is an income-tested
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scheme that offers additional grants to low-income households (below S$1,800 per
capita per month) for outpatient treatment. Similarly, the Pioneer Generation and
Merdeka subsidies reduce insurance premiums and co-payments for select
cohorts of elderly Singaporeans. There are also extensive public health campaigns
fully financed by the government.
In addition to the 3M schemes—Medisave, MediShield, and Medifund (described
earlier)—there are subsidies provided to hospitals. The arrangements for paying
providers have also changed over the years, moving increasingly in the direction of
capped payments. Until the 1980s, public hospitals had been paid a block grant based
on historical precedence. In the 1990s the payment formula was changed to reflect
the volume of services they provided, consistent with the fee-for-service they charged
patients. Predictably, hospitals increased the quantity of services they provided. To
curb rising expenditures, in 1999 the government introduced case-mix funding
which paid a fixed amount depending on the illness. To prevent under-servicing—
a problem that is endemic to case-mix because providers are paid a fixed amount per
case regardless of the treatment costs—there is a payment component that includes
the volume of services provided.
Regulatory Tools
The use of organizational and fiscal tools in Singapore is supplemented and
complemented by extensive regulations. The MOH, for example, regulates licens-
ing of healthcare institutions, provision of unsafe or undesirable services, and
advertising and marketing of healthcare products and services.
Self-regulation also exists in the form of practice guidelines and codes of ethics
and conduct by professional bodies, such as the Singapore Medical Council,
Singapore Dental Council, Singapore Nursing Board, and Singapore Pharmacy
Board. The councils play an active role in ensuring that costs are ‘competitively
priced’ and in the stewardship of the sector. There have been instances where the
Medical Council has censured providers for ‘over-charging’ patients (Straits
Times 2017). Such controls on provider behaviour reduce their monopoly
power in the health sector, and reduce room to engage in maleficent behaviour.
The Health Sciences Authority regulates the manufacture, import, supply,
presentation, and advertisement of modern and traditional medicines, health
supplements, cosmetic products, medical devices, and medicinal therapies for
clinical trials. The insurance industry is regulated by the Monetary Authority of
Singapore as part of its financial regulatory role (Liu and Haseltine 2015). The
extent of government controls over providers is higher than what is suggested by
regulations. The complete ownership of public hospitals allows MOH to direct all
significant aspects of their operations: the types and volume of specialized clinical
services they provide, the fees they charge, the salaries they pay, and the expensive
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equipment they purchase. Controls on providers are paralleled by similar curbs on
users, who are subject to co-payments, deductibles, and restrictions on the use of
Medisave and MediShield for consultations, treatments, and procedures. These
controls discourage unnecessary doctor visits, tests, and treatments, resulting in
more careful use of health system resources (Liu and Haseltine 2015).
There are also regulation-like controls exercised through fiscal tools. For instance,
ML covers hospitalization only in basic hospital wards, as subsidies decline with the
ward class, being zero for the highest A-class ward. Similarly, access to advanced
tertiary care or diagnostic tests is rationed by waiting times if treatment is to be
reimbursed by Medisave and ML. While patients have immediate access to tertiary
hospitals and specialists, they do not receive subsidized prices in the absence of
referrals. Restrictions on the use of Medisave as well as ceilings on the maximum
amount that providers can be paid from an individual’s Medisave account reduce
scope for moral hazard. The MOH is known to closely monitor billing practices of
hospitals and raise alarm when anomalies or excessive treatment are observed.
The government exercises light regulatory touch on private providers in order
to maintain their competitiveness vis-à-vis an otherwise robust public system in
the country. Private providers are seen as crucial to the objective of attracting
medical tourists to the country and enhancing the quality of public hospitals by
posing competition to them. Thus, public providers receive substantial subsidies
from the government but are also subject to strict controls regarding the number
of hospital beds and their distribution by wards, fees they charge, acquisition of
technology, and expansion of specialities. Private providers, on the other hand, are
lightly regulated but receive no or little subsidy. Through different regulatory
regimes for public and private providers, the government is able to pursue a
diverse range of goals.
Information Tools
One of the steepest challenges faced by healthcare policy-makers is the deep
information asymmetries that characterize the sector, allowing providers to be in
a dominant position vis-à-vis third-party payers and users (Bali and Ramesh 2015).
It is only recently that advances in information andmanagement technologies have
allowed development of tools to bridge the asymmetries by empowering users and
third-party payers.
An innovative information tool the Singapore government has employed to
improve service quality and lower prices is to acquire and disseminate informa-
tion on hospital charges and clinical outcomes. As the Minister of Health put it:
For economics and markets to work, we must make sure that the conditions for
market competition exist. That is why I published the bill sizes for the common
medical treatments . . .When competition is brought to bear on these services, we
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will then have the right incentives for the healthcare providers to do the right
thing, to raise standards even as they reduce cost. (Khaw 2005)
Since 2003, public hospitals have been required to publish their average bill sizes
and the distribution along the mean (which includes charges for room, treatment,
surgery, laboratory test, etc.) for different common conditions and procedures.
The collated data is subsequently published on the MOH’s webpage. The hospital
managers were understandably resistant to disclosing information on their
charges and clinical outcomes but the government eventually prevailed over
them. Private hospitals were more successful at resisting participation, but they
too eventually complied due to pressures from the government and users. This
exercise culminated in the MOH introducing benchmarks for medical fees jointly
developed by doctors, hospitals, and other stakeholders in 2018. Such benchmarks
are expected to give doctors a yardstick against which to measure their prices
while giving patients a clearer idea of comparative costs.
Given the volume of data collected over the years, the MOH now maintains
online calculators, which are synchronized with Medisave and ML limits. It is
likely that the information made available on the webpage is used more widely by
hospitals (rather than patients) who use the informative to benchmark their prices
and outcomes against their competitors’. To take advantage of modern informa-
tion technologies available for hospital management, the government has for more
than a decade tried to make hospitals harmonize their financial, clinical, adminis-
trative, and diagnostic processes through integrated information systems. The
National Electronic Health Records (NEHR) platform was established in 2011 for
capturing relevant information from all providers. While public providers have
participated in the platform, private hospitals and especially private clinics have
resisted it for a variety of reasons. This changed in 2018 when participation in
NEHR became mandatory. Providers must now contribute data regarding admis-
sion, visit history and hospital discharge; laboratory test and radiology results;
history of medication, surgeries, and procedures; allergies and adverse drug reac-
tions; immunizations; etc.
The diverse range of policy tools deployed illustrates the government’s governance
andmanagerial approach to the sector.Moreover, it hasnot shied away from retracing
its steps and experimenting with a newer combination of tools to address a given
policy goal such as reducing information asymmetry or managing moral hazard.
Political Conditions: Continuity and Unity of Purpose
It is broadly acknowledged that healthcare is one of the most difficult areas for
policy reform due to the diverse, powerful, and entrenched interests that consti-
tute the sector. This general description of the politics of health applies only
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partially to Singapore, however, as the government has been able to take drastic
and even unpopular measures to implement policies it thinks are right. This has
been possible due to the rare degree of policy autonomy that it enjoys as a result of
its overwhelming dominance of politics. It is improbable that a more contested
political system would allow the space necessary for comprehensive and coherent
policy of the sort in Singapore.
Singapore is essentially a one-party state with a single party in power since
1959, despite free though arguably not entirely fair elections (Tan and Grofman
2016; Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2014). The PAP has won 95–100 per
cent of all seats and more than 65 per cent of the votes in all elections since
Independence (Tan and Grofman 2016). The reason behind its long-term dom-
inance is not as simple or as pernicious as some critics allege. Freedom House
designates Singapore elections as ‘free from irregularities and vote rigging’ (2015),
though it also notes that ‘the opposition is hamstrung by a ban on political films
and television programs, the threat of libel suits, strict regulations on political
associations, and the PAP’s influence on the media and the courts’. While one can
rightly speculate on the outcomes in the absence of the hurdles faced by oppos-
ition parties in Singapore, there is no doubt that the PAP enjoys widespread
support and puts up a vigorous fight at elections.
The PAP’s electoral appeal is built on the reputation of the government in
bringing peace and prosperity to the island, raising the country from ‘the third
world to the first’ in one generation. For three decades since the early 1970s,
Singapore enjoyed one of the fastest economic growth rates in the world, with
corresponding improvements in education, healthcare, and other public services.
The tangible improvements in people’s lives afforded the government, and by
extension the PAP, high levels of performance legitimacy (Barr 2014). According
to the Global Barometer Survey, the Prime Minister and National Government in
Singapore are tied for the third most trusted institutions (behind police and
military) in the country. Caplan (2009) concludes that the secret to the PAP’s
success seems to lie in its electorate’s preference for a ruling party that happens to
take economic reasoning seriously and that party preferences in favour of the PAP
give it enough slack to impose policies that would not survive a direct popular vote.
With such a comprehensive appeal and political dominance in place throughout
the history of Singapore, the government has been able to pursue policies without
fear of political repercussions of unpopular choices. As Haseltine (2013: 1–2)
summarizes: ‘The People’s Action Party (PAP) has been in power since independ-
ence, resulting in sustained political stability. Along with stability has come a unity
and constancy of purpose and action throughout the government . . . That continu-
ity of philosophy and approach, I believe, has made possible the ability to plan and
execute over a long period of time.’
Backed by vast policy autonomy based on performance legitimacy and lack
of opposition, the PAP enjoys a largely free hand in implementing its core
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beliefs, which comprise a mixture of individualism and strong state intervention,
characteristically reflected in its healthcare policy. As is frequently noted,
Singapore’s healthcare system is built on the political philosophy of individual
responsibility and ‘many helping hands’, with the state as only one of the hands.
PAP leaders routinely call upon the population—though in more muted tones in
recent years—to stay clear of ‘welfare state mentality’ and instead look after
themselves and their family. Medisave, and the principles of compulsory and
individual savings on which it is built, is the clearest example of this line of
thinking. Government subsidies are meant for worthy causes such as education
and housing while welfare payments and subsidized healthcare are only for
those in genuine need.
Healthcare subsidies in Singapore are not only meant for the needy, but also for
treatments that are ‘cost-effective and of proven value’. The government sees
demand for healthcare as almost endless, necessitating proactive controls. As
one health minister put it, ‘I prefer to slightly under-supply than to over-supply
as this will put pressure on ourselves to intensify usage and minimize over-
consumption’ (quoted in Lim and Lee 2012). The government justifies the
approach on pragmatic grounds. Indeed, the government claims ‘pragmatism’ as
its ideology. In an interview shortly before his death, Lee Kuan Yew stated: ‘We
don’t stick to any ideology. Does it work? Let’s try it and if it does work, fine, let’s
continue it. If it doesn’t work, toss it out, try another one. We are not enamoured
with any ideology’ (New York Times 2016). This approach is certainly evident in
the country’s health policy, which is changed constantly and displays no particular
pro- or anti-state ideology.
In healthcare, pragmatism has meant extracting maximum value from a given
expenditure. The government explicitly states that public hospitals and govern-
ment clinics provide only a basic medical package that is cost-effective and of
proven value. ‘But it will not provide the latest and best of everything,’ it warns
(quoted in Lim and Lee 2012). The MOH at one point even described its mission
as building the ‘World’s Most Cost-Effective Health System’. Driven by cost-
effectiveness, it has not shied away from making tough decisions such as denying
subsidies for expensive medicines. Prescription of subsidized drugs in public
hospitals is restricted to ‘clinically relevant and cost-effective drugs considered
as basic therapies that are essential for the management of common diseases
afflicting the majority of our population’ (Pwee 2009).
But even the Singapore government has not always had its own way, at least not
as quickly as one would think. It took more than a decade for the government to
make private hospitals disclose the size of their average bills and clinical outcomes.
Similarly, it has taken more than a decade to make private general clinics
contribute to the National Electronic Medical Records. While the government
eventually got its way in both instances, it was not without protracted resistance,
showing the power of vested interests in the healthcare sector.
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Singapore’s policy-makers are acutely aware of the politics of healthcare in
other countries and constantly warn the population not to fall for promises of free
healthcare. As a minister recently warned:
Looking around at the world, it is clear that the more politicians play with
healthcare, the worse the health of the nation, because short-term popular
political interests overthrow the long-term outcomes and the deep issues. Will
we do the right thing or go down the route laid out for us by many other
advanced economies, where the key issues in healthcare are increasingly po-
larised and politicised? (Puthucheary 2018)
In a similar vein, Deputy Prime Minister Tharman explained:
There is no way of giving something to everyone . . . The free social services that
we all like the idea of, you must realise that it is not free. The average citizen is
paying for it, and paying for it big time. (Ho 2015)
More recently, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Leong stated:
It is important for the Government to present people with the full facts and the
trade-offs because every dollar that we spend on healthcare is one dollar taken
from taxpayers and one dollar less to be spent somewhere, whether it’s on
education . . . on housing, on defence or on the personal needs of our people.
(En 2018)
The government is aware of the population’s rising expectations and is doing its
best to contain them. It is particularly concerned about voters turning to oppos-
ition parties offering ‘free’ or highly subsidized healthcare. It is convinced that this
would be a policy disaster in the context of an ageing population.
A Health Policy Success? Assessment
Singapore’s healthcare system has been a subject of global attention since 2000,
when the WHO ranked it as the sixth best healthcare system in the world. Most
observers, both within and outside the country, focus on the country’s medical
savings account (Medisave) to explain the system’s superior performance. While
Medisave is indeed unique in being the only compulsory such scheme in the
world, the actual role it plays in financial protection is rather marginal. It serves
more of a symbolic purpose in highlighting the government’s belief in individual
responsibility for healthcare. Similarly, MediShield is designed to minimize moral
hazard even though the restrictive conditions limit the scheme’s usefulness as an
insurance mechanism. In this chapter we have argued that Singapore’s healthcare
success is explained by three broad factors: its unique socio-economic environ-
ment; a diverse range of policy tools addressing different health policy challenges
capably and in concert; and the sustained political legitimacy of Singapore’s long-
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serving regime. In this concluding section, we assess Singapore’s health policy
success using the four dimensions of success introduced in this book.
A programmatic assessment of Singapore’s health policy suggests that the
government was able to convincingly deliver value in healthcare: attaining excel-
lent health outcomes at relatively low levels of societal spending. Cost contain-
ment and affordability are primary considerations that affect all aspects of
Singapore’s health policy. To accomplish this the government plays an active
role in stewardship and marshals a diverse range of policy tools that address a range
of challenges that beset the sector such as information asymmetry, moral hazard,
etc. While cost containment is an overarching policy goal, the government is largely
agnostic to different modes of governance or instrument preferences. The approach
is buttressed by willingness to take risk with new tools and reversing choices when
the effects are found to be undesirable. This is experimental governance—typically a
forte of local governments (Sabel and Zeitlin 2012)—writ large at the national level.
Similarly, it is politically unwedded to any distinct policy style. For instance, while
earlier policy documents and government rhetoric emphasized individual respon-
sibility and anathematic attitudes towards societal risk-pooling to pay for health-
care, the government was quick to retrace its steps and introduce social risk-pooling
(through MediShield Life) in the wake of increased political competition.
As a large part of health expenditure in Singapore is financed through OOP
payments, analysts argue that there are inequities in how health benefits and costs
are distributed across the society (Asher and Nandy 2006). However, recent
reforms have introduced principles of universalism in the policy design and are
poised to increase the share of expenditure that is financed through societal risk-
pooling. Moreover, issues relating to the equity of how healthcare benefits and
costs are distributed across society must account for the country’s public financial
management practices, especially how (much) revenue is raised and what it is
spent on (Blomqvist 2011; Bali 2016). Total government revenues and expend-
itures are relatively low in Singapore, especially when compared to other high-
income societies (Asher et al. 2015).
In terms of process assessment, health policymaking is largely hierarchical in
Singapore and there are limited mechanisms for public representation, deliber-
ation, and inclusion (Rodan 2018). During key policy changes, the government
does conduct extensive public stakeholder consultations but there is limited
evidence to suggest that these exercises have shaped policy. As this chapter has
catalogued, the government frequently took unpopular decisions and prioritized
policy goals. Its managerial approach to health policy with many and moving
parts, requires firm stewardship, a range of policy skills, and deft micro-
management. Singapore’s public service is widely recognized to enjoy such cap-
abilities (Neo and Chen 2007). The capability of its bureaucracy to learn from
experience and adjust accordingly is another reason why the government is able to
carry out its policy intentions.
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In terms of political assessment, there is large societal acceptance and support
for Singapore’s health policy. This is fuelled by the high degree of trust that the
Singapore government enjoys. Moreover, the government has enjoyed an unpar-
alleled conducive political environment that allowed it to overcome all political
opposition in pursuit of measures it believes are necessary for the larger good. The
absence of opposition parties that could credibly challenge the government
allowed it to take tough and, if necessary, unpopular decisions without significant
political risks. However, recent political trends and increasing electoral competi-
tion are stymying the government’s magisterial approach. In the lead up to the
2011 general elections, issues surrounding the affordability of healthcare especially
for the elderly were brought to the fore. This was amplified in the following years,
and prior to the 2014 general elections the government announced extensive
health subsidies for a select cohort of retirees. Similarly, another round of health
subsidies that target a slightly younger cohort of retirees was announced in 2018.
This suggests that the government will have fewer degrees of freedom, politically,
in its approach to health policy.
On the temporal dimension, Singapore’s health policy has enjoyed success.
However, the unique economic and especially administrative and political condi-
tions and capacities that exist in Singapore make it unlikely that any other country
would be able to pursue goals in the manner the Singapore government does.
Indeed, it is uncertain if Singapore itself will be able to continue on its current policy
path. As Singapore’s population ages, the government will be under increasing
pressure to relax restrictions and spend more on healthcare. Indeed, following the
setbacks the ruling party experienced in the 2011 general elections, the government
rapidly increased the health budget (by 250 per cent over seven years) and substan-
tially expanded the scope and depth of protection afforded by Medisave and
especially MediShield. This is a far cry from the government’s austere health policy
stance of the past. In fact, the government leaders have themselves admitted that
they expect expenditures to rise dramatically in the future.
Additional version of this case
The case study outlined in this chapter is accompanied by a corresponding case
study from the Centre for Public Impact’s (CPI) Public Impact Observatory—
an international repository of public policies assessed for their impact using
CPI’s Public Impact Fundamentals framework. CPI’s framework provides a
way for those who work in or with government to assess public policies, to
understand why they were successful, so key lessons can be drawn out for
future policy work. The case can be easily located in the CPI repository at www.
centreforpublicimpact.org/observatory.
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Note
1. For instance at the end of 2017 nearly 40 per cent of Singapore’s labour force comprised
foreign workers. Between 2010 and 2016, the Gini coefficient varied between 0.458 and
0.478, and 0.402 and 0.425 after accounting for government transfers and taxes
(Department of Statistics, 2018: Table 3.8).
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4
Cutting the Wait—at Least for a While
The NHS’s Assault on Waiting Times
Adrian Kay
Introduction
Although health policy was not an original feature of the attempt by New Labour
to break from ‘old’ Labour politics in the UK, the alignment of political priority
and policy analysis in government produced a successful period in the UK
National Health Service (NHS). This chapter investigates one aspect of this, the
case of the historically significant decline in waiting times for NHS services.
Between 2000 and 2010, a policy mix was implemented that reduced the max-
imum waiting time from any referral of a patient by a general practitioner (GP) to
treatment in hospital, if required, to eighteen weeks in almost all cases. This
represented a significant performance improvement—equivalent waiting times
in 2000 had been routinely over eighteen months.
Unlike welfare state politics generally in the UK, the NHS has always enjoyed
strong political legitimacy. To those outside the UK, public attitudes to the NHS
in the UK are often puzzling; typical was the bemused international reaction to
parts of the opening ceremony for the 2012 London Olympics in which Oscar-
winning director Danny Boyle had choreographed lines of dancing nurses and
children in pyjamas jumping onto oversized hospital beds, all underneath a large
‘NHS’ sign. The 70th anniversary of the foundation of the NHS—5 July 2018—
was widely celebrated in the manner of a significant royal birthday. One of
Britain’s leading poets, Owen Sheers, produced fresh work to mark the public
occasion (Sheers 2018).
This deep public affection for the NHS has endured through several major
reform episodes and organizational restructuring phases over the last thirty years
and is an essential background condition to the case of improved waiting times
between 2000 and 2010 presented in this chapter. The sources of this legitimacy
are difficult to pinpoint precisely, and certainly there is no straightforward
account based on output or performance legitimacy. There is something in the
historical memory of immediate post-war Britain, the establishment of the NHS in
1948 as a collective endeavour by the first majority Labour government that
continues to resonate. There is no mainstream political opposition to the NHS
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in UK politics; policy debate instead pivots on how well one is managing the NHS
and success in framing reform as the preservation of its essential qualities.
This chapter investigates how this inherited dimension of legitimacy provided a
political success anchor for an initially impromptu and highly contingent reform
process to achieve notable programmatic improvement in waiting times in the
NHS, where previously abandoned programmes were recombined in a strong
emphasis on top-down targets alongside a significant boost in public expenditure
eventually agreed by a strongly resistant Chancellor of the Exchequer (Minister of
Finance), Gordon Brown.
Improving NHS Waiting Times: Assessing Success
The measurement of performance in a healthcare system as large and complex as
the NHS is inevitably a multi-dimensional exercise, requiring different scales to
capture separately each performance element. Further, attempts at creating aggre-
gate composite indicators of performance always present a set of technical and
philosophical questions. However, using the ‘3-P’ evaluative framework from the
introductory chapter, we can describe the reduction in NHS waiting times
between 2000 and 2010 as a success in the following terms.
Political Success
Although the improvement in waiting times was temporary and, from 2013, under
the Coalition government waiting time performance began to deteriorate on several
measures, it contributed to the Blair government’s electoral success (Kavanagh and
Butler 2005). In electoral terms, increasing access to NHS services—reducing
waiting times—was a salient issue and enjoyed widespread public support as a
policy objective in the UK. The Labour government’s success in this period con-
tributed to its re-election in 2001 and 2005; the first time the Labour Party had won
three consecutive general elections in British politics.
The political success of improved NHS waiting times endured. Early in David
Cameron’s tenure as leader of the opposition Conservative Party after the 2005
election, he committed to these reforms and maintaining funding levels in a big set
piece speech (The Guardian, 4 January 2006). Even as the broader politics of
public finance turned against Labour, particularly after 2008, there was bi-partisan
commitment to NHS funding increases. Gordon Brown’s ‘golden rule’, introduced
in 1997, that taxes and current spending should match over an economic cycle was
breached as UK public finances deteriorated markedly in the run up to the 2010
general election. Whilst the opposition crafted a politically successful narrative of
the imperative for urgent deficit reduction, the NHS remained protected from the
UK government’s biggest post-war spending squeeze (Kmietowicz 2014).
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Process Success
Assessing the case of improvements in NHS waiting times in process terms is not
straightforward. At least initially the process appears highly contingent on a series
of personal dynamics within the Labour government; triggered after almost three
years in power by an impromptu announcement of extra financial resources by
the Prime Minister Tony Blair on live TV rather than based on a carefully crafted
strategy developed through thoughtful deliberation. Nevertheless, as the chapter
discusses, there is evidence of subsequent political and bureaucratic leadership
that supports a claim of process success.
Programmatic Success
In programmatic terms, success is much clearer cut. An underlying theory of NHS
change was developed through a process of trial and error of different mixes of
policy instruments guided consistently by top-down targets alongside allocations
of substantial extra funding. This overarching programme was highly effective in
marshalling the attention of the NHS around the policy issue of waiting lists. It
also provided the means for discovering different policy mixes in terms of the use
of incentives for improvement such as ‘naming and shaming’, patient choice and
competition, organizational restructuring and commissioning.
The relationship between the three dimensions of success in the case is a
sequence of politics to process to programme. Public demand for improved access
to NHS services combined with the enduring political legitimacy of the NHS to
produce conducive conditions for political leadership to prevail in lobbying for
extra financial resources within government for the NHS and for waiting lists to be
the central focus of reform efforts.
Finding Money for the NHS: Political Leadership
at a Critical Juncture
The political leadership of Tony Blair as PM was successful in securing extra NHS
resources against the wishes of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown.
Brown was not only the political head of historically the most powerful depart-
ment in the UK government, HM Treasury (Brittan 1969; Talbot 2008), but also
widely credited as the New Labour architect of the building of voter trust in the
Labour Party’s ability to manage the economy after their fourth successive election
defeat in 1992. Self-styled as the ‘Iron Chancellor’, he operated with perennial
concern that a single word out of place could undermine the Party’s burgeoning
reputation for fiscal competence (Campbell 2007). He became notorious (at least
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among Labour backbenchers) during Labour’s first two years in office for sticking
rigidly to spending plans inherited from the previous Conservative government.
Blair’s political success in committing the Labour government to increasing
NHS spending significantly ahead of Brown’s fourth budget as Chancellor in
March 2000 was a politically significant event and trigger for the reform process.
In one of the best insider accounts of the governmental dramas of New Labour,
Rawnsley (2010: 77) quotes Brown as raging at Blair: ‘You’ve stolen my fucking
budget’ in response to Blair’s tactics in the budgetary process.
Winter crises in the NHS are a stock drama of British politics and the
1999–2000 version contained media reports of hospitals storing bodies in a freezer
lorry because the mortuary was full. Alan Milburn, the Secretary of State for
Health at the time, reports being convinced by that time that without a large
increase in NHS expenditure a genuine modernization of the way the service
operated was impossible (Milburn and Timmins 2002).
This was a critical juncture in the waiting times policy success. In what was
initially an act of transactional leadership to appease restless Labour backbench-
ers, Blair pledged to bring NHS spending up to the EU average by 2006, an
increase in the share of the UK national income devoted to the NHS of 1.5
percentage points, which implied annual cash increases of over 5 per cent in
real terms each year, compared with an average NHS increase of 3 per cent over
the previous two decades (Nicholas Watt in The Guardian, 17 January 2000; see
also Table 4.1).
Blair’s commitment was made on a Sunday morning live TV programme and
was apparently impromptu. The commitment to a specific spending target was the
catalyst for the waiting list reform process, in which Blair displayed a more
transformational leadership style. Blair had complained publicly of ‘the scars on
Table 4.1 NHS expenditure, 1999–2010 (in GBP bn,












Source: Institute of Fiscal Studies (2015), Health Spending.
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my back’ from trying to reform public services against the ‘forces of conservatism’
in his set-piece speech to the Labour Party conference in 1999 (The Guardian,
28 September 1999). A succession of junior health ministers had also been open
with the claim that the NHS was too producer biased, organized as much for the
convenience of its staff as its patients.
The commitment of substantial extra financial resources appears to have
catalysed the reform process rather than the other way around. Since its election
in May 1997, the Labour government had confined NHS policy to the dismantling
of a suite of policy instruments introduced in the preceding Conservative govern-
ment designed to create an ‘internal market’ in the NHS. During this period of
historic increases in public expenditure, a series of policy mixes was eventually
developed that were successfully implemented in terms of programmatic
improvements in waiting list times.
However, as a process, the assessment of success is less clear, mainly because
the financial commitment came first and then the NHS reform plans followed suit.
As a reform process, this carries risks because all health systems are a mixture of
financial resources and real resources of medical care. Increasing the former without
productivity-enhancing reforms of the latter risks costs inflation rather than
increases in the volume or quality of services provided. There is a well-known risk
of healthcare inflation exceeding inflation in the rest of the economy (Baumol 2012).
Even if assessment of serendipity on the process dimension falls some way short
of ‘success’ perhaps in the circumstances this process was the only way to link
political success to programmatic success. As discussed in the next section, by
2000 there had been a decade-long reform process in the NHS characterized by
significantly financially constrained environments.
The TV commitment was an early example of what came to be called ‘sofa
government’ in the later Blair years. His ‘brainstorming’ style of leadership,
famously telling senior civil servants to ‘Call me Tony’, produced informal
discussions among smaller groups of advisers without a formal cabinet process.
It is hard to establish quite where the financial commitments to the NHS came
from. But as Milburn himself later acknowledged, there was a strong transactional
element to Blair’s leadership: opinion polls at the time were suggesting that people
saw reducing waiting times as a critical element of health even if NHS staff did not
prioritize them (Milburn and Timmins 2002). What is clear is that the commit-
ment of extra resources focused efforts strongly on reducing the maximum
waiting times for outpatient appointments and inpatient treatments.
The so-called ‘war on waiting’ led by Blair in a transformational style, started
with the development of the eighteen-week target that subsequently directed the
process of developing a policy mix that was successful in programmatic improve-
ment terms. In Milburn’s account, the senior officials at the Department of
Health pushed for twelve months as the target for 2005, but the maximum wait
in Europe was about three months. A close friend of Alan Milburn, who became
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Secretary of State for Health in October 1999, died of a heart attack while on a
waiting list to see a cardiologist; Milburn reports this as catalysing his own person-
nel commitment to improving NHS performance on waiting times (Timmins and
Milburn 2002). Quoted by Timmins in the Financial Times (13 March 2010),
Milburn began to understand as Secretary of State ‘that for the public, waiting
was the thing’. Cutting waiting times was not necessarily what staff wanted but this
was what the public mood demanded.
Milburn claims success in persuading Blair to make this financial commitment.
The key internal political dynamic of the Labour government was an ongoing feud
between Brown and Blair (Campbell 2007; Rawnsley 2010). In this case, being
bounced on TV provoked fury from Brown. However, the sustained increases in
health expenditure did eventuate and this was important backdrop to the subse-
quent reform process.
With the money secured, the first in a series of ‘once-in-a-generation’ NHS
reforms was launched in the summer of 2000, followed by similar rhetorical
flourishes in reforms of 2002, 2004, and 2006. Targets came ahead of other
instruments in the policy mix; the 2000 version included commitments to no
more than a four-hour wait in accident and emergency, no more than a three-
month wait for an outpatient appointment by 2005, and no more than six months
for an inpatient operation by the same date.
Contexts, Challenges, and Agents of Reform
Klein (1990: 700) refers to the relationship between the government and the
medical profession in the UK in NHS policy as the ‘politics of the double bed’—
the government secured an electorally popular and important public service in
exchange for the medical profession securing favourable terms and conditions
(most notably in terms of pay).
There were two ‘rules of the game’ that underpinned the institution of the NHS
double bed between 1948 and the mid-1980s. The first was that each actor should
trust the other on both the process and substance of policymaking. Wistow (1992)
talks of trust becoming ‘embedded’ in the NHS policy community. This trust
supported a consensus on how business was to be conducted, as Jordan and
Richardson (1987: 101) describe it: ‘the process by which and the atmosphere
within which policy-making is decided’. In particular, this meant the exclusion of
other potential interests in healthcare policy, for example, public opinion, Parlia-
ment, the rest of Whitehall, and hospital managers. Ham (1992), Webster (1988),
and Klein (2005) describe how this exclusion became heavily institutionalized
after 1948. The British Medical Association (BMA) had privileged access and a
central role at every stage of the policymaking process.
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The second rule was to be bound by the implicit contract (Wistow 1992; Klein
2005) between the government and the medical profession. The contract was that
the former respected clinical autonomy in how to use resources but the latter
accepted that the decision on the overall level of resources, the budgetary con-
straint, was a matter for the government. It was on the basis of the observance of
these two rules that the healthcare policymaking in the UK has been described as a
policy community.
It is the breakdown of this policy community that created the context condu-
cive the waiting list reforms of New Labour. The Conservative government of John
Major had introduced a range of NHS reforms in April 1991, the outcome of an
extended and bitter reform process initiated by Margaret Thatcher after winning a
third general election in June 1987. There is a consensus in the historical commentary
on the NHS that these were the first significant reforms in its history (Webster 1998;
Ham 1999; Klein 2005). They were designed to improve performance, including on
waiting times, by addressing long identified weaknesses in its centralized manage-
ment structure. AsWistow (1992: 59) put it, resource allocation within the NHS was
‘determined largely by the sum of the individualistic behaviour of individual doctors
rather than through a hierarchical process of resource management’.
The two ‘rules of the game’ of the healthcare policy community were not
observed in this reform process. First, the trust between the government and the
BMA on how business was to be conducted broke down. Second, the ‘implicit
contract’ between the government and the BMA that set out the areas in which it
was appropriate for each to take political action was not respected.
New Labour policy mixes on waiting lists strongly echo, and in most cases, are
the direct descendants of the attempts by the Major government to compensate
for the lack of ‘the right economic signals’ by introducing new incentive struc-
tures. The Major reforms were designed to encourage provider units and NHS
staff to meet the ‘limitless demand’ for state-funded healthcare within a cash-
limited, public budget (Thatcher 1993: 606). To this end, the reforms introduced
an ‘internal market’ for NHS services, which separated the purchasing and
provision of healthcare interventions, and allowed GPs to elect to hold a cash-
limited budget for the purchase of a limited range of secondary care, staffing and
pharmaceutical services (GP fundholding).
The NHS internal market, including the GP fundholding element, was abol-
ished by the Labour government elected in May 1997 and marked the extent of its
ambition on health policy reform until 2000. Nevertheless, the experience of NHS
reform in the early 1990s was a key contextual factor in which waiting list policy
developed after 2000. Notably the policy ideas around commissioning which
emerged after 2002 have their direct origins in GP fundholding.
The internal market had been introduced and abolished without policy-makers
having any useful evidence of its effects (Kay 2001). For example, the GP
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fundholding scheme was abolished despite 57 per cent of GPs having opted to be
fundholders by 1997/98. This figure had increased in every year of the scheme and
was a proxy for the increasing acceptance of the scheme among GPs.
The Conservative government had decided against any appraisal, early evalu-
ation, or piloting of the internal market, partly due to fears that the medical
profession would sabotage such an enterprise in the aftermath of the very public
battles with the BMA in the process of introducing the NHS internal market.
Throughout the period 1991–7 the Labour Party, as the official opposition,
maintained its commitment to abolish the internal market if elected to power.
In a variety of contexts, it consistently made the claim that the GP fundholding
scheme had created a ‘two-tier’ NHS. The accusation that fundholders had
preferential access to secondary care, whilst it may have been true, was never
actually substantiated. The major fundholding literature reviews (Petchey 1995;
Baines et al. 1997; Gosden and Torgenson 1997; Smith et al 1997; Louden et al.
1998; Smith and Wilton 1998; Ham 1999) suggested that the evidence on the
desirability and effectiveness of the scheme was both limited and equivocal
when fundholding was abolished by the Labour government. Instead, the motiv-
ating factor for abolition seems to have been the history of fundholding as a
political issue.
The Labour government’s first Secretary of State for Health, Frank Dobson,
suspended entry into the fundholding scheme in May 1997 and instructed hos-
pitals to introduce common waiting lists for fundholding and non-fundholding
patients. Six months later, the government published a white paper, The New
NHS: Modern, Dependable, with proposals for a replacement. The 1998 National
Health Service Act abolished the key elements of the internal market, and intro-
duced Primary Care Groups (PCGs). Despite this being the zenith of commit-
ments to evidence-based policymaking in UK government, there was no provision
for: (i) the piloting of PCGs before their implementation; or (ii) a systematic
evaluation of the fundholding scheme before its replacement.
Although Labour’s plans allowed GP fundholding to be abolished without, in
principle, discarding the effective aspects of the scheme, the absence of a system-
atic evaluation has meant that conclusive evidence on what aspects of the initiative
worked was not available to the government or to PCGs. In the absence of clear
evidence, many of the main policy mixes of the internal market, including
fundholding recast as ‘world class’ commissioning after 2002, were never com-
pletely abandoned. Their redundancy was temporary and they were reintroduced
into the NHS policy agenda in different ways and forms from the summer of 2000
onwards.
Evidence-based policymaking requires a degree of trust to exist between
policy-makers and the part of society that is the subject of policy. In the case of
the NHS internal market, there was an absence of trust in the relationship between
the BMA and the government. Two main reasons account for this. First, the
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scheme was the subject of strong party political opposition and the Conservative
government had a long-held suspicion that the BMA had been working in
‘unspoken alliance’ with the Labour Party. Second, the scheme itself was deliber-
ately divisive of GPs; it produced two groups, the fundholders and the non-
fundholders. In a climate without trust, any evidence would inevitably be the
subject of political manipulation, or in the current terminology, ‘spin’.
As Hunter (1998: 133) puts it, in the UK ‘Health policy has been driven by a
mix of ideology, fashion and pragmatism but never by evidence.’ The internal
market episode illustrates the process problems associated with attempting to
formulate health policy in the absence of reliable data on the effects and cost-
effectiveness of new initiatives and those already in place. Policy-makers may
have no means of identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the policy initiatives
that they introduce, or determining what elements of existing policies should
be incorporated into future schemes. Of course, what is required for a more
evidence-based approach to policymaking is a detailed analysis or model of the
significant motors of change in NHS general practice. However, to produce such
work requires a commitment by government to systematic policy evaluation and a
period of policy stability not observed in the NHS since the mid-1980s.
In political assessment terms, the major consequence of the internal market was
a changed political context of NHS reform. Smith (1993: 165) suggests that: ‘for
most of the postwar period, the relationship between the government and the
doctors can be characterised as a closed policy community’.
The NHS policy community between 1948 and the end of the 1980s favoured
incremental and limited change because radical change threatened the consensus
on which the community was based. These marginal adjustments to policy were
developed through high level, closed, and routine relations with senior civil
servants who shared a commitment to that policy. Within the healthcare policy
community, ‘conventional wisdom has emphasized the dominant nature of pro-
fessional rather than political or managerial influences’ (Wistow 1992: 51). This
led Rhodes (1988: 78) to label the situation as a particular type of policy commu-
nity, a ‘professionalised network’. The medical profession enjoyed a large pool of
political resources: notably control of technical and specialist knowledge. The
perception of the medical profession as apolitical (in party political terms at least)
helped give the views of the BMA a moral authority and make them, potentially,
highly influential in public opinion (Klein 2005).
The institutional context also helps explain the political strength of the medical
profession in Britain. The NHS is a publicly funded healthcare system, with
publicly owned hospitals. From 1948, successive governments had relied on
doctors to deliver healthcare policy. For this reason the healthcare policy com-
munity came to be highly institutionalized after 1948 with the medical profession
having a central role at every stage of the policymaking process (Webster 1988;
Ham 1992; Klein 2005).
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Klein (2005), Smith (1993), and Wistow (1992) all suggest that the enactment
of the 1991 NHS reforms, and GP fundholding in particular, unsettled the policy
community in healthcare. The style of both the NHS Review and the subsequent
enactment of the NHS and Community Care Act provided the threat. Kay (2001)
argues that development of GP fundholding is the first observable indication of
the breakup of the NHS healthcare policy community. Further, the development
of the GP fundholding scheme was not based on evidence but rather guided by a
‘folk theorems’; and this lack of an evidence-based approach was a consequence of
the collapse of the healthcare policy community and has become typical of health
policy reform in the UK over the subsequent quarter of a century.
The decision by the incoming New Labour government to abolish the internal
market did not solve the problems of the NHS. Indeed, the salient challenge of
waiting lists continued as queues grew unabated. As Alan Milburn observed, staff
working in NHS wrestled with the consequences of significant ongoing organiza-
tion changes from the introduction and abolition of the internal market and did
not see waiting lists as the highest policy priority (Timmins 2010).
Reform Design and Choice
Despite Gordon Brown’s initial strong resistance to Tony Blair’s January 2000
financial pledge, the outturn was an unprecedented rate of growth in NHS
spending of almost 7.5 per cent annually in real terms in the subsequent six
years. This was the context to the policy design process on NHS waiting time
reduction. The extra funding served to increase NHS capacity, something which
was acknowledged in the publication of the Wanless Report (Wanless 2002) to the
Treasury. The report set out detailed empirical analysis of the chronic underfund-
ing of the NHS both comparatively but also in terms of pressures that changing
health needs of the population placed upon the service. The conversion of
financial resources into extra capacity to provide medical care facilitated policy
design options that had not been previously available. However, politically, it had
the effect of reinforcing internal pressure in the government for the NHS to deliver
meaningful improvements in waiting times. The mantra that a ‘step change in
resources must mean a step change in reform’ was repeated publicly by the Prime
Minister, Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the Secretary of State.
The additional money and attendant politics put the NHS on an unexpected
policy reform path three years after Labour taking office in 1997. The internal
market and GP fundholding had been abolished in 1998 with a stress on cooper-
ation replacing competition in the 1997 White Paper. Yet, importantly for the
policy design process after 2000, the split between providers and purchasers
(commissioning as it came to be known) remained in place. The idea of fund-
holding as a policy instrument endured in the PCGs, which soon evolved into
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Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) and were to be responsible for commissioning the
care needed by their populations. The 1997 NHSWhite Paper had argued that this
represented ‘a “third way” between stifling top down command and control on the
one hand, and random and wasteful grass roots free-for-all on the other’ (quoted
in Klein 2007: 41).
However, it was command and control—or targets and terror—that dominated
initially in the policy design process after 2000. Klein (2007) reports that NHS
managers estimated they had to meet 300-plus targets at one point. There was a
highly-developed system of rewards and punishments for performance on the
targets for reducing waiting lists. The 2000 NHS White Paper, The NHS Plan, was
clear that the extra resources would mean reduced waiting times, bring an end to
the postcode lottery in access to drugs, and lead to a more ‘patient-centred’ NHS.
The strength of the political commitment to an aggressive target-based policy to
reduce the very long waiting lists for non-emergency care in the NHS was a
change from 1997. Maximum waiting times, rather than total numbers waiting,
were set on an annual basis, monitored monthly, and reduced each year. The 2000
NHS reform imposed the target on NHS hospitals in England of no patients
waiting for inpatient treatment for more than eighteen months by the end of
March 2001. The target was then scheduled to decrease annually by three months
until the maximum waiting time was six months by the end of 2005.
Performance against targets was published widely and used as the basis for
direct sanctions and rewards. Managers of poorly performing hospitals could be
fired, while managers of high performing hospitals were granted greater auton-
omy in how they managed their hospitals and the freedom to keep certain
surpluses. In policy design process terms, there were several distinctive features
of this target-driven performance regime in the NHS. First, the targets were set
over several years and scheduled to increase over time. Second, the penalties for
failure to achieve these targets were judged by some experts as strong enough for
the epithet ‘targets and terror’ and compared to the targets set for managers of
state enterprises in pre-reform Soviet Russia (Bevan and Hood 2006).
Despite the visible political commitment from the Prime Minister to the targets
in the 2000 NHS Plan, in policy design terms it arguably represents continuity
from the 1997 White Paper—a shift to more highly powered incentives for
performance improvement rather than fundamental change in the NHS. In the
policy design process, the controversial ideas of patient choice and competition
only came two years later when the government published its third major White
Paper of its then five-year tenure, Delivering the NHS Plan (Department of
Health 2002). Milburn and Timmins (2002) report this as the critical juncture
in their understanding of the reform design process, where Milburn—as Secretary
of State for Health—accepted the limitations of the command and control system
that he and his predecessor had developed steadily since 1997. By the summer of
2001, while the very longest waits were beginning to be eliminated, it appeared
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that the extra financial resources allocated to the NHS were still not producing a
significant increase in activity, in terms of the number of patients who were being
seen and treated.
The centralized approach to managing the NHS from Whitehall was being
questioned inside and outside the Labour government (Greener et al. 2014). The
policy design process began to involve the development of options for other policy
instruments to complement top-down targets and tough performance manage-
ment. Policy ideas were revived from the abandoned inheritance from the Con-
servative government internal market reform efforts in the 1990s.
A recognition of the limits of top-down approaches to an organization on the
scale of NHS England in the party which introduced the NHS is significant. It
touched on a perennial theme in NHS policy and politics of devolving power, and
arguably touched on big questions of decentralization of the UK state more
broadly. The oft-quoted dictum of the Labour cabinet minister who led the
introduction of the NHS in 1948, Aneurin Bevan, was that if a hospital bedpan
is dropped in a hospital corridor in Tredegar (his South Wales constituency), the
reverberations should echo around Whitehall. As described below, any deviation
from this was controversial in Old Labour circles as a seeming abandonment of
principles of territorial equity and tantamount to surrendering democratic control
in favour of unaccountable hospital managers, still further the thin end of the
wedge of full-scale privatization of the NHS. Decentralization in the NHS remains
an important and ongoing agenda of 2018 health policy discussion in the UK.
The 2002White Paper set out the main NHS policy trajectories for the rest of the
New Labour period in office: a devolved NHS, a diversity of providers competing,
payment by results, and patient choice as the central value to be represented in
policy. In doing so, the balance of political power within the NHS was tilted: for
example, in the concept of Foundation Trust status to reward efficient NHS
primary care and secondary care organizations by granting them autonomy.
Practice-based commissioning—GP fundholding in 1990s terminology—and
national standards against which the performance of trusts would be assessed
were also introduced.
In terms of the policy design to reduce NHS waiting times, the central policy
instrument for performance management was a system of star ratings. This was
applied to hospitals from 2001; each organization being evaluated was given a
score on a scale of 0 to 3 stars based on performance on a limited range of key
targets as well as against a wider range of targets and indicators on a balanced
scorecard. Six of the nine key targets concerned waiting lists and one of the three
domains, patient focus, in the balanced scorecard was dominated by data reported
against waiting time targets. Hospitals that failed to achieve key targets were rated
zero and publicly ‘named and shamed’ as failing. The possible sanction on hospital
chief executives was losing their jobs. Timmins (2010) reports that among chief
executives of NHS hospitals, the waiting time goals were better known as P45
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targets. In the UK, a P45 is the tax form given to an employee when they stop
working for an organization. It is used colloquially to mean being sacked. Six of
the twelve chief executives of hospital trusts given zero rating in 2001 were sacked.
Organizations that performed well on both the key targets and the balanced
scorecard, and achieved the highest rating of three stars, were rewarded by
being publicly celebrated for being high performing and ceded various forms of
earned autonomy (Bevan and Hood 2006).
Following Labour’s initial success with its literacy and numeracy strategy,
Blair had created a Delivery Unit in Number 10 headed by Michael Barber.
Its purpose was to drive through his key public sector reforms, not just for
health, but for education, crime, and transport. The unit tracked progress on
waiting times almost daily. Barber (2007) reports that critical to progress
on waiting times through top-down targets was that Blair held scheduled
monthly meetings with Milburn to take stock of progress on waiting times
using real time data. Milburn then pressed the department’s civil servants who
in turn pushed hospital chief executives on performance problems. Some of
these executives report getting weekly phone calls from the government; when
they struggled to redesign services to reduce waiting times, specialist teams were
assigned ‘to help them’. For both Barber and Milburn (Barber 2007; Milburn and
Timmins 2002) the scheduled monthly attention of the Prime Minister on
waiting times really mattered in terms of performance. For these two key actors,
the ‘brutal’ performance management regime (Bevan and Hood 2006) repre-
sented the first time in NHS history that there was a clear line of sight in
accountability terms from the Prime Minister down to hospital chief executives
in charge of delivery of medical care at the street-level.
From 2002 onwards, the policy design process took a highly controversial turn.
The 2002 White Paper signalled a series of policy instruments to promote
competition and choice in the NHS. Although presented as the next phases in
the ‘war on waiting’ (Harrison and Appleby 2005), the introduction of privately
run surgical units, known as independent sector treatment centres, to treat NHS
patients was bitterly contested. Further controversy followed with the creation of
Foundation Trusts—free-standing hospitals no longer directly answerable to
Whitehall and run autonomously as businesses with ultimate responsibility for
their own performance. And finally, patients were given the right to choose where
they were treated, initially within the NHS, but then at any private hospital
prepared to take them at the NHS price. After a very slow start, the numbers of
people taking advantage of this right began to grow.
This was deeply unpopular within parts of the NHS and, even in 2018, this
period of reform is sometimes regarded by critics of New Labour as the beginning
of the privatization of the NHS. The BMA referred to the ‘commercialization’ of
the NHS and saw this as the slippery slope idea that private companies should
make profits out of healthcare. It was also unpopular with many Labour
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backbenchers. However, most of these choice and competition reforms could be
achieved through existing ministerial powers rather than requiring new legisla-
tion. With Blair committed to a more market-like approach to reforming public
services more generally, successive secretaries of state for health continued to
implement internal market type reforms. The significant policy design for which
primary legislation was needed—the creation of Foundation Trusts—produced
some of the biggest backbench rebellions of Blair’s time as Prime Minister. There
were nine rebellions during the passage of the Health and Social Care (Commu-
nity Health and Standards) Act that established Foundation Hospital Trusts.
This mix of policy instruments made the difference in reducing waiting times to
the shortest in the NHS’s sixty-year history by 2010. The extra spending went
throughout the NHS and large pay rises. There is no available estimate on how
much specifically went on waiting lists for elective surgery (which accounts for
about 12 per cent of total expenditure) but it was clearly focused.
Delivery, Legitimacy, and Endurance
of the Waiting Times Reduction Effort
In 1997, Sir Michael Barber was the key figure in setting the recently elected
Labour government’s initial targets on literacy standards as Head of the Standards
and Effectiveness Unit under David Blunkett at the Department for Education and
Employment. He became head of the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit in the second
term of Tony Blair but left government for a consultancy career after Blair’s third
election victory in 2005. He was the New Labour face of a whole set of imple-
mentation routines in Whitehall and credited with introducing a widely-
lampooned bureaucratic vocabulary: New Labour ministers talked in terms of
trajectories of travel, stocktakes, delivery reports, and traffic light systems. The
term ‘deliverology’, initially a pejorative term coined by senior civil servants for
Barber’s endeavours and personal style, became a firmly established neologism in
the administrative history of this period of UK government.
Barber (2007) gave an insider account of the use of targets for programmatic
success even if, politically, the UKmedia was wont to ignore successes against target
and instead concentrated exclusively on the manipulation of statistics in the pres-
entation of performance and the outright failures. He explains in his personal
account of this period that there was relatively little attention given to the accuracy
or validity of performance data on which the target system was based. Many experts
highlighted the problems reconciling and/or linking administrative and survey data
on health service waiting times (Bevan and Hood 2006). However, for Barber, the
targets focused attention with a clear success definition, expressed political priority,
and forced honest and sometimes uncomfortable conversations about bad news and
surprises. Routine oversight was the priority over measurement accuracy.
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The devolution process launched by Blair’s government immediately after
election has been avoided hitherto in the chapter. It is part of the waiting times
story. Following referenda in Scotland and Wales in September 1997, the Scottish
Parliament and National Assembly for Wales were established with management
of the delivery of healthcare devolved such that analysts talked of four NHSs
(Greer 2004). As such, devolution in the UK offers some potential for a natural
experiment to reveal some evidence that the ‘targets and terror’ of New Labour
(England) was successful in programmatic terms.
The analysis presented by Propper et al. (2008, 2010) shows waiting times
having fallen far faster in England than in either Wales and Scotland in the decade
after devolution. Both devolved administrations received broadly similar increases
in NHS spending in real terms as England though a mixture of bureaucratic by-
passes of the Barnett formula and local decisions over the allocation of block
funds. Both Scotland and Wales had higher NHS expenditure per capita baselines
in 2000. All three adopted similar waiting time targets. However, only in England
were these accompanied by the strong top-down performance management and
‘naming and shaming’ described above.
In the literature that looks at Scottish andWelsh devolution in the NHS, there is
a seam of research looking at differential impacts of waiting times targets. Alvarez-
Rosete et al. (2005) and Bevan and Hood (2006) examined trends at the England,
Scotland, and Wales level. Hauck and Street (2007) undertook a detailed analysis
across three English hospital trusts and one Welsh hospital trust close to the
border between Wales and England. Propper et al. (2008) looked at differences
between England and Scotland and estimated difference-in-difference models of
the proportion of people on the waiting list at three points in the waiting times
distribution (the proportion who waited over 6, 9, and 12 months). Besley et al.
(2008) compared waiting times for hospitals in Wales with those in England.
Each of these peer-reviewed publications suggests that the waiting times targets
and associated performance regime did reduce waiting times in England. Propper
et al. (2008) estimate the effect of the English target regime for waiting times by a
comparative analysis with Scotland, which did not adopt the target regime. They
report that the ‘targets and terror’ regime after 2000 in England lowered the
proportion of people waiting for elective treatment relative to Scotland. In a
follow-up study as a natural experiment, Propper et al. (2010) examined whether
the falls in waiting times had been the result of gaming and diversion of activity or
had produced adverse effects on the quality of medical care. Their finding was
unequivocal: the use of targets as a policy instrument backed by performance
management succeeded in meeting the goals of reducing waiting times without
diverting activity from other less well monitored aspects of healthcare and without
decreasing patient health on exit from hospital.
In Scotland, in contrast, the Scottish Executive (responsible for health policy)
had chosen not to adopt this target regime. Instead, from devolution in 1999, it
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focused on the abolition of the 1990s internal market and the re-introduction of a
professionally-led, integrated system based on concepts such as managed clinical
networks (Alvarez-Rosete et al. 2005). Targets played little role. In Wales, not
using NHS targets and performance management was celebrated as a highly
visible demonstration of ‘clear red water’ between Welsh First Minister, Rhodri
Morgan and Tony Blair. Instead, the Old Labour approach of top-down organ-
izational restructures were the preferred policy instrument in Wales.
How far competition and choice—which the Scots and Welsh also eschewed—
made a difference in waiting time performance is more debated (Greener et al.
2014). The number of NHS operations carried out by the independent sector
treatment centres and private hospitals is very small compared with the NHS’s
own activity. The existing published studies on the question—Propper et al.
(2008); Harrison and Appleby (2005, 2009); Bevan and Skellern (2011); Cooper
et al. (2012); Miller et al. (2012)—are inconclusive on the nature and scale of the
role patient choice and competition plays in the policy mix. There is some limited
evidence to suggest that competition between hospitals may improve the quality of
care (Propper et al. 2008, 2010).
Anecdotally, there is expert opinion from NHS insiders that choice and compe-
tition produced a fear that hospitals would lose patients and affected performance.
Duncan Selbie, the NHS performance director for much of the 2000s was quoted in
the Local Government Chronicle (20 September 2012) suggesting that this was an
important part of the policy mix. Timmins (2010) reports further anecdotal evi-
dence to back up this view. For example, Mike Parish, chief executive of Care UK,
one of the independent sector treatment centre providers, recalls a conversation
with an NHS hospital chief. ‘I asked him why his activity and productivity had gone
up. “Well,” he said, “we don’t want one of those bloody ISTCs on our doorstep”.’
Governing the NHS by Performance Targets:
Analysis and Conclusions
As a tax-funded service, the NHS had always been more centralized than other
healthcare systems. Bevan’s dictum about bedpans in the South Wales valleys
being monitored in Whitehall, as a guide for governing and public administration,
was never practical, and never achieved practically. But over the decade before
2000, waiting lists had emerged as a public issue as did the gaps in performance
between the most efficient and the least efficient providers. In political assessment
terms, ministers were answerable for every dropped bedpan in the NHS or each
individual case on the waiting list: there was a centralization of blame.
The NHS has endured as a cherished British institution despite repeated
concerns about its actual performance in delivering healthcare to UK citizens.
The chapter investigates how the pattern of political success relative to policy
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performance catalysed a reform process and, in the case of NHS waiting times,
produced significant programmatic success in improved access to NHS services
over the decade from 2000. The waiting times case has been presented a sequenced
pattern of policy success; from politics to process to programme. The sequence in
the case is highly contingent, with various reform processes only being triggered
in the context of an unprecedentedly quick redistribution of national income
towards healthcare provision—a fiscal decision itself made apparently off the cuff
on a UK television show.
The use of top-down performance targets fell out of fashion long before the
electoral defeat of the Labour government in 2010; one Labour Health Secretary,
John Reid, introduced the much-ridiculed target for reducing targets. However,
the evidence suggests that targets and aggressive performance management did
play an important part in the policy mix to reduce waiting times without negative
side effects on patient health.
There are several reasons for this programmatic success. First, because long
waiting lists were seen as a problem by most of society, and were salient in
Westminster politics terms, the targets may have acted as a mission for NHS
employees, inducing additional effort at no cost. Second, the fact that the targets
were announced in advance and were escalating may have meant that production
was reorganized on a long-term basis, so increasing productivity over the long
term, rather than simply resulting in short-term fixes to a one-off policy. Finally,
the policy was accompanied by extra resources. While we have established that
our results are robust to controls for resources, it is probably easier to engage in
extensive service reorganization in a time of generous resources.
The case of NHS waiting times indicates programmatic success but also reveals
an unexpected capacity for bricolage in the UK leading to process success. Labour
strongly opposed the Conservatives’ internal market reforms in the 1990s but
came to adopt and adapt them after several years of policy inertia after 1997.
Whilst Whitehall is littered with policy failures, a number of unsung successes in
NHS policy do seem to have been remembered in the reform process that
developed the waiting times policy mix.
Thinking about any NHS policy reform as a distinct period with an end, a
plaque or ribbon cutting moment is misguided. Health reform is a hardy perennial
of British politics. This means new reform initiatives, problem definitions, and
options for change all become temporally fused with implementation. In policy
cycle terms, whilst there is feedback and possibly lessons to be extracted because
the cycle is spinning at a cadence of major reforms per two years, the implemen-
tation of a specific reform though a distinct activity is not a distinct period. Indeed,
in several implementation programmes, interim evaluations of pilot projects were
starting just as the policy under which they had been initiated was being abolished.
The temporal compression of NHS reform processes has meant that folk
theorems, anecdotes, and ad hoc hunches have often driven policy, rather than
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considered evidence bases. Implementing major healthcare reforms takes a lot of
time and consistent direction; whilst obvious points in the abstract, time and
consistent political commitment have often been difficult to detect in most NHS
reforms of the last twenty-five years or so. This backdrop makes the assessment of
policy success in this chapter notable.
Of course, NHS reform is never a one-shot game but rather a repeated political
game. The inherent features of NHS politics continue to apply after any policy
instrument is introduced or policy mix designed; the gap between policy as
designed and policy as executed is always at the centre of academic study of
implementation. As new models in the process are implemented, they coexist with
the command-and-control structure built up in earlier years. The NHS landscape
therefore represents an often confusing mix of different, overlapping policy strata.
Healthcare reform never starts from a tabula rasa; instead policy is ‘layered’ to use
a term from academic literature on institutions.
To overcome tensions and difficulties of implementation requires consistent
prime ministerial attention, and arguably from a prime minister in the ascendant
politically, in order overcome the potential for bureaucratic inertia, resistance,
transition/switching costs, and transaction costs between old and new elements in
the system that all come into play in the implementation. The pre-Iraq War Tony
Blair appears in retrospect to have been good at keeping the guiding principles of
NHS reform alive. His mantra that ‘I have no reverse gear’ (The Guardian,
1 October 2003) did serve to push the Labour Party in a reform direction which
subsequently has been not just abandoned but thoroughly repudiated.
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The UK has one of the most comprehensive set of tobacco controls in the world.
The scale of its policy development puts it at the forefront of a global model for
tobacco policy led by the World Health Organization, and at the top of the
European league table for tobacco control (Mamudu et al. 2015). It has gone
from ‘laggard’ to ‘leader’ over three decades.
The success of the UK tobacco control case is clearest when seen through the
eyes of public health advocates, who identify tobacco as one of the world’s largest
public health problems and causes of preventable death, and who seek an
‘evidence-based’ theory of change (Cairney 2016). In this context, ‘comprehensive’
tobacco control relates strongly to preventing non-communicable diseases
(NCDs) and early death by regulating the sale and use of tobacco and promoting
healthier behaviour. In this case, long-term programmatic success in terms of
encouraging smoking reduction and ‘denormalization’ of tobacco, was achieved
through an incremental adoption of several evidence-informed policy instru-
ments. It was the cumulative weight of measures dealing with price, promotion,
education and health warnings, plain packaging, and the regulation of ingredients,
sales, who can smoke and where they can smoke that led to such successful
programmatic outcomes. To some extent, this approach is based on a pragmatic
response to uncertainty: if the relative impacts of each policy solution on the
population are uncertain, a combination of all known effective interventions can
produce an effect greater than the sum of their parts. This approach to tobacco
control serves as a model for countries around the world, as well as other public
health measures within the UK (including alcohol and food policies—Cairney and
Studlar 2014).
The main explanation for this comprehensive policy change is how policy-
makers reframed tobacco—from an economic good to a public health epidemic—
and managed the policymaking environment to produce conditions conducive to
policy change. Policy changed markedly when public health actors used new
scientific evidence to reframe tobacco from an economic good to a public health
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epidemic, and when policy-maker attention shifted from ‘should we act?’ to ‘how
should we act?’ The health department became the key player, with rules on
evidence gathering and network formation favouring public health over industry
cooperation. Further, socio-economic changes—including reductions in smoking,
tobacco tax revenue, and opposition to tobacco controls—reduced the political costs
of policy change. This trajectory highlights how a conducive environment and
socio-economic context allowed interested entrepreneurs and motivated policy-
makers a ‘window of opportunity’ for policy change (Kingdon 1984; Cairney and
Yamazaki 2018).
The UK’s ban on smoking in almost all public places is symbolic of a long-term
shift from minimal policy intervention in the 1980s to comprehensive policy by
the mid-2000s. If seen through the eyes of public health advocates, this measure
demonstrates process success, following high public attention and widespread
political deliberation, and political success, as indicated by the perception among
policy-makers that they enjoy unequivocal support by key stakeholders and
diminishing opposition to tobacco control among the public. Although tobacco
control is not exactly popular in the UK, the government has used a ‘permissive
consensus’ among the public, or a level of reduced—and comparatively low—
opposition that has proved conducive to policy innovation in this field (Key 1961;
Cairney et al. 2012: 120).
Focusing alternatively on overall and individual policy changes provides
different indicators of legitimacy and endurance. The trajectory towards com-
prehensive change in a series of incremental steps from the 1980s suggests that
the overall project endured and is now almost taken for granted, even though
each new instrument faced new challenges. A process of denormalizing smoking
has become normalized. A focus on the smoking ban shows that its design—to
punish the building owner, and prioritize enforcement by environmental health
bodies—mattered, and that popular support for the ban became more apparent
after policy change. The ban on smoking in public places is a remarkable
implementation success—it is flouted by almost no one—and it opened the
door for more restrictive measures such as a ban on smoking in cars with
children present.
In the analysis and conclusion of this chapter, I draw lessons relevant to a
dominant theme in public health research and beyond: a desire for ‘evidence-
based policymaking’. By focusing on the conditions under which evidence ‘won
the day’, it becomes apparent how important context, power, and politics are in
explaining the outcomes of this policy. This conclusion matters primarily for
tobacco control’s future success as a model of change for tobacco in other
countries, but also for other public health initiatives in the UK. Therefore, attrib-
uting success primarily to the production of scientific evidence would provide an
incomplete and misleading story on which to build new strategies to emulate UK
success.
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UK Tobacco Control: A Great Policy Success?
The UK’s tobacco success is mainly programmatic, in terms of the social behav-
ioural (and economic) outcomes produced by the policy reforms. Key criteria for
programmatic success are an unusually well-developed and empirically feasible
public value proposition and theory of change (see Chapter 1 in this volume).
Tobacco control’s claim to provide public value and beneficial social outcomes
relates to smoking (and now environmental tobacco smoke) as ‘the number one
preventable cause of premature death and disease in the world’ (Cairney et al.
2012: 1). The theory of change, to reduce smoking and ill health, is empirically
feasible and based on global efforts to identify and share best practice. The policy
has fulfilled its main aim by making a major and measurable contribution to
reduced smoking prevalence (Feliu et al. 2018), albeit with benefits distributed
unequally, since smoking remains a major cause of health inequalities. Program-
matic success has also endured for the long term, with tobacco control increasing
in scope and intensity over several decades, and minimal evidence of any policy
reversals or reductions.
The process and political elements of this case are more difficult to assess,
particularly since stakeholder assessments about adequate deliberation and popu-
larity relate strongly to their own support or opposition to policy change.
However, key measures have received widespread consultation and public atten-
tion and there is now public support for measures—such as a ban in smoking in
public places—that would have seemed unimaginable until the mid-2000s. Fur-
ther, although most policy change happened under the control of one party
(Labour), it was reinforced by the other (Conservative) to produce a strong
sense of policy commitment and endurance. Overall, this paradigmatic policy
change is here to stay.
Programmatic Success
The UK is one of very few countries at the forefront of the global tobacco control
agenda. Programmatic success equates to progress towards ‘comprehensive’
tobacco control via the adoption of a collection of the most evidence-informed
policy instruments. Comprehensiveness is measured according to criteria derived
from the WHO Framework Convention for Tobacco Control (FCTC), which
provides a list of measures to which 181 ‘parties’ (covering 90 per cent of the
global population) have committed (WHO 2017). The measures include:
• Tobacco taxation policy—price and tax measures to reduce demand for
tobacco
• Smoke-free policy—protection from exposure to second-hand smoke
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 25/7/2019, SPi
86   
• Tobacco product regulation—regulation of contents of products (toxic
ingredients)
• Ingredient disclosure—regulation of public tobacco product disclosures
• Health warning labels—at least 30 per cent of the package of tobacco
products should be a health warning
• Education and advocacy—to improve health education, communication,
training, and public awareness
• Banning tobacco advertising, promotion, and sponsorship
• Smoking cessation services
• Prohibiting the illicit trade in tobacco products
• Banning tobacco sales to minors (under 18)
• Litigation against tobacco companies
• Research to monitor and evaluate tobacco control
• Support for economically viable alternatives to tobacco growing. (Mamudu
et al, 2015: 860)
If this list represents indicators of comprehensive policy change, the UK is a key
leader within a group of only nine countries demonstrating the most significant
adoption and implementation of such measures. Although almost every country
has committed to the FCTC in writing, very few have successfully turned that
commitment into meaningful policy change on the ground (Mamudu et al. 2015:
865). Self-reported progress by each country highlights very uneven global imple-
mentation, and expert assessment highlights very limited change in most coun-
tries in key areas such as the regulation of products and illegal sales. Further, very
few countries have matched the UK’s intensity, including relatively high taxation
and a ban on smoking in public places with almost no exceptions (Mamudu et al.
2015: 867–9; Warner and Tam 2012).
A further measure of success comes from the UK’s shifting position from
laggard to leader. In the 1980s, the UK oversaw minimal control, with little
prospect of policy change (Taylor 1984; Read 1996). Baggott (1988: 5) compared
the UK unfavourably to Norway. While both entertained the same measures,
Norway’s had statutory weight while the UK relied on ineffective voluntary
measures favoured by the tobacco industry. The UK was, in many respects, closer
to countries like the Netherlands and Japan, in which tobacco companies had a
major presence and preferred non-statutory measures (Willemsen 2018: 81;
Cairney and Yamazaki 2018). By 2007, the UK had left such countries behind
and leapfrogged Norway to reach the top of the first ‘tobacco control scale’ (TCS)
(Joossens and Raw 2007, 2017) which measures ‘the implementation of a com-
prehensive set of control measures in Europe’ (Cairney and Yamazaki 2018: 255).
The scale uses the top six policy instruments deemed most important by the
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World Bank and assigns percentage points to reflect their importance: price (30),
bans on smoking in public places (22), health education (15), advertising bans
(13), health warnings on products (10), and smoking cessation treatment services
(10) (Joossens and Raw 2017: 8). It then asks country experts to assign scores
according to policy intent and delivery. In each ranking, from 2007–16, the UK
has been ranked first.
This shift of status reflected a shift from voluntary to statutory measures
combined with relatively high commitment to important non-legislative policy
instruments. Key policy changes included: legislation to ban tobacco advertising
(2002), a ban on smoking in almost all public places (2006), an increase in the
minimum age for the sale of cigarettes from 16 to 18 (2007), the introduction of
plain packaging for tobacco products (2015), a ban on smoking in private cars
with children present (2015), high levels of taxation designed to reduce smoking
demand (from the 1980s) coupled with greater customs enforcement, higher
spending on smoking cessation services, and a shift towards unequivocal health
education (Joossens and Raw 2017: 3; Cairney et al. 2012: 101–2).
For public health advocates, the UK’s experience is an ‘evidence-based’ model
for future tobacco control across the globe (Cairney and Yamazaki 2018). Smok-
ing is an urgent domestic and global problem, initiatives such as the tobacco
control scale and FCTC help us identify the most technically feasible responses,
and the UK was one of the fastest and most intense responders, at the forefront
of processing politically feasible options. Further, tobacco control contributed
strongly to reductions in smoking prevalence, such as from 35/31 per cent in
men/women in 1986 to 17/13 per cent in 2017 (ASH 2018). As Feliu et al. (2018)
report in their comparison and quantitative assessment of EU member state
tobacco control, ‘countries with higher scores in the TCS, which indicates
higher tobacco control efforts, have lower prevalence of smokers, higher quit
ratios and higher relative decreases in their prevalence rates of smokers over the
last decade’. As a leader in adopting and implementing precisely those policy
instruments which are empirically linked to the primary goals of tobacco control,
the UK case is an example of programmatic success.
Process Success
The process assessment of tobacco control is more difficult to determine because
the divisions between pro- and anti-smoking coalitions (Cairney 2007a: 57)
necessarily produced winners and losers. This division reduced the possibility
that all stakeholders could see policy deliberation and action, during policy design
and choice, as ‘just and fair’. Indeed, the history of UK tobacco policy is of one
coalition being privileged to the exclusion of another. From the early post-war
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period, and over several decades, medical and public health groups complained
of exclusion from a close-knit policy community between treasury and trade
departments and the tobacco industry, which had gained a patriotic reputation
during the Second World War and had the resources to maintain its insider
position (Read 1996). Now, becoming a party to the FCTC commits countries
to excluding tobacco companies from formal consultation on policy. This position
gives industry stakeholders their turn to describe the policy process as exclusion-
ary (Cairney et al. 2012: 214), while public health stakeholders would see the
exclusion as good policy and policymaking. In a field with such clear winners
and losers, it is difficult to incorporate the role of consensus-seeking or collab-
orative policymaking as an indicator of success.
There is, however, more evidence of the ‘robust deliberation’ of process assess-
ment, at least in relation to key instruments. For example, the UK government was
initially guided strongly by survey opinion which favoured a ban on smoking in
public places but with exemptions for pubs and clubs, and policy only became
more restrictive following wide deliberation and a ‘free vote’ for MPs in West-
minster (Cairney 2009: 478). In Scotland, in which some tobacco control is
devolved to the Scottish Parliament—the smoking ban represented policy innov-
ation within the UK and it became the ‘big idea’ used by the government (led at
the time by a Labour–Liberal Democrat coalition) to legitimize Scottish devolu-
tion and enhance the ‘political capital’ of Scottish politicians (Cairney 2007b: 86).
The Scottish government oversaw a mass consultation in which most respondents
favoured major policy change.
Political Success
The same divisions which clouded procedural success limited the policy’s political
success. There are clearly pro- and anti-smoking coalitions, but over time the former
diminished and the latter grew in importance. Tobacco control in the UK is not
popular per se, but there has been growing citizen acceptance which allows (a)
public health coalitions to push for more tobacco control in line with the FCTC
aims, and (b) governments to show leadership, while confident that the measures
will be accepted over time. Similarly, association with tobacco control does not
exactly ‘enhance the political capital’ of policy-makers, but the UK Labour govern-
ment from 1997–2010 was willing to use much of its new capital—after a landslide
electoral victory—to reform, introduce, or accelerate tobacco control measures
(Cairney and Yamazaki 2018: 255). Indeed, the UK government’s narrative of policy
change was ‘deliberately incremental, with measures to influence, but not get ahead
of, public opinion’ (Cairney 2007a: 50). Further, the Scottish government was
careful not to go too far ahead of opinion without the support of its consultation
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exercise, while acting on the correct assumption that public opinion for tobacco
control becomes more supportive after policy change (Cairney 2011: 170).
The policy’s political success can also be linked to its longevity. Tobacco
control, including the smoking ban, has proved to be highly durable. There is
no equivalent to the Dutch partial reversal of smoking in public places and there
were few implementation problems. Enforcement came largely under the purview
of environmental health officers who made it an initial priority, but seemed to face
minimal opposition, partly because—based on learning from Ireland—the legis-
lation placed the onus on premises owners to enforce customer behaviour on the
government’s behalf (Cairney 2009: 482).
Contexts, Challenges, Agents: The Conditions
Conducive to Policy Change
Policy theories shed insight on the contexts and challenges shaping the success of
tobacco control in the UK (John 2003; Cairney et al. 2012; Cairney 2016; Cairney
and Weible 2017; Heikkila and Cairney 2018; compare with McConnell 2010).
Five key factors or concepts help identify the constituent parts of the policymaking
‘environments’ which provide the conditions conducive to policy change:
1. Actors. There are many actors—policy makers and influencers—operating
in many ‘venues’ (arenas in which authoritative decisions are made) across
many levels and types of government.
2. Institutions. Each venue has developed its own rules, from the formal rules
which are often written down and well understood, to the informal
rules which are often not well known and communicated in ways that are
difficult to identify from the outside. Institutions also help create a sense of
‘path dependence’ when choices made in the past make it relatively expen-
sive to change course (Pierson 2000).
3. Networks. Such rules can relate to the ways in which policy-makers interact
with other actors, based for example on levels of trust built through regular
contact and exchanges of information.
4. Ideas. One way of thinking about the world, or a policy problem, can be
taken for granted or dominate discussion for extended periods of time. Such
dominance—expressed with reference to terms such as paradigms, hege-
mons, or core beliefs—provides the context for discussion of potential
policy solutions.
5. Context and events. Policy-makers face socio-economic conditions and
events over which they have limited control but can interpret and respond
to them in different ways.
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In the UK before the 1980s—and in most countries to the present day—the
tobacco policymaking environment was not conducive to policy change (Cairney
et al. 2012). ‘Critical junctures’, that can be traced back to the Second World War,
helped produce a series of decisions to produce conditions conducive to tobacco
production and consumption for decades (Cairney et al. 2012: 220). Policymaking
power was concentrated primarily in treasury and trade departments in this era.
Those departments tended to reproduce rules which minimized tobacco control.
Their closest networks were with a small number tobacco companies, built
initially on the patriotic image of companies providing cigarettes to aid the war
effort in the Second World War, and reinforced by tobacco strategies to influence
the production and dissemination of science and work closely with policy-makers
to produce largely-voluntary responses to potential smoking harms. Throughout,
the dominant image of tobacco was as an economic good, providing export
revenue, tax revenue, and jobs, with health as a secondary concern addressed
primarily with reference to personal responsibility for healthy behaviour. Socio-
economic conditions were largely supportive of this position, particularly when
tobacco prevalence and taxation was high and public support for policy change
seemed low (albeit in the absence of routine polling, which meant that elected
policy-maker perceptions of attitudes were key).
In this context, paradigmatic policy change would be remarkable, even if it took
place over decades. As Table 5.1 shows, this is what happened in the UK. In terms
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adapted from Howlett and Cashore (2009) and Cashore and Howlett (2007),
policy change is associated with a shift in policy ends and means. Past tobacco
control policy was based on a political economy frame, which emphasized the
economic benefits of the industry and the freedom to make choices such as to
smoke. Contemporary UK tobacco policy is now premised on a public health
frame in which smoking is an epidemic and the challenge is to tackle preventable
NCDs and early mortality by combining a wide range of policy instruments.
There is some debate on how to describe such profound but incremental
change in the absence of a ‘big bang’ event associated with ‘punctuated equilib-
rium’ accounts of institutional change (Hay 2002: 163; Palier 2005: 129; Streeck
and Thelen 2005: 9; Studlar and Cairney 2014: 519). It is also difficult to provide a
highly specific and definitive account of the causal mechanisms of this change
process, or the policy’s main drivers and stewards, since many factors reinforced
one another and each cause of change was necessary but insufficient. However, we
can describe key elements of each change and relate them to the actors and
conditions which produced a policymaking environment far more conducive to
control.
First, scientific evidence was key to long-term policy development. It has been
the main driver in shifts of practitioner, public, media, and policy-maker under-
standing, by identifying a clear causal link between smoking (and ‘passive smok-
ing’), NCDs, and premature death (Cairney et al. 2012: 67). The UK was a key
player in producing early key evidence (e.g. Doll and Hill 1950) and disseminating
it to doctors and policy-makers. The production and effective use of new scientific
evidence helped actors reframe tobacco as an urgent public health epidemic (also
producing economic harms), and shift the question from ‘should we control
tobacco?’ to ‘how should we control tobacco?’ (Feldman and Bayer 2004).
However, we can also see in the UK a lag of twenty to thirty years between the
production of the evidence and a proportionate response, from the evidence of
smoking harm in the 1950s (major policy change began from the 1980s) to newer
evidence on environmental smoke effects from the 1980s (the smoking bans began
from 2005). To some extent, the lag reflected early debate on the causal connec-
tion between smoking and illness until unequivocal statements by the UK Royal
College of Physicians in 1962 and US Surgeon General in 1964 (Pearl and
Mackenzie 2018: 167–9). However, the lag also reflected a wider policy environ-
mental problem in which the evidence alone would not disrupt path dependence.
During this transition, we can see a slow process of change in other key factors.
For example, the evidence of harm encouraged behavioural and attitudinal
change. Socio-economic conditions changed gradually over time, including reduc-
tions in smoking and tax revenue, while reduced opposition to regulations
reduced the perceived political cost of policy change. The effective use of scientific
evidence in persuasion strategies also helped reframe tobacco’s policy image,
which gave health departments more relevance, which increased demand for
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public health evidence, and so on. However, during this long transition, opponents
of tobacco control were able to influence the production and interpretation of
evidence (by commissioning research and hiring scientists to undermine other
research) and to promote less radical solutions—such as to foster individual
choice and trust the industry to regulate its own activities—‘to make it look like
the problem had been solved’ (Cairney et al. 2012: 68). Indeed, a shifting frame to
incorporate addiction over choice only took off from the 1980s, while the new
moniker ‘Big Tobacco’—to describe high power and low credibility—only took off
when industry chief executives were exposed as giving misleading testimony to US
Congress in 1994 (Cairney et al. 2012: 132).
Second, policymaking responsibility shifted from treasury and trade towards
departments of health. The department of health became a key player which was
increasingly likely to consult with the medical and public health groups who
shared their understanding of the problem and were the routine sources of
evidence on possible solutions. While the Treasury was still involved, its role
changed under the Labour government, when it took responsibility for reducing
health inequalities and therefore reframed its definition of tobacco from an
economic good to describe smoking as ‘the single most significant causal factor
for the socio-economic differences in the incidence of cancer and heart disease’
(HM Treasury and Department of Health 2002; Cairney 2007a).
Third, the role of interest groups is now key, but their strategies took decades to
consolidate and come to fruition. Action on Smoking and Health (ASH) was often
working on a shoestring budget, the British Medical Association (BMA) was not
as focused on public health campaigns as it is now, and cancer charities such as
Cancer Research UK have only become overtly politically active since the early
2000s (Baggott 1988: 15; Cairney 2007a). Further, some groups have, in the past,
entertained the idea of policy change through incremental steps, and their
unequivocal stance on health education, policy change, and relationships with
the industry seem to have hardened after policy change began from the 1980s. On
the other hand, their role seems particularly important in a comparative context.
For example, the lack of a public campaigning role of public health groups in
Japan is one factor in its relatively slow policy change (Cairney and Yamazaki
2018), and the inability of NGOs to organize in any comparable way in China (at
least until 2009) puts the role of UK interest groups in a new perspective (Cairney
et al. 2012: 176).
Finally, the party in government mattered for policy innovation. The main
impact occurred when Labour accelerated policy change from 1997, making
policy for the UK in some cases, and providing the conditions for devolved
government policy innovation. It also represented the removal of UK government
opposition to European Union pressure in key areas (with a temporary exception
in advertising—Duina and Kurzer 2004: 67), and the UK generally went far
beyond minimum European Union standards (Cairney and Yamazaki 2018).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 25/7/2019, SPi
      93
Design and Choice: The Window of Opportunity
for a Smoking Ban
A focus on the policymaking environment largely describes conditions conducive
to policy change. In addition, to provide a more detailed and convincing account
of the drivers for policy design, we need to explain the different ways in which
different policy instruments came to exist. Each instrument has its own story
relating to the motive to propose and design policy in a more or less ambitious
way, the measure of success, and the role of key actors. To demonstrate, I draw
briefly on MSA to provide a more detailed explanation of the design and choice of
the ban on smoking in public places in the UK. MSA invites us to focus on the
need for three ‘streams’ to come together during a ‘window of opportunity’ for
policy change (Kingdon 1984; Cairney and Jones 2016; Jones et al. 2016):
• Problem stream—attention lurches to a policy problem. There are no objective
indicators to determine which problems deserve attention, and perceptions
of problems can change quickly. In some cases, issues receive attention
because of a crisis or change in the scale of the problem, but the emphasis
of MSA is on the more or less successful framing strategies of participants
competing for policy-maker attention. Getting attention to one way of
looking at a problem is a major achievement which must be acted upon
quickly, before attention shifts elsewhere.
• Policy stream—a solution to that problem is available. While attention
lurches quickly from issue to issue, viable solutions involving major policy
change take time to develop. Kingdon describes ideas in a ‘policy primeval
soup’, evolving as they are proposed by one actor then reconsidered and
modified by a large number of participants.
• Politics stream—policy-makers have the motive and opportunity to turn it
into policy. They have to pay attention to the problem, and be receptive to the
proposed solution, perhaps because it is consistent with their beliefs, fits the
‘national mood’, or represents a way to address the feedback they receive
from interest groups and political parties.
MSA also emphasizes the role of key actors—‘policy entrepreneurs’—with the
skills, tenacity, and connections to know how to frame policy, propose solutions,
influence policy-maker receptivity, and therefore help exploit those windows of
opportunity (Cairney 2018). In particular, they help develop technically and
politically feasible solutions in anticipation of future attention to problems, then
find the right time to exploit attention.
In this case, there were actually four separate windows of opportunity in the UK
because there were four relevant governments from 1999: the UK, making public
health policy primarily for England (and legislating to allow Wales and Northern
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Ireland to act), the Scottish Parliament with legislative powers, the National
Assembly for Wales which showed the earliest interest but did not possess
sufficient powers, and the Northern Ireland Assembly as the last to pay attention
to this issue during the suspension of devolution (Cairney 2009; Cairney and
Yamazaki 2018). All three devolved governments relied on direct support from
the UK government to pursue their aims, but their actions also influenced the
Westminster debate and subsequent vote for a full ban (Cairney 2009: 476–7).
Although they produced similar policy choices and outcomes, the timing and
content of debate differed, and some comparisons help us clarity the relationship
between conducive conditions and key actors/interventions. Described initially in
terms of the three ‘streams’ (see Cairney 2009: 477) we see:
• The problem stream. Policy-makers in each territory paid high attention to
the issue from the early 2000s and paid greater attention to the need to
restrict smoking in public places, but framed evidence (such as on public
opinion) differently.
• The policy stream. The UK government was learning primarily from US
experience, in which key states introduced partial and incremental bans. The
Irish experience of a complete ban in 2004 had a greater influence on the
devolved agenda.
• The politics stream. The party of government mattered, with Labour in office
in the UK, Scotland (in coalition), and Wales, and generally more in favour
of tobacco control than the Conservative Party (in Northern Ireland, there
was cross-party support for tobacco control to emulate Ireland).
In the UK, Health Secretary John Reid (2003–5) played an unusual role as a
major player whose actions provided direct and indirect support for other entre-
preneurs. Crucially, as a senior member of the government, he ensured that the
Department of Health was central to policy, allowing actors in favour of tobacco
control, such as the Chief Medical Officer, to set the agenda at the expense of
tobacco companies. However, Reid also opposed a full ban on smoking in public
places (a position reflected in Labour’s 2005 general election manifesto), so the
Department of Health described survey opinion (correctly) as in favour of a
partial ban which exempted pubs and clubs and pursued the relatively incremental
strategy to limit smoking in stages. The full ban only took shape after Reid’s
replacement as Health Secretary in 2005 by Patricia Hewitt, who opposed it but
less vigorously. In the lead up to passing the legislation in 2006, several actions
were key:
• Health Select Committee chair Kevin Barron, and All-Party Parliamentary
Group on Smoking and Health chair David Taylor persuaded Prime Minis-
ter Tony Blair to allow a ‘free vote’ on the legislation.
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• The BMA (and local doctors) and ASH pursued an intense lobbying cam-
paign in many MP constituencies.
• Groups like Cancer Research UK (lobbying government in this way for the
first time) and the Chartered Institute of Environmental Health highlighted
major problems with a partial ban.
• When the government appeared to strengthen its ban, and only exempt private
clubs, the British Beer and Pub Association reversed its economically-driven
opposition to exemptions (in other words, it was not part of a well-coordinated
actionbuilt onother concerns, such as a libertarian argument—Cairney 2007a: 58).
Overall, policy-maker and public attention to the proposed legislation was high,
multiple solutions (including a full or partial ban) existed, the free vote gave
Labour MPs the opportunity to vote for a full ban, and lobbying campaigns in
favour of legislation reinforced their motive (Cairney 2007a).
In Scotland, the process played out differently (Cairney 2007b). Early legisla-
tion took shape from the early 2000s, via a Member’s Bill developed by a cross-
party group including the BMA Scotland and ASH Scotland, taken forward by
Scottish National Party (SNP) MSP Stewart Maxwell in 2003. This bill was
relatively unopposed by a tobacco industry that did not take devolution particu-
larly seriously (Cairney 2009: 481). The bill proposed a smoking ban in areas such
as government buildings, partly to reflect (a) Maxwell’s perceived limits to Scottish
Parliament powers and (b) wider politician uncertainty about public opinion in
the early 2000s. Several factors then contributed to the Scottish government’s
decision to introduce a full ban in 2005:
• The Scottish Parliament Health Committee signalled to Scottish ministers
that they would support Maxwell’s bill after scrutiny.
• The BMA and ASH Scotland had agreed to participate in a press conference
lauding Maxwell and criticizing government inaction.
• Ireland had produced comprehensive legislation.
• Some key actors—including Deputy Health Minister Tom McCabe and the
Scottish Government’s Chief Medical Officer—had already signalled internal
support for more action and began to see their chance to act more intensely.
First Minister Jack McConnell was able to use these conditions to sell policy
change, with reference to committee activity, McCabe, the CMO, and the Irish
experience. Indeed, the smoking ban legislation gave the Scottish government the
‘big idea’ that it sought to justify the cost of Scottish devolution (Cairney 2007b:
86), emphasizing the scope for policy innovation within the UK, three-party
support (Labour and Liberal Democrat in government, and the SNP as the main
party outside of government) and the popularity of the move in relation to a
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 25/7/2019, SPi
96   
massive public consultation to demonstrate majority support for a full ban akin to
that in Ireland (Cairney 2009: 478–9).
In each case, the main point is that we can identify a policymaking environment
conducive to policy change, but politics and perceptions of public opinion really
mattered. Throughout this period, there was a strong element of contingency, and
the possibility of an extreme range of results, from no legislation at all (up to 2003)
to a partial ban (2003–4) and the realistic prospect of a comprehensive ban on
smoking in public places (from 2004). Perhaps the strongest indicator of contin-
gency is the surprise expressed by participants that the issue rose so quickly on the
agenda, and a full ban became politically feasible, after such a long period of
legislative hesitancy (Cairney 2007a, 2007b). For example, devolution occurred in
1999, the first Scottish government initially favoured voluntary measures—agreed
with industry stakeholders—to give premises the choice to allow smoking or not,
the BMA expressed frustration in 2003 that policy-makers would not even discuss
the issue, and yet the full ban was government policy by 2004 (Cairney 2007b).
Similarly, Scotland’s Chief Medical Officer would not propose a full ban because it
‘was utterly opposed by so many that a full ban would happen but not in their
lifetime’ (Cairney 2009: 480). Even by 2004, the Scottish Government was express-
ing caution:
Much progress has been made in smoke-free environments in public places in
Scotland through voluntary action . . . in our view statutory controls would only
be truly effective—and ultimately enforceable—if they take place in an environ-
ment in which the legislation reflects rather than attempts to force public opinion
on what remains essentially an issue of personal behaviour.
(Scottish Executive 2004: 25)
Although it subsequently went ahead of public opinion, the Scottish government
only decided to do so when ministers ‘sensed a shifting public mood’ and
predicted that public opinion would—as in Ireland—shift after policy change
(Cairney 2007b: 84).
The UK government had been even more reluctant to get ahead of opinion. For
example, John Reid expressed concern in public that tobacco control would be
seen as a punishment for the working classes (an argument expressed over several
decades by Labour politicians—Cairney 2007a: 62). The UK government main-
tained a commitment to incremental change before its position was quickly
overtaken by events and choices in Westminster (Cairney 2007a). In that context,
the sense among Labour MPs that public opinion was changing—and would
change after legislation—combined with BMA and ASH pressure, and scientific
evidence on the harms of passive smoking, to produce policy change during a
window of opportunity (Cairney 2009: 480).
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Delivery, Legitimacy, and Endurance: Smoking
Denormalization
The long-term legitimacy of tobacco control is best indicated by four main factors.
First, there has been no significant public debate or pressure to reverse or reduce
the smoking ban since its introduction (unlike the Netherlands, in which a partial
reversal is apparent—Willemsen 2018). Instead, UK public opinion has shown
majority support for the ban after its implementation (Cairney et al. 2012: 117).
Second, the delivery or implementation of the smoking ban appears to be one of
the most impressive cases of its type, in which it is difficult to find any evidence of
a breach of policy in any public places (with the exception of very few bars, in
which this illegality would be low on the list of government priorities). In part,
successful implementation resulted from: (a) the high priority given to enforce-
ment by environmental health officers (signalled in the run up to enactment), (b)
the onus on premise owners, not customers, to enforce (producing vivid stories of
bar owners using baseball bats to discourage high fines), and (c) the socio-
economic conditions, in which bars and restaurants were relatively able to accom-
modate policy change via beer gardens and on-street smoking (in Japan, the
relative infeasibility of enforcement—and potential to affect small business—is a
factor in limited change; Cairney and Yamazaki 2018: 264).
Third, since the acceleration of tobacco control took place during Labour’s
term, a key test of the endurance of tobacco control came with the election of a
Conservative-led coalition (2010–15) and single party government (from 2015).
The Conservative government did not reverse, and often reinforced, strong public
health measures. For example, it banned smoking in cars with children in 2015
and obliged plain packaging for tobacco products by 2017 (the packets are sludge
green, with large and vivid anti-smoking messages). These measures would have
seemed unimaginable even during Labour’s government.
Fourth, the endurance of comprehensive tobacco control in the UK is best
evidenced by the continuous accumulation of policy change. The process to
‘denormalize’ smoking—largely by making it harder to buy and find places to
smoke—has become a normal part of UK policy. Each successful policy measure
reflects and reinforces an environment conducive to policy change. It began slowly
in the 1980s under a Conservative government which proved to be relatively in
favour of the status quo, experimenting with voluntary measures in areas such as
advertising and promotion, coupled with health education and high taxation
(Cairney et al. 2012: 104). The election of a Labour government in 1997 prompted
a major acceleration of policy change, including new measures and more intensity
in most others (Cairney et al. 2012: 104). Further, policy change has continued in
earnest to this day.
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In global terms, the UK is one of a very small number of countries in which the
implementation of key measures is relatively consistent and meaningful (Mamudu
et al. 2015: 866). In many cases, implementation success is highly visible: there are
media bans on smoking advertising, combined with plain packaging, health
warnings, and education campaigns; the rate of tax is comparatively high; and
there is demonstrable funding for smoking cessation services through the
National Health Service (albeit with some debate on the role of e-cigarettes in
cessation). Only in some cases is implementation success difficult to gauge: the
success of customs and excise bodies in limiting illegal imports and counterfeit
products (the existence of which limits the impact of tax rises); and the ability to
restrict sales to over 18s (a policy that is not enforced well in most countries).
Analysis and Conclusions: A Success Story
for ‘Evidence-Based Policymaking’?
The UK success story tends to be used as a model for others to emulate. Tobacco
control advocates across the globe seek lessons to import, and UK public health
actors seek lessons for alcohol and sugar, salt, and obesity policies. Tobacco
represents a totemic example for the wider effort to regulate behaviour, and
promote healthy behaviour, to reduce preventable NCDs.
In this context, it is common to view this process through the lens of contem-
porary debates on ‘evidence-based policymaking’ (Cairney 2016), particularly
since policy success seems to relate the relatively strong and clear association
between smoking and ill health (although with alcohol and food, it is not as
possible to make the argument about no safe or beneficial level of consumption—
see Studlar and Cairney 2019). However, it would be a mistake to place so much
emphasis on the role of evidence, since it would suggest that the UK’s experience
can be replicated in a straightforward way without considering the role of tem-
poral politics (windows of opportunity) and the conducive conditions that devel-
oped over decades. Evidence of the unhealthy effects of smoking is available to all
countries, but policy actors may use information as a resource in very different
ways in each political system.
To understand how (or if) to replicate UK tobacco control success, a wider
perspective is needed. Scientific evidence was pivotal, but the extent to which it
‘won the day’ should be situated within the context of the multiple contingencies
involved. Successful use of evidence relies on policy framing, a policymaking
environment more or less conducive to policy change, and the sense of serendipity
that accompanies discussions of windows of opportunity. We can summarize
these factors with reference to three main conditions (Cairney 2019).
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First, actors were able to use scientific evidence to persuade policy-makers to pay
attention to, and shift their understanding of, policy problems. In leading countries
like the UK, it took decades to command attention to the health effects of
smoking, reframe tobacco primarily as a public health epidemic (not an economic
good), and generate support for the most effective evidence-based solutions. To do
so, influential groups such as the BMA and ASH had to find ways to frame the
evidence successfully in relation to the language of NCD epidemics (and that
language developed via global efforts led increasingly by the WHO).
Second, the policy environment became conducive to policy change. A new and
dominant frame helps give health departments a greater role; health departments
foster networks with public health and medical groups at the expense of the
tobacco industry; and they emphasize the socio-economic conditions supportive
of tobacco control: reductions in (a) smoking prevalence, (b) opposition to tobacco
control, and (c) economic benefits to tobacco. When policy-makers in health
departments took primary responsibility, they were able to support key health
actors to take forward the policy agenda, in cooperation with public health groups
and to the exclusion of anti-tobacco groups.
Third, actors exploited ‘windows of opportunity’ successfully. A supportive frame
and policy environment maximizes the chances of high attention to a public
health epidemic and provides the motive and opportunity of policy-makers to
select relatively restrictive policy instruments. However, the smoking ban example
highlights contingency, particularly in relation to the relationship between shifting
levels of public opinion and the willingness and ability of policy-makers to get
ahead of and shape opinion.
Scientific evidence is a necessary but insufficient condition for major policy
change and enduring success following implementation. Key actors do not simply
respond to new evidence. They use it as a resource to further their aims, frame
policy problems in ways that will generate policy-maker attention and underpin
technically and politically feasible solutions that policy-makers will have the
motive and opportunity to select. This remains true even when the evidence
now seems unequivocal and when countries have signed up to an international
agreement, the FCTC, which commits them to major policy change. Such com-
mitments can only be fulfilled over the long term, when actors help change the
policy environment in which these decisions are made and implemented, to
produce the conditions conducive to policy change.
We know that politics matters because there was a major gap between the
production of evidence and policy in the UK, and it is far wider in most countries
across the globe. So far, successful paradigmatic policy change has not occurred in
most countries or, in other aspects of public health in the UK. Therefore, it would
be a mistake to treat this policy success as inevitable or the emulation of policy
success as straightforward.
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6
The ‘Social Warfare State’
Americans’ Making of a Civic Generation
Mallory E. Compton
Introduction: An Historic Achievement
The GI bill gave generations of veterans a chance to get an education,
to build strong families and good lives, and to build the Nation’s
strongest economy ever, to change the face of America, and with it, to
enable us to change the face of the world. The GI bill helped to
unleash a prosperity never before known.
—President William J. Clinton, 12 April 1995
On the 22 June 1944, just weeks after D-Day in France, President Franklin
D. Roosevelt signed into law the Serviceman’s Readjustment Act (U.S. Senate
1944). Supported by a bi-partisan coalition, this package of benefits for soldiers
returning from the Second World War was the most expansive social policy ever
offered by the US federal government. Buoyed by both an economic boom and a
sense of social solidarity, the American public was able and willing to expend
resources on a group perceived as worthy and deserving. Veterans were offered
training vouchers, family stipends, up to a year’s worth of transitional unemploy-
ment payments, and low-interest, federally guaranteed loans for homes, farms,
and businesses. By the mid-1950s, nearly 8 million ex-servicemen and women
would take advantage of at least one programme. GI Bill benefits became a part of
the typical American household, and the policy would soon become a cherished
and respected institution in American society. So powerful is the reputation of this
programme, that to this day compensation to wartime veterans retains the same
moniker as the law passed more than seventy years ago: the GI Bill.
Programmatic success of the GI Bill, also known as the ‘New Deal for Veterans’,
was not an accident, though political success of the policy exceeded expectations.
Having learned from the administrative failings of veteran’s support following
the Civil War and the political debacle of First World War benefit payments,
policy-makers wanted to ensure that assistance to Second World War soldiers
would be more successful. With the war still underway, elected lawmakers initially
approached veterans’ compensation as a macro-economic policy. With the risk of
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post-war unemployment and economic depression in mind, many feared populist
uprisings among dissatisfied discharged soldiers. Both sides of the aisle agreed that
something must be done to help veterans readjust to civilian life, but Republicans
and Democrats disagreed on the most appropriate policy instruments. While
Democrats sought to integrate veteran’s compensation into their broader pro-
gressive federal social policy agenda, Republicans sought to limit the scope of
government and curtail federal interference in local affairs. In a compromise to
forge bi-partisan support, it was decided that programme benefits would be paid
out of federal funds directly to individual veterans, through state and local
administrative apparatuses. One consequence of this political compromise—that
payments go directly into the pockets of veterans and their families—was to make
policy benefits clearly visible to millions of American households, thereby pro-
moting the policy’s political success. Another consequence of this compromise,
however, was to allow racial and gender biases to subvert administrative proced-
ures, especially in the Southern states. Although the federal law was written to be
inclusive, with universal eligibility for all veterans, decentralized administration
gave local public and private institutions the opportunity to discriminate (espe-
cially in education, see Herbold 1994; Dynarski 2002; Turner and Bound 2003;
Mettler 2005b; Katznelson and Mettler 2008; Woods II 2013).
Now several decades after the bill was signed into law with benefit eligibility
long ago expired, empirical evidence supports the policy’s programmatic and
political achievements and points to some procedural shortcomings. Not only
was the GI Bill successful in its original aims—to ease the economic transition of
veterans back into the labour force—it also boosted educational attainment and
social mobility, expanded social rights, set precedent for federal voucher pro-
grammes, and spurred civic participation for a generation (Skocpol 1997 Mettler
and Welch 2004; Mettler 2005b; Nesbit and Reingold 2011). Programme benefits
were generous, administration was efficient (though not without problem), and
political success was unprecedented. In this chapter, I unpack the social and political
consequences of the GI Bill by tracing the chain of events leading to the final version
of the law and the critical stages of implementation. I assess the ‘success’ of this
policy in programmatic, process, and political terms across time and explore what
factors may have played a pivotal role in producing the pattern of outcomes
observed. Finally, I examine what lessons may be drawn from this case.
Prelude to the Bill
The GI Bill followed nearly two centuries of ad hoc attempts to reward American
soldiers for their service. Special compensation for war veterans dates back
to the Revolutionary War (1775–83). Though support for disabled veterans
enjoyed broad support in the Continental Congress, the regular service pensions
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advocated by George Washington in 1781 were primarily an incentive to prevent
mass desertion (Teipe 2002). The goal was to improve retention among the ranks.
Officers were promised half-pay for life, an offer which was almost immediately
recognized as an impossible promise. After a near-coup by officers who were
convinced the government could not meet the obligation, a compromise was
made to pay full wages for five years, in the form of a bond (Teipe 2002). Enlisted
soldiers, however, had less success in negotiation. At the end of the war, non-
officers faced challenges in simply claiming back-pay, which was due to them
since the government had stopped paying wages in 1777. According to Teipe’s
(2002) account, Revolutionary War veterans constituted a very small portion of
the population at the time and were unable to effectively organize a political
coalition. It wasn’t until the Civil War, nearly a century later, that widespread
compensation for soldiers was effectively paid.
From 1861 to 1865, 12 per cent of the Union (North) population served in
the Civil War, which remains the deadliest war in American history, with roughly
13 per cent of Union service members returning home wounded (Department of
Veterans Affairs 2017).¹ Disabled Union veterans were offered financial and
medical assistance, and most service members were eligible for a general pension.
The federal program, however, allowed broad local discretion in the distribution
of payments. Funds were funnelled through local politicians for disbursement,
leading to widespread corruption and patronage (Mettler 2005b). Additional
pensions for surviving wives and mothers were offered by scattered state-level
programs, and the federal Sheppard Towner program provided subsidies for some
women’s healthcare (Skocpol 1992).
Decades after the war ended, the federal government extended the existing
pension programme for Civil War veterans with the Dependent Pension Act of
1890. In what would become a fundamental shift in American social policy,
widows and the children of Union soldiers were made eligible beneficiaries
(Skocpol 1992). Remarkably, as of 2017, a full 152 years after the end of the
war, the last remaining dependant (daughter) of an American Civil War veteran
continued to collect a monthly pension of $73.13 from the U.S. Department of
Veterans Affairs (Department of Veterans Affairs 2017; the same case was also
reported on by Frizell 2014). Though far more generous than any federal social
policy ever before, eligibility for Civil War pensions and health services was not
universal. First, administration through local politicians meant widespread dis-
crimination and misuse of funds. Although African Americans and other religions
or ethnic minorities were officially eligible for federal programmes, they found it
difficult or impossible to gain access to the benefits (Skocpol 1992). Second, the
programmes were only available to soldiers who had served for the North. All
federal post-war programmes were limited to Union (Northern) veterans and
excluded all Confederate (Southern) veterans. Each former Confederate (Southern)
state was responsible for organizing and funding their own pension programmes.
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Assistance to Civil War veterans and their dependants may have been imperfectly
administered, but at the time it was by far the most generous and comprehensive
provision of social assistance that had ever been offered to American wage-earners
and families.
The next major turn in veterans’ policy came with the end of the First World
War. Motivated by fears of corrupt administration and the economic ‘waste’ of
disabled or out-of-work (i.e. unproductive) veterans, Progressive Era reformers
designed a very different package of veteran benefits than had been offered in the
past (Linker 2011). The ideological emphasis of post-First WorldWar policy-makers
was on rehabilitating veterans and restoring their economic independence—the
goal was a speedy return to productivity in the labour market (Linker 2011).
Upon discharge, healthy veterans were welcomed back with a separation pay-
ment of $60 and a train ticket home (Peeps 1984). Only disabled veterans
were eligible for some (limited) reimbursement of tuition and costs for rehabili-
tative or vocational training. Later, in 1924, the Adjustment Compensation Act
promised a deferred interest-bearing certificate payable in 1945 or, at death, to
the veteran’s beneficiaries (Ortiz 2012). Also keen to avoid past experiences of
corrupt local administration, post-First World War policy-makers ensured
heavy federal (centralized) control.
Compared to what Civil War veterans had received, First World War veterans’
programmes were far less generous. The policy was scorned by veterans’ organ-
izations for offering too little too late, with discontent focused directly on Con-
gress and the President. With the onset of the Great Depression in the 1930s,
dissatisfaction grew. Many veterans in dire economic need sought relief with early
payment of their meagre pensions at a depreciated amount, or in taking loans
against later pension payments. Supporting their cause, the Veterans of Foreign
Wars (VFW) organized a nationwide campaign culminating in a march on
Washington, DC, in May 1932 (Ortiz 2012). More than 20,000 veterans and
their families marched into the city. This ‘Bonus Army’ settled into camps along
the Anacostia river and remained there until 28 July, when they were forcefully
removed by the Army. The violent eviction—tanks, cavalry, and torches were used
to raze the encampments—coupled with the government’s failure to produce
legislation spelled the end of President Hoover’s political legitimacy (Ortiz
2012). The bitter disappointment of the era spurred First World War veterans’
organizations to professionalize lobbying efforts and expand membership (Ortiz
2009; Hindley 2014). The VFW and the American Legion have since become
powerful institutions in American society and politics.
Months after the ‘Bonus Army’ debacle, Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) was
elected president. His successful bid was aided by the VFW’s mobilization. Once
in office, FDR’s administration quickly set about enacting the Democrats’ pro-
gressive ‘New Deal’ plan. Two years into the term, still in the midst of the
Great Depression, Congress passed the first federal social policy available to all
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Americans: the Social Security Act (SSA) (Derthick 1979; Weir et al. 1988).
A public pension (Social Security), unemployment insurance, and medical care
for the elderly and blind were the largest programmes in the bill. Whereas social
assistance before had been limited to special groups (i.e. veterans), the SSA social
insurance programmes covered any man or woman. Subject to contribution
requirements or means-tested eligibility, these programmes were available to
any citizen. Democrats advanced their policy of economic assistance further by
growing federal employment. The Civilian Conservation Corps, the Works Pro-
gress Administration, and the Federal Emergency Relief Administration were
created with this aim of boosting employment and economic security. This
economic and social policy agenda was extremely popular, demonstrated by the
fact that Roosevelt was re-elected three times (a record in US history, and the
reason for the 22nd Amendment to the Constitution, which now puts a two-term
limit on the presidency).
Roosevelt continued to advocate a progressive and universal social policy
agenda throughout his term(s) as president. FDR personally believed that no
group should be eligible for benefits based on special status. True to this belief,
FDR went so far as to issue an executive order scaling back veterans benefits in
1935 (Skocpol 1997), preferring instead legislation that would serve both veterans
and non-veterans in economic need (Mettler 2005b). Yet, with the Second World
War underway, it would became an important task of FDR’s administration to
work with Congress, government committees, and veterans’ organizations to craft
what is now known as the GI Bill.
Drafting and Negotiating the GI Bill
Politics surrounding Second World War veterans’ policies reflect lessons learned
from previous post-war eras, as well as contemporary ideas about social pro-
grammes serving economic aims. Colouring debate about readjustment policy in
both Congress and the administration was also an acute awareness of the political
and economic threats posed by mass post-war unemployment. The end of the
Second World War meant discharging 15 million soldiers into a 60-million-
person labour force, in an economy adapting from wartime to peacetime produc-
tion (Cogan 2017). Europe’s experience following the First WorldWar with public
unrest driven by economic depression, which had opened the doors for dictatorial
populism, weighed heavily on American policy-makers’ minds when designing
social policy during and after the Second World War. Neither had lawmakers
forgotten the political failure of veterans’ compensation at home, and the ‘Bonus
March’ just a decade earlier. First and foremost, the Serviceman’s Readjustment
Act was meant as a tool to prevent economic depression and widespread unemploy-
ment among young men returning from war (Wynn 1996; Skocpol 1997; Cogan
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2017). The altruistic goal of ‘rewarding’ soldiers for service or expanding social
rights was secondary to these macro-economic concerns (Olson 1973). Ultimately,
the legacy of SecondWorldWar veterans’ policy would be the institutionalization of
social policy principles in American society and a boom in civic participation. These
outcomes are may be heralded as successful legacies, but it is important to empha-
size that these were the unintended consequences of political compromises in
administrative design.
FDR’s view was that veterans’ compensation should be folded into existing (or
new) universal social programmes. Under his plan, veterans and non-veterans
alike would be provided labour-market assistance through universal programmes.
Articulating this view, the President’s Executive Conference on Post-War
Readjustments of Civilian and Military Personnel proposed only a small package
of higher education benefits for veterans, contingent on competitive exams and
limited to studies deemed relevant to economic needs. An even more exclusive
proposal was advocated by the fiscally conservative Armed Forces Committee on
Postwar Educational Opportunities for Service Personnel. This plan offered only
unusually talented veterans higher educational services for just one year (Mettler
2005b). Late in 1943, FDR’s administration supported this plan with a bill in
Congress, proposing only narrowly-targeted education benefits.
Despite holding a majority in both houses of Congress, however, FDR’s New
Deal Democrats could not rally the support needed to pass the bill. While five
months passed with little legislative progress, the anti-statist conservative Ameri-
can Legion took action by drafting an omnibus bill it called the ‘GI Bill of Rights’.
Known in the post-First World War era as a veterans’ organization promoting
patriotism and community service, the American Legion had traditionally focused
its efforts on local voluntary aid for ex-soldiers, eschewing federal assistance
(Mettler 2005b; Ortiz 2009). In contrast to the VFW organization, the politically
active and influential Legion had not fully endorsed the ‘Bonus Army’ movement
in the 1930s (Ortiz 2009). And yet, in 1944 it was the American Legion which
drafted and lobbied for a bill with unprecedentedly generous and broad benefits to
veterans—both able-bodied and disabled (Skocpol 1997).
Composed mostly of First World War veterans, the Legion’s policy position
was motivated by their own memories of financial and social difficulties with
readjusting to civilian life (Mettler 2005c). Whereas the President and many
members of Congress emphasized economic goals, the Legion’s position advo-
cated society’s obligation to servicemen. Harry W. Colmery—a First World War
veteran and Legion member who personally drafted the GI Bill in longhand on
hotel stationery—testified to Congress that veterans ‘should be aided in reaching
that place, position, or status which they had normally expected to achieve and
probably would have achieved, had their war service not interrupted their careers’
(as cited in Cogan 2017: 129). The organization’s policy position had changed
since the last war, while their political strength had grown. In breaking with the
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tradition of creating new veterans’ organizations following each war, the Legion
had decided to expand their membership and mission to include Second World
War veterans. This decision incorporated a new generation of veterans into an
already organized and professional organization, thereby growing their strength in
numbers and political influence. Not only did the Legion speedily draft the bill, it
also lobbied intensely and it coordinated a persuasive media campaign with
Hearst Newspapers (Cogan 2017). Other veterans’ groups were more suspicious
of the bill, however. The VFW and other veterans’ organizations worried that such
a large expansion of benefits might disadvantage disabled veterans in accessing the
services they needed if resources were shared with able-bodied veterans (Hindley
2014). But in the end, the Legion’s grass-roots organizational power prevailed—
members across the country mobilized to contact their congressmen in support of
the bill (Skocpol 1997).
Though it had popular momentum when proposed to Congress in early 1944,
compromises were necessary to shore up the votes needed to pass the Legion’s GI
Bill of Rights. Conservative Republicans’ negotiation was driven by several fears.
There was first a concern that the Roosevelt administration and Democrats would
use the legislation to advance a broader (New Deal) social policy agenda (Cogan
2017). To satisfy Republicans and prevent programme overreach, key administra-
tive tasks were assigned to state and local institutions. Unemployment insurance
eligibility rules were set by the federal government and capped at one year, but it
was left to state workforce agencies to certify eligibility, issue checks, and provide
job-finding services. Home, business, and farm loans would be guaranteed by the
federal government, but only if a (local) bank approved the veterans’ application.
There was also widespread Republican concern about growing executive power
and federal interference with states’ rights, especially in education administration
(Skocpol 1997; Cogan 2017). Some Republican congressmen were distrustful of
higher education, fearing it would spread a leftist ideology. The chair of the House
Committee on World War Veterans’ Legislation, John E. Rankin of Mississippi,
said in a hearing in January 1944 that he ‘would rather send [his] child to a red
schoolhouse than to a red school teacher’ (as quoted in Mettler 2005a: 22). So, it
was negotiated that subsidies and benefits would be funnelled directly to individ-
uals, who could then enrol in any education or training institution of their
choosing. Importantly, it was ultimately up to the university, college, or technical
school to evaluate applications for enrolment. Also, states retained control over
certifying schools and training programmes, with no federal oversight of institu-
tional qualifications or curricula. Applicants would file for benefits directly with
the federal Veterans Administration, which had authority only to certify veterans’
eligibility and to issue vouchers.
The final version of the GI Bill stipulated that upon discharge (including
administrative discharges and excluding dishonourable discharges), all service-
men and servicewomen under the age of 25 (with some exceptions made) who had
served at least ninety days would be eligible for programme benefits for a period of
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nine years. Any veteran could attend college or vocational school tuition-free for
four years (up to $500, which was enough to cover tuition at elite colleges like Yale
or Harvard at the time), while also receiving a cost of living stipend determined
by family size. If veterans opted to re-enter the workforce, the bill included a
$20 weekly unemployment benefit for a maximum of one year, as well as job
counselling and work placement services. Further, the government guaranteed
(co-signed) loans for veterans approved to purchase a home, business, or farm,
with no down payment. Finally, specialized medical care was provided and new
hospitals under the management of the Veterans Administration were opened.
The bill’s passage through the Senate was helped by Senator J. Bennet Clark, the
chairman of the responsible committee. Senator Clark also happened to be one of
the American Legion’s founders (Cogan 2017: 129). Passage through the House
was less smooth, with more debate, but it eventually passed with an overwhelming
majority. Only in the final stage of reconciling the House and Senate versions of
the bill was there any cause for concern. Congressman John Gibson had left
Washington for his home in rural Georgia before the final bill was out of
conference committee. When the reconciliation committee chairman refused to
acknowledge Gibson’s designated proxy, panic ensued. Being rural war-time
Georgia, all attempts to reach Gibson by phone failed, so radio stations ran
news alerts and state police were ordered to search for the congressman. Georgia
police eventually found Gibson playing poker in a truckstop and immediately
escorted him 150 miles to Jacksonville, Florida, to catch a commercial flight
waiting on the tarmac to fly him to DC. It was only with the coordination of the
American Legion that the 2 a.m. commercial flight was discovered and deliber-
ately delayed for the senator—the pilot’s supervisor was an active Legion member
(Cogan 2017). After Gibson’s dramatic final-hour vote, the bill easily passed the
final votes and the Serviceman’s Readjustment Act was signed by President
Roosevelt on 22 June 1944, making the GI Bill law.
The next year, just weeks before VE Day, FDR passed away and the monu-
mental task of managing mass discharge and administering the Serviceman’s
Readjustment Act fell to his successor, former vice-president Harry Truman.
Nevertheless, the GI Bill, as well as the SSA, would become centrepieces of
FDR’s presidential legacy. In offering a range of educational and financial services,
the GI Bill fundamentally changed the US government’s approach to veterans’
support and, in doing so, reflected lessons learned from the past. First, learning
from the First World War, the GI Bill was intended as an economic instrument.
Policy-makers feared discontent among veterans struggling to reintegrate with
civilian life, and therefore promised every veteran the education, training,
unemployment or job assistance necessary for gainful employment. Secured
loans for homes, businesses, or farms further ensured economic health. This
approach was a clear departure from the history of wartime veterans’ legislation
and benefits as a recruitment tool or means to compensate insured or killed
servicemen (Cogan 2017). Second, the memory of post-Civil War patronage and
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corruption from local politicians’ distribution of benefits was reflected in the
distribution of benefits directly to soldiers. Veterans would be free to pick and
choose the services they needed or wanted and could choose any institution of
higher education or training anywhere in the country. This was novel for Ameri-
can veterans’ policy, but it also meant that the GI Bill was the first large-scale
federal voucher programme (Cogan 2017). Design of the policy also reflected
political compromises. Although benefits would be disbursed by the federal gov-
ernment, state and local institutions retained some administrative responsibility.
Delivering the Policy
The original objective of Second World War veterans’ readjustment programmes
was to stave off widespread unemployment and economic depression. In remarks
delivered to the 1944 Annual Convention of the American Legion, the Head of the
Veteran’s Administration (VA) said of the recently passed GI Bill that ‘our present
high level of employment and national income, and the maintenance of a sound
economy, should be our goal’ (Frank 1944). In the process of implementation, as
millions of soldiers (80 per cent of SecondWorld War veterans) and their families
took advantage of the array of programmes available in the following decade, that
focus shifted from macro-economy to the household-economy. By 1956, accord-
ing to President Eisenhower’s Commission on Veterans’ Pensions, the objective of
compensation ‘should be to return veterans as nearly as possible to the status they
would have achieved had they not been in military service’, with priority given to
disabled soldiers (Bradley et al. 1956: 4). The same Commission concluded that a
fundamental change had transpired since the initial passing of the ‘New Deal for
Veterans’: ‘These programs have . . . become an important factor not to just a small
minority, but to our society as a whole. Veterans’ benefits are now a significant
force in our economy’ (Bradley et al. 1956: 24). The policy had become a signifi-
cant influence in millions of ordinary households. Veterans who took advantage
of the programmes overwhelmingly viewed the educational or guaranteed loan
programmes as a turning-point, changing the course of their lives for the better
(Mettler 2005b). To understand how this happened, how and to what degree
veterans were helped, how household well-being was improved, and why this
policy, above all previous veterans’ assistance programmes, came to be so revered,
it is important to evaluate its programmatic, process, and political impacts.
Assessing the GI Bill
Each of the GI Bill’s key programmes largely achieved their aims—the policy was a
programmatic success. In her analysis of both archival primary sources and
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 25/7/2019, SPi
112   
hundreds of in-depth interviews with surviving veterans, Suzanne Mettler (2005a)
distinguishes between the first- and second-order policy impacts. The first-order
programmatic successes of the bill have been greater higher education (college)
enrolment and attainment among programme recipients (Bound and Turner
1989, 2002), better jobs among beneficiaries (Mettler 2005b), and greater eco-
nomic security (Bradley et al. 1956; Angrist 1993; Gabriel 2017). Overall, veterans
who took advantage of the education and vocational training programmes found
themselves in positions of better employment and income (Bradley et al. 1956;
Nam 1964; Olson 1973; Bound and Turner 1989, 2002; Stanley 2003; Gabriel
2017). Some have even argued that the influx of veterans into higher education,
which doubled enrolment at some universities, had a lasting impact on American
academic culture by normalizing non-traditional student life (i.e. part-time stu-
dents and students with families). University officials were initially concerned
about the aptitude of veterans and their ability to keep up in the classroom
(McDonagh 1947; Olson 1973; Clark 1998). However, opinions among academics
and administrators changed, with evidence suggesting that veterans were more
focused and diligent students than noneterans (Carpenter and Glick 1946; Olson
1973; Peeps 1984; Clark 1998; Mettler 2005b).
The second-order success of the bill concerns its impact on civic participation
and volunteering among GI Bill beneficiaries. Statistical analyses reveal that
holding income, education, occupation, age, gender, and many other observable
characteristics constant, veterans who used the education benefits of the GI Bill
reported greater participation in civic and political activities over the course of
their lifetimes compared to both veterans who did not use programme benefits
and to non-veterans (Mettler 2005b; Nesbit and Reingold 2011). Improved
economic security provides the resources needed to participate in politics and
civic organization, but the effect documented by Mettler suggests something
stronger than this. Upon return from war, veterans received help from the
federal government through administrative procedures largely seen as fair and
respectful. The message sent to veterans through the process of applying for and
receiving GI Bill assistance was that they were not only compensated for their
service, but that they were valued and respected by their government and
country, and they felt more a part of their communities and politics as a result
(Mettler 2005b). The visibility of education benefits especially contributed to this
feedback effect. Social policies like the GI Bill have this ‘interpretive effect’ by
shaping attitudes and behaviours (Pierson 1993). Policies which distribute bene-
fits while including participants in administrative processes can leave beneficiar-
ies feeling incorporated into the political system, which promotes civic norms
and increases political and civic involvement (Pierson 1993; Campbell 2002,
2012; Mettler 2002, 2005b; Mettler and Soss 2004; Mettler and Welch 2004).
There is overwhelming evidence that the GI Bill had this effect on the Second
World War generation.
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While the programmatic aims of the policy—to help veterans readjust to
civilian society—were successfully met, the programmes suffered from procedural
shortcomings. In short, administrative procedures failed to ensure equal treatment
of all eligible veterans. These problems were largely due to state and local
institutions’ discretion, which introduced prejudice into the implementation
process. This was especially true in the South, where a combination of racial
discrimination and poor (local) administration prevented many black Second
World War veterans from using GI Bill programme benefits to improve their
socio-economic status (Onkst 1998; Mettler 2005b).
First, local offices of state-level agencies had authority to decide individuals’
eligibility for unemployment benefits and re-employment services. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, many black and minority veterans faced discrimination and
were denied fair treatment by their local workforce agency offices. Accounts retell
how these veterans were routinely wrongfully deemed ineligible for benefits, or
were directed only to low-status employment despite having valuable technical
skills gained during service (Mettler 2005b). Related to this problem was the
experience of prejudice in the home, business, and farm loan guarantee pro-
gramme. The policy relied on local and private banks to approve veterans’
applications, which meant that even with a guarantee by the federal government,
black veterans found it nearly impossible to obtain loans (Woods II 2013).
Next, state governments were responsible for certifying institutions of higher
education and vocational training. Most states did not require site-visits or
documentation for technical schools to be certified to receive veterans’ vouchers.
As a result, opportunistic businesses exploited the system. These ‘fly-by-night’
institutions would admit students, accept tuition vouchers, and offer little or no
value in skill or education in return (Mettler 2005b). In short, many veterans who
enrolled in vocational programmes received little of value for their tuition vou-
chers. This problem was exacerbated in Southern states, where institutionalized
segregation in higher education prevented black veterans from enrolling in most
universities (Olson 1973; Onkst 1998; Mettler 2005a).
Two other problems have been cited with administration of the policy. First,
only a small fraction of veteran women applied for GI Bill benefits. Many eligible
women opted not to take advantage of the programmes because doing so would
interfere with the typical family life at the time (Skocpol 1997; Mettler 2005b). It
was inconvenient or less acceptable for women with families and children to take
advantage of higher education, especially if their husbands were going to school as
well. But also, some women were not informed of their eligibility for veterans’
benefits when discharged from service (Mettler 2005b). As a consequence, men
had greater access to education vouchers and they enrolled at higher rates than
women. In the decade following the war, women were underrepresented in
higher education, though ratios returned to near parity as the cohort aged out
(Larsen et al. 2015). Although the absolute number of women enrolled in college
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did not decline, it was the relative representation that diminished (Olson 1973;
Skocpol 1997).
The last concern with administration of the GI Bill was raised in a government
report published in 1956 by a presidential commission, known as the Bradley
Report (Bradley et al. 1956). This report highlighted rehabilitation challenges
unique to disabled veterans, which continued even a decade after returning
home. It was argued specifically that healthcare provided by the Veterans Admin-
istration was insufficient in quality and efficiency to rehabilitate disabled veterans.
To resolve these and other problems within the Veterans Administration, the
report recommended greater resources be put towards ‘more adequate facilities
for research, planning, and program analysis, so that the needs of veterans and the
effectiveness of veterans’ programs will be analysed on a continuing basis’
(Bradley et al. 1956: 5). Despite these procedural problems across all levels of
administration—state, local, and federal—the GI bill is remembered as an historic
success.
An Enduring Commitment and Its Legacy
In July 1956, The New York Times ran an article titled ‘GI Bill, Expiring After
Twelve Years, Has Been, It Is Agreed, an Outstanding Success’. At that point, the
total cost of the bill to the US government had exceeded 14 billion dollars (just shy
of 130 trillion dollars in today’s currency) (Fine 1956). One half of the American
public was a serviceman, veteran, or a related family member, according to the
Bradley report (Bradley et al. 1956). This means that roughly half of the US
population was likely affected by one or more federal educational, mortgage,
unemployment, disability, or veterans’ health programme. Implementation of
the GI Bill made federal social programmes an ordinary part of working-age
Americans’ lives, without stigma.
A unique constellation of players and incentives led lawmakers in 1944 to pass
an anti-depression economic policy in the form of direct payments and vouchers
to service members. The lasting impact of this decision on veterans’ policy in the
United States was twofold. First, the perception became ingrained that govern-
ment should assist individual service members with a range of social programmes.
Second, this assistance should be made available immediately upon return home
to transition into normal life. This differed from the past policy of offering
deferred pensions to veterans. A broader impact on politics was to solidify a
coalition of veteran beneficiaries (and their families), a politically influential group
which cross-cut class and race. It was not only families who came to value the bill,
however. Service providers who benefited from the bill’s provisions gained a
vested financial interest in the programme (universities received tuition and
increased enrolment, bankers benefited from secured insured loans, etc.)
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(Cogan 2017). Direct in-kind benefits on this scale had never before been offered
by the government. The GI Bill was a new kind of entitlement from the federal
government, and it set an historically significant precedent for subsequent veterans’
legislation, and social welfare policy more broadly. A lasting impact of the bill on
policymaking more broadly was to normalize and destigmatize social assistance.
Following the Second World War, Congress has renewed or revised the GI Bill
several times to incorporate new veteran cohorts. Without a permanent author-
ization, each version/revision of the GI Bill has been subject to political debate. At
the heart of these debates, especially in the 1960s, was the deservingness of veterans
to receive benefits. A particular point of contention is whether servicemen during
peacetime had ‘earned the right for benefits’ (Ortiz 2012: 256). Despite these
debates, however, subsequent bills have maintained the same approach to securing
veterans’ economic stability through individual and direct assistance, though
benefits have become less diverse and more narrowly targeted at education
(Mattila 1978; Skocpol 1997). The instrumental logic and choice of policy tools
have changed little over the years, though the enduring emphasis on education
vouchers for veterans suggests this instrument of the policy has been the most
politically successful. Although the instrumental logic behind compensation for
veterans has stayed much the same, the principal aim of the policy has evolved
since the debate between FDR and Congress in the early 1940s. Insured home loans
and education vouchers for veterans have evolved from economic instruments into
in-kind reparation. Macro-economic stability has been replaced as the central goal
of veteran’s policy; today the central aim is to compensate service members’
sacrifice by enabling individuals with education and economic assistance.
Why the policy was such a political success is in part due to the bill’s program-
matic success—it did what it was intended to do. But also, political success is
explained by popular perceptions of the Second World War relative to military
conflicts since. The Second World War was (and still is) heralded as a legitimate
war and prided for evidencing the superiority of American military strength and
foreign policy (Wynn 1996), and veterans from this era were awarded a level of
respect unique in modern history. Later wars are not viewed in the same way, a
fact reflected in debates about later veterans’ deservingness of benefits (Ortiz
2012). The Korean War has largely escaped America’s collective memory and
the Vietnam War is haunted by the stigma of disastrous foreign policy, defeat,
shocking casualties, and domestic discord (Wynn 1996). More recent military
conflicts including the first and second Gulf wars and the war in Afghanistan are
similarly tainted by domestic disagreement and the absence of decisive wins.
Members of the armed services in these wars experienced less of the popular
reverence for the victories of the Second World War that was associated with
those veterans. Support for public assistance programmes is closely associated
with the perceived worthiness and deservingness of the recipient group
(Applebaum 2001; Barrilleaux and Bernick 2003; van Oorschot 2006). The
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deservingness of the targeted population confers legitimacy on public policy, and
there is perhaps no group collectively viewed as more deserving of assistance in
the United States than Second World War veterans (Mettler 2005b). The political
success of the GI Bill was shaped by the perceived legitimacy of the war itself, and
the associated deservingness of its veterans. The contribution of programmatic
success to political success may be a lesson for future policy, but the translation of
reverence for Second World War veterans into political success of the GI Bill may
lead one to ‘a pessimistic conclusion about the possibilities for recapitulating its
best features’ (Skocpol 1997: 114).
Little has changed in veterans’ policy since 1944. The central features of the
original GI Bill remain intact. On 16 August 2017, President Trump signed the
most recent update to the law: the Harry W. Colmery Veterans Educational
Assistance Act. Colmery was the American Legion commander who originally
drafted the 1944 bill. The 2017 law, commonly called the ‘Forever GI Bill’, had the
support of both parties, as well as the VFW and the American Legion. Although
the Forever GI Bill was the most substantial amendment to veterans’ policy in a
decade, the underlying aims and choice of instruments are unchanged. In the
terminology of Howlett and Cashore (2009), the 2017 legislation merely calibrates
benefit and eligibility criteria of existing programmes to increase generosity, but
does not reflect fundamental change in aims or tools. Education benefits were
expanded by, among other things, permanently extending breadth and duration of
eligibility. The window for enrolment is increased up to fifteen years for all
veterans, including previously excluded groups like the National Guard. Other
programmatic changes make it easier for Purple Heart recipients to qualify for
benefits, allow benefits to be transferred to dependants in the case of death, and
grant surviving family members greater financial assistance. Living stipends
during education, however, were decreased. On the procedural side, all school
officials responsible for verifying veteran enrolment are required to undergo
training. Overall, relatively minor adjustments were made to existing benefits,
and it is a testament to the political success of the GI bill that current legislation,
passed in 2017, honours the original author of the 1944 proposal.
Conclusion
Politically, the GI Bill was a spectacular success. In programmatic terms, the policy
is also a sound success. Procedurally, it is now recognized that there were
deficiencies, as racial biases and historical legacies limited the benefits available
to some (black and women) veterans. Administrative procedures could have
overcome these limitations to ensure greater equity.
Programmatic success was advantaged by the economic boom of the war and
post-war era, spurred by public spending. Economic growth made funding of a
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generous social policy feasible and enabled veterans to use the benefits—to buy
houses and land, for example. As discussed above, many of the programmes
funded by the federal policy had a significant impact on the targeted outcome.
Education, training, and income support all promoted social mobility and economic
security. The programmes were successful not only in their economic goals, but also
exceeded policy-makers’ aims by promoting civic and political participation.
Process success of the policy was more limited because administrative rules
and procedures produced inequities in the availability of GI Bill benefits to
veterans. State and local authorities were responsible for key administrative
decisions. Consequently, especially in Southern states, biased (racist) de facto
implementation denied many black and minority veterans the benefits and
services to which they were entitled. Also, insufficient oversight of vocational
institutions meant that veterans opting for job training instead of higher
education often found themselves wasting their vouchers on tuition to exploit-
ive enterprises. Despite these administrative shortcomings, the GI Bill has
endured as an historic political success. This is in part due to the policy’s
programmatic success—the policy did what it was meant to do, and more.
The historical political success of this, however, is also due to perceptions of
the legitimacy of the war itself.
History will surely (continue to) remember public policies supporting Second
World War veterans as a landmark policy achievement. In 1995, President
Clinton claimed Roosevelt’s ‘most enduring legacy’ was a post-Second World
War ‘generation prepared to meet the future, a vision most clearly embodied in
the G.I. Bill’ (Clinton 1995). This reputation is likely to endure, since the legisla-
tion itself is long expired and all first-order outcomes were realized long ago and
yet current policy is still named to honour the original 1944 bill author. Oppor-
tunities to build solidarity with social policy were unusually large in the post-
Second World War era, uniquely advantaging the GI Bill in generating social
capital. This should not detract from the programmatic performance of the policy,
but it makes replicating the broader social outcomes a challenge.
Additional version of this case
The case study outlined in this chapter is accompanied by a corresponding case
study from the Centre for Public Impact’s (CPI) Public Impact Observatory—
an international repository of public policies assessed for their impact using
CPI’s Public Impact Fundamentals framework. CPI’s framework provides a
way for those who work in or with government to assess public policies, to
understand why they were successful, so key lessons can be drawn out for
future policy work. The case can be easily located in the CPI repository at www.
centreforpublicimpact.org/observatory.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 25/7/2019, SPi
118   
Note
1. The rate of surviving wounded soldiers in the Confederate (Southern) army is
unknown (Department of Veterans Affairs 2017).
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7
The Finnish Comprehensive School
Conflicts, Compromises, and Institutional Robustness
Jaakko Kauko
Introduction
The aforementioned evaluations of industrial and societal develop-
ment and their requirements for the school show that all young
people, independently of the focus or level of their talents and other
personality traits, must be educated as efficiently as possible to exploit
the current and future potential for mental and material growth.
—Hallituksen esitys 44/1967, 5 [Government Bill
on Comprehensive Education]
The comprehensive school system in Finland (peruskoulu) is widely recognized
as a case of policy success. A comprehensive school is a nine-year school for all
children, divided into six lower classes (ages 7–13) and three upper classes (ages
13–16). In the lower classes the children generally stay with the same teacher most
of the time; in the upper classes they have subject-specific teachers. The great
majority of schools are run locally. Primary responsibility for providing education
lies with each of the more than 300 Finnish municipalities, which have consider-
able autonomy. There are also a few independent education providers, and even
fewer state-provided (usually special education) comprehensives. The municipal
autonomy ensured by the constitution and the decentralized education systemmean
that the state has little statutory power over schooling. The national core curriculum
frames teaching, but there are no mandatory standardized tests for entire age
cohorts or inspections to enforce curriculum implementation, and the municipal-
ities and teachers have degrees of independence in interpreting the curriculum.
Municipalities are responsible for monitoring the quality of the education they
provide, while the state only provides non-binding guidelines. The strongest steering
mechanism for the state’s support of municipally provided education is financial.
This is largely limited to the non-earmarked lump sumdistributed tomunicipalities,
as well as some project-based additional funding. The comprehensive school and its
institutional set-up differs from education systems in many parts of the world,
including in some Nordic counterparts (Dovemark et al. 2018). An interesting and
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important question, then, is to what extent the public policies establishing and
supporting these education institutions can be seen as a success.
The quote introducing this chapter described the main ideological motive
behind comprehensive school reform: an alliance between industrial development
and harnessing all potential with the promotion of equal education opportunities.
The political process leading to the complete reorganization of the formerly
bipartite school system and the establishment of the comprehensive school and
its implementation took more than three decades—and even longer if we track
the origin of some of its constitutive ideas. The process was advanced by different
government coalitions in an unstable parliamentary situation, included the squar-
ing of differing political views, and led to several dead ends. Incremental advances
eventually resulted in a critical juncture in which the comprehensive school was
created in the late 1960s. Despite repeated criticism, its institutional frame sur-
vived and is now a recognized and almost unchallenged part of the Finnish
education landscape. The aim of this chapter is to evaluate the degree and type
of success observed in the case of comprehensive school policy in Finland.
Assessing Comprehensive Education’s Success
With respect to programmatic success, assessment of this case relates to how
comprehensive education has contributed to its goal: harnessing the age cohorts’
full potential. This can be reduced to two factors: economic growth aided by
human resources; and the possibilities of upward social mobility education
affords. In relation to the first, Kokkinen (2012) points out that Finland has
been one of the few countries that have been able to catch up with its wealthier
counterparts during the twentieth century, and that this growth has drawn on
human (an educated workforce and technological innovation) and fixed capital. In
relation to the second factor, programmatic success is seen in the achievement of
upward social mobility for many. Kivinen et al. (2012) examine how the odds ratio
for a child from an academic family in contrast to a non-academic family for
participating in higher education has changed during the comprehensive school
period and the massification of higher education. They interpret this as indicating
better possibilities for non-academic families’ children: for the 1946 age cohort the
odds ratio was 19.1 favouring academic families’ offspring; for children born in
1986 it was only 6.8. Pekkala Kerr and Rinne (2012: 322) also indicate that the
education rate boosted the post-war generations. Comprehensive education policy
has produced a well-educated and more prosperous Finnish population.
Evaluating the model’s second dimension—the success of the process leading to
the adoption of comprehensive education—is more complex. The policy under-
went a period of long and thorough deliberation, in which a range of options
were considered. Much of this work was conducted in committees. At the time
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of deliberation, support for the ideas of ‘scientific’ planning meant that the com-
mittee system was especially powerful in Finland. Committees worked as a forum
for the deliberation of different interests and research. However, the committee
work was not straightforward: it was variously constituted and was not always
unanimous. In addition to these broad-based ad hoc committees, the permanent
parliamentary standing committees played an important role. A parliamentary
resolution of 1963 which delegated preparatory work to standing committees was
carried forward later by a government consisting of Left and Centre parties. This
would be the single most important impetus. Throughout the debates, opinion
divided along the Left–Right spectrum concerning private grammar schools, and
this escalated during the implementation phase into what the Right termed ‘school
wars’ (Okkonen 2017). The policy process could be seen as fair in the sense that the
opinions of the opposition were considered and deliberated in the committee work
and in parliamentary decision-making. However, disputes arose during the imple-
mentation phase concerning what had actually been agreed to in the policy.
Finally, the political success of the comprehensive school policy is also multifa-
ceted. The situation was exceptional in Finland during the Cold War. The centre-
right National Coalition Party was with very few exceptions consistently excluded
from government, because at the time the main political parties saw their inclu-
sion as difficult due to the sensitive foreign policy relations with the Soviet Union.
Researchers largely agree that the long process leading to the birth of the com-
prehensive school resulted in a lasting compromise on which different parties and
political interests could eventually agree (Ahonen 2012; Kettunen et al. 2012;
Simola et al. 2017; see Okkonen 2017). The forging of this lasting compromise
may also be due to the embedded features of the political system, which supported
continuation, and the strength of the committee system in preparing decisions.
Continuation was embedded in the formation of coalition governments, which
nearly always entailed some parties in the previous administration continuing in
the new government.
It is fair to say that as part of a universal welfare state, comprehensive schooling
benefits the majority of the population and that it has been key in increasing both
upward social mobility and economic growth. As Okkonen (2017) observes, the
comprehensive school project was part of a larger ideological shift towards the Left
that the Right considered a threat. The disappointed stakeholders, in addition to
the right-wing opposition, were the private grammar school organizations, the
grammar school teachers’ labour union, and conservative right-wing civic organ-
izations. Industrial interests supported the criticism. The right-wing criticism
emerged immediately after the comprehensive reform in the 1970s and resurfaced
in the 1990s but was then replaced by the success-story narrative after the
popularity of the international large-scale assessments (Simola et al. 2017). In
the following two decades the Finnish education system has basked in inter-
national glory, being called one of the best in the world. This reputation is largely
due to the successful performance of Finnish teenagers in the Programme for
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International Student Achievement (PISA), run by the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD).
Indeed, education performance is usually measured by results in large-scale
assessments. This is not the case in the Finnish comprehensive education per-
formance, because national assessments are sample-based, and school-specific
results are not made public (see Simola et al. 2017). However, since the turn of
the millennium, Finland has participated in many international assessments.
Compared with OECD countries and some other regions,¹ Finland was first in
PISA in reading (2001), mathematics (2003), and science (2006) and then dipped
slightly in reading to second (2009), in science to fifth (2015), and more dramat-
ically in mathematics to twelfth (2012) (OECD 2002, 2004, 2006, 2010, 2014,
2016). In the large-scale assessments operated by the International Association
for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA), the Trends in International
Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) and the Progress in International Reading
Literacy Study (PIRLS), Finland’s performance has been good, but more modest
when compared with PISA. Eighth graders have ranked fourteenth (1999) and
eighth (2011) in mathematics and tenth in science (1999) in TIMSS. Fourth
graders ranked eighth (2011) and seventeenth (2015) in mathematics and seventh
(2015) in science (Mullis et al. 2000, 2012a, 2016; Martin et al. 2000, 2016).²
However, Finland occupied third (2011) and fifth (2016) places (Mullis et al.
2012b, 2017) in PIRLS reading tests for fourth graders. These tests differ in that
the OECD tests rely on its own definition of what constitutes necessary skills,
whereas the IEA tests attempt to use the content of the national curriculum. Both
tests indicate little variance between schools, which supports the notion that the
education system has created equal starting points for pupils across the country.
The international large-scale assessments have their deficiencies, not least in their
disregard for the socio-historical context in which teaching takes place (Mulford
2002; Simola 2005), but we can certainly conclude that Finnish comprehensive
school pupils consistently perform well in various international tests compared
with their peers in other countries.
In sum, Finnish comprehensive school policy is a success: it has delivered
programmatic goals and widely valued impacts; the basic set-up of schooling
enjoys broad legitimacy among political actors and parents; and it has gained
international recognition in performance. The case story affords a more complex
view.
Setting the Scene: The Main Actors and the Political Landscape
The early years of education in Finland can be described as a process of the
secularization and institutionalization of education. Finland belonged to the
Swedish Empire between the thirteenth and nineteenth centuries. Education
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during this period was church-led, and teachers served as lower ranking clergy.
With the eighteenth century, Enlightenment humanism and philanthropy
began to gain ground. Between 1809 and 1917 Finland was an archduchy of
Russia. Under Russian rule the state took more control over education and
contributed to both the institutionalization and secularization of education
(Joutsivuo 2010). As the state needed a larger workforce during Finland’s late
industrialization from the latter half of the nineteenth century, responsibility
for education provision was eventually transferred from the church to the state
and municipalities (Leino-Kaukiainen and Heikkinen 2011). Between 1860 and
1870 the school system was reorganized into elementary schools (kansakoulu,
literally ‘folk schools’), and grammar schools (oppikoulu, literally ‘learning
schools’).
In the first three decades following independence from Russia in 1917, the
country faced a series of internal and international conflicts. Although it suc-
ceeded in preserving its independence in this period, it was on the losing side of
the Second World War and was subjected to war reparations and land cessions to
the Soviet Union. The economy was predominantly agricultural, and Finland’s
urbanization and industrialization was late. This was also reflected in the late
decision to make education compulsory in 1921 (Laki oppivelvollisuudesta 101/
1921). It was not until the 1940s that elementary schools began to reach the
country’s more remote areas (Simola 2002).
In the post-war period societal conditions were conducive to supporting
change. The coming of age of the baby-boomer generation in the 1950s produced
an urgent need for widespread education, and the rapid transformation into a
more industrialized and service-based economy at the end of the 1960s also
stimulated demand for a more educated workforce (Kettunen et al. 2012). This
need is explicitly stated in the first sentences of a government bill (Hallituksen
esitys 44/1967), which eventually became law on comprehensive schools in 1968,
but there were many twists and turns in the political process to get to this point.
Throughout the half century of its existence the radical original reform concept
of the common school has endured in the institutional structure of the compre-
hensive school, and it has been able to resist the most radical global trends towards
a more marketized approach to schooling (Simola et al. 2017). There are various
ways of periodizing the phases of the Finnish comprehensive school (e.g.
Lampinen 1998: 30–79; Puhakka 2006: 9; Ahonen 2012: 153; Kettunen et al.
2012: 37–41). For the most part, the first ideas were introduced immediately
after the Second World War. Political decisions were taken and further planning
took place in the 1960s, and the reform was undertaken in the 1970s. An
important contextual change happened during the 1980s and 1990s, generally as
a result of a swing to the Right, when the degree of municipal autonomy was
radically increased and there was also a gradual weakening of state control in
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education. A result of the changes in the political climate was a moderate
liberalization of school choice in the 1990s. These periods are roughly followed
in the following the rest of this chapter.
Positions of key stakeholders varied during the critical years between the late
1950s and the late 1960s, when the comprehensive school was designed. A key
feature was the changing balance of parties in parliament. Because governments
in this era were weaker than they are today, parliamentary initiatives played an
important role. From a constitutional perspective, parliament’s instability was
the result of the semi-presidential system, and the President’s power was
strengthened because there was only one incumbent between 1956 and 1982,
Urho Kekkonen (Agrarian Union, Maalaisliitto). The continuity and political
colour of not only the Minister of Education but also the key civil servants in
directing the National Board of Education were contributing factors. Directors
were the heads of the main committees that designed the principles of education
and could create continuity between unstable governments. Trade unions and
industry-funded interest groups were involved in the project’s opinion forming
and criticism.
The main drivers of change were the political parties, which could eventually
compromise in piecing together differing interests. During the key years of
education reform, the Finnish parliament (Eduskunta) was dominated by three
parties: the Agrarian Union, which changed its name to the Centre Party
(Keskustapuolue) in 1965; the Social Democratic Party (Suomen Sosialidemok-
raattinen Puolue); and the left-wing Finnish People’s Democratic League (Suomen
Kansan Demokraattinen Liitto). Most of the 200 seats in parliament were held by
these parties or their predecessors or successors from independence in 1917 until
2007. Although they did not necessarily form coalitions or even share interests
(not always even internally), this triad generally reflected the voters’ preferences
during this period. Every post-war majority or minority government (apart
from those consisting entirely of civil servants) was led by one of these parties,
although the Finnish People’s Democratic League headed the government only
once. The largest party of the Right was the National Coalition Party (Kansallinen
kokoomus), which, having spent decades mostly in opposition, became stronger
only during the 1990s. The centre-right Swedish People’s Party of Finland
(Suomen Ruotsalainen Kansanpuolue) was occasionally involved in government
and held the Ministry of Education during the 1980s and 1990s. These shifts in
the balance of power and their relationship with education policy are illustrated
by the number of days Ministers of Education were in office. Figure 7.1 shows
that the post was largely shared between the Centre and Left parties between
the 1950s and 1970s, whereas since the 1980s it has been shared between the
Left and Right parties, with the exception of the 1990s, when right-wing parties
were dominant.
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A Critical Juncture: The Creation of the Legislative Framework
The establishment of the comprehensive system was a rather long process in
which committees were used extensively. These independent, broadly politically
representative, and expert-based committees served as ad hoc organs in producing
reports and drafting laws. Interestingly, decision-making in committees was often
not unanimous, and many members wrote dissenting opinions on particular
aspects of their reports. Such dissent reflected the larger political differences
occurring during the decision-making process.
In 1946 the left-centre government headed by Mauno Pekkala, historically the
only far-left Finnish People’s Democratic League Prime Minister, assigned a
committee to work on a general plan for reform of the education system and to
determine the extent of compulsory education. The committee was led by the
director of the National Board of Education, Yrjö Ruutu, who was then affiliated
with the Finnish People’s Democratic League. The Committee (1/1948) Report
proposed the first comprehensive eight-year school model in Finland. However,
the government soon collapsed due to internal conflicts between the Left parties
before a bill was introduced. The impetus was lost: following the 1948 parliamen-
tary elections, the proposed comprehensive system had lost sufficient support in
parliament (Ahonen 2003: 127; Kettunen et al. 2012: 37).
Left parties continued to demand a comprehensive system in parliament, and
the debate intensified with the establishment of a new committee by the coalition
government of K.-A. Fagerholm (composed of the Social Democratic Party, Agrarian
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Figure 7.1 Percentage of days in office of Ministers of Education in the post-war era
(1944–2018) in Finnish governments
Source: Valtioneuvosto [Finnish Government] (2018).
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near future for schools (Kettunen et al. 2012: 37). The committee (1956–9) was led by
Ruutu’s successor, R. H. Oittinen (Social Democrat), who was to become one of the
main figures in the comprehensive school project. The committee consisted of six civil
servants, an academic, two politically active teachers, two members of parliament
(from the Agrarian Union and the Finnish People’s Democratic League), and a clerk
(Ahonen 2003: 127). The Committee recognized several ‘shortcomings and flaws’ in
the school system. It also envisioned that many contextual factors would support
an exhaustive education reform, among them an increased birth rate and the need
to increase the length of compulsory education to avoid youth unemployment
(Committee 1959: 8–9). The report stated that the workforce needed more skills,
which could be achieved through better education. In practice, this would entail a
nine-year comprehensive system administered by the municipalities which should be
free of direct and indirect costs to pupils (Committee 1959: 83–4, 177). The report’s
views were not shared by all the committee’s members. In a dissenting opinion,
half of the committee members disagreed with the abolition of private middle
schools and expressed doubts concerning the possibility of the provision of free
education. Sirkka Ahonen (2003: 130–1) argues that the strong opinions of the
committee’s chair, R. H. Oittinen, influenced the report’s radical main message
supporting a comprehensive system, despite the dissensions. He had opposed
the bipartite system for a decade.
It is indicative of the instability of the period that Oittinen’s committee outlived
five governments, and the sixth, which received its report, resigned little more
than a month later. This instability prompted parliament to act. Four MPs
sponsored petitionary motions concerning comprehensive education (Eduskunta
2018). The Standing Committee for Education, led by the MP Anna-Liisa Tiekso
(Finnish People’s Democratic League), started to work on these petitionary
motions, with the motion of the MP Olavi Lahtela (Agrarian Union) as a base
text (Kettunen et al. 2012: 37). Following the Standing Committee’s work and
parliamentary debates, parliament approved a resolution by 122 votes to 68 on
22 November 1963, urging the government to act based on Oittinen’s committee
report of 1959 (Eduskunta 2018). While some elements were shared across
parties, key to the resolution’s approval was its support by the Agrarian Union,
whose votes tipped the balance between the pro-comprehensive Left and the
doubtful, grammar-school-defending Right (Eduskunta 2018). The Agrarian
Union’s support was motivated by urbanization and a desire to support rural
areas. The National Coalition Party again calculated that it was easier to support
the interests of grammar schools from within the process (Okkonen 2017: 93).
The next move was to come from a centre-right government. A coalition
government led by Johannes Virolainen of the Centre Party (before 1965 the
Agrarian Union), and in which the National Coalition Party held the Minister of
Education’s post, established a committee under Oittinen to draft the legislation
for the creation of a comprehensive system. The Comprehensive School Committee
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(1964–7) formulated the basis of the current system of nine-year schooling, with
six lower grades (primary) and three upper (lower secondary) grades. Political
representation was broader than in the previous committees (Ahonen 2003:
142). The committee’s first report (Committee 1965) was used almost verbatim
as the Government Bill (Hallituksen esitys 44/1967). It outlined the basic prin-
ciples of the comprehensive school. These included principles of uniformity of
content and teaching, compulsory nine-year schooling for all, the reforming of
previous school types into one comprehensive school, allowing some optional
subjects, a class teacher for the first six years and a subject teacher for the last
three years, free schooling and social benefits, and the idea of non-private
municipal education (Hallituksen esitys 44/1967: 6–7; Committee 1965: 11–13).
There were other committees, but this committee was central in outlining the
most important aspects of the comprehensive school policy framework.
The process was not without critique, however, and the parliamentary process
was criticized in the debates for being opaque and confusing (Okkonen 2017: 120).
Okkonen (2017: 82–4) maintains that the debate’s starting point was difficult
because the majority in parliament wanted municipal comprehensive schools,
which were difficult to reconcile with the private (grammar) schools. This was
resolved in the work of the Standing Committee, when it was agreed to utilize the
private schools in the new system. However, it later became clear that the Left and
Right interpreted this differently (Okkonen 2017: 93–114). The question of the
private schools was to escalate during the implementation phase, but it was now
settled for the legislative phase.
The Paasio (Social Democrat) government (1966–8), a coalition of the Finnish
People’s Democratic League, the Social Democratic Party, and the Centre Party,
with Oittinen as the Minister of Education, presented the Government Bill
(Hallituksen esitys 44/1967), which was overwhelmingly approved by parliament
as the Act on the Foundation of the School System (Laki koulujärjestelmän
perusteista 467/1968), creating the comprehensive school.
The final legislation was a compromise between competing interests, and
different actors gained different things. The left-wing parties supported a state-
run municipal system which could provide free education for working-class
children. The centre, more specifically the Agrarian Union/Centre Party, could
agree to this aim and was also able to couple the vibrancy of the different rural
areas to the comprehensive system’s aim of regional equality. Part of the com-
promise for the right-wing parties, and especially the teachers of the soon-to-be-
abolished grammar schools, was a streaming system which retained some aspects
of the former school structure. It divided the students into groups in mathematics
and foreign languages, based on aptitude. Importantly, some groups did not
entitle their members to continue into general upper secondary education, the
main avenue to universities. The legitimation the comprehensive school gained
during these years, despite the original right-wing doubts, is indicated by the fact
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that only six MPs opposed the preceding law to abolish streaming in 1982. The
system came to its end in 1984, when a new national core curriculum came into force
(Ahonen 2012; Kettunen et al. 2012; Simola et al. 2015: 88; see Okkonen 2017: 122).
Labour unions also played a role in the policymaking process. Unions were
divided along the old bipartite lines, where grammar school teachers and elem-
entary school teachers had their own organizations. Both the grammar school
teachers and their trade union opposed the idea of having one school for all
students, because of their concern about the profession’s declining status. After
the comprehensive reform was complete, opposition became futile and the two
trade unions sought to improve their relations and finally merged in 1974 into an
entity which also included vocational teachers (Jauhiainen and Rinne 2012:
111–12).
The professional status of teachers went through an interesting interlude during
the comprehensive school reform. Teachers in Finland now enjoy a high profes-
sional status, but this is because they have been successful in bolstering their
position by arguing that teaching is an academic and research-based profession
(Säntti and Salminen 2015; Säntti and Kauko 2019). The most radical thesis
suggests that the transfer of teacher training to the universities, with the require-
ment of a master’s degree, was a contingent historical event. Hannu Simola and
Risto Rinne (2010) point out that the work of the Committee (1972) for Degrees in
Philosophy and Social Sciences expanded to include all academic degrees and that
this contingent event was the key element resulting in master-level teacher train-
ing. However, the committee did conclude that ‘teacher education was an appro-
priate example of academic education as it had a concrete professional basis’
(Committee 1972, quoted in Säntti and Kauko, 2019).
Implementation Disputes
After the policy framework was established, some adjustments were made to the
comprehensive school system in the initial phase of implementation. Later, in the
1980s and 1990s, adjustments were related more to how the general frames
around the comprehensive school had started to change. However, the common
feature here is that all reforms since the creation of the comprehensive school have
occurred either within or outside the set frame, without changing it. This means
that in the last fifty years there has been no initiative to change the fundamental
principles of the original policy establishing the comprehensive school system
(Kauko et al. 2015; Simola et al. 2017).
The comprehensive school reform was implemented between 1972 and 1977,
beginning first in the northern and north-eastern areas of Finland and continuing
towards the south. The state supported municipalities in constructing new
schools. While this resulted in the closure of some smaller rural schools, the
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state supported regional diversity by emphasizing the importance to children of
the local school (Ahonen 2012: 153).
The private school question, considered settled during the legislative process,
was re-politicized in the first stages of implementation. Okkonen (2017) argues
that the Right was anxious about a loss of political hegemony and reopened the
question of municipal education, which had already been agreed during the
legislative process. When the city of Kemi and the Ylitornio municipality decided
to exclude private schools from the comprehensive system, conflict between Left
and Right culminated in opposing constitutional interpretations. The Right, with
the support of the organization of private grammar schools (Yksityisoppikoulujen
liitto), claimed that comprehensive reform was an unconstitutional ruse to abolish
private schools. The Chancellor of Justice agreed that unless there were grave
reasons, private schools should not be integrated into the municipal systems
(Okkonen 2017: 172–3). This dispute resulted in a legislative amendment in
1974, which clearly left it to the municipalities to decide whether to accept private
schools into the comprehensive school systems (Ahonen 2012: 153). This resulted
in the end of private schools in the traditional sense, and they were largely
incorporated into the comprehensive system.
There was thus a growing concern on the Right about leftist tendencies and
personnel in the Ministry of Education, the National Board of Education, and the
universities. The Free Education Support Foundation (Vapaan koulutuksen tuki-
säätiö) was established in 1973 to oppose the Left’s policies, combining political,
cultural, and economic powers sympathetic to the cause. The Foundation func-
tioned especially as a channel for industrial interests (Suutarinen 2008; Okkonen
2017: 176). The Right’s criticism was fuelled by a heated discussion before
the 1975 elections about the state-funded municipal curriculum experiment in
Pirkkala (Okkonen 2017). The experiment produced teaching material with a
Soviet bias which had not passed national textbook reviews. This created fear of a
left-wing conspiracy on the Right (Leskinen 2016; see Seuri 2016), and it circled
the wagons (Okkonen 2017: 280). Comprehensive schools only felt the effects of
this rightwards push in the following decades, when the political situation
changed, and the National Coalition Party found its way into government: key
civil servants were now influenced by New Public Management ideas.
Deregulating Equality: The Discourse and Policy
Change of the 1990s
The political landscape started to change during the 1980s and 1990s. The collapse
of the Soviet Union and the strengthening of parliament during the presidency of
Mauno Koivisto (1982–94, Social Democratic Party) created a new stability in the
government’s work and opened more possibilities for right-wing parties. Criticism
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of right-leaning interest groups intensified during the 1980s. The education
committee of the Confederation of Finnish Industries published a series of
pamphlets supporting science and mathematics education, freedom of choice in
subjects, and entrepreneurialism (Varjo 2007: 93–4). These were echoed in a
speech by Prime Minister Harri Holkeri (National Coalition Party) in 1987, in
which he promoted the right of every child to receive an education that supported
their talents in favour of one system designed for everyone. This represented an
historic shift in discourse after the creation of the comprehensive system (Simola
et al. 2010). The Holkeri government programme outlined the broad legislative
reform, but its implementation only started under the government which fol-
lowed, when the Ministry of Education started a working group, led by Permanent
Secretary Jaakko Numminen who later described the work at this stage as tech-
nical, to evaluate the legal corpus and offer suggestions for its simplification (Varjo
2007: 121). A committee led by Permanent Secretary Vilho Hirvi (National
Coalition Party) continued the work. It prepared more detailed suggestions for
legislative change (Varjo 2007: 127–32). The working groups and committees set
deregulatory and more individually oriented policies that changed some of the
features of the comprehensive school. These changes were connected with
increased municipal autonomy, the role of private schools, and the question of
school choice.
A radical change came with the decentralization and deregulation of govern-
ance during the 1990s, influenced by New Public Management trends. These ideas
also enabled the transfer of unpopular budgetary cuts to the local level in a period
of economic crisis. Reforming the organizational structure and funding had the
effect of significantly increasing the autonomy of municipalities as the main
providers of comprehensive education (Laki peruskoululain muuttamisesta 707/
1992; Kuntalaki 365/1995). The state lost many means of exerting control at local
level: school inspections, for example, were gradually abolished during the 1980s
and 1990s (Varjo et al. 2016); and financial control was lost as decisions were
delegated locally. Municipalities gained more power piecemeal in freeing school
choice locally (Seppänen 2006: 71). As a result, school districts were abolished,
making choice possible, and the only legislative restriction was that families would
have to contribute to travel costs for distances of more than five kilometres
(Ahonen 2003: 180; Seppänen 2006: 66). In 1991 it became possible to establish
new private schools with the permission of the government. Such schools could
opt out of the curriculum if their teaching was based on an ‘internationally known
pedagogical system’ (Laki peruskoululain muuttamisesta 169/1991).
The changes in relation to school choice and private schools were readjusted in
the 1998 Basic Education Act (Perusopetuslaki 628/1998). The Government Bill
(Hallituksen esitys 88/1997) proposed by the Paavo Lipponen (Social Democratic
Party) Left–Right coalition government followed the working groups’ deregula-
tory ethos. However, drawing on expert hearings and parliamentary debates,
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the Standing Committee on Education amended the proposal. Municipalities
were now required to allocate pupils a place in a ‘nearby school’ with a safe
journey, and there was a requirement for regional equality (Ahonen 2003: 191–2;
Seppänen 2006: 71). The 1998 Act also made the establishment of new private
schools easier on various ideological grounds (education philosophy, religion, or
pedagogical method), but retained the requirement for special permission from
the government.
Criticism from the Finnish Confederation of Industries continued at the begin-
ning of the new millennium. At its peak, it highlighted the purported ineffective-
ness and mediocrity of the comprehensive school, which were the subjects of a
large conference. In December 2001, shortly after the conference, the first PISA
results came in, and the criticism lost its force (Simola et al. 2017). Apart from
curriculum development the major legislative reform of the 1990s and the PISA
results gave no reason for further large-scale comprehensive school reform.
Nevertheless, contrary to Pasi Sahlberg’s (2011) argument, Piia Seppänen et al.
(2019) point out that comprehensive education policy during the new millennium
has been quite active. Government programmes have discussed varying topics
such as funding, regional equality, class size, special education, and the declining
results and gaps between pupil groups. Attempts to capitalize internationally on
the Finnish reputation with the help of education markets and exports has been a
recent development—and possibly the most marked because of PISA (Schatz et al.
2015; Seppänen et al. 2019).
Within the national framework it has become clear that municipalities vary
in their policies regarding school choice. Evidence suggests that these choices
reflect more social background than aptitude, and that in some bigger cities choice
is very popular (Seppänen et al. 2015; Varjo et al. 2015; Kosunen 2016) and yet
faith in the comprehensive school policy and system is still strong among parents
(Seppänen et al. 2015). The Swedish example of boosting inequality through the
radical liberalization of school markets (e.g. Dovemark et al. 2018) has raised
concerns in the Nordic research community that such reforms should be avoided
in Finland and other countries (NordForsk 2018). Though challenges have arisen
throughout the history of the policy, the Finnish comprehensive school system has
demonstrated success (to varying degrees) in terms of programme goals, process
legitimacy, and political support.
Summarizing Success in the Finnish Comprehensive
School System
The central programmatic goal of the comprehensive school policy—to enhance
equality—has endured over time. In addition to equality, education policy has also
been linked to economic prosperity. The balance between these two goals, and the
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understanding of equality, has determined the structure of the comprehensive
school system. At its most abstract, the main policy debate about education in
Finland is on the relative emphases on education equality and education equity.
The former is linked to the social democratic agrarian tradition of equality; the
latter to the new market-liberalist version of equity that was boosted in the late
1980s. Whereas equality emphasizes the similarity of pupils or students and the
right to receive an education, equity emphasizes ‘difference among pupils and
everybody’s right to receive schooling that fits his or her capacities, needs and
individuality’ (Simola et al. 2017: 33). This great debate is echoed in the various
discussions of the regional balance of higher education (Kauko 2013), the discus-
sion of school choice (Seppänen 2006), or the role of New Public Management in
education (Uljens et al. 2016). The same debate is globally relevant, but in many
respects—concerning quality assurance and evaluation policies, for example—
Finland presents a rare case of a policy with a more dominant emphasis on
equality (Simola et al. 2013). In this debate comprehensive schools have been
the foundation of equality. The Finnish policy of providing comprehensive school
education has successfully delivered universal welfare, drawing on producing
beneficial social outcomes with the help of raising the population’s level of
education.
The process of policymaking and negotiation resulted in a grand compromise
between the different parties and stakeholders. Despite the various criticisms of
right-leaning interest groups, the compromise has held. It is now difficult to
imagine a scenario in which the comprehensive school framework is loosened
and another form of school introduced (as has happened in Sweden, for example).
However, changes within the comprehensive school may prove decisive in the
longer term. Historically, the comprehensive school has been a success in process
terms: different voices were included and a solution was found in the decades of
reform, and we can conclude from the prevailing silence that the outcome is
viewed by most to be just and fair. Future threats to the main goals of sustaining
equality and economic growth are related to the potential of the middle-class
distinction, the continuing discussion in the wake of declining PISA results, and
the demands of austerity politics.
Returning to the issues raised in this chapter’s introduction, it is clear that the
Finnish comprehensive school has enjoyed political success, and it still enjoys a
halo effect. Political and professional actors associated with the policy may take
their share of the international glory awarded to Finnish education (see Rautalin
2013). Within Finland, stakeholders in the programme also enjoy political bene-
fits. Education researchers would agree, for example, that the Finnish Trade
Union of Education enjoys a strong position as part of the policymaking estab-
lishment and the trade union landscape. Among politicians there are very few who
identify themselves as education policy experts (e.g. Kauko 2011). This could be
interpreted as a feature of a state-centred and bureaucratically led system. It is
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nevertheless clear that the comprehensive school has enjoyed the support of all the
main political parties for decades.
Learning from the Finnish example is challenging because the education system
is deeply rooted in socio-historical context (Salokangas and Kauko 2015), which
may not be easily transferred or emulated. Despite this, efforts have been made to
explain and learn from the success of Finnish comprehensive education. Many
such efforts do not precisely operationalize what they mean when they speak of
success, which risks projecting onto the Finnish case whatever is expected to be
the key to success. In short, determining whether the purported success of Finnish
education can be exported is complex. Simola et al. (2017: 123) list ‘explanations
of the Finnish success and decline in basic-schooling politics’, which all derive
from root causes such as war experience, late industrialization, contingent events
such as municipal autonomy, or the varying pedagogical traditions that have
evolved since the 1960s, to name but a few.
The Finnish comprehensive school policy is a story of political conflicts result-
ing in compromises and a robust institutional set-up. A workable hypothesis is
that the Finnish comprehensive school is a modern institution attempting to
survive late modern pressures. The political system of the 1960s and 1970s,
along with the growing economy of the Golden Years (Hobsbawm 1994), was
able to institutionalize an enduring political compromise that relied on a radical
idea of equality independent of the child’s background. The political system
generally supported continuation rather than radical change, and at some poten-
tially critical junctures contingent events, such as municipal decentralization
(1990s) and PISA results (early 2000s), supported the continuation of the insti-
tution. The former was important in locking in autonomy of the municipal system
and the latter in resisting criticism that could have led to political changes (see
Simola et al. 2017). Finally, a major factor contributing to success has also been the
diversity of political representation in parliament, which is of course a represen-
tation of the will of the people.³
Additional version of this case
The case study outlined in this chapter is accompanied by a corresponding case
study from the Centre for Public Impact’s (CPI) Public Impact Observatory—
an international repository of public policies assessed for their impact using
CPI’s Public Impact Fundamentals framework. CPI’s framework provides a
way for those who work in or with government to assess public policies, to
understand why they were successful, so key lessons can be drawn out for
future policy work. The case can be easily located in the CPI repository at www.
centreforpublicimpact.org/observatory.
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Notes
1. The number of countries and ‘economies’, smaller regions such as Hong Kong and
Taipei, has grown from forty-three to sixty-five, having peaked at seventy-five (OECD
2016: 27).
2. The number of participating countries has varied between twenty-nine and fifty-eight,
US states from zero to thirteen, ‘benchmarking participants’, meaning smaller regions,
between two and six, and there have also been between zero and three off-grade
participants (National Center for Education Statistics 2018).
3. I would like to thank Mira Kalalahti and Janne Varjo from the University of Helsinki
for their valuable comments on a previous version of this chapter. The remaining
errors are mine alone.
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Estonia’s Digital Transformation
Mission Mystique and the Hiding Hand
Rainer Kattel and Ines Mergel
A Digital Success Story
In 2017, The New Yorker published a story titled ‘Estonia, the Digital Republic’
(Heller 2017). The article’s subtitle was ‘Its Government is Virtual, Borderless,
Blockchained, and Secure. Has this Tiny Post-Soviet Nation Found the Way of the
Future?’ It summarizes the buzz around Estonia’s digital transformation: from the
outside, at least, it is seen as a major success and has been lauded in mainstream
media such as the New York Times, Financial Times, and Forbes (Scott 2014;
Crouch 2015; Gaskell 2017). In these, Estonia’s success in digital government is
frequently described in parallel with its thriving ICT industry, best exemplified by
Skype which originated and is still primarily based in Estonia and which was
subsequently acquired by Microsoft.
The Estonian e-government infrastructure and its success rest on two main
pillars, both introduced in 2001, that essentially create a digital state and digital
citizens: the data infrastructure X-Road and a compulsory national digital ID
(Kalvet and Aaviksoo 2008; Kalvet 2012; Margetts and Naumann 2016). X-Road
is an interoperability platform for existing decentralized databases and a data
exchange layer that can be used by public and private sector actors. It is inde-
pendent of platforms and architectures and provides secure interoperability for
data exchanges and identification of trusted actors in digital service delivery. The
digital ID makes it possible for citizens to be identified digitally and to use digital
signatures. Together, X-Road and the digital ID make it possible to digitally sign
any contract, access essentially any public service such citizens’ digital medical
history, order prescriptions, file taxes, vote, and so forth. More than 2,300 public
and private services use X-Road, and the digital signature has been used almost
We would like to thank Brian Gannon, Ella Fitzsimmons, Mallory Compton, Paul ’t Hart, Wolfgang
Drechsler, and participants at a workshop in Utrecht in April, 2018 for their comments on earlier drafts
of this article. The article is based on 22 interviews with leading Estonian politicians, policy-makers,
ICT activists, ICT entrepreneurs and third sector representatives carried out between September 2016
and June 2017. Quotations used in this chapter are gleaned from these interviews. A list of interviewees
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350 million times by Estonia’s population of 1.3 million. The digital ID penetration
is close to 100 per cent; 30 per cent of votes are cast digitally (in both local and
national elections); almost all personal income tax declarations and medical
prescriptions are done online, and most medical records held by hospital and
family doctors are accessible online. The Estonian government claims that its
e-government infrastructure has annually led to savings of about 2 per cent of
GDP and more than 800 years in working time for public and private sector in a
calendar year.¹
According to the EU’s Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI) for 2017,
Estonia is the leading nation in Europe in digital public services (it dropped to
second place in 2018). However, in most other e-government rankings, Esto-
nia’s digital success is less evident. In DESI’s overall ranking, Estonia is featured
in the ninth spot for 2018, and it is ranked only sixteenth globally, according to
the UN’s 2018 e-government survey.² This mismatch—high praise and leader-
ship position in global news outlets vs. relatively middling rankings in overall
digital transformation indexes³—reflects the nature of Estonia’s digital success:
Estonia is ranked high for its digital public service infrastructure, universally
available and mandatory, as an integral backbone of public service delivery.
Estonia’s digital success, however, is not about other digital offerings such as
digital democracy, citizen engagement, or digitally transforming public services
such as the welfare state.
The specific nature of Estonia’s digital achievement and at the same time the
disconnect between technological infrastructure and degree of digital penetration
are often overlooked in international coverage. Domestically it has become a
crucial political and policy issue over the past few years. For instance, Kaja Kallas
who heads the Reform Party since April 2018 (the Reform Party is one of the
largest and most popular parties which has led various coalition governments
over the past fifteen years until 2016 when it was forced into opposition) referred
to the abovementioned less than stellar rankings in global indexes and argued
that much of the e-government infrastructure is outdated and called for funda-
mental reforms in Estonian e-government (Kallas 2018). With the decision to
focus its digital development on X-Road only, Estonia has effectively created
its own legacy system—a move that the initial thinkers wanted to avoid.
This realization comes amidst increasing domestic criticism of the so-called
e-residency programme, launched in 2014 and highly lauded in international
media, which essentially opens some of the X-Road and digital ID-based services
globally (Tammpuu and Masso 2018).⁴
In order to assess Estonia’s digital transformation along the three dimensions
deployed in this book—programmatic, policy and political success—it is import-
ant to note that Estonia’s case is a success of a national strategy rather than of a
single policy or even a bundle of programmes. Indeed, Estonia’s digital initiative
does not arise from a documented foundational policy or strategy, or even
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documented discussion and debate. The government’s e-government strategy
document, Principles of Estonian Information Policy (1998) approved by the
Estonian parliament in 1998, which was seen as the critical scene-setter for digital
transformation in the 1990s (Kalvet 2007), does not mention any of the funda-
mental principles or developments that took place just a few years later. It can
therefore be argued that the Estonian digital transformation is characterized by
‘development-driven strategies’ rather than by ‘strategy-driven development’
(Kalvet 2007: 11).⁵
Furthermore, Estonia has never had a central office for digital transformation
like other countries that have set out on the digital transformation journey, such as
the UK’s Government Digital Service (GDS), despite the fact that such a central
agency was initially envisioned to manage (among other things) vital public
registries (Estonia’s Roadmap to Information Society 1994). Nor is there a for-
mally designated and empowered state official for digital enablement: the current
government Chief Information Officer position exists only in English translation,
and only informally.⁶
Estonia’s digital transformation has been an extended and ongoing process over
three decades, starting in the early 1990s when Estonia regained its independence
and continuing to the present day. It was informed by successive debates and
developments, and multiple policy initiatives. Much of this process has been ad
hoc and informal. For example, many strategic policy documents for digital
transformation have followed the rhythms of European (structural) funding
periods rather than responding to domestic challenges and planning processes.⁷
Similarly, various overlapping and mostly self-managed public–private networks
provided the informal dynamic capacity and capability for change, few of which
have been institutionalized or formalized.
However, a fundamental constant in Estonia’s digital transformation has been
widespread cross-party support for the digital agenda. Starting with the first
independent government in 1992, ICT development in society was seen as
delivering competitive advantage, as a symbol for leaving the Soviet past behind,
and as an indicator for opening the Estonian society and economy towards the
West. Digital transformation as a vision was part of a broader political consensus
at the time that included the agreement to join the European Union and
NATO. To this day, the digital agenda enjoys widespread political support.
It has become part of Estonia’s official image and branding as evidenced by the
e-Estonia showroom (https://e-estonia.com), almost a mandatory stop of any
official state visit.
In the following, we review past events and decisions to untangle the essential
elements and distinctive features of Estonia’s digital government success. We
examine whether the success factors and drivers of the past decades can be relied
on to ensure this success endures and delivers the next generation of digital
transformation policies in Estonia.
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Contexts, Challenges, Agents
History and the Hiding Hand
In 1990, Estonian state-owned electronics companies employed 26,000 people—
this is more than today despite electronics being one of the principal and highly
successful export articles over the past twenty years (Ubar 1993; Tamkivi 2017).
Yet Estonia’s electronics industry, and its transformation from the Soviet legacy
systems into an integral part of Scandinavia’s global value chains, has almost
nothing to do with Estonia’s digital government. So why and how did digital
government emerge as a paradigm next to and competing with electronics and
industry in general? In other words, why did not digital transformation follow the
path of the ‘invisible hand’ of free-market reforms—a set of ideas so dominant in
Estonia from the 1990s onward?
Two crucial political circumstances in the 1990s provide the answer. First, after
regaining independence in 1991, the first free elections in Estonia brought to
power political forces that were intent on cutting ties to Soviet legacies in all
aspects of society. Some developments were inevitable: as the Soviet planning
system collapsed, so did export markets to the east, and companies needed to
transform themselves into privately owned entities relying on domestic (and
mostly Western) markets (Reinert and Kattel 2004). Others came from political
will, such as consciously embracing recent Western technologies, products, and
services rather than attempting to upgrade inherited Soviet technical, produc-
tion, and service systems (Drechsler 1995). This resulted, for instance, in changes
to the funding and governance of R&D, the privatization of state-owned com-
panies, and transformation of the finance sector—all following a guiding politi-
cal principle of transition by replacement (Kattel 2012). This proved particularly
crucial for ICT because it encouraged a focus on new IT solutions as opposed to
large-scale centralized legacy systems in both private and public sectors, also
excluding Western legacy systems available in the form of development aid.
Transition as replacement was complemented with a political idea underpinned
by the same ideological principle: namely, to ‘leapfrog’ the West’s technology. Here
the success of Finland and Nokia became one of the guiding political reference
points: ‘What is our Nokia?’ asked Lennart Meri, Estonia’s first president after
Estonia regained independence in 1991, a question that has remained a popular
catchphrase. As Estonia seemed to lack the political will and economic capacity to
build its own significant industry, the focus turned to develop what might be
labelled as a general purpose technology. In other words, rather than developing
specific IT and electronics industries, the political focus was on developing IT as a
general purpose socio-economic skill to be shared by as many citizens as possible.
These twin ideas laid the groundwork for three critical features of Estonia’s
digital transformation that are still dominant today:
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1. Focus on future-oriented and almost utopian solutions—the realm of ‘crazy
ideas’, as expressed byMart Laar, primeminister from 1992–4 and 1999–2002.
2. Public digital architecture should be universal in nature.
3. Decentralized digital agendas (including databases) of line ministries.
Thus, in its purest form, Estonia’s digital transformation can be seen as a
strategy to leapfrog rather than just catch up with the West (Burlamaqui and
Kattel 2016). In this view, widely shared among the emerging policy networks in
the early 1990s, the Soviet occupation that lasted over five decades is seen as a lost
time. This implied a particular glorification of what can be called the first republic,
which lasted from 1918 until 1940. Following its independence, Estonia not only
reissued the kroon, its currency from the interwar period, but also based its new
constitution on its previous constitutions from 1920 and 1938—indicating its
reliance on traditional values. The digital initiative epitomized the other compo-
nent of the new republic’s dual ambition: to be the state and the society that it was
in the interwar period and to leapfrog the West in development.
However, two significant differences exist between Estonia in the 1930s and
the 1990s: the ethnic composition of its society and its economic structure. In
1934, 88 per cent of inhabitants were Estonian, and this increased to 97 per cent
after mass emigration during the Second World War. In subsequent decades
this trend reversed as people, mostly ethnic Russians and Ukrainians, were
encouraged by the Soviet government to move to Estonia from the Soviet
Union. By 1989 the share of native Estonians dropped to as low as 62 per cent;
in north-eastern Estonia, the percentage of Estonians decreased to 13 per cent in
1989 (from 65 per cent in 1934) (Estonian Statistics n.d.). These shifts in the
population were associated with rapid industrialization, particularly in north-
eastern Estonia, that created a long-standing high demand for labour (Rajasalu
2002). Plans for even more investment into resource-intensive heavy industry
and mining—and fears of new waves of immigration—played a crucial role in
galvanizing the popular independence movement in the late 1980s around
environmental protection issues (Manning 2007).
This confluence of industrialization with ethnic tensions explains why Estonia,
despite being one of the most economically and technologically advanced coun-
tries within the Soviet Union, chose not to upgrade the inherited economy and
instead sought to do something completely different. As an emerging general-
purpose technology, ICT offered an almost perfect solution, particularly given
the availability of R&D skills in this sector. ‘The digital’ thus came to express
Estonia’s—or more precisely, its elite’s—ambitions, and explains why to this day,
the ‘digital elite’ is almost entirely ethnically Estonian.
The role of ‘crazy’ ideas was initially also part of Estonia’s economic policy. For
example, Estonia introduced a relatively unique currency board to manage its
currency, and a flat income tax rate (both rare in Western or other economies).
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The first prime minister after regaining independence, Mart Laar, was openly
radically neoliberal, citing Milton Friedman and counting Margaret Thatcher
among his friends. Also, the success of these reforms brought international recog-
nition and gave Laar and others confidence to pursue further radical ideas. This
contributed largely to Estonia’s rise as the extreme and successful reformer in the
eyes of the international community—and as the main disciple of Adam Smith’s
famed ‘invisible hand’-led economic policies whereby free markets provide the
best economic outcomes. The implementation of ‘invisible hand’ infused pol-
icies by the first Laar government in 1992–4 relied upon the enthusiasm of
amateur politicians, who drew at least part of their risk-taking courage from
their naïvety. This process is well described by Albert Hirschman (1967), whose
principle of the ‘hiding hand’ notes that policy-makers sometimes take on tasks
without realizing the risks involved, and this may result in unexpected creativity
and success. Hirschman argues the hiding hand works through ignorance of
ignorance, and Laar agrees: ‘I was 32, I was young and crazy, so I didn’t know
what is possible and what’s not, so I did impossible things’ (Laar 2010). In digital
government, this did not lead to free-market based solutions, but rather to
visionary policies that relied on charismatic leadership, small tight networks,
and constant renewal of both leadership and networks.
External Influences and Skills
The academic elite played a vital role in the early genesis of Estonia’s digital
transformation. Mart Laar recalls how one of the first things that came onto his
desk as prime minister was a memo by Raimund Ubar, professor of computer
engineering at Tallinn University of Technology, titled ‘Targeted program for
Estonian electronics and computer technology’ (Ubar 1993). The purpose of the
memo was to convince the government to establish an R&D programme in
electronics and computer engineering to upgrade Estonia’s industry. While
Ubar’s memo focused on industry and applied research, what seemed to have
impressed Laar was Ubar’s insistence on avoiding the legacy trap he had observed
in Western countries and encouraging a policy of investment in future-oriented
emerging technologies rather than in legacy technology. Laar recalls: ‘Ubar wrote
that it is not sensible to overreact and start immediately by buying things. He was
the first person who told us not to buy anything old.’
The avoidance of this legacy trap allowed the policy-makers to avoid large-scale
investments into ICT as budgetary means were scarce and capacity to develop
centralized IT systems was low. Later, during Laar’s second government
(1999–2002) this became the unspoken principle of frugality: rather than buying
large-scale solutions from established vendors, government departments and
agencies were encouraged to find open-source solutions. This also enforced
departments and agencies to develop their own digital agendas.
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In the initial decision-making processes, academics played a vital role as part of
the first formal advisory body on ICT, the Informatics Council, established in
1990. The focus on cyber security, a prominent feature of the X-Road, can be
traced back to the Informatics Council, as many of its members had a connection
with the Estonian Academy of Sciences Institute of Cybernetics.⁸ From this
institute, Cybernetica AS was founded, one of the companies that delivers many
of the public digital solutions, including X-Road. Academics were also the first to
establish actual internet connections with the West through networks with Swed-
ish colleagues (Högselius 2005).
Proximity to Scandinavia played an essential role in building the ICT landscape
in Estonia. The Estonian government reorganized the Ministry of Communica-
tions into two state-owned companies, Eesti Telekom and Eesti Post in 1991,
decoupled from Soviet telecommunication networks and created a mobile joint-
venture with Swedish and Finnish counterparts called Eesti Mobiiltelefon. This
company initially used the NMT and not the GSM standard for mobile technology
(as did the Nordic countries at the time). Eesti Telekom, in turn, acquired the
monopoly rights for Estonia’s fixed telephony until 2000, but the concession
agreement left out mobile and data communications—and this proved critical in
the years to come. Another joint venture between Estonia and the two Nordic
countries, Eesti Telefon, was an important early investor into Estonia’s digital
infrastructure modernization (Högselius 2005: 81–91).
The R&D programme in electronics, proposed by Ubar to Laar, never materi-
alized, but ICT gained importance as a cross-party policy goal throughout Laar’s
first administration. During Laar’s second administration, between 1999 and
2002, many of the critical elements of Estonia’s ICT policy coalesced into a
more or less coherent framework and were quickly translated into swift and
radical actions. Key to this development was Linnar Viik, a serial entrepreneur
and later founder of the e-Government academy, as the ICT adviser to the prime
minister. Viik became an influential adviser with a wide-reaching portfolio, more
important and powerful than many of the ministers (Laar 2010).
As the digital experiment—and the modern republic—matured, political lead-
ership in ICT became less about ideas and policies and more about recruiting
talented IT people to work for the government. This was much helped by the fact
that the Estonian civil service is designed as an open system: almost all positions
can be filled through open competitive calls. Thus, for instance, Taavi Kotka,
former CEO of Nortal, one of the largest domestic ICT companies, was hired as
government ‘Chief Information Officer’ in 2013. Lack of legal and public barriers
arising from the large-scale support of digital transformation helped attract talent
from the private sector, as Kotka (interview) states:
The good part was that in ICT there [were] very few legislation initiatives. It was
mostly about inspiration, it was mostly about fixing investment processes, getting
toward the right resources and strategies in place. It was more like organizing
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work than working the policy or the legislation. ICT and cyber security are not
regulated at all, basically. It’s a very lightly regulated effort.
If the hiding hand style of strategic leadership was provided mostly by politicians
in the 1990s, then in the 2000s it was provided increasingly by strategic advisers
and recruits from some of the most prominent Estonian ICT companies.
Design and Choice
Following Ubar’s guidance a fundamental principle of Estonia’s digital transform-
ation efforts was the idea of no legacy. As mentioned earlier, government ICT
projects could not afford to build massive systems run by large vendors. Instead,
the government was encouraged to embrace a distributed architecture of IT
systems to cater to the different needs of each government agency. This became
an explicit strategy from 1999 onwards: ministries were asked to build their IT
systems according to their specific needs but ensuring frugality and interoperabil-
ity across government. The resulting distributed architecture created the need for
a software layer that allowed these distributed IT systems and databases to
exchange data with each other.
Laar’s second government rapidly expanded X-Road as a layer for secure data
exchange for distributed public IT systems and databases, followed shortly after
by digital signature and e-ID based on the unique personal code. Viik and others
were able to tap into personal networks in the public and private sectors, for
example with the banking sector, which helped develop competency in cyber
security (Kerem 2003). In this way, the public ICT infrastructure—with its funda-
mental principles of governance: distributed data architecture and strategy, central
strategic guidance and financial controls, decentralized implementation—worked
with public–private networks to access competencies and increase legitimacy.
Despite this seemingly coherent strategic move, Estonia has never had a central
digital agency, nor does it have centralized or even unified public databases.
Instead, politicians and civil servants have relied on cross-sectorial networks to
receive strategic advice in pushing their digital transformation agenda forward.
Viik (interview) notes:
The overall ICT policy coordination and formation were carried out by the,
I would say as a central group of some 10 to 15 people, and the broader group
involved some maybe 20, 25 persons who twice a year, sometimes three times a
year had seminars and reviews on what we should do next.
This is highly unusual in the Estonian political and bureaucratic culture. Most
neoliberal political cultures mistrust close-knit networks or the heavy influence of
private sector actors on public sector representatives and are acutely sensitive
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when it comes to corruption and erosion of accountability associated with such
networks. In the Estonian ICT sector the networks and exchanges between the
private sector and government operations rely heavily on each other’s advice and
guidance—and build the trusted backbone of its digital transformation efforts. As
a matter of fact, belonging to these networks is more important than having a
formal government role. This is even more remarkable in the Estonian context
where in all other policy fields one of the key complaints is lack of cooperation and
weak coordination structures (Randma-Liiv and Savi 2016).
Despite the potential accountability threat the ICT sector has remained rela-
tively scandal-free over the past two decades, with little evidence of corruption,
influence, or accountability issues. The most critical moment occurred in 2007
when Estonia became the first nation-state to fall victim to a coordinated Distrib-
uted Denial of Service (DDoS) cyber-attack in 2007 (Lesk 2007). The continued
attacks led to the establishment of NATO’s cyber security centre in Tallinn.
Following the initial attack, the country had to repair its services by disconnecting
from the internet for four weeks, and a strategic intent emerged that focused on
collective rather than on individual actions. According to Andres Kütt, a principal
adviser to the Estonian Information System’s Authority:
Strategically this is from where [the network] emerged. The ideology from it
actually stems from what our former Director General Jaan Priisalu called the
collective brain. Which is primarily behind the cyberwar ideology of Estonia. The
doctrine is that in cyber conflict, the party who can amass the biggest collective
brain wins. Because in the internet world, everything is interconnected, and no
one single organization can withstand attacks or can sort of execute attacks en
masse alone. You need to have that sort of collective brain. And the collective
brain being distributed needs to work together, there needs to be trust between
parties in that brain, so that network stems from that sort of ideology.
The close-knit network among high-profile politicians and their private sector IT
advisers also emerged as a natural development from the fact that public–private
partnerships initiated significant IT investments and digital services as joint
ventures with Scandinavian state-owned companies and then mainly by the
banking industry. With electronic banking proliferating in the late 1990s, banks
were at the forefront in rolling out the national e-ID (initially bank offices issued
e-IDs). Through the educational Tiger Leap and Look@World programmes in the
late 1990s and early 2000s, the banks financed IT education in schools and for the
broader population so that citizens could use their online services. In essence, the
banks took over the task to train and inform citizens who might not be naturally
drawn to conduct online transactions and preferred physical bank branches:
The bank’s self-interest was to not have a bank branch everywhere. They
embraced electronic banking. So what they did for a while was to teach people
in rural areas, especially older people, how to use computers.
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The banks deployed training kiosks across the country to bring their clients
online. Also, Hansapank, the leading bank at the time, built up the data infra-
structure and hired cyber security specialists to protect the banking system. Some
of the top cyber security people moved from banks to the government, which
proved vital in responding to the DDoS attack in 2007 and paved the path for
continuous personnel movement between sectors.
Delivery, Legitimacy, and Endurance
Estonia’s early focus on integrating IT education with general school education
was an essential factor in enabling digital transformation. Funded by both public
and private sector organizations, the Tiger Leap programme was initiated by Jaak
Aaviksoo and Toomas Hendrik Ilves in 1996: a first step was to bring all Estonian
schools online. Private sector companies became involved in a co-sponsored
public–private partnership called Look@World. Both programmes had an imme-
diate effect on Estonian youth and led to the emergence of a vibrant IT start-up
sector and arguably to improvements in government operations in recent years, as
one official notes:
The last several years, when I went around visiting Estonian start-ups, I always
asked them why did they end up in technology, and they would say ‘Oh, well
I was a Tiger Leap child.’ So now people in their mid-30s, are people who were
14 or 15 [when they] got online.
The subsequent success of IT start-ups such as Kazaa and Skype provided further
stimulus:
What really transformed young people’s attitude was the success of Skype.
Basically, there were four, at that time, young Estonians who after they managed
to avoid doing prison time in the United States for inventing Kazaa, which was a
file-swapping program, like Napster, and of course it violated copyright laws.
And then the same group of four, because the technology concept’s fairly similar,
invented Skype. And the idea that in this sort of far away provincial, cold, rainy,
backward backwater, which is kind of the concept young Estonians had of where
they lived. You could send the career—some, some people who were good at
math and science, would invent a worldwide brand, and become rich was an
enormous motivating factor to get people interested in technology.
In particular, the Tiger Leap programme can be seen as a blueprint for how digital
transformation was delivered. The programme was initiated in 1996 through a
legally private foundation in which government was one of the founding members
and key funders, alongside eleven IT companies. It created competitive grants
and encouraged schools and local governments to submit applications for the
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rather limited government funding for IT education programmes. In essence, this
governance structure created a highly agile environment, where those willing to
invest their time and energy could be easily engaged either as funders or partici-
pants, and it did not matter whether they belonged to the public or private sectors.
Above all, such fluid structures allowed private actors—notably banks—to be
heavily engaged in the Tiger Leap programmes. Importantly, foundation based
structures allowed public–private networks to operate outside of government
without much red tape—and without much institutionalization or formalization.
The networked cooperation between the public and the private sector occurred
as a natural evolution: CEOs, non-profit managers, or academics are moving
between different sectors, accept short-term appointments in government, or
are asked to serve as strategic advisers to the Prime Minister and the President.
The phenomenal success of Estonian IT start-ups, like Skype, gave rise to another
powerful network of Estonians with ICT skills and members of its local start-up
ecosystem (the ‘Skype mafia’), mostly developers and entrepreneurs with shared
values and ideas (see http://skypemafia.com). Thus, layers of trusted network
relationships have evolved between public and private organizations that focus
on exchanges and strategic planning initiatives. Many of those incorporate prom-
inent Estonian IT companies, such as Cybernetica, Nortal, or Skype which are
active in the cyber security, e-government, and banking industries.
Movement between sectors is not one-directional. Government agencies have,
for example, signed a memorandum of understanding with Nortal, which allows
the company to request government officials to work on international client
projects abroad. Frequently, public managers are sent on leave to work on
international projects, for example in Oman, lending deep public administration
expertise and understanding of government systems to the private sector.
Another layer—beyond the consultative layer—is the information exchange
and networking layer of cyber security experts who regularly meet as an informal
group. Their goal is to exchange knowledge and good practices to protect the
country’s infrastructure against cyber-attacks. Ties among participants are
extremely strong and take on a regulative function since the informal network
members include representatives across all industry sectors. For instance, failing
to fall in line with what is decided in terms of processes and technologies can lead
to exclusion from the network. This has a real impact, as one of the network
organizers explains:
It is a small community, but it [can] still to an extent deliver. In the sense that, it
is acknowledged that the formal mechanisms can get you that far, but true
cooperation between parties only happens via personal contact. We need to
have some level of personal rapport with people. Yes, at the end of the day,
you can whack somebody with a piece of law, or regulation, or a process, yes, you
can do that. But, it only works very limited. Has very limited effect.
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The design principles of the Estonian digital transformation are a result of the
strong political decision-making and networked governance. Some of these are
ingrained in the policymaking culture, others in the explicit legal codex. The most
influential design principles are not, however, codified in law or regulation;
instead, they are followed by those in leadership positions in government. They
bear the hallmarks of what can be dubbed a civic hacker culture that fuses start-up
agility with design thinking. The once-only principle—designed to reduce the
bureaucratic burden (Wimmer et al. 2017)—is a case in point. Citizens and
businesses provide their information to government one time only and thereafter
this information is available to all other government actors. In Estonia, this is a
principle, not a law. As Kotka explains:
It’s not a law. People think it’s a law, it’s not a law, it’s a principle. So, there’s no
law saying that the government can ask only once information from the people.
This is so in the case of companies, but about the people it’s a principle.
Similarly, the high level of interoperability made possible by components such as
the X-Road data platform and its connected applications are also not mandated by
law: ‘Or the saying [that] an ICT system has to be interoperable with other
systems. That’s, again it’s a principle. There’s no legally binding regulation.’
Nor is it a rule that the Estonian public sector should not use IT technologies
that are more than thirteen years old or avoid off-the-shelf IT systems offered by
large international vendor companies. Instead, such principles emerged from early
thinking typified by the Ubar memo, and are a reflection of the start-up culture of
that time, of which Skype and its later alumni—‘Skype mafia’—are examples.
This development of informal networks can be summarized as a specific kind
of ‘mission mystique’ that spans organizational boundaries: a set of institution-
strengthening characteristics and institutional charisma Goodsell (2011: 477–8).
In the Estonian ICT sector, such mission mystique transcends organizational
institutions and strengthens networks that are driven by common values and
held together by (digitally savvy) charismatic leadership. Such mission mystique is
essential for the hiding-hand principle by creating legitimacy for risk-taking and
experimentation.
Analysis and Conclusions
At the core of Estonia’s digital transformation is the idea of a digital citizen who
accesses public and private services through a digital platform that ensures the
interoperability of diverse and decentralized information systems. This relies on
ideas that are counter-intuitive to free-market thinking and follow a principle
characterized as the ‘hiding hand’ rather than the invisible hand. Two elements
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were essential: first, the adoption by politicians and policy-makers of a culture of
risk-taking and bold ideas; second, the formation of multiple overlapping small
networks to promote early success and build momentum. These phenomena
became mutually enforcing and enabled rapid adoption of innovative solutions.
To summarize, Estonia’s digital transformation and its success rest on three key
factors. First, a confluence of a number of contextual factors; second, on a set of
agreed upon governance principles; and third, on a set of design principles:
Contextual Factors
• The Soviet legacy had left Estonia with an outdated industrial structure and
widespread dislike of industrialization. More positively, it left Estonia with a
wealth of R&D talent in ICT through various Academy of Sciences insti-
tutes, such as the Institute of Cybernetics (established in 1960) and other
similarly highly advanced academic institutions. As their funding collapsed
in the early 1990s, much talent poured into emerging private companies, in
particular, various joint ventures with Scandinavian telecoms and other
companies.
• Geographical vicinity to Scandinavia. In the 1990s, Nordic countries had one
of the fastest developing telecommunications sectors globally. Opening up
both policymaking processes (through advice and joint ventures) and mar-
kets (through privatization and regulations) to Scandinavian partners
brought know-how and investment.
• Small size and population concentration. Estonia has 1.3 million inhabitants,
almost one third in the capital, Tallinn. This clustering of population facili-
tated agile networks that were able to gain quick and lasting political support,
and which required low initial infrastructure investment.
Governance Principles
• Government ministries and their agencies had direct responsibility for their
ICT strategies, investments, and data—and information architecture and
departmental ICT strategies were decentralized.
• A critical coordinating and guidance function in negotiating ICT investment
decisions and the formulation of crucial design principles was performed in
the centre. During the 1990s the prime minister’s office played this vital role,
and it is now coordinated by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and
Communications.
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• There was a deliberate focus on public–private networks rather than on
individual organizations. Estonia’s e-government landscape consists of a
number of organizations (agencies such as Information System Authority,
or departments within ministries such as Department of State Information
Systems) and cross-organizational networks that are sometimes formalized
(such as the Estonian Defence League’s Cyber Unit⁹).
Design Principles
• No legacy principle: public digital infrastructure should not use technological
solutions that are older than 13 years.
• Build-vs.-buy principle: particularly in the early stages of digital transform-
ation, the priority was to build systems from scratch rather than buying ‘off-
the-shelf ’ software systems from ICT vendors.
• Once-only principle: businesses and citizens have to supply information for
government authorities only once and data is available through the data
exchange layer X-Road across government agencies.
• Interoperability and security principle: rather than seeking to create unified
databases and information system, the focus is on secure interoperability of
data systems.
Together, the coordination of strategy, social conditions and policy combined
with a uniquely talented, motivated and relatively young workforce resulted in the
creation of a public digital infrastructure that is recognizably world-class.
The rapid pace of change and the focus on digital citizen and identity none-
theless highlighted anomalies. In the first place, despite the statement of a
strategic intent of participatory governance, innovation—and in fact the drive
for digital initiatives—has come from a tight-knit elite network of politicians,
business leaders, and civil servants and few ideas have emerged through co-
creative processes with citizens. The recent e-residency programme is one of
the only initiatives that places a strong focus on user feedback. Second, while e-ID
and other advances have changed aspects of the user experience of crucial
public services such as electronic tax declaration, the services themselves have
remained remarkably unchanged. Third, while many digital services have brought
efficiency gains to citizens and businesses in Estonia, citizen satisfaction with crucial
services such as healthcare and education has remained low. As an example,
according to OECD rankings in 2014, Estonia ranked fifth from bottom in
satisfaction with health services (in 2007 it ranked the lowest), and second
from bottom in satisfaction with education system (in 2007 it ranked third
lowest). Further, Estonia performs poorly on some critical social indicators:
for example, in 2016 it had the highest gender pay gap in Europe, and a higher
than EU average Gini index (Eurostat). While citizen satisfaction is not the only
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measure of the quality of public services—and digital infrastructure only one
component in the provision of sophisticated services such as health and
education—it is indicative that there is a little-measured improvement in the
provision of core public services.
While decentralized digital agendas of line ministries provided needed
agility, it also created uneven digital capabilities across different departments
and agencies. This reliance on bottom-up departmental initiatives seems to
necessitate stronger and perhaps more formalized coordination structures than
are currently present. Furthermore, while e-voting is increasingly popular,
other aspects of digital democracy such as civic engagement have remained
weak (with a notable exception of the so-called Citizen Assembly between 2012
and 2014 that, however, eventually failed to deliver any significant results; see
Jonsson 2015).
Finally, while distributed IT architecture is at the heart of Estonian digital
transformation, the central X-Road layer represents a dependency: ‘It’s the
X-Road or no road.’ While Estonia has already successfully exported this proven
infrastructure to other European countries, like Finland, there are alternative
paradigms that do not rely on it (e.g. the UK’s domain and platform focused
approach).
Estonia’s focus on ICT as general-purpose technology proved to be one of the
critical success factors as it enabled the creation of digital infrastructure that is
universal in nature. Yet, relying on decentralized and mostly informal networks in
building this infrastructure, Estonia now faces a challenge to build capacities and
capabilities within the public sector to take advantage of the public digital infra-
structure. In sum, perhaps the most significant question faced by Estonian digital
government is whether the main reasons for its success—particularly its charis-
matic leadership-based informal networks and civic hacker culture—provide it
with enough endurance to sustain its early success and with the institutional
capacity to harness the potential of Estonian digital infrastructure for more
inclusive public services and society.
Additional version of this case
The case study outlined in this chapter is accompanied by a corresponding case
study from the Centre for Public Impact’s (CPI) Public Impact Observatory—
an international repository of public policies assessed for their impact using
CPI’s Public Impact Fundamentals framework. CPI’s framework provides a
way for those who work in or with government to assess public policies, to
understand why they were successful, so key lessons can be drawn out for
future policy work. The case can be easily located in the CPI repository at www.
centreforpublicimpact.org/observatory.
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Notes
1. E-Estonia facts, https://e-estonia.com/wp-content/uploads/updated-facts-estonia.pdf.
2. For details, see https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/desi and https://
publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/en-us/Reports/UN-E-Government-Survey-2018
respectively.
3. Drechsler (2018) offers an excellent discussion on the hype around Estonia’s digital
success.
4. E-residency programme homepage and live dashboard can be found here: https://
e-resident.gov.ee. As of August 2018, there are more than 40,000 e-residents. As the
main service e-residents can currently use is setting up a company, this has had
unintended consequences as it has drawn the attention of money laundering regulators
in some countries.
5. Thus, for instance, the data exchange layer called ‘X-Road’—introduced in 2001 and
fundamental to Estonian e-government—is not mentioned in the 1998 strategy docu-
ment at all, either by name or principle. A subsequent 2004 strategy document, ‘Basics
of Information Policy’ mentions it once; a follow-up strategy in 2006 (Development
Plan for Information Society 2013) discusses X-Road twice; and the current strategy
(Development Plan for Information Society 2020, adopted in 2013) mentions it eight
times—even though the X-Road has not changed significantly since 2001.
6. The position is formally called Deputy Secretary-General for Communications and
State Information Systems, and it is part of the typical management level in Estonian
ministries and not a stand-alone office; see https://www.mkm.ee/en/ministry-contact/
management.
7. Starting with the 2004 strategy, the timings of adoptions of the strategies reflect EU
structural funding periods (2004–6; 2006–13; 2014–20).
8. For a detailed discussion of the vital importance of Institute of Cybernetics, established
in 1960, and its R&D capabilities in the evolution of Estonian ICT sector, including
involvement in ‘Soviet Arpanet’, see Högselius (2005).
9. See http://www.kaitseliit.ee/en/cyber-unit.
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Building and Paying for the Alameda
Corridor Rail Project
Richard F. Callahan
Introduction: A Public Infrastructure Success
The Alameda Corridor rail project became a tale of two cities: Los Angeles and
Long Beach, California. It started as a story including each of the six cities in
between. As a policy success, the story offers insight into the programme, pro-
cesses, and politics that in 2002 built a 20-mile cargo rail line for $2.4 billion.
Initially this is a story of a compelling facilitator, Gill Hicks, who persisted in
developing consensus across disparate political jurisdictions and the private
sector railroads and port shippers. However, over time the story changes, with
cooperation of the six mid-corridor cities evaporating, along with the projected
revenue. Time, accompanied by an economic downturn and introduction of
new logistics technology for cargo shipping, has changed a positive financial
position to one of deferring a future debt that exceeds the initial construction
costs of the project.
The Alameda Corridor Transportation Authority (ACTA) transformed a tan-
gled web of rail lines, each owned and operated by three competing railroads, into
one line. The new corridor created public value in eliminating grade rail crossing
that backed up truck and car traffic in six mid-corridor cities, and through the
reduction of air pollution emissions and groundwater contamination. Private
sector value was created as the new line moved freight trains at 40 mph rather
than 10 mph. The line moved the harbours from reliance on nineteenth-century rail
technology to a twenty-first-century system aligned with the technology needed to
compete in a globalized goods movement world. Public expense was significantly
reduced as the line was built primarily with private sector debt financing, which was
paid off by fees on private sector container cargo.
The process included the formation of a task force to explore the feasibility of a
consolidated rail line. From the task force emerged an approach for governance
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as a formal joint power authority inclusive of the six mid-corridor cities, as well as
the large cities of Los Angeles and Long Beach, each of which controlled the
harbour. Subsequently, the ACTA eliminated the mid-corridor cities in a legally
contested action. The move to governance by only the cities of Long Beach and
Los Angeles contained costs and kept the project on time to reduce the financial
uncertainty that would have adversely affected the costs of borrowing. This
efficient decision-making structure based on those with a financial stake in cost
containment came at the expense of participation in decision-making by mid-
corridor cities. However, each city received a range of social benefits, which
included a construction job training and hiring programme for local residents,
contaminated groundwater clean-up, and millions of dollars of negotiated funding
for specific benefits and in construction permitting fees.
Described as a successful public–private partnership (Callahan et al. 2010), the
ACTA used private sector funding to retire the debt incurred to pay for construc-
tion. Politically, having the railroad companies pay a container fee to generate the
revenue needed for debt service created a positive reputation for all participants.
The use of a private funding mechanism insulated the public purse as well as
elected officials from the costs of the project, yet the palpable success of con-
structing and operating the Alameda Corridor rail line through the first five years
of operation benefited the elected officials of Long Beach and Los Angeles as well
as the senior management of ACTA.
The ACTA linchpin has always been the temporal element—would revenue
projections prove to be accurate? Could construction be completed on time?
Would a long-term infrastructure project remain viable in a volatile global
containerized shipping market? And not surprisingly, will a future technology
make ACTA financials successful in the future (Pisano 2018)? When looking
back at the ACTA project, there is reason to qualify the endurance of its initial
level of success. The programme was a success in terms of construction to
consolidate lines and increase rail cargo speeds, but with the Great Recession
came a reduction in worldwide shipping. Also, new technology has reduced
the amount of containerized cargo shipped by rail. The initial reduction
in traffic congestion due to grade cross separations became less successful as
truck traffic again increased. Initial emissions reductions also backtracked
as truck traffic increased, and with it small particulate pollution as a potential
health risk. Similarly, over time the ACTA governance structure evolved from
inclusion to exclusion of the small cities in order to limit veto powers which
could delay construction. The initially successful mechanism of the harbours
paying for any shortfall in collected revenue broke down with the prospect of
an extended shortfall of revenue. The process and political success of ACTA
also waned over time. With the exclusion of mid-corridor cities, the politics
became muddled.
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Navigating Complexity in Developing ACTA
As an infrastructure project, the Alameda Corridor construction addressed bottle-
necks in goods movement and economic growth. Prior to the construction of the
grade-separated railroad lines, the existing outlets for shipping containers to move
from the ports in Los Angeles and Long Beach harbours were a series of railroad
lines and roads running north from the harbour to downtown. Most of the
goods moved on routes that were roughly parallel to a major north–south surface
street named the Alameda Corridor. Three separate railroads moved goods from
the two harbours to Union Station, 20 miles north in downtown. In addition,
trucks carried containerized products on Alameda Street and onto area interstate
highways.
At the time of the initial studies in the mid-1980s, ranked as the third busiest
port complex in the world, the Port of the City of Long Beach and the Port of the
City of Los Angeles were increasingly congested. The growth in annual volume
handled by the ports was anticipated to double from the 1980s to the 1990s and
threatened to overwhelm existing rail and road capacity. Failure to expand
transportation capacity ran the risk of losing future business to other ports. The
challenge noted by the president of the Los Angeles Harbor Commission was for
‘the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, which are considered the most
technologically advanced ports in the world, to make an archaic local 19th century
rail system into a 21st century state-of-the-art cargo transportation system. We
are doing this so that we can continue to expand to meet the cargo needs of the
future’ (Lushing 1993).
In the early 1980s this uncertainty regarding the impact for future harbour
expansion prompted the ports’ governing bodies to study alternatives for improv-
ing transportation outside the harbour. The policy challenge was to ‘fix’ the
‘archaic rail system’ in the area (Goodwin 2001; Hicks 2001). The Union Pacific,
Southern Pacific, and Santa Fe railroad companies competed against each other
out of the harbour area along three different routes to downtown and eastward,
each crossing over roads and bringing trucks and cars to a stop while their freight
cars rumbled past. The at-grade crossing created unwelcome congestion in the
mid-corridor cities, as well as decreased air quality. A significant potential benefit
for the Alameda Corridor project was to consolidate these three lines onto one line
that had grade separations. When testifying to the California Legislature’s Senate
and Assembly Select Committees, Alameda Corridor General Manager Gill Hicks
noted that though only thirty-four of the actual grade separations were along the
Alameda Corridor. The rerouting of other trains would create a total of 200 grade
crossing eliminations (California State Legislature 1997: 8–9).
Four sets of benefits were to result from grade separation. Truck and automo-
bile traffic would no longer be stuck at street intersections waiting for countless
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freight cars. Cargo could travel at increased speeds of up to 40 miles per hours on a
grade separation rather than the existing 10 miles per hour average. Air quality
could improve measurably with the reduction of idling cars and trucks in
the region. And finally, what was described by Mayor Richard Riordan of Los
Angeles as ‘the most important economic asset for Southern California over the
next 30 years’ (Kirkorian and Zamichow 1993) would be able to thrive again, and
according to project Executive Director Jim Hankla, lay ‘the foundation for other
transportation improvements and long-term economic revitalization’ (Corridor
Chronicle 1999: 3).
A Search for Governance
Given the fragmented multi-jurisdictional stakeholder and regulatory environ-
ment, a dedicated governance structure for building the line needed to be
designed. In fact, the creation of the ACTA became a journey in governance as
much as in rail construction. Initially in the early 1980s, the regional land use
planning agency, the Southern California Association of Governments (SCAG),
studied improving highway access to the harbour. The planner at SCAG working
on the study was Gill Hicks, who became the top staff person for ACTA. Over the
next two decades, and until the actual construction began, Hicks’ ability to
facilitate and innovate, coupled with his persistence, would be rewarded with
eventual funding and construction of the project. Hicks had been socialized into
SCAG’s distinctive approach towards governance. SCAG served over 100 separate
political jurisdictions, with the driving need to build regional consensus. Against
that backdrop, Hicks approached his agency’s role in the Alameda Corridor
project as one of a ‘facilitator . . . with a mindset of building consensus’ (Hicks
2001). Serving for over thirty years as executive director of SCAG, Mark Pisano
viewed the Alameda Corridor project as a model of a locally crafted, decentralized
institutional solution that responded to a pressing regional need (Pisano 2001).
As the SCAG lead for the Alameda Corridor, Gill Hicks’ role was as staff to the
committees that met, but also multifaceted: initiator of action, innovator of
solutions, navigator of the cities, harbours, county, state and federal government,
and negotiator with the private and public sectors. From the initial discussions in
the early 1980s to successfully securing finding, Hicks navigated and negotiated
through a complex public sector intergovernmental landscape, with multiple
veto powers, in the context of the multiple perceptions (public, journalists, and
politicians) of the contemporary failings of the large-scale rail transit construc-
tion in Los Angeles County. At the start of Hicks’ journey, the first question was
one of problem definition. In retrospect, the decision to build a consolidated,
grade-separate cargo rail line appears foreordained. However, at the time of the
discussions, multiple options included doing nothing, focus on moving truck
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traffic over adjacent interstate highways, leaving the problem to the harbour
commission or the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission, or con-
sider rail construction.
Preparations for the project began to pick up steam with the railroads funding a
study of rail access which recommended consolidating port traffic on the Alameda
Corridor at a ‘ridiculously low’ estimated project cost of $220 million (Hicks
2001). This led to the creation of an Alameda Corridor Task Force (ACTF),
chaired by the influential Los Angeles City Council Member Joan Milke Flores,
whose Council District 15 included the Los Angeles harbour area. Also, serving on
the task force was a representative from the Los Angeles County Transportation
Commission (LACTC), Jackie Bacharach—a city council member from a small
city along the coast, and Art Goodwin representing the Los Angeles ports. As with
Gill Hicks, Flores, Bacharach, and Goodwin remained involved in the Alameda
Corridor project from the early task force discussion through the initial funding
and ground-breaking for construction.
A key feature in the early discussions was the inclusion on the task force of
representatives from the six small cities that experienced the traffic congestion
at the rail crossings for the varied railroad routes of the Alameda Corridor:
Carson, Compton, Huntington Park, Lynwood, and South Gate. Also serving on
the task force were county and state representatives from Los Angeles County
Supervisor Kenny Hahn’s district and from the state transportation department,
Caltrans. The task force structure included the varied stakeholders, becoming
the model for the initial legal governing body of the Alameda Corridor project.
Representation on the task force was mirrored to a large extent in the initial
joint powers agreement (JPA) that initiated and oversaw the Alameda Corridor
project.
The project did not progress much from 1985 to 1989 despite the task force
meetings. However, the two ports’ proposals to expand port facilities triggered
state and federal laws requiring an environmental impact report (EIR) and
environmental impact statement (EIS) prior to approval. The harbour project to
increase cargo capacity would generate additional truck and rail traffic out of
the harbours toward downtown Los Angeles for transcontinental shipment. The
EIR/EIS process would lead to required mitigation of the traffic impact through
communities between the harbour and downtown. Consequently, officials at the
ports recognized the immediate need to improve the flow of goods along the
Alameda Corridor.
The ports began intense negotiations in 1989 to structure a governing body that
could improve goods movement outside of the harbour (Hicks 2001). The process
for governance included at least three distinctive options. One, handing the
project lead to the existing regional transportation planning and funding agency,
the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission (LACTC) which was con-
structing the above ground light rail. Two, creating through legislation a special
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district as had been done for the LA Rapid Transit District which oversaw the
running of the second largest bus fleet in the United States and was building the
downtown subway project. Three, retaining strong local control through a formal,
legal agreement between public sector jurisdictions, known as a Joint Powers
Agreement (JPA).
The leadership of the cities and harbours of Los Angeles and Long Beach
favoured the third option. Accordingly, the strong local control option needed
to decide who was in control of the governance process. At the core of this
challenge was allocating representation. The six smaller cities along the Alameda
Corridor diverged in their interests from the larger cities and harbours of Los
Angeles and Long Beach. Each of the harbour commissions favoured limiting
the governing body to a representation allotment that allowed the ports to
dominate (Hicks 2001). However, the process for developing the ACTA Board
saw the officials from the ports compromise to include representation from the
mid-corridor cities. From the perspective of the ports’ staff, this process of
expansion was ‘the fatal mistake to get buy in of the small cities’ (Goodwin
2001). The initial JPA included fifteen members, with the harbour commissions,
Los Angeles City Council District 15, the City of Long Beach, the six mid-
corridor cities, the state Caltrans, and the regional transportation agency,
LACTC, each having representatives.
In Los Angeles County, a very public debate was occurring over the larger
transit agencies on requiring the principal elected official on a board to attend
meetings, without the option to appoint an alternate delegate. Requiring the
principal elected officials to meet was seen as a mechanism to advance account-
ability for successful transit construction and operations. The design of the ACTA
JPA Board required the principals to attend meetings. The direct involvement of
the principal board members, as opposed to designated alternates from staff or
public members, had two significant effects. First, mid-corridor city ACTA mem-
bers were deeply enmeshed in local politics as council members in their respective
cities. Also, they were directly connected with other local elected officials as well as
with their state legislators. The connection to the legislature allowed the corridor
cities to press their grievances in another forum, seeking to bring the ‘shadow of
the legislature’ to influence negotiations between the corridor cities and the cities
of Los Angeles and Long Beach.
A second consequence of the principals exclusively serving on the boards was
an expertise imbalance among the mid-corridor city representatives, the harbour
commissioners, and executive directors of the ports. The representative from the
Port of Los Angeles and the Port of Long Beach had detailed technical expertise on
the issues related to the ports. In addition, they had considerable experience with
the financing and construction of large capital projects. This accountability to the
best interests of the ports, coupled with expertise in building infrastructure
projects, drove the port representatives to attain control of the JPA Board.
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In the words of the long-standing General Manager Gill Hicks, ‘the ports were not
interested in risking hundreds of millions of dollars’ (Hicks 2001) with technically
inexperienced mid-corridor city representatives who were more focused on bene-
fiting their city than in competing a rail project.
Building and Maintaining Political Support
Politically, the Alameda Corridor project occurred in the substantial shadow
of one of the United States’ largest infrastructure investment in the 1980s
and 1990s: the construction of the Los Angeles rail transit subway and light
rail lines. These projects were plagued by cost escalations, construction prob-
lems, and political acrimony to the point where both transit agencies were
abolished and replaced by a new agency (Callahan 2007). In facilitating the
delicate political agreement needed to move forward, Gill Hicks drew from
the experience of the other projects to significantly influence important gov-
ernance, project design, and contract award decisions affecting the Alameda
Corridor project (Hicks 2001).
The political management of the project was initially led by Mark Pisano as
Executive Director of the Southern California Association of Governments, with
the point person as Gill Hicks of SCAG staff. Pisano had considerable experience
of over a decade working with the powerful elected officials in the cities, the six-
county region, state legislators, and members of the United States Congress. The
governing board of SCAG eventually totalled seventy members. Gill Hicks had an
inclusive political management style that looked to develop consensus with the
elected officials most directly affected, as well as with the communities and the
ports. Hicks worked closely with the Los Angeles County Transportation Com-
mission Task Force that included powerful commissioners whose support would
be needed for moving forward.
As the primary beneficiaries of the success of the construction of the Alameda
Corridor, the Port Commissions for the harbours and their oversight the City of
Long Beach and the City of Los Angeles emerged as important political players. As
significant contributors to each city’s infrastructure and economic vitality, the
harbour commission of each port had significant political importance. The essen-
tial shift that occurred in political management was the dominance of the cities
and ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach representatives on the ACTA Board
(Callahan 2007). The political management of the project was one of reducing
the potential for the mid-corridor cities to add costs or slow down the project.
The ACTA Board’s political management carried through to the construction
phase with the selection of Jim Hankla to replace Gill Hicks. Each step in the
political management of the project can be seen as the cities of Los Angeles
and Long Beach’s elected officials and their designated representatives to the
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completion of the rail line construction on time and on budget. The context of
costs overruns for the transit infrastructure focused the political actors on
protecting the Alameda Corridor projects from cost overages or unfunded
costs. From the perspective of Mark Pisano, ACTA became a political success
perceived as building needed regional infrastructure with significant costs car-
ried by the private sector railroads.
Tackling Challenges
The strategic challenge facing ACTA was always a race to reduce uncertainty
on the problem definition, the infrastructure solution, funding, governance, the
private sector, construction costs, and project completion. The biggest challenge
was to reduce the significant ambiguity on the global goods movement which
provided the future revenue stream. As the project progressed, the ACTA Board
struggled with its profound lack of control and uncertainty over land, funding,
and mid-corridor city support. All these problems were connected. Problems
included not owning the right of way. Right of way acquisitions required funding.
Private capital required ownership of project land, and public funding was not
in place. The need for mitigation of construction impacts required funding and
certitude over the location of lines to address the need for local mitigation.
There was no certainty that the project could create the resources needed and
sustain the cooperation essential for constructing one of the largest public
works projects in the United States in the 1990s, eventually costing in the
range of $2.4 billion (United States Congress 2001: 5).
Rights of Way
The privately held railroads—the Union Pacific Railroad, the Southern Pacific,
and the Santa Fe—owned the right of way needed for construction of the
Alameda Corridor project. Not only did they own the rights of way, but each
also operated an active rail line shipping freight from the harbour in the same
direction as the Alameda Corridor. The conflict over the purchase of the railroad-
owned rights of way revolved around the value attached to the land. Assembly-
woman Martha Escutia (1993) wrote, in a letter to the editor of the LA Times, after
a joint legislative hearing that ‘railroad right of way valuation procedures and
guidelines were highly subjective and indeed unfair to California taxpayers’. The
critics of the purchase price argued that the railroads would continue using the
right of way, that Southern Pacific had recently received nearly $1 billion in
public money for railroad rights of way purchased in other areas, and that loss
of competitive advantage in owning the lines was overstated. The proponents for
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 25/7/2019, SPi
168   
purchase argued typically that the Alameda Corridor was, according to LA Harbor
Commission President Ronald Lushing (1993) the ‘foremost infrastructure
improvement project in our state’, with significant environmental and economic
benefits.
The ACTA Board chose a negotiated settlement over applying eminent
domain. The assembly member representing Long Beach in the legislature con-
cluded that ‘land seizure would only have resulted in a terribly expensive legal
battle which would stall the Alameda Corridor project for years’ (Karnette 1994).
The Port Commissions led the negotiations as they were providing the funding
for the purchase of the rights of way, excluding ACTA’s board and general
manager from the two years of negotiations (Goodwin 2001). The negotiations
resulted in purchase of the 20 miles of rights of way from Southern Pacific for
$240 million. The ports also paid approximately $75 million to Union Pacific
Railroad and $2 million to Santa Fe Railroad to complete the purchase of
needed rights of way. The negotiation structured a cost sharing agreement on
anticipated environmental clean-up, with Southern Pacific paying the first $15
million, the ports the next $10 million, and then sharing any additional expense
(Kirkorian and Zamichow 1993).
The purchase of the right of way significantly reduced several sources of
uncertainty. For construction, the ACTA Board gained control of the land for
the entire length of the project. For operations, ACTA gained railroad customers
committed to future use of the line for shipping containers from the ports. For
future revenue, the railroads agreed to a negotiated charge per container shipped
on the new rail line, providing a revenue stream for repayment of the debt service
for construction of the project, with an escalation clause tied to the consumer price
index (Goodwin 2001).
A Tale of Many Cities: Complexity and Institutional Design
The institutional design of the Alameda Corridor project as a Joint Powers
Agreement (JPA) was the seminal event for the Alameda Corridor project. The
ports’ staff drew upon earlier experience forming the Intermodal Containerized
Task Force (ICTF) in 1986 which provided the exact language for the subsequent
formation of ACTA with the exception of the initial representation on the
governing board (Goodwin 2001). The key feature of the ACTA JPA involved
structuring the legal document as an agreement between the City of Los Angeles
and the City of Long Beach but also including the mid-corridor cities on the
ACTA Board. This inclusion reflected the preference of SCAG leadership to
include representation of small cities and the contemporary institutional design
of the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission with four designated
members from small cities.
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On ACTA, representatives of the ports pushed for increased control at the
expense of representatives of the mid-corridor cities. A precipitating event was
when port representatives were frustrated over being out-voted by mid-corridor
cities on the selection of firms for bond financing. After the meeting the port
representatives asked their legal counsel to draft language for a seven-member
board that excluded representation from the mid-corridor cities. This evolved into
a formal amendment to the JPA agreement to allow the formation of a seven-
member finance committee in 1995. The finance committee consisting of repre-
sentatives of the cities and harbours of Los Angeles and Long Beach assumed all
significant contractual and financial powers for ACTA. In effect, the fifteen-
member board lost authority over all important decision-making to the finance
committee, which would present the results of their 8:30 a.m. meeting to the full
board later in the morning for ratification (Goodwin 2001).
The four mid-corridor cities without representation on the ACTA Board lost
control over the impact of a very large below-grade railroad trench literally being
dug through each of their jurisdictions. In legislative hearings on the Alameda
Corridor, Assemblyman Carl Washington, whose district included mid-corridor
cities affected by the proposed project, argued that ‘in the final analysis, when this
Alameda Corridor is completed, the burden of proof will be upon us as legislators
that we allowed these type of people [the ACTA Board members] to come in and
just put together a $2 billion project that affects all our districts’ (California State
Legislature 1997: 91). At the same legislative hearing, Assemblywoman Escutia
noted that ‘there was a great mistrust between the cities and the ports’ (California
State Legislature 1997: 105).
The mid-corridor cities contested the ACTA Board action on two counts:
the amendments to the JPA Board structure and the environmental impact
statement. The extent to which the mid-corridor cities resisted, with the exception
of Huntington Park (Hicks 2001), is reflected in the involvement of ACTA’s legal
counsel in the Senate and Assembly select committee joint hearing on the project.
The Chief Counsel for ACTA Gerald Swan’s testimony responded to the lawsuit
by the mid-corridor cities of South Gate, Compton, Vernon, and Lynwood as well
as three separate lawsuits by the City of Lynwood and another suit by the City of
Alhambra on the environmental impact statement. Swan concluded his testimony
with, ‘I encourage members of the State Legislature and members of the commit-
tees that you have assembled to discourage litigation and to encourage all to work
cooperatively to see that this important project is completed without disruption’
(California State Legislature 1997: 108).
The appellate court ruled in favour of the cities and ports of Los Angeles and
Long Beach on 10 October 1996 (Los Angeles City Council 1996). The court
found that the JPA was an agreement between the cities of Los Angeles and Long
Beach and that as long as any amendment was approved according to the legal
requirements of the JPA, the amendments were legal. Control of the governance
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of the project shifted entirely to the cities of Los Angeles and Long Beach. The
JPA evolved from a fifteen-member Board in 1994 to a seven-member board
in 1997.
However, the ACTA Board members still needed to address the mid-city
concerns for very practical reasons. First, the lawsuits posed the potential for
cost and delay, and according to Assemblywoman Martha Escutia, they were
‘about leverage to get more mitigation’ (California State Legislature 1997: 105).
Escutia publicly stated the fear that mid-corridor cities would hold the project
construction hostage to gain additional funding from ACTA: ‘some other city
council members felt well, gee, if they’re going to screw over my community by
putting in a trench, which frankly was approved by both city council members,
I want some money for the action, you know’ (California State Legislature 1997:
105). Digging a ten-mile, 33-foot deep trench through the six mid-corridor cities
required construction all at once rather than in phases (Goodwin 2001) with prior
approval of city permits for construction in their localities. ACTA needed to
ensure the cooperation of the mid-corridor city governments or run the risk of
delays in permits and introducing general uncertainty affecting the timely com-
pletion of the project.
The reconstituted Board shifted control over the project to those who were
paying for the project: the cities and harbours of Long Beach and Los Angeles
(Hicks 2001). The revised governance structure addressed the fundamental issues
of financing. With the cargo fee revenue from the ports paying for the most
significant portion of the project, the shift in governance allowed the appropri-
ators to also be the expropriators. The governance of the project was in control of
representatives of the ports and cities who were directly accountable for use of the
ports’ generated money. The amended JPA ensured that the only decision-makers
for the expenditure of funds represented those entities paying for the project. The
new governance structure provided the increased control and a reduced uncer-
tainty that were important to the bond market.
Adapting to Change
After approximately five years of successful operations, ACTA faced two signifi-
cant changes forcing adaptation. First, the Great Recession of 2008 dramatically
reduced the cargo flow to the port. Consequently, the revenue generated by the rail
line declined significantly. Second, a new technology appeared in the late 2000s,
transloading of containerized cargo shifting to trucks. Transloading moved spe-
cialized items locally, as opposed to container units moving items in bulk.
This new technology reduced the number of containers shipped by rail from
over 60 per cent to approximately 40 per cent of total harbour volume. As a result,
rail revenue declined.
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The combination of these two unforeseen events caused ACTA to lack sufficient
funding for making bond repayment subsequent to 2008. In response, two
adaptive features in the design of ACTA were called upon. First, the agreement
with the rail companies called for any shortage of revenue to be made up for by the
harbour commissions. For two years, each harbour commission contributed to a
total of over $10 million annually. Second, the ACTA Board voted to refinance the
loan, moving debt service out to the future. The result created more total debt, but
literally bought time for revenues to increase. The debt service (Alameda Corridor
Transportation Authority 2018: 5) now totals over $2 billion.
The deferral of debt service added significantly to the interest payments due,
particularly the 2004B series line, with over $100 million in additional interest
payment due. Two competing views characterize the borrowings. A critical view
compared the debt service to a ‘Ponzi scheme’ (Humphreville 2017), using the
promise of future revenue to create unsustainable debt. Alternatively, there is the
view that the time value of money lessons the impact of the debt and creates time
for additional technologies to emerge that will increase the revenue on the rail
corridor (Pisano 2018). As an operating entity, ACTA had little choice but to
reschedule debt payments when the harbour commissions insisted that they
would not meet revenue shortfalls until the economy and technology combined
to increase cargo flow.
Assessing the Alameda Corridor Project
Programmatic Assessment
In the US arena of infrastructure construction, the Alameda Corridor has been
held up as a model of project success (Callahan et al. 2010). Six features were
notable in framing the project as initially successful: One, the on-time and on-
budget completion contrasted significantly with the ongoing construction woes of
the subway, including cost overruns, and Hollywood Boulevard sinking due to
tunnelling. Two, a project definition emerged from an amorphous set of alterna-
tives (Hicks 2013). Three, funding was developed as a public–private partnership,
with the bulk of the debt borrowed against future revenue from a per container
cost charge paid by the railroads. Four, the operation met revenue projects from
the start in 2002 through the onset of the Great Recession in 2008, including
repayment of the $400 million federal loan. Five, the project provided localized
improvements with reduction of traffic congestion at thirty-four grade-separated
rail crossings, a Job Training and Development Program (ACTA 2000), and the
Alameda Corridor Business Outreach Program assisted disadvantaged businesses
in competing for contracts. Six, local environmental mitigation addressed the
century-long accumulation of long-standing copper contamination of ground-
water and leeching chromium.
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Process Assessment
The process for success began with an initial broad planning coalition with
members from local, county, and state government. The regional, federally des-
ignated planning agency, the Southern California Association of Government
(SCAG) facilitated an inclusive task force study process. The process identified
the problem as a regional challenge in moving freight quickly from the harbours to
support regional economic growth into the future. The process also developed
consensus on a solution of consolidated rail lines, with benefits to the harbours
and to the mid-corridor cities. The resulting governance structure as a Joint
Powers Authority evolved from inclusive of all jurisdictions impacted by the
construction to a narrow governance structure, including only those paying for
the project. The process moved forward through negotiating detailed settlement
agreements and memoranda of understanding (MOUs) between the revised
governing JPA and each of the six corridor cities. The construction phase
appeared successful with the shift from the planning orientation of Gill Hicks
with the hiring of a new Executive Director who delivered an on-time and on-
budget project. Initially, the operational process appeared successful with repay-
ments of the federal loan and other debts as anticipated from the revenue on
containers until the start of the 2008 recession. The design of ACTA also facili-
tated a process of addressing the loss of revenue after the recession and the shift to
new transloading technology change caused failure to meet debt service.
Political Assessment
The political actors’ perceptions of the ACTA project hinged on three features:
first, effective political oversight to avoid costly construction delays that exhausted
available funding; second, careful management of financial risks to limit public
spending; third, no political infighting between appointees and public agencies.
The first two features characterized the project at the time of the line opening
in 2002. However, the removal of the mid-corridor city representatives was
a source of political infighting between public agencies and appointees where
‘many public officials in the six cities along the corridor route—many with low
income, minority populations and high unemployment rates—are concerned about
the project’s dispersed benefits but concentrated costs’ (Erie et al. 1996: 5). The
political success derived from deliberate sets of political actions that addressed the
above items one and two for avoiding delays and use of private sector funding, as well
as the mitigation of the third in the political embarrassment of removing the
representatives of the small cities. The following three specific mechanisms facilitated
political success:
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1. Governing through a Joint Powers Authority (JPA) as the political decision-
making board.
2. Authorizing use of the purchasing clause in the Los Angeles City Charter as
a legal basis for issuing a combined design/build contract for construction.
3. Funding of approximately one million dollars to each of the city councils for
benefits or mitigations along with permit fees.
Endurance Assessment
The challenge for ACTA has been to sustain its initial level of success. The
project’s construction success endured: increased cargo freight speed through
consolidated rail lines, street traffic grade separation reducing congestion and
air particulate pollution, and continued private sector operational oversight and
payment per cargo container. However, the financial performance of the oper-
ations has prompted a reassessment of the success. The June 2018 assessment by
S&P Global Ratings (2018) on the debt of ACTA now describes the project as
viable with financial concerns for debt service problems. With over thirty years of
professional connection to the project, Pisano (2018) concludes that the primary
lessons learned for future long-term infrastructure projects are the need to
account for both a potential change in the macro-economic environment and
the potential for introduction of new technologies. Pisano draws on the concur-
rent impact on ACTA of the Great Recession of 2008 reducing revenue for debt
service repayment and the introduction in logistics of transloading from the cargo
container for trains to truck containers that reduced the project rail cargo volume
from a projected 70 per cent to an actual 42 per cent of total volume. As a result, in
fifteen years of rail operations the initial assessment as a success focused on
construction and initial repayment has shifted to a focus on the reduction of rail
cargo volume with a less than successful financial performance. However, the
project continues with the development of new technologies and changing global
economies offering the potential for a future reassessment (see Table 9.1).
Towards Sustained Success in Infrastructure Governance:
Learning from ACTA
The Alameda Corridor project combines the political complexity of regional
projects with the risks inherent in large-sale construction, and uncertainty in
thirty-year revenue projections. Though the rail corridor was an apparently uncom-
plicated idea, the challenges to governance and construction took over a decade to
solve. ACTA’s success was that unlike most rail transit projects (Berechman 2018),
the construction was on time and on budget, without cost overruns, and initially
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accurate forecasts for demand. And unlike typical rail cargo lines, this public benefit
project was design-built by a public sector agency for multiple public purposes.
A variety of connected problems impeded the realization of the project. The ACTA
governance structure evolved to address performance issues.
































change caused loss of
reputation with





















































































OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 25/7/2019, SPi
     175
Endurance of Success
The sustainability of this project draws on the adaptability and responsiveness to
the project demands by the governance board. ACTA’s changes in governance
structure allowed development of financial resources to mitigate political conflict.
The evolution towards increasing political control by the major beneficiaries and
funding sources of the project provided resource allocation opportunities. The
port city representatives worked to gain control of the governance structure. In
excluding the mid-corridor cities, the representatives of the ports sought to gain
control of the problem of opportunism. Rather than address various demands of
the mid-corridor cities as voting issues before the ACTA Board, the removal of
these cities allowed the Board to negotiate more durable agreements with each
city. These agreements were adapted to specific local needs of each city and
retained the autonomy of the ACTA Board.
The fiscal sustainability of the debt service moving forward remains an
ongoing question. The basic equation is the following: Will revenue increase
quickly enough to repay debt? The revenue question is contingent on not only
continued growth in global trade, but on finding an alternative technology to
address transloading. There are potential technologies in development that could
increase utilization of the rail lines or movement of goods within the harbour
(Pisano 2018). The temporal analysis applied to the first twenty years of the
project suggests the potential that subsequent temporal analysis might find
changes in the future finances.
Can the ACA Experience Travel?
As a great policy success three features stand out for the ACTA programme,
process and politics. First, the programme defined a project, secured public and
private sector funding, and completed construction. Second, the process devel-
oped an initial consensus across multiple political jurisdictions. Third, the politics
between large cities and small cities that threatened to derail the project were
addressed through a series of negotiated agreements. But the success was not
unmuddled when considered across an extended time frame. ACTA designed the
first fifteen years of success in project agreement, on-time construction, and initial
operation repaying the debt service. However, the long-term nature of the infra-
structure programme extended the time frame for changes in the economics
and technology. The introduction of a new logistics technology coupled with the
Great Recession shifted the financial ledger for ACTA at this moment in time.
Analysis of the programme, process, and politics over an extended period of
time shows an adaptive quality to the financial challenges through extending the
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debt service time frame. The resiliency in ACTA suggests the potential for new
cargo movement technology to emerge that would increase utilization of the rail
lines. Increased usage can again turn around the revenue stream. The ACTA case
suggests that policy success, once initially achieved, can never be taken for
granted. Economic, technological, and other sources of change require constant
monitoring, reassessment, and adaptation.
For ACTA as an infrastructure project, the compelling local need coupled with
regional benefit suggests a confluence of circumstances that would be particularly
specific to geography. The success of ACTA built on SCAG’s institutional dynam-
ics in facilitating regional solutions, with the mechanism of approving proposals
for federal transportation funding. Similarly, the leadership skills of individuals
such as Mark Pisano and Gill Hicks advanced the project over the course of the
first decade. However, the institutional design of ACTA, and the institutional
context of SCAG are not necessarily constrained to southern California. There
are metropolitan planning organizations for each region of the United States.
And the evolution of ACTA over time suggests three potential leverage points
for transferability.
One, the combination of public funds leveraging private investment offers the
most promise as a lesson that can be transferred to future infrastructure pro-
grammes. In eras of reduced availability of public funding in the United States for
infrastructure projects, coupled with a reluctance to increase taxes, the use of
private funding for projects that provide a public benefit is seen as an important
way forward. The initial efforts with toll roads built by the private sector has had
mixed results. However, the basic formula of investment of limited amounts of
public sector dollars as a catalyst for study and design of future infrastructure
programmes continues to be explored in public sector legislation.
Two, the most robust feature of the ACTA case with lessons for future projects
is how ACTA solved the accountability problem by having the appropriators have
total authority over expropriators. This ensured credible commitment. Differing
from the other regional agencies—LACTC, RTD, and MTA—for ACTA the
consequences of over-expenditure on any one aspect of the project would be the
responsibility of the beneficiaries of the project. In projects other than ACTA,
over-expenditures or delays on any project did not threaten the completion of the
project or the direct beneficiaries of that project. Instead, delays in the MTA
construction reduced available funding for other rail transit that would benefit a
different set of actors. The evolution of ACTA solved the credible commitment
problems that plagued the other rail construction projects.
Three, political control should focus on reducing uncertainty in a project.
Bond buyers either flee from uncertainty or charge a higher premium for
borrowing. The port representatives on the ACTA Board and senior staff recog-
nized the fiscal costs of uncertainty, and by achieving governance control, they
reduced it. Paradoxically, reducing the uncertainty over construction through the
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mid-corridor cities took the form of partnerships. Addressing local opposition
acknowledged that regional projects are inescapably an aggregation of agreements
with local governments. Securing the cooperation of the opposing mid-corridor
cities through detailed legal agreements and payments resulted in the local
cities and residents achieving improvements in their municipal infrastructure,
reduced traffic congestion, environmental improvements, and increased potential
for economic development.
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10
‘Marvellous Melbourne’
Making the World’s Most Liveable City
Emma Blomkamp and Jenny M. Lewis
The Rise, Fall, and Return of Marvellous Melbourne
During the 1880s, the term ‘Marvellous Melbourne’ was coined to capture a
booming city that its inhabitants (known as Melburnians) were extremely proud
of. At around half a million people, it was larger than many European cities at
the time, despite its location on the other side of the world—in the south-east
of Australia. Money was poured into building lavishly decorated banks, hotels,
and coffee palaces (temperance hotels which refused to serve alcohol). The Royal
Exhibition Building was built for the 1880 Melbourne International Exhibition.
This was, and happily remains, a building on a grand scale, epitomizing the wealth,
opulence, excitement, energy, and spirit of Marvellous Melbourne (Museums
Victoria 2018).
Of course, the good times did not last—the early 1890s saw the inevitable bust
that followed the boom of speculation. While Melbourne developers had built
some stunning and multi-level buildings in the city for non-residential purposes,
housing was built outside the centre, laying the footprints for an expansive set
of suburbs. The city of Melbourne as it exists today began from earlier and much
less salubrious beginnings. The settlement was illegal in the eyes of the British-
backed governor based in Sydney, and, as was the case across the landmass being
colonized by Britain, it notoriously involved the dispossession of the indigenous
inhabitants of the area through deception and worse (Campbell 1987; Presland
1994). The gold rush of the mid-nineteenth century laid the foundations for many
remaining landmark buildings and streetscapes (Museums Victoria n.d.). But it is
the 1880s, more than any other period, that continues to define Melbourne’s shape
and mentality. It bequeathed the city a set of ‘good bones’ but also created a raft
of future planning challenges that came to a head a century later in the 1980s.
A determined set of changes introduced over a long period of time were required
to address these.
Our heartfelt thanks to Benjamin Maltby for his excellent and thorough historical research assistance
on this chapter.
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These policy changes, amounting to a tale of governance rather than a single
dramatic policy, are mapped out in this chapter as a success story. By the 1980s
Melbourne was in decline with major industrial difficulties and economic stagna-
tion. Yet, in 1990, it was named alongside Seattle and Montreal as one of
the world’s most liveable cities (Department of Planning and Development et al.
1994: 23). This position has been maintained in various rankings up until the
present day. Such rankings are fraught with definitional and simplification issues.
But Melbourne has appeared at or close to the top of several of these—seven years
at the top of The Economist’s (e.g. Economist Intelligence Unit 2017) Global
Liveability Ranking, and in 2018, top of Time Out’s ‘happiest cities’, and fourth
on its list of ‘most exciting cities’ (Manning 2018)—indicating that it is a desirable
place to live and visit for many.
The transformation of Melbourne back to a city that can be considered mar-
vellous in terms of its desirability as a place to live, work, and play, has been
underpinned by a set of interacting state and city government policy moves.
Hence, the success explored in this chapter is not one of a single policy, but one
of governance change, involving two governments at different levels whose
choices and their effects on each other produced benefits. In summary, as elabor-
ated more fully below, there has been a high degree of programmatic, process, and
political success, which has been maintained over time. There are, not surpris-
ingly, winners and losers in this tale of urban revitalization. Melbourne’s trans-
formation has benefited property developers and those who can afford to visit and
live in the city, at the expense of the less wealthy, including some of the artists and
activists who actually helped to change it. There has nonetheless been a substantial
level of convergence in perceptions of the value proposition of the new governance
arrangements, and a conferring of legitimacy on the political system because of the
success of Melbourne as a liveable city.
Marvellous Melbourne as a Governance Success
Making Melbourne one of the world’s most liveable cities meets this book’s
criteria of policy success as it created widely valued social outcomes, through
policy design, decision-making, and delivery that have enhanced problem-solving
capacity and political legitimacy. This programmatic, political, and process suc-
cess has been sustained for a considerable period of time, with a broad coalition of
actors and initiatives uniting to make Melbourne more liveable. The city and state
governments continue to focus their urban policies on ‘liveability’, indicating the
ongoing strength of this policy frame and powerful influence of international
indicators.
First, in terms of programmatic success, state governments in the 1980s under-
took a set of purposeful and valued actions to fundamentally remove planning and
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development powers from the municipal level and the Melbourne Metropolitan
Board of Works (MMBW—a statutory planning authority) and move them to the
state. Both levels of government were interested in transforming the Central
Business District (CBD), from a place that was only for working into a more
inviting place outside of business hours. Hugely important to this was the reform
of liquor licensing laws, which enabled many new cafés and restaurants to open
and serve alcohol, and a focus on retail development and revitalization projects.
These important first steps were foreshadowed and followed by a consistent
approach to urban planning by the city government, tilted towards liveability
and a people-centric approach.
The relationship with the incumbent state government throughout this has
experienced several vicissitudes that make the overall consistency remarkable. The
achievement of liveability as a major goal can be measured by Melbourne’s place
in the world rankings, but also by the ongoing growth of the city and continuing
demand for inner city housing as the centre has become a desirable place to live.
Clearly, these changes have brought benefits to many, but not to everyone, with
poorer inhabitants being squeezed out of previously cheap accommodation and
those who cannot afford to live in the city or in the inner suburbs facing long
commutes from dormitory suburbs on the fringes of the urban sprawl. Critics also
claim that it is developers rather than citizens who have benefited most from
Melbourne’s apartment building bonanza.
Second, in regard to the process, a careful choice of policy instruments was
made and wielded by the state government in terms of ‘hard’ instruments. These
included transferring planning powers to the state government and reforming
laws (John Cain’s Labor government), and major amalgamations of municipalities
and the replacement of elected councillors with state government appointed
commissioners (Jeff Kennett’s conservative government) while elections were
held for the new, much larger municipal governments. In the case of the city
government, the reliance was (given reduced planning powers, limited resources,
and political turmoil due to amalgamation, probably not surprisingly) on ‘soft’
instruments—strategy documents, long-term plans for the city, ‘Postcode 3000’
(described below), and a series of ‘Places for People’ strategies. Through the
development of these policy instruments emerged a new shared understanding
of the role and responsibility of the city government—as guardian and architect of
public spaces—and a consistent emphasis on good urban design.
There was serious public disgruntlement over the state government’s increased
powers but it yielded the opportunity for major projects (Docklands, Southbank,
the tennis centre, Crown casino) and many new apartment buildings to be
approved more easily. The decision-making process was firm but not popular at
the beginning—only once the benefits of a revitalized city became apparent did the
changes come to be seen as correct and beneficial. The delivery process achieved
the intended outcomes effectively. The combination of instruments used by the
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governments at different levels meant that there was broader planning being
directed from above which removed this more politically contentious aspect
from the city government (and the MMBW), leading them to focus on liveability.
The importance of having the same staff member leading urban design for the city
since 1983 (Rob Adams—still in post) and his experience and sustained vision
over such a long time appear to have been crucial. He clearly is an adept political
strategist himself who can deal with the craft of policy. There is likely a bigger
story here about how the administrative side of the city government has had
substantial continuity, while the political side has twice been removed and replaced,
and the city boundaries and governance changed substantially with council amal-
gamations in the 1990s.
Third, this is a fascinating case in regard to politics and public legitimacy. The
reformist Cain (Labor) government (1982–90) made some bold policy moves
throughout the 1980s. It was prepared to weather short-term unhappiness in the
hope that the longer-term gains from city development and revitalization, and the
attraction of major events to Melbourne, would win people over eventually.
Similarly, the Kennett (Liberal) government (1992–9) was willing to suffer
short-term unhappiness from the electorate with municipal government amal-
gamations in 1993, changes to Melbourne’s boundaries in 1995, a reduction to the
number of city government politicians, and the introduction of a longer mayoral
term. The state government has the more contentious role in relation to planning,
and doubts about the wisdom of continuing to build so many high-rise apart-
ments in the city centre continue to this day. But the major events and many of the
revitalization projects that began in the 1980s have provided the state government
with revenue, as well as political capital and organizational reputation.
While these state government moves were in train, the city government—and
in particular its administrative arm—was meanwhile establishing its vision of a
liveable city. The new planning arrangements and community activists (some of
whom were later elected as local politicians) encouraged them to focus on the
social and cultural dimensions of the city. While the changes to municipal
government initially created conflicts with a range of community and business
groups (Gardner and Clark 1998: 137), these tensions were reduced by a strategy
plan in 1985, which clearly delineated state and city government responsibilities
for different domains. Throughout the development of the 1985 Strategy Plan, the
City of Melbourne brought different stakeholders together to work on revitalizing
the city (Ord 2018). Local individuals and groups, and the City itself, were not
always included in state government-led initiatives, however. Initially unpopular
developments, such as Docklands, demonstrate the consequences of top-down
planning that fails to recognize existing community assets and aspirations (Gehl
2018). The political capital and organizational reputation of the city government
has been enhanced by the obvious changes and vibrancy of the city, backed up by
being ranked highly on liveability scales.
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In summary, we argue that this is a success story first and foremost because of
its ‘programmatic’ outcomes. Melbourne has been transformed into a world-class
liveable city and has become marvellous again. This success has been achieved
through an interacting set of state and city government policy choices. The state
adopted a set of ‘hard’ instruments that limited the city’s capacities. The city
adopted ‘soft’ strategies within its more limited scope, but also decided to do
things differently. The persistence of a committed and astute urban designer in the
city government, whose ‘people-centric’ vision for Melbourne has not wavered in
more than thirty years, has been important. The early pain of change has now
given way to broad support for the directions taken. But the benefits and costs have
not been distributed equally. Some are concerned that the planning laws allow too
many new skyscrapers to be built, and that the city is growing in population too
rapidly for the infrastructure to cope. There are also losers amongst the less
wealthy, who cannot afford to live in the world’s most liveable city.
Contexts, Challenges, and Agents of Urban Transformation
Paradoxically, what has made Melbourne so liveable is both how ‘unliveable’ it
used to be and the state’s removal of the municipal government and the MMBW’s
planning powers. The industrial decline of the 1980s and established preferences
for suburban living and car-centric city design, along with the weak financial
position of the city government, led to dramatic changes at many levels, against a
backdrop of broader socio-cultural and governmental shifts. The main challenge
for both state and local governments over this period was in facilitating economic
and cultural revitalization to transform Melbourne into a city where people
wanted to live, work, and play. Playing a key role in the new governance arrange-
ments were the Cain and Kennett state governments. Though from opposite ends
of the political spectrum both took a bold, reformist approach to urban planning,
which was supported and enacted by the City of Melbourne, where Rob Adams
has had a strong influence as Director of Urban Design (and similar roles)
extending from 1983 until the present.
In stark contrast to the opulence and vibrancy of ‘Marvellous Melbourne’ a
century earlier, by the 1980s the city was widely considered an urban backwater.
Residential and retail activity had largely shifted to the suburbs, the streets were
dominated by cars and noisy trams, and many heritage buildings were threatened
with demolition or had already been replaced by Modernist high-rises (Dovey and
Jones 2018: 9). In 1983, there were fewer than 800 houses and no supermarkets in
the CBD (Neilson 2013). Danish architect Jan Gehl (2018: 21) writes of his first
impressions of Melbourne in the late 1970s:
The city was indeed boring and suffered quite a bit from the double impact of
Modernist planning and automobile invasion. Going to the city centre in the
evening was not a great experience at all. It was deserted. A few service people
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attended to the many high-rise office buildings, but otherwise it was a quiet scene.
It was even worse on the weekend—the city centre was as if neutron-bombed.
By the early 2000s, however, the city had been brought back to life. Gehl, who
returned to Melbourne in 2004 to document the changes that had occurred in the
central city since his first ‘Places for People’ study was conducted there in 1994,
summarizes the improvements as follows:
a much larger residential community in the city centre; an increasing student
population; improved streets for public life; new public squares, promenades and
parks; a revitalised network of lanes and arcades; several city-wide art programs;
more places to sit and pause; more attractions; a 24-hour city; better cycle and
public transport access; and integrated policy for paving and furniture; and a
greener city. (Gehl 2018: 23)
The transformation of Melbourne from a ‘doughnut city’ that was dead in the
middle to what it is now has taken decades of steadfast commitment and incre-
mental change, orchestrated by a number of dedicated individuals and govern-
ment structures that have encouraged collaboration between the state and city
governments, with significant input from other major stakeholders.
The unique status of local government as a ‘creature of the state’ (Aulich 2005)
within Australia’s federal system of government helps to explain how the scene
was set for new governance arrangements to be created. As elsewhere in Australia,
local government in the State of Victoria is subject to the ultra vires principle,
where it is restricted to those functions explicitly granted to it by higher levels
of government. While the role of Australian local government has evolved over
time (Dollery et al. 2006: 555–6), its limited authority is common to the ‘Anglo’
group, one of three broad models in Hesse and Sharpe’s typology of local
government systems found in Western industrialized countries (Cheyne 2008).
The Minister for Local Government in each jurisdiction retains the authority to
dismiss democratically elected local politicians if they consider a municipality is
not well managed. Indeed, Melbourne’s dysfunctional city government was sacked
by the Liberal State Government on Christmas Eve in 1980 (and again in 1993,
as part of broader local government reforms) and replaced by commissioners (see
Table 10.1). Melbourne illustrates the trend of Australian city governments that
have ‘been regularly dissolved, usually when state governments have pursued
strong pro-development agendas’ (Freestone 2010: 40).
An important part of this governance story is that, while the city government
was democratically elected again in 1982, the new Labor State Government
removed its planning powers. The authority to approve all major planning
applications within central Melbourne was delegated to planning minister (and
former architect) Evan Walker, and the Victorian State Government still retains
these planning powers. The government’s effort to streamline planning approvals
and make the city more attractive for developers resulted in wait times on
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Table 10.1 Key changes and elections in Melbourne City and Victorian State
governments, 1981–2001
Victorian State Government Year Melbourne City Council
Rupert Hamer’s Liberal government
in power since 1972. Lindsay
Thompson becomes Premier after
Hamer’s resignation.
1981 MCC sacked by Hamer government
and replaced by Commissioners.
John Cain’s Labor government
elected. Removes city government’s
planning powers and delegates
authority for city planning to
planning minister Evan Walker.
1982 MCC reinstated with reduced
number (21) of councillors,
majority of whom are Labor Party
members/supporters.
Amendment 150 to the Melbourne
Metropolitan Planning Scheme
introduces ‘new zones and controls’.
1983 MCC begins its review of the 1974
MCC Strategy Plan.
Rob Adams employed as consultant.
‘Central Melbourne, Framework for
the Future’ released.
1984
John Cain re-elected. Centralization
of planning power in the Cain Labor
government.
1985–6 ‘City of Melbourne Strategy Plan’
released.
Cain government releases ‘Shaping
Melbourne’s Future’.






Joan Kirner replaces John Cain as
Premier.
1990–1 Elizabeth Proust takes over as the
MCC CEO.
Jeff Kennett’s Liberal government
elected.
Planning policy at a State level
reduces dramatically.
1992 Directions: 1992–1995 reviews the
1985 Strategy Plan.
Postcode 3000 policy introduced.
Local Government (General
Amendment) Act 1993 reduces city
governments in Victoria from 210 to
78, and City of Melbourne Act
removes local politicians and
restructures MCC boundaries.
1993–5 MCC sacked by the Kennett
government and replaced with four
commissioners (as part of the City
of Melbourne Act).
Large electoral reforms
implemented within the MCC.
Jeff Kennett re-elected. 1996–8 MCC fully reinstated
Steve Bracks’ Labor government
elected. New ‘City of Melbourne Act’
reforms MCC structure and voting.
1999–2001 MCC dismissed, to prepare for the
Bracks government’s new ‘City of
Melbourne’ Act (to be introduced
in 2001).
Note: White: Liberal (conservative); Dark grey: Labor; Light grey: Commissioners (appointed).
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development applications being slashed around five-fold (Ministry of Planning and
Environment 1984: 19). The same government also increased its infrastructure
spending from 1982 onwards, and drew upon public–private partnerships, aiming
to ‘maintain the primacy of (and property values in) the CBD’, in the context of
a worsening economic recession (McLoughlin 1992: 232; Freestone 2010: 38).
In 1984, it released its planning policy manifesto ‘Framework for the Future’,
which was primarily designed as an economic strategy (Ministry of Planning and
Environment 1984: 4). In 1985, planning power was further centralized in the state
government when the Ministry for Planning and Environment subsumed the old
MMBW’s planning powers. In 1988, it liberalized liquor licensing laws, enabling
many new restaurants and opening the streets for al fresco dining (Zajdow 2011).
In the meantime, the city government focused its efforts on management
reforms and strategic planning processes. Building on its (never implemented)
strategic plan from 1974, the City of Melbourne Strategy Plan 1985 was developed
as an intervention to rehabilitate and stimulate the city following more than a
decade of policy neglect (Melbourne City Council 1992). As discussed in more
detail in the next section, its development was guided by a steering committee
which led to a shared understanding and ownership of urban design strategies,
and the deliberate recruitment of consultants and experienced staff who shared
their vision and values (Ord 2018: 39–40).
The 1985 Strategy Plan was strongly influenced by the community activists who
had formed ‘Melbourne Voters’Action’ (MVA), a coalition of inner-city residents’
groups, in response to the conservative (Hamer) government’s dismissal of the
democratically elected city government (Ord 2018: 38). Led by social and envir-
onmental planners and activists, many of whom were members of the local Labor
Party and who had contributed to the community consultation on the popular
1974 Strategy Plan, MVAmonitored the commissioners appointed to run the city.
They also lobbied the opposition Labor Party to reinstate the city government and
institute fixed three-year terms if elected (Ord 2018: 37–8). When this happened
and Melbourne’s city government was reconstituted in 1982, many of the young
activists from MVA were elected as local politicians (Neilson 2013; Ord 2018).
Recognizing economic and demographic changes in the city, the new city gov-
ernment extensively reworked the 1974 Strategy Plan to produce a comprehen-
sive, detailed policy document that outlines goals and strategies for transforming
Melbourne. The 1985 Plan clearly articulates the different roles of state and local
government in developing the city, which helped to resolve tensions between
them, both of whom had been working to articulate different ‘visions’ for the
city (Gardner and Clark 1998: 137–8).
Along with local activists-cum-politicians who spearheaded MVA, a key figure
in the City’s strategic planning process and wider liveability movement was—and
still is—Rob Adams. Employed as part of the consultancy team designing the 1985
Strategy Plan, he was soon appointed to the City of Melbourne’s executive and has
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remained there ever since, currently as Director of City Design and Projects. He
appears at multiple points in this story, and his longevity and commitment to
making Melbourne a place where people want to spend time constitute a crucial
strand of the liveability focus that has been developed.
At the start of the 1990s, the City began comprehensive internal management
reforms, aimed at making decision-making processes within its executive more
streamlined, consensual, and efficient. Reflecting the broader New Public Man-
agement (NPM) reforms sweeping through Australian local government at the
time (Aulich 2005), in Melbourne this change was led by Elizabeth Proust,
who arrived as the CEO in early 1990, followed by her successor Andy Friend.
Central to this reform was an attempt to combat an entrenched ‘vertical’
management structure within the council, which had siloed responsibility for
different policy areas into different departments that rarely communicated
effectively with one another. Under the new structure, three corporate managers
who held multiple portfolios reported to the City’s CEO, creating a ‘team approach
to management, which not only broke down barriers but also provided very clear
leadership within the organisation’ (Gardner and Clark 1998: 139). This new
structure supported the earlier efforts of elected members to create a more unified
and productive organization through the selective recruitment of executive officers
and collaborative planning processes focused on urban design and social inclusion
priorities (Ord 2018). The more consistent and efficient practices in the adminis-
trative branch were complemented and enabled by the state reforms that reduced
the frequency of local elections, after the destabilizing previous arrangements
whereby one-third of all councillors and the mayor were elected each year, which
had resulted in decisions being regularly overturned and the newspapers dubbing
the City, ‘Clown Hall’ (Ord 2018: 37; Adams and Dovey 2018: 205).
The transformation of municipal management under the compulsory competi-
tive tendering era, ushered in by Kennett’s neoliberal government, saw services
increasingly provided by external contractors (McKeown and Lindorff 2011). This
has resulted in consultants having a significant influence on urban design and
local government policies throughout Australia (Stevenson 2000: 112). Insider
accounts of Melbourne city planning highlight the important role that (inter-
national) consultants played in both the development of the 1974 and 1985
Strategy Plans (Ord 2018: 36, 39) and in demonstrating the significance of
pedestrianization and public seating in how people behave in the city (Gehl
2018: 22; see also Jones 2018: 103). The City of Melbourne’s heightened appreci-
ation of urban design reflects international trends in shifting from cities for cars to
cities for people.
Around the world, city governments have turned to ‘soft’ policy domains such
as arts and culture in their quest to improve quality of life and compete as ‘creative
cities’, especially through urban regeneration (Blomkamp 2014). The ‘Places for
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People’ urban design framework adopted both in Melbourne City and at the
national level in Australia (Gehl 2010; Department of Infrastructure and
Transport 2011) represents a more human-centred and holistic approach to
urban planning, influenced by transnational flows of consultants and the powerful
‘creative city script’ (Grodach and Silver 2013: 9–10; see also Landry 2000; Florida
2005). The ‘creative city’ concept is alleged to have been formulated in Melbourne
in the 1980s, before anywhere else in the world (Yencken 2018: 73). Growing
concerns about environmental sustainability and the ideas of urban activist Jane
Jacobs (1961) have also been important international influences in Melbourne.
They informed the ‘grassroots approach to town planning’ and the desire
‘to create networks of walkable communities’ that took root in the 1970s and
spread through subsequent city plans and policies, such as its 1985 pedestrian
strategy (Adams and Dovey 2018: 202–3; Jones 2018: 100; Ord 2018: 37). These
trends have been reinforced by global rankings that provide external validation of
the City’s focus on quality of life.
Unsurprisingly, the development of Melbourne as a city has thus been influenced
by global trends and events. Along with those already discussed, immigration
and related policies have significantly shaped the vibrant culture of Melbourne.
The traditional owners of the land, the people of the Kulin nation, were largely
displaced by early settlers from England, Ireland, and Scotland. Following the
gold rushes of the 1850s, Melbourne became home to a diverse range of
ethnicities during ‘the land boom of the 1880s’ (and the rise of the Marvellous
Melbourne label) and later through post-war migration in the mid-twentieth
century (Damousi 2008). Although British immigrants continued to constitute
a majority, ‘non-English-speaking groups clustered in the inner city’ from the
beginning of the twentieth century (Damousi 2008).
National policymaking has also had an influence on the demographic make-up
of Melbourne. Increased ethnic diversity, particularly in the form of refugees
and migrants from Asia, followed the dismantling of the ‘White Australia’ policy
and a turn to multiculturalism in all levels of politics. More recent influences on
the transformation of central Melbourne that were outside the city or state
government’s control include the deregulation of higher education and subse-
quent increase of international fee-paying students, along with foreign invest-
ment from Hong Kong (in anticipation of unification with China), especially in
residential towers in Southbank (Ord 2018: 41). The City of Melbourne has
relished this increasing cultural diversity, epitomized in the resulting prolifer-
ation of festivals and restaurants with cuisine from many different cultural
traditions. Thus, while the city and state government can lay claim to enabling
some impressive changes in central Melbourne, their policies have been shaped,
constrained, and complemented by a range of national and international con-
textual factors.
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Designing and Delivering a Liveable City
Despite—or perhaps even because of—its relatively limited role in planning
following the changes described above, the city government proactively and
constructively worked with the state government to improve ‘liveability’ in
Melbourne. The new governance arrangements involved collaboration, negoti-
ation, and compromise between the state and city governments, and significant
and vocal non-government organizations. A sample of specific policy design
processes are explored here to illustrate the different roles and approaches taken
by these governmental actors.
The major strategic plans developed by the City of Melbourne between the mid-
1970s and mid-1990s focused on making Melbourne a nicer place to live and visit,
especially by improving public amenities and promoting residential development.
The 1985 City of Melbourne Strategy Plan sits at the heart of the relatively
consistent approach to urban planning policy taken by the local government
despite the wide array of challenges and changes it faced. Based on the 1974
Strategy Plan, the newly reinstated city government developed the 1985 Strategy
Plan over three years in the early 1980s. Their successors further extended and
updated this policy with Directions 1992–1995 (Melbourne City Council 1992).
A guiding principle of the 1985 plan was ‘full citizen engagement in the exercise
such that at its conclusion there would be real citizen ownership of its recom-
mendations’ (Huggard, cited by Yencken 2018: 77). Building on the city’s assets
and ‘local character’, it aimed for incremental changes rather than ‘grand schemes’
(Adams and Dovey 2018: 204, 230). The plan explicitly sought to attract people
‘to live, work, shop, and enjoy their leisure in the city’ (Melbourne City Council
1985: 15). It deliberately redefined the CBD as the ‘CAD’—central activities
district—emphasizing the ‘entertainment, government, civic and cultural activ-
ities’ taking place alongside business in the city (Jones 2018: 128). Lecki Ord, a
member of MVA who became Melbourne’s first female mayor in 1987, empha-
sizes the social dimensions of both the policy process and content:
There was a focus on opportunities for social interaction with the full spectrum of
society, and self-expression in cultural and recreational activities. The city’s
programs and works over succeeding years were driven by the Strategy Plan’s
aims that the city should emerge from the engagement of citizens in decisions
that vitally affect their lives, and that it should symbolise the values and achieve-
ments of the larger Melbourne community. The extent to which Melbourne
today is one of the world’s most liveable cities is in no small way a result of
informed and organised citizen engagement in its planning. (Ord 2018: 41)
The 1985 plan was distinctive at the time for taking a detailed, ‘goal achievement’
approach, aiming to counter the trends of population decline and economic
productivity losses. It specified detailed objectives in each of the key areas it
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focused on—the city’s economy; commercial and industrial development;
population and housing; community services; ‘movement systems’ (such as
transport); tourism and leisure; and the ‘physical environment’—setting meas-
urable goals for improvement in each area. Recognizing the limited scope and
resources of the city government, the goals were designed to be achievable over
time and ‘on very low budgets’ (Adams and Dovey 2018: 204). The plan’s
development involved extensive research and consultation with the local com-
munity, taking into account data on traffic flows, pedestrian movement, space
utilization, analysis of prior policy, and input from consultants (Melbourne
City Council 1985).
The incorporation of different forms of evidence and ideas, and contributions
through expert and community consultation contributed to building legitimacy,
increasing the policy’s chances of success. The City’s own review of its 1985 plan
concluded that two thirds of the policies set out in the original plan ‘have been
completed or are ongoing’ (Melbourne City Council 1990: 10). The subsequent
‘update’ advocated slowing the pace of development, and refining it, with the goal
of making Melbourne an inclusive, artistic city, not just a busy, business-focused
one (Melbourne City Council 1992). New for the 1992 report was an outline of
actions to be undertaken either by the Victorian State Government, or jointly by
state and city governments.
The City of Melbourne was thus ahead of its time, implementing strategic
planning and reporting regimes that were to be mandated through NPM reforms
applied to local government in Australian states from the late 1980s to early 2000s.
It followed the City of Sydney, whose 1971 Strategic Plan exemplified the ‘new
wave of progressive strategic city plans . . . experimenting with innovative meth-
odologies and new-look emphases on urban design and environmental manage-
ment’ (Freestone 2010: 35). New provisions later set forth in state legislation were
accordingly designed to make local authorities more accountable and more
responsive to community wishes, notably through mechanisms such as strategic
planning and performance statements, as well as sometimes broadening the scope
of local government activity (Aulich 2009).
Throughout the 1980s and beyond, the city government actively incorporated
and promoted pedestrianization as a key plank in liveability. As understood by the
City of Melbourne and articulated in the ‘Places for People’ reports, ‘liveability’ is
about how people experience the city, especially public space. In 1993, Adams, as
the City’s Urban Design Manager, brought Gehl to Melbourne to conduct a large-
scale planning and social study of the city. Gehl’s subsequent ‘Places for People’
report studies the people of Melbourne and how they use their city, specifying for
instance how long people spend walking between spaces and remaining in each
space. Explicitly focusing on making the city more ‘liveable’, it suggests improving
pedestrian links around the city, and creating more functional and amenable
‘gathering spaces’ (City of Melbourne and Gehl 1994: 13–14).
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The report ends by recommending two sets of goals: a series of numerical targets
for pedestrian movement and space utilization, as well as amenity development
(for example, ‘number of outdoor café seats’), to meet by 2001; and two pages of
specific recommendations on how these goals might be achieved (City of
Melbourne and Gehl 1994: 41–3). Its establishment of clear benchmarks for
measuring the city’s development was somewhat unusual in the context of local
government planning in Australia at the time. Along with its emphasis on ‘people-
centric’ design, resembling the language of the 1985 Strategy Plan, this likely reflects
the influence of Rob Adams and team over both documents. It also illustrates a
more grounded approach to measurement that ultimately drives city planning,
in contrast to the external validation offered by international indices of liveability.
The State Government also emphasized good urban design as it developed and
released its own plans for central Melbourne during this period, although it
focused more on economic development. Appointed as head of the Ministry of
Planning and Environment for the Cain Labor government, David Yencken
(2018: 73) defines ‘high-quality urban design’ as making the public realm
‘as attractive to as many people as possible, to ensure that people find pleasure
in public spaces and that the spaces in turn attract supportive activities’. Ten
years later, the importance of ‘good urban design’, defined as ‘visual meaning,
functional efficiency and broad access to change in cities and towns’, was also
recognized and promoted by the national government’s Urban Design Task
Force (Freestone 2010: 39). The planning policies released by the Cain Labor
government—‘Central Melbourne: Framework for the Future’ (Ministry of Plan-
ning and Environment 1984) and ‘Shaping Melbourne’s Future’ (Ministry of
Planning and Environment 1987)—reflect this appreciation of urban design, but
essentially as a way of harnessing central Melbourne as a tool to boost Victoria’s
economy. They focused on encouraging ‘urban consolidation’ and large-scale
development. In contrast to the City’s ‘goal achievement’ approach, ‘Shaping
Melbourne’s Future’ was arguably ineffective because it lacked clear implemen-
tation mechanisms and talked in vague terms; indeed, the ‘implementation’ section
of this report is only two pages long (Goodman et al. 2016: 29; Ministry of Planning
and Environment 1987: 56–7).
Nevertheless, elements of the state’s plan were carried through to the 1990s,
and adopted by the Kennett (conservative) government, in particular through
the first major policy document released jointly by the city and state govern-
ments. Creating Prosperity: Victoria’s Capital City Policy was designed princi-
pally to ‘act as a guide to the private sector’ (Government of Victoria and
Melbourne City Council 1994: 1). It aimed to make Melbourne a more inter-
nationally attractive city, particularly focusing on its strengths and opportunities
as an appealing centre for big business, through initiatives such as building the
Melbourne Exhibition Centre and a new Museum of Victoria, and beginning the
Docklands developments. Other commitments that reiterated the City’s plans
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included promoting Melbourne as ‘Australia’s best place to live and visit’
and ‘Australia’s premier retailing centre’, by retaining the city’s unrestricted
(24 hour) trading hours, encouraging more activities in the main street, upgrad-
ing and maintaining the city’s lanes, arcades and footpaths, and building the
new public space Federation Square (Government of Victoria and Melbourne
City Council 1994: 5).
The City’s 1985 Strategy Plan is the key policy at the local level in this tale of
urban revitalization. Shaped by input from community activists and urban design
professionals, it functioned not only as an important policy document to guide
decisions and design in the administration but was also used as a manifesto in city
government election campaigns and as a vehicle for bringing together state and
local government actors and other key stakeholders. Like the plans it immediately
preceded and followed, the 1985 Strategy Plan was shaped by community activists
who had professional experience in planning and architecture, some of whom
then became local politicians (after lobbying the state’s Labor Party to institute
changes to local government), and who employed consultants and staff who
shared their vision and values.
Gardner and Clark (1998: 138) suggest that the 1985 Strategy Plan was suc-
cessful where it outlined policy and planning targets that were achievable. Adams
confirms the importance of targets, such as 8,000 new residences, for keeping
politicians and planners accountable (Adams and Dovey 2018: 206). He also
suggests that it was strong alignment and collaboration between city and state
planners that enabled the policy changes that led to Melbourne becoming more
liveable (Adams and Dovey 2018: 206). According to Freestone (2010: 38), the key
factors that led to the successful implementation of the 1985 Strategy Plan,
specifically in terms of achieving increases in the city’s residential population and
conserving its local character, were: ‘political support, design-led delivery through
area-partnerships, specific master plans, and public–private partnerships’.
After Melbourne was rated as the world’s equal-most liveable city in one of the
first global ‘liveability’ studies undertaken in 1990, the state government began
to focus on preserving and promoting this quality. ‘Liveability’ was a central and
explicit focus in its 1994 ‘Melbourne Metropolitan Strategy Discussion Paper’.
Identifying urban sprawl as a key threat to liveability, and noting that much of the
region’s growth was occurring on Melbourne’s outer metropolitan edges, the state
suggested that a solution would be to further encourage housing development near
and within the central city (Department of Planning et al. 1994: 23–5). Echoing and
extending the city government’s plans, it also suggested ‘enhancing’ the city’s
pedestrian environment, cultural and heritage features, universities, perceived
level of safety, and ‘diversity’, both in terms of demographics and of housing and
jobs available for citizens (Department of Planning et al. 1994: 26–31).
The different policy documents developed by successive state and city govern-
ments demonstrate tensions between these two levels of government over the
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future of Melbourne, with each fighting to instate their preferred plan for the city
(McLoughlin 1992). Local community and stakeholder groups, in turn, fought for
different visions of how and where the city would develop. As Freestone (2010: 37)
puts it, describing the state government’s approach to urban and suburban
development in the 1990s, ‘turmoil at the local level was often profound’. Each
government proposed focusing on development in different parts of the city in
their central policy documents.
In the 1980s, however, the tug of war between the state and city governments
resulted in both parties giving much more attention to the central city than in
preceding decades. Both parties had comprehensive, well-funded plans to
redevelop the city, and both agreed on key areas to be funded. The policy
consensus was that something had to be done. Over time, the City appears to
have taken on the role of managing smaller-scale urban design and infrastructure
projects, focused on how people use the city, while the state government has
retained responsibility for large-scale projects that define what people come to the
city for. Despite local objection to urban consolidation, these policies helped to
revitalize the inner city, leading to its ‘liveable’ qualities that are widely appreciated
today. It can also be argued that increases in policing and improved perceptions of
safety have contributed to the city’s perceived ‘liveability’, by making it appear a
safer place especially for wealthier people to live and work (Palmer and Warren
2013: 83–4).
Alongside these major battles centred around planning, an important policy
development aimed at encouraging and assisting residential development in the
centre of the city was ‘Postcode 3000’. This policy was coordinated by the city
government and supported by the state Department of Planning. Refusing to
accept the state government’s projected forecasts of a declining population, the
City had set targets in its 1985 Strategy Plan to increase housing types and add at
least 8,000 new dwellings to accommodate a population increase of 16,000
residents (Jones 2018: 129). However, its initial mechanisms to implement this
policy were not successful and it was not until the property market crashed in the
late 1980s that the subsequent empty commercial space provided an opportunity
to realize this vision (Adams and Dovey 2018: 206–7).
Postcode 3000 provided financial incentives and technical and capital works
support to developers proposing to build thirty or more residential units. These
incentives were combined with a media strategy to promote the advantages of
living in the city. At its heart was a demonstration building conversion project,
where the City, working with industry partners, converted vacant floors of a
historic building into apartments. Despite initial scepticism, the City recovered
its investment as rents exceeded expectations and ‘a long waiting list of prospect-
ive tenants’ exemplified it had succeeded in persuading people to live in the
CBD (Jones 2018: 129–30). The policy is credited with bringing redundant
buildings back into use as apartments, helping the City meet its fifteen-year target
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for residential growth within ten years, and the creation of Birrarung Marr, a
riverfront park reclaimed from under-used rail sidings. An unanticipated side
effect, however, was that, as rents increased and residential property investment
became more attractive, low-income residents were forced out of the central city
(Adams and Dovey 2018: 208).
A connected policy development was the transformation of Swanston Street,
which similarly illustrates both tensions and collaboration between government
actors, residents, and other stakeholders. Swanston Street has been the site of
prolonged debate and divergent policies between state and city governments over
the past three decades. It has long been described as the ‘civic spine’ of Melbourne
(Jones 2018: 106), despite in the 1980s being ‘little more than a traffic artery; close to
90 per cent of the vehicles travelling along it had neither an origin nor a destination
in the city’ (Yencken 2018: 75). Early experimentation led to implementation that
was later legitimated through external awards and changing attitudes and behav-
iours. Inspired by an international example shared by a young designer in the
Ministry of Planning, the state government embarked on an experimental initiative
in 1985 to show what was possible, while tensions between government depart-
ments and media criticism prevented more substantial change at the time. The
‘greening of Swanston Street’ closed part of the road to traffic for a street party over
a weekend, when it was covered in grass sods. Initially seen as a political stunt,
around half a million people came to the central city to experience the event, which
was reportedly ‘loved to death’ (Jones 2018: 102; Yencken 2018: 76).
After an international expert ‘brought in to advise and reassure based on the
European experience of pedestrianization projects’ failed to do more than preach
to the converted, an economic study persuaded the state and city governments to
reduce traffic in the area (Jones 2018: 103). A massive consultation then effectively
identified practical implementation needs. Seven years after the ‘stunt’, Swanston
Street was closed to vehicular traffic, an improvement that was considered ‘the key
to the City of Melbourne’s receipt of the first Australia Award for Urban Design’
in 1996 (Jones 2018: 104). The continued need for trams to use the street has
thwarted full pedestrianization, but the street now has the widest footpaths in
Melbourne, is much safer for pedestrians, and has more amenities—the number of
cafés, for instance, doubled between 1992 and 2003 (Jones 2018: 104–5). Its
eventual (partial) pedestrianization demonstrates Yencken’s (2018: 74) argument
that the best way to change perceptions of a city is by making physical changes to
the environment and letting people experience them.
Enduring Allure
Local and global legitimating factors have contributed to the enduring effects of
the shared vision promoted by administrators, planners, and activists in the
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1980s. The localized focus of city government on tangible dimensions of people’s
experience in the city, genuine community input into planning processes, and
their recognition of existing assets can all be seen as success factors in this
governance story. Over several decades, globally circulating ideas, indices, and
consultants have provided inspiration, information, and external validation.
As key actors from this period point out, ‘high-quality urban design is a long-
term process’ (Yencken 2018: 66) which needs to be considered far beyond
electoral cycles, and takes decades to achieve (Adams and Dovey 2018: 253;
Jones 2018: 141). While state government legislation and planning guidelines
introduced height limitations in the 1980s, for instance, these were ignored and
dismantled by subsequent governments who ‘bowed to developer pressure’
(Yencken 2018: 69–71). It is remarkable that the city government, in spite of all
the pressures and changes outlined above, managed a consistent approach to
urban design and planning during this period. It was aided by the state’s local
government reforms that reduced the electoral changes in city government and
the voting power of businesses (although property owners still have dispropor-
tionate electoral sway).
Local politicians’ determination to include community voices and local data in
planning processes and to establish organizational structures and internal cap-
ability also effectively ensured a relatively consistent implementation of strategic
plans. The persistent ‘people-centric’ approach of the council administration,
despite changing politics at the city and state levels, and broader changes in the
urban environment, may not have been possible if the key role of Director of
Urban Design had not been filled by the same person for more than three decades.
The ‘political work’ and ‘craft work’ of Rob Adams are an important factor in this
governance success story. Ord (2018: 39) echoes others when she claims, ‘The
successful implementation of the 1985 Strategy Plan is in no small way due to the
commitment of Rob Adams to see the principles embedded in all subsequent
council decisions.’His persistence and collaboration with a range of other import-
ant actors, notably local politicians, state planners, international consultants, and
industry partners, has made a mark on the city. The cumulative effects of thirty
years of incremental changes by state and city governments can be seen in
Melbourne’s streetscapes (Adams and Dovey 2018; Jones 2018: 93, 139).
Analysis and Conclusions
The success that we have focused on in this chapter is a story about the changing
governance arrangements that have reshaped central Melbourne. This story
analyses the combination of state and city government policies and strategies
over more than three decades. The increased capacities of state government
reduced the formal capacity of the city government, but also gave it licence to do
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things differently. The layered and emergent interactions between these two levels
of government managed to combine economic and commercial interests with
culture and liveability. NPM worked together with urban design principles and
committed activists interested in citizens’ rights: Melbourne rose from the ashes.
The state government changed numerous planning and strategy settings, mak-
ing some unpopular decisions but using its legitimate power to shape the city at a
macro level. Major building developments were pushed through in the face of
opposition, and determined efforts were made to attract people to Melbourne’s
centre as a place to live and play as well as to work. Successive state governments
redefined the scope of the municipality’s powers and showed a determination to
remove financially incompetent local politicians. Amalgamating what were then
small municipalities with limited scope and abilities and changing the boundaries
of the city so that it effectively straddled both sides of the Yarra River were also
important, if unpopular, reforms.
Changes to the city government itself are also key to this governance success
story. The changes that saw the local politicians’ roles move from an annually
revolving door—even for the (then elected from within) mayor—to three-year
terms and a directly elected mayor, had significant effects. The city government’s
new focus on immediate and tangible things, which matter a great deal to people
as they move around the city, was combined with a more visible, approachable
and professional cadre of local politicians. The result was the removal of doubts
about the legitimacy and competency of the municipal government, following
years of perceived incompetence and financial mismanagement. Changes that
modernized the city’s administrative structures and procedures also bolstered its
reputation. In what we would now easily recognize as New Public Management,
many corporate management principles were imported to the City, followed by
ideas about the importance of competition and the desirability of contracting out
services. These moves added up to a clear signal that the City government had
been transformed into a modern, responsible, and professional organization.
The social and environmental activists who first made an appearance in com-
munity consultations on the 1974 Strategy Plan, before becoming much more
visible when the local politicians were sacked, and then numbered amongst the
newly appointed politicians once elections were held again, were also an important
part of this story of new governance arrangements. They can be credited with
staunchly supporting the focus on good urban design that the state and city
governments were beginning to embrace, and which has since become so important
to Melbourne’s liveability. They are also likely to have had an enduring influence by
promoting the incorporation of citizens’ views into strategy documents.
This governance success story rests on the redefinition of the realms of respon-
sibility of the state and city governments, which changed their capacities and their
interactions. It also points to the symbolic importance of markers of success,
which in this case helped to change residents’ perceptions of their city and its
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standing in the world, in the context of changing national and international
trends. Having landed towards the top of world liveability rankings, this very
public marker of success helped the state and city governments and the people
living in it, to continue to focus on Melbourne’s liveability as a core concern. All of
these contributed to making Melbourne marvellous again.
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11
The Dutch Delta Approach
The Successful Reinvention of a Policy Success
Arwin van Buuren
Introduction
Many foreigners are amazed when they visit the Netherlands and are told that
26 per cent of this country is below sea level and 60 per cent of the country is
susceptible to flooding. And, to make it even worse, the flood-sensitive area is
densely populated: the main cities of the Netherlands (The Hague, Amsterdam,
Utrecht, and Rotterdam) all are located in the part of the country that is below
sea level. However, after the disastrous flooding of 1953, the Dutch produced
an unparalleled success story in protecting their delta against flooding. They
established a legal framework of high norms for flood protection and realized a
series of massive infrastructural works. A powerful institutional regime of a semi-
autonomous national implementation agency (Rijkswaterstaat, the executive
agency of the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment), dedicated regional
water boards, and a well-developed expert community maintained this frame-
work. It turned the Netherlands into one of the best protected delta areas of the
world and the international benchmark for effective delta management.
More recently, the Dutch successfully reformulated their ‘delta approach’ in
order to adapt to the possible but uncertain impacts of climate change. There were
no apparent policy failures as a trigger for this policy reform, but the necessary
trigger for this ‘policy update’ was deliberately invented by installing a high-level,
independent advisory committee that advised the Dutch government about how
to deal with climate change. Their advice was used to initiate a new national Delta
Programme under the stewardship of an independent national Delta Commis-
sioner. As part of this programme quite a few important elements of the current
policy were revised. Most importantly a paradigm shift was realized from a
prevention-oriented policy towards a more risk-based orientation. In the inter-
national community the Dutch delta approach is seen as a hallmark of quality,
effectiveness, and robustness.
The reinvention of the Delta approach is an exercise in policy maintenance
(Hogwood and Peters 1982): reinventing a policy in order to enhance its lifespan.
The case of the new Dutch Delta Programme is remarkable in part because it went
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one step beyond maintenance: it successfully reformulated the paradigm behind
the Dutch delta approach before the existing paradigm had demonstrably failed.
And so it is also an example of an anticipatory policy style (Bovens et al. 2001).
The case raises the question how we can explain that already efficacious policies
are successfully reinvented before their initial success has been exhausted. After
all, reinventing successful policies is not self-evident. Path-dependent incremental
adjustment is the much more likely long-term trajectory of a successful policy
regime. Moreover, a policy network’s core competencies (ways of working in
which it is highly experienced and thus very good) can easily become so deeply
institutionalized as to narrow the scope for adaptation, learning, and innovation of
current routines.
In this chapter we demonstrate how the Dutch Delta Programme—devised as
an external driver injected into the existing policy sector to come to a revision of
the Dutch delta approach—can be seen as a successful device to combine exploit-
ation (sustaining the successful elements of the former flood management regime)
with exploration (developing new strategies and avenues to deal with new chal-
lenges related to climate change).¹ First, we assess the case as one of successful
reinvention. We then delve deeper into the way in which the Delta Programme
accomplished this reinvention and look for possible explanations why an already
successful policy could be successfully reinvented. In the final part of the chapter
we probe these potential explanations more deeply and articulate a set of lessons
for policy reinvention that might be drawn from this case study.
Reinventing a Success Story
The basis for the successful Dutch delta approach can be traced back to the major
flood of 1953. This flood resulted in more than 1,800 casualties, 100,000 people
lost their homes, and 150,000 hectares were flooded. Total damage was estimated
at 1 billion Dutch guilders. Twenty days after the flood the Dutch government
installed the Delta Committee tasked with advising the government on how future
catastrophic flooding could be avoided. This committee—mainly composed of
civil engineers—presented a Delta Plan with proposals to close off all major sea
arms and to shorten the coastline by 700 kilometres. Alongside the plan new flood
norms for the whole country were proposed.
During the half century that followed, Dutch water management was remark-
ably effective in preventing new floods from occurring. In 1993 and 1995 two
‘near-miss’ riverine flood events took place during periods of extreme water levels
triggered by a confluence of weather events and erosion impacts upstream. In
1995 more than 250,000 people had to be evacuated (Rosenthal and ‘t Hart 1998).
These near floods constituted a wake-up call. Past success could not be allowed to
breed complacency, and the result was a new law to hasten the implementation of
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dyke enforcements along the main rivers (Delta Law Main Rivers), because many
necessary enforcement projects were overdue. This law was followed by a pro-
gramme ‘Room for the River’, consisting of thirty-nine projects aimed at enhan-
cing the discharge capacity of the rivers. This programme again was a success. On
time and within budget (2 billion euros) the thirty-nine projects were imple-
mented to enlarge the discharge capacity by giving the rivers more room. In
addition, a couple of innovative and multifunctional projects were realized and
new nature development was accomplished (Van Buuren et al. 2013).
Until 2008 the main focus of the Dutch flood policy was on guaranteeing a high
level of flood protection. The norms for flood protection were linked to the
probability of flooding. This is quite a unique characteristic, because it is more
logical to base such norms on the risk (probability and consequences) of flooding.
The First Delta Committee had proposed such risk-based norms, but they were
never developed due to the technical complexity of formulating them. The strong
prevention-oriented focus, however, fits well in the Dutch culture of keeping the
water at a distance: most Dutch people feel themselves safe behind the dikes and
are convinced that the dikes prevent flooding. Their risk awareness is low,
especially because of their strong belief in the quality of flood prevention.
Until now the Dutch have been perceived as very successful with their flood
protection policies although it is quite difficult to prove just how successful. The
Dutch delta approach is regarded as a world-leading example of keeping dry feet
in low-lying delta areas, but we only know whether it performs well when a super-
storm (around once in 10,000 years—the norm for the water defences in the
Netherlands) hits the Dutch coast. Nevertheless, the Netherlands is seen as an
international hallmark for delta management. And the societal support for the
yearly investments in flood protection is quite strong, although local enforcement
projects were sometimes quite time-consuming due to resistance from local
residents.
But even successful policies need maintenance and adaptation as their oper-
ational and socio-political environments change, or—as in this instance—when
‘events happen’ that have a game-changing significance. Following a wave of
alarming reports about the scope and possible impacts of climate change, in
2008 the Second Delta Committee was installed and presented a highly influential
report. The committee reminded the government and the public at large that the
Netherlands could not assume that in the decades to come its post-1953 infra-
structures and governance arrangements would suffice to maintain current levels
of safety. It called for a concerted approach to discover what was needed and
advised the installation of an independent national authority to coordinate the
effort. It also called for setting up a national fund for the purpose of safeguarding
the availability of enough financial means to cover the presumably significant costs
of infrastructure updating and other newmeasures that might be deemed necessary.
Due to effective boundary work with the national cabinet and a powerful media
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campaign, the government accepted the committee’s recommendations within a
week of their presentation. It prepared the Delta Act that called for an annual
presentation of a Delta programme, a new authority (the ‘Delta Commissioner’),
and the instatement of the Delta Fund.
In 2010 the first Delta Commissioner took office. Following a four-year fact-
finding, community-building and collaborative policy design effort, Kuijken—a
three-time department head and one of the most experienced public sector chief
executives in the country—presented five important ‘Delta decisions’ that would
shape the fifty-year programme that was to follow. These decisions articulated
new norms for flood risk and devised policy ambitions for spatial adaptation that
were to be implemented through regional water governance networks. They were
ratified by the Dutch parliament and have since begun to be implemented (see
section ‘Design and Governance of the Programme’ for a more detailed account).
Assessing the Dutch Delta Approach
When we examine the Dutch delta approach in general and the Delta Programme
in particular with the PPPE framework for policy assessment used throughout this
volume, a picture of fairly comprehensive success emerges (see Table 11.1).
Within the Dutch public sector the second delta approach is often mentioned as
a success story and parts of its institutional architecture and programme man-
agement philosophy have percolated to other government portfolios and the
governance of other ‘national challenges’ (for example the drafting of the National
Energy Strategy or the National Coordinator for Security and Counter Terrorism).
The Dutch approach has also received accolades from international institutions
like the OECD and others, who hail the Dutch delta’s record as amongst the safest
worldwide (OECD 2014).
In addition, the Dutch delta approach has become a successful export product.
With the help of deliberate policy branding and marketing, the Dutch government
sold its approach to a couple of other delta areas (both in developed countries like
the United States and in less developed countries like Vietnam, Bangladesh, and
Indonesia). A special ‘water envoy’ was appointed to ‘spread the word’ and market
Dutch knowledge and experience with regard to delta management everywhere in
the world. The Delta Programme in other words became a global brand name that
clearly contributed to the already strong international reputation of Dutch water
management (Minkman and Van Buuren, 2019).
Flood risk safety affects so many people in the Netherlands that there is
unwavering public support for robust flood risk safety standards. The entire
country has a lot riding on the success of the Delta approach; should it fail, the
damage on so many levels would be immeasurable. In short, it is difficult to
say who loses or does not benefit from the flood policy. Although the Dutch flood
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Table 11.1 Assessing the success of the Dutch Delta approach
Programmatic assessment Process assessment Political assessment
• The value proposition is about keeping ‘dry
feet’ by safeguarding a high standard of
flood protection. This proposition is
undisputed.
• The policy is based upon the solidarity
principle which means that all parts of the
Netherlands pay an equal part in flood
protection.
• The way in which the Delta Programme arrived
at the delta decisions and the regional
implementation strategies is valued by the great
majority of the involved stakeholders and local
and regional authorities.
• Decision-making about dyke enforcement is
embedded in adequate procedures, although the
regional water boards faced difficulties with
implementing the necessary measures in time
and within budget.
• The implementation of dyke enforcement is
embedded in intensive participation processes
in which the negative external effects are
compensated for. The procedures are highly
effective to deliver the necessary measures in
time.
• There is a broad and deep political coalition that
supports the policy’s value proposition that
sustaining high flood norms is necessary to
safeguard economic prosperity.
• The Dutch Delta Programme, the national
agency Rijkswaterstaat, and the regional water
board authorities do have a strong
organizational reputation (both within the
public domain and among citizens).
Endurance assessment
The focus of the Dutch Delta Programme is upon the long term and measures have a lifespan of at least 50 years. While no assessment is possible at
present, at least the programme is explicitly ‘built to last’, and contains important provisions designed to ensure it is adaptive and able to accommodate
further changes in the environment.
The value proposition is broadly supported among the Dutch people and this support is quite stable.

























risk approach has some distributional effects (people from areas that are not
flood-prone pay also for the defence of the flood-prone areas; people that live in
the areas directly surrounding rivers have to accept dikes in their backyard
although they are mainly designed for people in the hinterland), overall, flood
risk is perceived as an issue of collective survival.
The most frequently heard criticisms with regard to the Delta Programme are
twofold. One is that the more fundamental decisions are postponed (for example
to close off with sluices the Nieuwe Waterweg River, the access to the port of
Rotterdam), on grounds that they can be considered in the future, when some of
the persistent uncertainty about local manifestations of climate change will be
reduced. The philosophy of adaptive delta management is espoused to legitimize a
stepwise approach in which small, no-regret measures are prioritized above more
fundamental measures which are not necessary yet.
Second, the consensual character of the Delta Programme means that measures
that are opposed by some stakeholders are not implemented even though there are
serious indications that they need to be adopted. One such example concerns the
question whether project developers and land owners involved in spatial devel-
opment initiatives should be made responsible for taking mitigating measures
to reduce flood risk. Until now, the responsibility for managing the water man-
agement consequences of construction projects has been shifted onto the water
authorities, who however have no veto powers over spatial developments in flood-
prone areas and thus are left to pick up the pieces once these developments have
been approved. The Delta Programme has yet to address this incongruence.
Design and Governance of the Programme
The Delta Commissioner has been positioned as an independent (‘honest’) broker
between the national government (including between its different departments,
e.g. Public Works and Environment, Agriculture and Nature, and Internal Affairs)
and the various layers of subnational government (provinces, regional water
boards, municipalities). The Delta Commissioner was never designed to become
a ‘czar’-like figure who can coordinate from the top-down and relies on an
expansive bureaucratic fiefdom. The Commissioner was not given any decision-
making authority (‘hard power’), but instead has to rely mainly on three sources of
influence: the power to convene, facilitate, and broker (‘soft skills’), the power to
report directly to parliament (and thus the possibility to publicly shame non-
cooperative parties), and the power to draft the yearly investment programme
regarding flood protection and climate adaptation (up to 1.2 billion euros annu-
ally). At approximately 15 fte (full-time evuivalents), the Commissioner’s staff was
deliberately kept small and organized as an autonomous team outside the national
departments. The overall aim was for the Commissioner and the programme to be
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seen as truly ‘national’ interventions instead of as a ‘central government’ takeover
of delta governance: a boundary-spanner and bridge-builder among the various
governmental layers and domains.
Subsequently, the Delta Programme was deliberately split into regional as well
as functional (fresh water, flood risk safety, and spatial adaptation) programmes.
Each of these was managed by a programme manager. A Steering Group with
broad representation of all relevant government actors was installed to take the
necessary strategic decisions. In addition, each programme also has an Advisory
Committee on which the main societal stakeholders are represented. This
structure contributed significantly to the development of an active ‘delta com-
munity’, with annual conferences and network meetings both at the regional and
national levels, frequent newsletters, and other forms of communication and
interaction.
The Delta Commissioner decided at the start of his activities to work towards
five strategic delta decisions that would set norms and directions for the Delta
Programme moving forward. Each region had to draft a ‘preferential strategy’ on
how to implement these decisions. This regional strategy must be focused on the
long-term (2050) and be ‘adaptive’: the possibilities for changing the path had to
be explored and possible tipping points and step changes taken into account.
A meticulous iterative approach was used to arrive at the five Delta Decisions
and the preferential strategies. Each year one step in the exploration was set.
Each sub-programme started with a problem exploration phase. After that, an
array of possible strategies was considered and then reduced by selecting the
most promising ones. In the final year of the cycle, the preferential strategy was
chosen. This approach thus provided a comprehensive, inclusive, and grounded
method to first open and then gradually close the strategy development process.
It had the twin features of promoting wide search and robust analysis as well
engendering trust and commitment among the parties involved. This was
achieved by a strong emphasis upon joint fact-finding (including actively seek-
ing out local knowledge in the regions), inclusive deliberation, and consensual
decision-making. The entire process took four years but ultimately the results
were widely accepted.
The Delta Programme also kick-started a wide variety of local and regional pilot
projects. In 2011 a first series of pilot schemes was initiated to explore the idea of
multi-layered safety, a new—more risk-based—approach to flood management
focused upon the integration of flood protection, spatial planning, and emergency
management. Various pilots were undertaken to explore the consequences of
new norm settings for flood risk safety. Subsequent pilots started to explore
more in-depth the possibilities of using spatial measures and flexible responses
to flood emergencies as an alternative to rigid and highly costly protective
measures. Regional delta programmes started their own pilots in order to test
and adapt their preferred regional strategies.
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In 2014, the Delta Commissioner presented the five Delta Decisions which were
then ratified by the national government and the parliament. One decision was
about the new flood risk norms. Another was about spatial adaptation, also
referred to as ‘water-robust planning’, designed to arrive at more risk-neutral
forms of spatial development. The Delta Decision on flood risk safety mentioned
the possibility of ‘smart combinations’, to provide the opportunity for exceptional
situations in which dyke enforcement can be replaced by a combination of
measures (by elevating the land, or by realizing waterproof buildings and improv-
ing the possibilities for evacuation). Three pilot cases were selected to further
explore the possibilities of these combinations. They examined the opportunities
for certain areas to opt for a programme of (spatial, infrastructural, and crisis and
disaster management) measures instead of only dyke enforcement. The imple-
mentation process of the Delta Decisions has a number of defining characteristics
that epitomize the Dutch delta approach.
First of all, the implementation path has a really long-time horizon. The new
flood risk norms have to be settled in 2050. The new norms guarantee everyone
the same level of flood protection. For everyone the risk of flooding (based upon
the probability of flooding and the consequences in a certain area) has to be 1 in
100,000 years. That means that there is ample time for making the investments
that are necessary for their achievement. Simply put: there is much work to do, but
there is also enough time to do it. The new norms have to be translated in new
regulations, standards, working methods, and organizational routines. All (pri-
mary) dikes in the entire country (with a total length of 3,600 km) have to be
reassessed so that actual rather than statistical risk determines whether and how
reinforcement measures have to be implemented.
Second, the implementation is planned in an adaptive way: its progress is
monitored in relation to the evolution of the impact of climate change and
alternative pathways continue to be explored, so that when external circumstances
necessitate a change of strategy the system does not have to begin from scratch.
The concept of Adaptive Delta Management was coined to underpin this grad-
ualist, learning-oriented approach to implementation.
Third, the more innovative part of the Delta Programme—with regard to
adaptive planning and risk and disaster management—is accompanied by soft
policy instruments focused upon knowledge development within regional pilot
projects, e.g. by providing some seed money to municipalities for hiring expertise
and developing communicative steering instruments. Most of the implementation
of this ambition was translated into developing a ‘Stimulation Programme Cli-
mate Adaptation’ focusing on showcasing best practices, information sharing, and
networking.
Fourth, the implementation of the Delta Decisions has been put ‘back in the
line’. In other words: while the policy development phase of the Delta Programme
was an inter-organizational effort to come to a set of broadly shared policy
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proposals, in the implementation phase responsibility has been cast back onto the
individual organizations to discharge their own responsibilities by leveraging their
own competencies. That means for example that the implementation of dyke
reinforcements is not the responsibility of the Delta Programme or the regional
sub-programmes, but of the regional water board authorities. To make sure that
their activities continue to align with what has been termed ‘the spirit of the
programme’, they are obliged to consult provinces and municipalities before they
finalize their planning.
Finally, even after the Delta Decisions were formalized, the Delta Commis-
sioner remained in office and became responsible for monitoring the implemen-
tation of the Delta Programme. Each year the Commissioner prepares a formal
progress statement about the implementation of the Delta Programme for dis-
cussion in the national parliament—a ‘soft’ but nevertheless powerful way of
ensuring accountability across the system.
The Road to Policy Reinvention
The seminal work of Hogwood and Peters (1982) is most frequently cited when it
comes to the question of what can happen when policies are at the end of their
lifespan. They distinguish between policy termination, policy maintenance, and
policy succession. They observe, as others would do in great detail later, that
public programmes are hard to terminate; many of them persevere for a long time
(Rose and Davies 1994), sometimes well beyond the point of marginal returns.
Ideally such policies are abolished and succeeded. With regard to policy succes-
sion Hogwood and Peters (1982: 299) observe: ‘policy succession is conceived of as
an instance in which a previous policy, program or organization is replaced by a
new one directed at the same problem and/or clientele. Policy succession occurs as
a result of a process in which the issue of replacing is put on the relevant political
agendas, a coalition is mobilized to authorize the replacement, and the replace-
ment is successfully implemented.’
Policy maintenance, in contrast, is about continuing a current policy. Accord-
ing to Hogwood and Peters, maintenance occurs for several reasons: because the
policy is essentially not broken and there are no alternatives to replace it whole-
sale; because the current policy regime is inert; or because actors failed to
terminate the current policy or failed to organize for it to be succeeded with
another policy. Their overall interpretation of policy maintenance is thus quite
negative. It is a second-best option.
In the decades of research that followed this publication, many have questioned
this interpretation. Real-life cases do not match this typology and policies are
multifaceted which means that in every case of policy evolution, we can discern
elements of maintenance and succession. Furthermore, in the case of policy
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maintenance or succession, the main trigger is the fact that current policies no
longer suffice. However, many instances of policy change are not triggered by
failure. The drivers for change or evolution can be more political and thus can
result from changing power positions of different actor coalitions (Sabatier 1988).
They can also be more cognitive. In that case, changing insights about the
effectiveness of a policy result in policy change. And finally, they can be more
ideational: new ideas or discourses enter the political arena, become hegemonic
and lead to policy change (Schmidt 2011).
In this chapter we asked ourselves how in the domain of Dutch flood risk
management we can explain this case of successful policy reinvention (which can
be seen as somewhat more far-reaching than maintenance, but not as dramatic
as the invention of a completely new paradigm). The question of how to explain
this case of successful policy reinvention (in the case of an already successful
policy) is relevant for two reasons. First, most instances of policy succession
involve policies that are widely seen to have failed. In the case of the Dutch delta
approach, this was certainly not the case: the post-1953 response has widely
been hailed as a major success. Also, policy change is more difficult when the
policy and its institutional context are strongly path dependent (Pierson 2000;
Weaver 2010). The Dutch water domain is often referred to as featuring strong
path dependencies, not only when it comes to its institutions and policy ideas,
but even in its physical infrastructures and the geography that resulted from
centuries of building dikes and dams (Gerrits and Marks 2008; Van Buuren et al.
2016). That makes policy innovation and renewal even more difficult when the
status quo is not perceived as problematic.
So, neither condition applied and yet the second Delta Programme constituted
a major innovation in this deeply institutionalized sector. There are at least five
mechanisms that can explain why this could occur.
A triggering event overseas was leveraged locally—When the awareness of the
consequences of climate change grew and after the devastation wrought by
Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans in the United States, people became convinced
that the Dutch delta approach had to be reinvented to prevent a future disaster. As
we have seen, in 2008 the Second Delta Committee was installed and presented its
highly influential report. This led to the creation of an independent national Delta
Commissioner and a Delta Fund to safeguard the availability of sufficient financial
resources. The various proposals of the Delta Committee were adopted by the
Dutch government.
Verduijn et al. (2012) convincingly argued that the Delta Committee did a very
good job in framing their key messages. Even though no crisis occurred, the
Committee was highly successful in creating awareness for the urgency of climate
change. They were able to put the revision of flood risk policy and management
high on the political agenda. This success can be explained when we look at the
way in which the Delta Committee framed its narrative, using the story of a
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‘common delta identity’ and creating a sense of urgency and collectiveness. To
enhance the sense of urgency the Committee successfully constructed a crisis
narrative (with the help of historical examples, recent examples from abroad, and
by illustrating the potential impact of future disasters).
The policy arena was successfully opened and operated in a collaborative
fashion—The Dutch Delta Programme was highly successful in mobilizing a
broad range of actors to discuss the future of Dutch flood risk management. It
invested in a large number of venues that allowed for participation of all kind
of actors that previously were not strongly involved in flood risk policy or
management: provinces, municipalities, the private sector, interest groups, and
others). Some of them were invited to enter the inner circle of the Delta
Programme (for example the provinces and municipalities). Others were
invited to enter the second ring (such as the regional safety authorities and
private interest groups). Those were invited to join advisory committees at the
regional and at the national level. The participation of these actors contributed
to a more ‘spatial’ and ‘ecological’ perspective on flood risk management.
Especially the participation of regional and local authorities contributed to a
policy paradigm in which the spatial consequences of flood management are
put more central. The strict focus on prevention (deeply embedded in the
existing, closed policy community) was broadened and replaced by a wider
perspective on risk management.
Multiple niches were organized as a seedbed for promising ideas—The Dutch
Delta Commissioner was a convinced proponent of exploring new ideas at a
distance of the formal policy regime in pilots and other experimental contexts.
With the help of some additional budget, external expertise and provisions for
positive exposure, many regional governments were facilitated to explore prom-
ising ideas and concepts. These pilots were organized in a collaborative way and in
close interaction with experts. The yearly Delta Congress was used as a venue to
present these pilots and to enable interaction among them. Many of these pilots
resulted in promising ideas that were used as arguments for new policy ideas in
the yearly Delta Programme.
New policies (and their authors) were perceived as authoritative—The piecemeal
approach (from problem exploration to drafting the preferred strategy) contrib-
uted to the quality and thus the authority of the ultimate Delta Decisions. Joint
fact-finding was the common method that was used to establish consensus about
the scientific knowledge used. For the Delta Decisions and the regional strategies
broad support was made visible (with formal advice, scientific reviews, and so on).
The coalition that supported the Delta Programme also possessed authority. It was
a broad community in which many representatives of the different public author-
ities were visible. The national Steering Group was composed of representatives
from national ministries, regional and local governments, and water boards. And
finally, the person of the Delta Commissioner significantly added to the authority
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of the proposals of the Delta Programme. The Commissioner is a very senior and
experienced public manager with a broad political and administrative network
and an independent position.
The approach respected and built upon valuable existing institutions—The Delta
Commissioner was quite keen to prevent resistance and alienation among
the traditional policy community. His strategy to organize room for policy
change can be characterized as a threefold approach. First of all, the existing
institutional structure and the existing ways of working were maintained and
were used to implement the Delta Decisions. Second, most of the changes were
relatively small and most of the time not obligatory (although the new norms of
course were!). For example programmes on spatial adaptation were based upon
the idea of communicative steering, knowledge governance, and ‘leading by
example’. And finally, a really long-time horizon was chosen to implement the
Delta Decisions, which gives the involved actors enough time to translate these
decisions into their own procedures and routines. By opting for an adaptive
approach it is possible to adjust its implementation when new insights make
that necessary.
Conclusions: The Strength of Consensual Incrementalism
Many policies are path-dependent and successful policies even more so. Policy-
makers like to retain and emulate ‘what works’, and perceived success thus is one
of the most powerful, self-reinforcing mechanisms that brings about path depend-
ency. The Dutch flood approach focusing on prevention is highly path-dependent
and the presence of the many hard flood defences (dikes, dams, and so on)
contributes to this path dependency (Van Buuren et al. 2016). This being the
case, the Delta Programme’s reinvention of the Dutch approach to flood risk can
be seen as an even more remarkable achievement. The gentle break with long-held
professional monopolies and their technocratic-paternalistic policy styles in
effect constituted an attempt to initiate a process of ‘path creation’ that over
time leads towards another direction in Dutch flood management—one that
takes a more balanced approach to flood risk in which not only protective
measures and big civic engineering projects are important but also spatial
policies to reduce impact as well as measures to enhance community and
business resilience. This approach is based upon the idea that initiating alterna-
tive, complementary pathways for flood management can lessen the dominance
of the current path and possibly can lead towards a more resilient balance
between prevention and adaptation. The new flood norms form the ‘enabling
context’ for such a new approach and are designed to prevent the system falling
back into old routines. The new norms legally secure a risk orientation in flood
protection. They ensure that not only are the consequences of flooding taken into
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account explicitly when programming dyke enforcements, but also that spatial
developments that could lead to increased flood risks appear on the agenda of the
various governments early on, so they are able to discuss their necessity, conse-
quences, and possible mitigating measures.
From our case we can learn that constructing the wake-up call is really
important to open the possibility for reflecting upon an already successful policy
and to organize the possibility to change the existing path. There has to be a sense
of urgency that the current policy has to be revisited, despite there being no
apparent failure. The interesting thing in the Delta Programme case is that the
sense of urgency to reconsider the successful existing policy had to be created. This
was successfully done by the blue-ribbon Veerman Committee, which provided
catalytic leadership through its well-timed use of framing techniques to raise the
salience of issue and convince the national government to seriously consider the
need for policy revision.
The Delta Commissioner in turn deliberately reframed this urgency. In the first
publication of the Delta Programme (2011) the economic importance of safe-
guarding flood protection in the long run was emphasized in combination with
the so-called Dutch sobriety. The need for policy revision was not framed in
relation to the quality of the existing policy, but with reference to the future.
Revising the current policy was deemed necessary in order to ‘protect future
generations against flooding’ (www.deltacommissaris.nl).
Reinventing hitherto successful policies might well be more difficult than
repudiating and terminating failed policies. The bar creating a credible ration-
ale for it is high, because why would anyone change a winning proposition? In
the absence of a self-evident ‘burning platform’, there is a strong need for solid
scientific underpinnings and a broad-based, collaborative approach to fact-
finding, analysis, and advocacy. The Delta Programme showed many indicators
of collaborative innovation (Van Popering and Van Buuren 2017). Through
dozens of pilots, novel ideas were explored and tested locally without being
threatening for the existing regime. The Delta Programme became a breeding
ground for new solutions, many of which were scaled up to the Programme’s
policies and practices.
Second, the Delta Commissioner created new venues that provided a much
wider array of actors than had been customary the opportunity to influence the
revision of flood risk policy and management. The integration of these new actors
led to a broadening of the existing policy community, increasing its operational
capacity for developing and implementing alternative policy pathways.
The choice for a broad-based consensual approach, one that emphasized
gradualism (no rush into big infrastructural works) and joint fact-finding, puts
the Delta Programme’s approach into the mainstream of the so-called ‘polder
politics’ which has long characterized Dutch water management as well as many
other domains of public policy (Hendriks and Toonen 2001). Combined with
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the incremental, step-by-step approach to implementing the policy changes, the
Delta Commissioner created a safe environment for piecemeal, risk-averse policy
innovation. The fact that the trigger for the entire process—the (possible) long-
term consequences of climate change—was framed as highly important but not
urgent, gave this approach its credibility. It is highly unlikely that in this cultural
context another, more top-down and crash-through approach would have
achieved similarly good results faster or more cheaply. At the same time, it is
also questionable whether this incremental approach to policy reinvention is
suitable when the need to adjust flood policies is far more serious and urgent, as
is the case for flood-prone communities in less resourceful countries.
It is difficult to predict whether the Delta Programme’s success will prove
sustainable across the programme’s projected lifespan, yet on current indications
its prospects are good. Measures have been taken to guarantee the long-term
availability of resources. The new flood risk norms have been written into law.
Stakeholder support for the philosophy of adaptive delta management—which
institutionalizes periodic (every six years) revision of the norms and the measures
in order to keep them up to date in the face of changing geophysical and socio-
economic conditions—is broad and deep. All this bodes well for the programme’s
robustness.
The case of the Dutch Delta Programme suggests the importance of an authori-
tative ‘honest broker’ supported by a lean but high-quality staff performing
catalytic, facilitation, and stewardship roles designed to energize and empower
an existing governance network in tackling major new challenges that cannot be
effectively addressed using only existing repertoires. It also suggests that there is
merit in taking the time and making the effort required to activate and involve a
wide and diverse suite of actors; this may be critical in forging a policy community
that is willing and able to engage in a collaborative innovation process. Third, the
case shows the power of small steps even when tackling complex and large-scale
problems (Collingridge 1992). Fourth, making explicit choices early on to
preserve those elements of existing practices that function well can contribute
significantly to increase support for innovation efforts. Finally, the Delta Pro-
gramme case suggests there is indeed wisdom in Rahm Emanuel’s maxim that
policy-makers should ‘never let a good crisis go to waste’: by 2010, climate change
was still a ‘creeping’ crisis—high threat, major potential impact, massive uncer-
tainty, but no immediate time pressure—allowing for a proactive yet piecemeal,
learning-oriented response strategy. There was enough pressure to ‘get going’ but
not enough pressure to generate impulses to go for the kind of dramatic gestures
and quick fixes that arise in acute crises. Moreover, the source of the threat was
exogenous to the system that had to respond to it, so there were no blame games to
dilute the problem-solving energy.
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Note
1. This chapter is based upon two different sources of empirical material. First of all, a
secondary analysis is made of many different research projects in which the Dutch
Delta Programme was analysed. I also used existing descriptions of the Dutch Delta
Programme (Van Twist et al. 2013) and a couple of scientific articles (Verduijn et al.
2012; Van Alphen 2016). Secondly, as a researcher, evaluator, and adviser I was
involved in a couple of research projects related to the Dutch Delta Programme (Van
Buuren and Teisman 2014; Van Buuren et al. 2013; Ellen and Van Buuren 2014; Van
Buuren et al. 2015).
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A Robust Urban Planning Success Based
on Collaborative Governance
Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing
The Long Shadow of a Post-War Expansion Plan
The metropolitan area in the Danish capital of Copenhagen has successfully
avoided both urban sprawl and overly dense and chaotic urbanization. The early
adoption of a comprehensive and adaptive urban plan has created a well-balanced,
award-winning metropolitan area that combines residential neighbourhoods
with green areas and access to public transport. The urban plan was drafted
seventy years ago and still governs urban planning practices in the greater
Copenhagen area.
Physical planning of urban developments is extremely complex due to con-
flicting pressures on land use, contradictory socio-economic dynamics, uncertain
prognoses and outcomes, multi-level governance structures, and limited public
planning capacities. In addition, comprehensive planning of housing and sup-
portive infrastructures often fails because planning experts dream up ambitious
master plans that have little or no bearing on local conditions, knowledge, and
needs and only enjoy modest political and popular support. Finally yet import-
antly, socio-economic turbulence, shifting political priorities, and bureaucratic
resistance may undermine stated planning objectives and preferred strategies for
how to attain them. Against this background, it is surprising how successful the
so-called ‘Finger Plan’ in Copenhagen has been in governing decades of urban
expansion in ways that secure desired outcomes in terms of high quality urban
living and continuous support for core planning objectives by elected politicians,
public planners, private stakeholders, and citizens.
The Finger Plan was conceived in the optimistic post-war years from 1945 to
1948 when pressure on land use outside the city centre was still limited. It was
initiated by the private Urban Planning Lab and implemented by a dedicated
group of planners in the semi-independent Regional Planning Office. In today’s
terminology, it was a bottom-up policy initiative that managed to garner support
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from local, regional, and national government officials as well as a broad range of
interest organizations and civil society associations. Political support was so
strong that the Finger Plan soon became the official planning doctrine of public
authorities in the Copenhagen metropolitan area, effectively turning it into a top-
down planning strategy.
The Finger Plan provided an ambitious and comprehensive plan for how future
urbanization in the Copenhagen metropolitan area should cluster around regional
traffic axes for trains and cars running outwards from the city centre along five
fingers that created residential areas separated by green wedges. The Finger Plan
was constantly challenged by new developments and superseded by higher than
expected growth rates, but it was able to accommodate these by integrating new
demands and adapting the original plan to changing circumstances.
This chapter analyses the conditions for, and the adaptive development of, the
Finger Plan. The empirical analysis of the factors driving the successful formula-
tion and implementation of the Finger Plan will pay particular attention to the
question of timing, the development of a responsive policy design, the strength
of metaphors, the process of collaborative governance, the role of leadership, and
the ability to adapt to changing conditions. The discussion section introduces the
notion of ‘robustness’ in seeking to understand the governance success of the
Finger Plan. The chapter concludes with lessons learned.
Our empirical analysis of the Finger Plan is based on original planning docu-
ments and narrative historical accounts of the planning process by the involved
actors. Over the years, the Danish Urban Planning Lab has made numerous efforts
to collect historical accounts from all the main actors. These accounts are often
rather personal and may tend to paint a rosy picture of the past, but there are so
many different accounts that it is possible to cross-check facts and events and
piece together a pretty solid interpretation of the planning process and its results
and achievements. Unfortunately, the material tends to lapse into long technical
planning discussions, with only rather scant information on governance issues.
Our intention to interview some of the main actors to obtain further information
about the governance process had to be abandoned since the key actors have all
passed away. Fortunately, there are enough bits and pieces to assemble a good
understanding of the political and administrative dynamics.
A Planning Success
Physical planning of urban environments is an important aspect of public policy
and governance (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003). Successful planning produces a
highly visible result in the form of cities with distinctive and well-connected
neighbourhoods, well-functioning transport systems, and easy access to work-
places, shopping, public services, and recreational areas. By contrast, planning
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failures—which are ubiquitous—result in urban sprawl, defined as dispersed and
inefficient urbanization at the fringe of urban areas which results in sub-optimal
land use, uneven development, and the loss of open farmland and nature. Urban
sprawl begins as scattered, low-density, car-dependent settlement patterns but,
after a while, continued expansion turns it into dense and incoherent urban
environments characterized by unintended clashes between residential enclaves
and polluting industries, lack of key public and private service functions, severe
traffic congestion, limited access to green areas, and low quality urban living
(Johnson 2001; Squires, 2002; Nechyba and Walsh 2004). In the United States,
where urban planning is weak and limited, urban sprawl and overly dense and
chaotic urbanization are considered major problems (Downs 1998). Stronger
planning regimes in Northern Europe have made it possible to prevent urban
sprawl and incoherent urbanization through the development and implementa-
tion of broad framework plans for current and future land use. They have also
prevented the development of cities in which housing and industry compete for
space, traffic congestion is the norm, and green areas and open nature are scarce.
Planning is important, but planning disasters are frequent due to a combination
of uncertainty about future socio-economic developments, interest-based conflicts
among key stakeholders, and shifting preferences and value judgements among
the public and associated opinion formers (Hall 1980). Planning builds on an
element of forecasting—perceived as a mechanical exercise in projecting future
trends—that often turns out to be flawed. In addition, conflicts of interest between
politicians, professional planners, bureaucrats, and private actors, including citi-
zens, private firms, and civil society organizations, may erode support for even
the most carefully designed master plans, thus preventing long-term planning.
Finally, the popular image of what constitutes a good and liveable city may change
over time, causing planners and politicians to halt or reverse existing planning
strategies and invent new ones, only to revert to some version of an older strategy.
The ubiquity of planning failures should not, however, overshadow the many
examples of successful planning. We can learn a lot from studying ‘the dog that
doesn’t bark’, but we hardly ever scrutinize cases of successful planning (for a
notable exception see Innes and Booher 2003, 2010). The latter are treated as
unique, singular, and exceptional experiences that can neither be generalized nor
learned from.We counter this trend by examining a genuine planning success that
has managed to achieve its core objectives while maintaining broad-based political
support.
Progammatically, the Finger Plan has had a very positive impact on the lives of
Copenhageners. Not only has it prevented urban sprawl, it has also prevented the
construction of chaotic and congested cityscapes with a low quality of life. The
Finger Plan has facilitated rapid urbanization in post-war Copenhagen without
compromising the demand for distinct, coherent, and self-servicing neighbour-
hoods with easy access to fast and reliable transport to the inner city and to green
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recreational areas situated right next to the residential areas. Private developers
have no doubt cursed the strict enforcement of the core principle of the Finger
Plan that prohibits the construction of shopping malls and new neighbourhoods
in the attractive green wedges separating the urban fingers. By contrast, local
sports associations, nature conservation organizations, and environmentalists
have praised the protection of the green areas and their proximity to the residen-
tial neighbourhoods, as this enables local citizens to enjoy the healthy pleasures of
outdoor activities.
The contemporary architect Jens Rørbech describes the Finger Plan as an
‘ingenious plan for the metropolitan area’ (Rørbech 2011). Indeed, most com-
mentators consider the Finger Plan to be the biggest Danish planning achieve-
ment ever. It is a cultural icon that most Danish people have heard about. In 2006,
it was included in the Ministry of Culture’s national list of outstanding cultural
heritage sites, and it continues to be the subject of celebration and discussion. In
2013 and 2014, the international global affairs magazine,Monocle, ranked Copen-
hagen as the world’s most liveable city, mostly due to its grand urban design, and
in 2017 the government invited public and private stakeholders to a debate about
the need for future additions to the Finger Plan.
The policy process was expert driven, but still quite inclusive. As a result, the
Finger Plan enjoyed widespread political, administrative, and societal support.
Despite its character as a comprehensive master plan based on rigid principles
about urbanization, land use, and centralized planning initiatives, the Finger Plan
was successfully implemented throughout the post-war period. Over the years,
new demands were incorporated, and adjustments in the face of new develop-
ments were made in a flexible manner and based on deliberation between a broad
range of public and private stakeholders.
Politically, the popularity of the Finger Plan amongst Copenhageners, especially
those who moved out to the suburbs to enjoy the fresh air and green environment
as well as easy access to public transport, further enhanced support for the Finger
Plan at different levels of government and among politicians from different
political parties. The positive response both from local residents and elected
politicians, and the international praise from foreign planning experts, convinced
the planning authorities in the Copenhagen metropolitan area that the Finger Plan
was close to perfect.
In terms of endurance, the Finger Plan’s core principle of separating areas for
housing development from open land was maintained in urban development
plans throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, and it continued to inform
planning reforms in the 1990s and at the beginning of the new millennium. The
most recent regional plan for the metropolitan area is called Fingerplan 2018
(Ministry of the Environment 2018). The Finger Plan survived a minor attack in
the late 1960s and early 1970s, when a state-sponsored plan introduced some
disruptive planning ideas, and it has been adapted in several ways in response to
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new demands and developments. However, its core principle is still intact and
even the most recent attempt to improve cross-cutting transport between the
fingers and expand the palm of the hand through land fill merely tends to confirm
and consolidate the existing finger structure.
The Finger Plan with its urban fingers radiating from the city centre was
inspired by the planet-city of London, but the fingers were prevented from
spreading to the east by the sea that separates Denmark and Sweden. Cities like
Helsinki and Stockholm have also concentrated urbanization along fingers,
whereas Barcelona has created a green belt around the city to provide access to
open nature. A green heart shared by a ring of surrounding urban areas is found in
the Randstad region in the Netherlands. As such, the Finger Plan is a particular
type of planning strategy that, like other planning strategies, aims to avoid
unplanned urbanization that often results in an amalgamation of urban areas
with few and fragmented green areas. Typical examples of the latter are found
in Antwerp, Los Angeles, and Milan (Vejre et al. 2007). Compared to those
examples, the Finger Plan governing urbanization in the Copenhagen metropol-
itan area is an undisputed success.
In a world where plans are constantly undermined, halted, reversed, and
changed, the longevity of the Finger Plan is truly remarkable and an indicator of
its success. We will try to explain this enduring success at the end of the chapter
but let us not forget that the Finger Plan is literally supported by strong path
dependency (Pierson 1995, 2000). When the S-train lines that form the core of
the fingers were first built, and new housing developments began to cluster
around the train stations, the path was laid for further expansion along the
urban fingers, and the cost of changing and redesigning the urban structure
became exorbitant. Moreover, after a few years, planners, politicians, and private
developers soon began to think and act in terms of the Finger Plan, thus
providing positive feedback that further reinforced the structure. New gener-
ations of planners were educated in the ideas and principles of the Finger Plan,
local politicians sought to thicken and extend the finger that fell under their
jurisdiction, and private developers knew exactly where they should buy land in
anticipation of new urban developments at the tips of the fingers. While the
original path dependency argument (David 1985) is that the contingently chosen
path will prevail in the face of more optimal solutions, in the same way as the
QWERTY keyboard survived the invention of new and faster keyboards, it is
difficult to identify that kind of competition in relation to the Finger Plan. So far,
there has been no real competition to challenge the Finger Plan and no alter-
native urban plan has claimed to provide a better and more efficient planning
model for the Copenhagen metropolitan area. In other words, the highly suc-
cessful Finger Plan has enjoyed almost total hegemony, except for a few skir-
mishes along the way.
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The Historical Context for the Emergence of the Finger Plan
To provide some context for the emergence of the Finger Plan, let us briefly
recount the political and socio-economic events leading up to post-war planning
efforts. In 1848, a peaceful democratic revolution put an end to almost two
centuries of absolutism in Denmark and paved the way for the formation of a
constitutional monarchy. The absolutist king had built a strong and modern state
that was now controlled by a democratically elected parliament and a government
appointed by the king. Based on an efficient tax collection system and meritocratic
recruitment of public administrators, which were both established by the absolutist
state, the public sector slowly took the form of a Weberian-style bureaucracy based
on hierarchy, specialization, rule-governed decision-making, and the separation of
politics and administration. The continued devolution of powers and tasks to
regional and local governments and individual public service organizations such
as hospitals and schools meant that public bureaucracy was combined with a strong
professional rule that gave the well-educated public professions inhabiting the
public welfare institutions considerable power and discretion (Andersen et al. 2017).
Over time, the democratically controlled bureaucracy was supplemented by an
elaborate system of collaborative governance that sought to bring relevant and
affected actors from the state, market, and civil society together in public decision-
making (Christiansen and Nørgaard 2003). The collaborative governance trad-
ition was prompted by the coexistence of a strong and well-functioning state and a
strong and well-organized civil society that called for the formation of arenas for
cross-sector interaction. The collaborative tradition was also spurred by the rise of
strong cooperative movements from the 1870s onwards. The farmers formed a
cooperative movement in order to facilitate the transition from crops to animal
farming, whereas the workers formed cooperatives in response to capitalist
exploitation. The cooperative movements demonstrated that socio-economic
problems could be solved through multi-actor collaboration. The development
of the collaborative tradition in Denmark deepened with the gradual institution-
alization of corporatist negotiations between employers and employees in the
private labour market, and between the social partners and government officials
in local and national policy-making. The elaborate system of corporatist negoti-
ation was formed in the 1890s, institutionalized around the First World War, and
further expanded during the 1930s and in the post-war era. It reached its high
point in the 1960s and 1970s, and while the role and impact of tripartite negoti-
ations has declined in the 1980s and 1990s, the role of loosely coupled networks
that bring together a broad range of public and private actors seems to have
increased at all levels of government, not least the local municipalities where
politicians and administrators engage in extensive negotiations with local citizens
and stakeholders (Torfing 2010).
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Corporatist negotiations combined with a stable political alliance between
social democrats and social liberals have played a key role in the expansion of
the universalistic welfare state before and especially after the Second World War.
Denmark has one of the most decentralized welfare states in the world. The
subnational regional authorities are led by democratically elected regional coun-
cils, and are in charge of health, planning, and infrastructure; and the local
municipalities are governed by elected municipal councils and have responsibility
for service delivery, but also for local planning. Together, the regions and the
municipalities spend almost two thirds of total public expenditure and deliver the
lion’s share of tax-financed welfare services to the citizens, although the latter are
based on national legislation and state regulation that define minimum standards.
Originally, devolution was spurred by the central state’s promise to reimburse
local governments that built public schools, public libraries, hospitals, social
institutions, and so on. Today, the local municipalities are financed by a combin-
ation of block grants from the central government and locally collected income
and property taxes.
In terms of urban planning in the metropolitan area, there were a few, lone
attempts to plan urban development when King Christian IV expanded what
today constitutes the inner city of Copenhagen in the first half of the seventeenth
century. Recurrent fires and epidemics decimated the city and its population until
a new growth era began in the second half of the nineteenth century. New
neighbourhoods were built outside the urban fortifications that were later torn
down. In 1856, the first building and construction law was passed in order to
regulate the booming construction sector in Copenhagen. Two years later, the law
was expanded to include construction work outside the city of Copenhagen
(Hansen 2001).
As the population continued to grow at the beginning of the twentieth century,
new land from the areas surrounding Copenhagen to the north, west, and south
was prepared for urban development, and the construction of new neighbour-
hoods followed a carefully designed plan that emerged after an international
architectural competition in 1908–9. This was a major breakthrough for urban
planning in the metropolitan area that by now included several municipalities, of
which the Municipality of Copenhagen was the largest. In 1925, the first national
urban planning law was issued. The new planning law prompted the Municipality
of Copenhagen to expand its administrative planning capacity (Lyager 2004). In
1939, the planning law was supplemented by a new building law that mandated all
the municipalities in the Copenhagen metropolitan area to develop local plans for
appropriate urban development and allowed them to expropriate land without
monetary compensation. As part of the new law, the Ministry of Domestic Affairs
appointed a Planning Commissioner who would discuss local plans with the
municipalities and ultimately approve them. The growing emphasis on urban
planning helped to ensure the construction of new neighbourhoods with proper
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sanitation, adequate transport, and recreational facilities, but it did not prevent a
layered and somewhat chaotic development of housing and industrial production
sites at the outskirts of the new neighbourhoods (Hansen 2001).
In order to plan and regulate land use at the periphery of the new neighbour-
hoods, a new planning law in 1949 required local and regional authorities to
make long-term development plans that distinguished between land zones,
urban zones, and middle zones (Hansen 2001). The construction of new housing
in the land zones was strictly forbidden. The new planning law, which was later
expanded and renewed in the 1960s and 1970s, was an important condition for
the emergence and longevity of the Finger Plan. While the regional authorities
in the metropolitan area did not have the mandate to determine what should
be built, how and where, they were able to use the zoning law to ban housing
construction in certain areas.
The post-war planning endeavours in Copenhagen were driven by a young
generation of architects who had begun to meet in their lunch breaks during the
Second World War, and who longed for the German occupation to end so that a
new era of rational planning could begin. The Danish planning-for-peace-in-
wartime movement drew inspiration from Britain, where ‘planning’ was seen as
a potent tool for reconstructing cities that had been destroyed by German bombs.
This rational and analytical approach to planning was in particular inspired by
Patrick Geddes’ book Survey before Planning (1949). The title soon became a
slogan for the new generation of urban planners (Lyager 2004).
The mandatory development of local urban development plans called for
coordination across the municipalities in the metropolitan region to avoid con-
flicts and create synergies. There was a growing need not only for housing, but also
for train lines, road construction, and recreational areas. In the 1930s, a series of
independent expert committees had worked on housing development, railroad
lines, traffic plans, and the preservation of large stretches of open land. However,
there had been no coordination between the different planning initiatives and no
attempt to assess the implications of one planning initiative for another. Hence,
the call for inter-municipal coordination was complemented by an urgent need for
cross-sectoral coordination of post-war planning efforts.
Social and political actors in the Copenhagen metropolitan region faced a
formidable challenge. The absence of a comprehensive regional plan for an
integrated expansion of housing, transport, and green areas would result in
urban sprawl in fringe landscapes and a chaotic and layered urbanization outside
the inner city. This would create an incoherent amalgamation of housing, busi-
ness, and service functions without access to public transport and green areas.
Urban sprawl onto open land and attractive sites along lakes and coastlines had
been growing throughout the 1920s and 1930s, and could not be stopped by
conservation, since only forests were deemed worthy of this (Vejre et al. 2007). In
the urbanized areas in and around the inner city, there were several examples of
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housing and industry located side by side in congested cityscapes with limited
access to green areas. Planners, administrators, and politicians agreed that these
unintended negative developments had to be stopped by a rational and compre-
hensive plan for the location of housing, business, service functions, transport
lines, and green corridors. A holistic plan was needed that respected and com-
bined all these functionalities while simultaneously facilitating and accommodat-
ing the expected growth of the Danish capital.
The post-war planning goal was accomplished by sticking to the ‘central city
concept’ but letting housing and local service functions develop along five fingers
stretching out from the inner city, which would constitute the palm of the hand.
The fingers would expand along a new subway system (the so-called S-train
system) that would be supplemented by roads running along the borders of the
five fingers. The fingers would be separated by green wedges that provided easy
access to nature and recreation for those living along the urban fingers. The Finger
Plan is illustrated in Figure 12.1.
The Finger Plan turns the potential zero-sum game between rapid urbaniza-
tion, efficient transportation, and nature conservation for recreational purposes
into a plus-sum game by linking the different functionalities in ways that create
synergies rather than mutual externalities. This is done by replacing the traditional
layered expansion of big cities with a radial development where the different
functionalities are placed side by side along the fingers.
Figure 12.1 Illustration of the 1947 Finger Plan
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Two leading planning experts, Steen Eiler Rasmussen and Peter Bredsdorff,
initiated the process that led to the formulation of the Finger Plan. In March
1945—two months before the German occupation ended—they invited a broad
range of interested people to an open meeting in the Danish Urban Planning Lab,
which was a private forum for discussion amongst architects and planners. The
topic of discussion was the need for comprehensive metropolitan planning. Soon
after, the Danish Urban Planning Lab created the Regional Planning Office, an
independent institution that was nonetheless co-financed by the local municipal-
ities, the regional government, and several ministries. In 1947, the Regional
Planning Office published a ‘Sketch of a new plan for the greater Copenhagen
Area’ that came to be known as the Finger Plan (Regional Planning Office 1947).
The sketch was not formally approved by elected officials, but was widely circu-
lated amongst planners, bureaucrats, and politicians. It was crafted by a team of
planners and architects led by Peter Bredsdorff, who also led the formulation and
implementation of a number of local development plans from 1949 onwards, as
well as the new General Plan for the metropolitan area that was adopted in 1952.
While the state financed the local development plans and the City Councils
endorsed them politically, the responsibility for their formulation and implemen-
tation was placed in the hands of the original team behind the Finger Plan (Lyager
2004). The new General Plan from 1952 was mainly an operationalization of the
principles laid down in the Finger Plan in and through a series of local develop-
ment plans that were assembled and mutually integrated.
Although elected governments at the local, regional, and national levels sup-
ported the development of the Finger Plan and formally approved the General
Plan that governed its implementation, the Finger Plan was created through a
bottom-up initiative by professional planners who enjoyed a high degree of
autonomy. Drawing on recently developed theories of governance (Jessop 2002;
Kooiman 2003; Sørensen and Torfing 2009), we can say that the involved gov-
ernment agencies played the role of a meta-governor that framed, supported,
financed, and endorsed a networked governance process that took place outside
the formal institutions of government, although it included a broad range of
government actors.
Policy Design, Political Decision-Making, and Initial
Implementation
The Finger Plan built on the assumption that growth in business and housing was
inevitable and impossible to stop (Regional Planning Office 1947). The plan had
to allow for continued population growth, but the growing number of people had
to be directed to the west and south-west in order to protect the north that was
already relatively developed at the time. It also built on an early recognition of
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the need for fast and effective transport combining trains and cars, and for easy
access to green recreational areas. The latter was already clearly stated in a 1936
inter-municipal white paper on the protection of green areas (Forchhammer
1936). As explained earlier, the challenge was to avoid incremental, unplanned
urbanization where housing, business, and small pockets of nature were mixed
up in a messy structure that prevented the development of an efficient public
transport system. Fortunately, the planners had a keen eye for balancing urban
areas with non-urban green areas, and for separating the two from each other
while ensuring mutual proximity. As one of the chief planners argued: ‘The
most important thing in urban planning is to identify the areas that should not
be urbanized’ (Andersen 2001: 5).
Retrospectively, we can say that the Finger Plan builds on two simple design
principles. The first principle is ‘station proximity’, which basically establishes that
housing, business, and service functions should cluster in centres placed along
radial railroad lines and roads, constituting the joints in the fingers. The second
principle is ‘green wedges’, which establishes that the urban fingers should be
separated by green areas in which no building or construction is permitted.
The simplicity of the Finger Plan’s design was one of its major strengths. The
two design principles were combined and condensed in the finger metaphor. The
image of a hand with the palm resting on the compact inner city and the fingers
spread out in different directions, indicating future urban developments, graced
the cover of the original Finger Plan document from 1947, and has since been
reproduced in an infinite number of planning documents. The Finger metaphor
was simple, easy to communicate to policy actors and the general public, and
captured the essence of the new plan in terms of the radial development of
housing and transport separated by green areas. People understood it, liked it,
and remembered it. The Finger Plan soon became a popular icon. People only
needed to take a quick look at the map of the S-train system to be reminded of the
Finger Plan that governed the rapid urbanization in Copenhagen. The finger
metaphor communicated and travelled well. Today, it provides a well-known
reference point in international planning debates (Hall 1989; Ravesteyn et al.
2005; Vejre et al. 2007).
When it was formulated at the end of the Second World War, the Finger Plan
was visionary, bold, and highly ambitious in its insistence on a rational and
comprehensive approach to planning. It would never have taken off if it had not
gained early support from a political coalition of planning experts, local and
regional governments, and several ministries. Motives for entering into this
broad political alliance differed. Planners were driven by professional concerns
for rational and comprehensive planning based on thorough quantitative and
qualitative analysis. The twenty-five to thirty municipalities in the greater Copen-
hagen area clearly recognized the need to coordinate their local planning efforts,
and the regional government was keen to develop a comprehensive plan for the
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rapid urbanization that was expected in the post-war era following the baby boom
after the Second World War and the optimistic embrace of the newly won peace.
The Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Social Affairs were desperate to
initiate public construction work in order to reduce mounting unemployment.
They knew that investments in housing development and transport infrastructure
would please the building and construction sector, including the strong trade
unions (Jensen 1990).
Back in the late 1940s and 1950s, there were no systematic attempts to involve
local citizens in public planning. However, it is easy to imagine that Copenha-
geners were keen to move out of the dark and congested inner city and perhaps
buy a one-family house in one of the new neighbourhoods that were nicely
situated close to public transport, service functions, and green areas. In the
local government election in 1946, the Communist Party, which had formed
the backbone of the Danish resistance movement, did very well and captured
20 per cent of seats in the Copenhagen City Council. The communists secured
the mayoralty for planning and development, and the new mayor immediately
called for a general urban development plan and supported the idea of devel-
oping a larger regional urbanization plan (Theisen 2001). Political support for
the Finger Plan was secured.
As already mentioned, everything started with a new generation of planners
who met over lunch to discuss their grand planning ideas. In order to muster
support from administrators and politicians from local, regional, and national
government, the planners wrote pamphlets and newspaper articles and gave
public presentations on planning issues wherever they were invited to speak, not
least at the so-called ‘office meetings’ at the city hall where there was a lively debate
over the prospects for urban planning in the metropolitan region (Lyager 2004).
The Urban Planning Lab took the initiative to form the Regional Planning Office
that became the vehicle for the formulation of the Finger Plan. Seven planners and
five technical drafters were attached to the Regional Planning Office that was
headed by Peter Bredsdorff, who was a visionary and hard-working leader who
taught at the Academy of Arts and ran a small planning consultancy firm when he
was not working on the Finger Plan (Jensen 1990).
An Advisory Board comprising more than fifty people from local munici-
palities, regional government, national ministries, interest organizations, and
civil society organizations such as social housing associations and the national
sports federation, oversaw the work of the planners. Annual meetings provided
detailed information about the evolving Finger Plan but did not allow for much
debate. They mainly served the purpose of disseminating information to the
hinterland of the board members and building support for new ideas and
proposals (Jensen 1990).
The plenary assembly of the Advisory Board formed a smaller Work Commit-
tee consisting of administrative leaders from municipalities, the capital region,
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and the state, and a handful of independent experts from the planning, building,
and transport sectors. The Work Committee met twice a month and was the focus
of intense political debate. Professional, economic, and political interests clashed,
and it is reported that Steen Eiler Rasmussen and Peter Bredsdorff had to use all
their diplomatic skills to settle disputes and muster support for the emerging
Finger Plan (Jensen 1990). Apparently, the only major defeat they suffered was
that the Work Committee refused to ratify the Finger Plan document. This
problem was soon turned into an advantage since the final document could now
be written in a clear and straightforward manner without too many compromises
and with a pointed and stirring foreword by Peter Bredsdorff.
The Finger Plan was further specified and operationalized in the General Plan
from 1954 that provided the templates for its implementation. The General
Plan was later superseded by the ‘Principal sketch of a regional plan’ from 1960
that estimated an increasing growth rate and put further emphasis on the devel-
opment of the fingers towards the south and the south-west.
The Finger Plan was designed by architects and planners and then successfully
sold to a broad range of stakeholders, including local and regional authorities that
were responsible for its implementation, and to the ministries of labour, social
affairs, and transport that monitored and financed its implementation. The nested
planning structure involving close interaction between local, regional, and state
planning continued in the subsequent decades in which the Finger Plan was
implemented and adapted. The local municipalities were responsible for develop-
ing local plans based on local hearings. At the regional level, the Regional Planning
Committee (1967–74), the Capital Council (1974–89), and the Capital Develop-
ment Council (2000–6) had overall planning responsibility in the metropolitan
area and maintained close relations with key for-profit and non-profit stake-
holders that were involved in a large number of public committees. With the
municipal amalgamation reform in 2007, regional planning responsibility was
split between the local municipalities and the state. The Ministry of Social Affairs
and the Ministry of Labour had ceased to play a role in the planning process since
urban planning was no longer seen as a tool for boosting employment in the
building and construction sector. The Ministry of Domestic Affairs that regulated
the municipal sector had also lost influence to the new Ministry of the Environ-
ment that became the chief planning agency as planning was increasingly con-
nected with environmental issues. As such, the most recent versions of the Finger
Plan were formulated by the Ministry of the Environment.
The decisive step in the implementation of the Finger Plan was the construction
of the five S-train lines around which the new housing and the related business
and service functions would cluster and form small urban centres like the joints
on a finger. There were already two S-train lines, so another three lines had to be
built to complete the transport radials stretching out from the palm of the hand
that comprised a dense urban area with surface traffic running in all directions
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and a ring road that connected the industrial areas at the roots of the fingers.
The construction of the S-train lines was carried out by the state-owned railway
company, DSB, that would further extend the S-train lines when new housing
areas were constructed at the tips of each finger. There were many discussions
about the placement of new train lines and roads. Decisions were taken based on
careful analysis of localities. Train stations were located so that local residents
would have no more than fifteen minutes’ walk to the nearest S-train.
When the S-train lines were first built and the new zoning law had
banned housing in the green wedges, the development of new housing and service
functions along the fingers almost took care of itself. Private investors constructed
new neighbourhoods based on local plans developed by the municipalities. All in
all, the implementation was relatively successful inasmuch as urbanization devel-
oped along the city fingers and the green wedges were protected from urban
sprawl (Primdahl et al. 2006). However, one of the green wedges to the north-west
came under heavy pressure from urbanization. It was repeatedly eroded due to
uncoordinated municipal planning, and the remaining green space was only
narrowly rescued when the four local municipalities came together and made a
joint agreement to preserve it (Vejre et al. 2007). While for the most part the size
of the green wedges has been protected, the Finger Plan has been unable to prevent
agricultural landscapes from being transformed from production to consumption
landscapes. As such, hobby farmers and sports grounds have replaced full-time
farmers and farmland. However, from the point of view of the residents, this might
appear to be a positive development.
Absorbing Change: Adapting the Finger Plan
While the initial implementation of the Finger Plan was relatively frictionless, new
demands started to emerge only a few years after the General Plan had begun to be
implemented. Already in 1958, it was clear to everybody that both economic and
population growth exceeded the predictions in the Finger Plan, which had been
made during a downswing after the economic crisis in the 1930s and the war in
the 1940s. At the end of the 1950s, a growing number of planners claimed that the
Finger Plan had outlived itself and should be abandoned (Larsen 2004).
A new state-sponsored regional ‘Principle Plan’ from 1960 abandoned the
Finger Plan altogether and proposed new housing developments and trade centres
along a new high-speed railroad towards the south-west that would eventually
open Copenhagen up towards the rest of the country (Larsen 2004). The Muni-
cipality of Copenhagen rejected this plan entirely because it would stimulate
growth outside the Copenhagen metropolitan area. Soon after, it announced its
own plan which proposed a combination of longer fingers with new joints,
massive urbanization of the island of Amager situated south of the city centre,
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and the construction of large shopping malls and housing complexes at the roots
of the fingers.
The construction of large shopping centres and housing complexes along the
freight train line connecting the roots of the fingers was opposed by the local
municipalities and residents outside the city centre, who feared that new buildings
and roads would diminish the green areas and create further traffic congestion.
A lot of negotiations took place back and forth between the municipalities and the
regional authorities, and in the end a compromise was reached to build a new
urban centre outside Copenhagen in Høje Tåstrup on the railroad line to Roskilde,
towards the south-west. There was much more space out there, and a new urban
centre would alleviate the pressure on Copenhagen while still being located in one
of the fingers. The plan was executed with considerable delay, but Høje Tåstrup
never became a vibrant urban centre.
The idea of a massive expansion of housing on the island of Amager was
promising. An architectural competition was held in 1965, and the winners
provided detailed plans for the urbanization of Amager. The only problem was
that the new plans required that Copenhagen Airport would have to be moved to a
new place, preferably to the unpopulated island of Saltholm next to Amager.
Preparing this small island for building and construction, and digging a tunnel to
the new airport, would have been extremely costly, however, and the plans for the
new neighbourhoods and airport removal were soon abandoned.
In the end, it was the economic crisis from the mid-1970s onwards that put an
end to the dreams of massive housing expansion on Amager and the construction
of large shopping malls and housing complexes along the freight train line.
Denmark entered a long period of stagflation that put pressure on public finances
and lowered demand for new housing. In addition, there was a growing concern
for the uneven development of Denmark, with too much emphasis on stimulating
growth in the capital region. This new discourse halted the plans for the con-
struction of new highways in and around Copenhagen (Elle 2004). From now on,
new highways were to be built in the western part of Denmark rather than in the
metropolitan region to the east.
So, what remained of the new municipal plan was really an extension of the
Finger Plan with longer fingers in each direction. New, and perhaps thicker, joints
would be added along the southern finger to Køge and the south-western finger
towards Roskilde. A new finger along the northern coast line to all the rich
residential neighbourhoods was also added by extending the old S-train connec-
tion to Klampenborg. The train line was carried through to Elsinore, and new
neighbourhoods expanded in Kokkedal and Humlebæk. The new northern finger
figures prominently in recent representations of the Finger Plan model (Ministry
of the Environment 2007: 17, 2013: 5). In some of these representations, one of the
original fingers is depicted as a half finger, reflecting the fact that it was never
extended as far as was originally planned (Ministry of the Environment 2007: 15,
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2013: 2). Hence, fingers are modular and consist of sub-modules. They can be
extended and shortened, and new fingers can be added. The urban fingers and
their joints are highly flexible and scalable.
The 1980s saw a growing focus on urban regeneration in the inner city and
in the adjacent bridge areas that had received scant attention from advocates of
the Finger Plan, who were more concerned with the fingers than the palm of the
hand. Bulldozer tactics were applied in some neighbourhoods, leading to popular
and political protests and occasionally to uprisings. Alternative strategies focusing
on renovation of existing buildings and the creation of green inner courtyards
spurred gentrification as the original tenants could not afford to live in the
renovated flats. Finally, the old industries along the harbour front closed down
or moved out of town, and the harbour front area was gradually redeveloped with
new and expensive housing and new corporate domiciles and office buildings
(Mikkelsen 2004).
The return to the Finger Plan after the frontal attack in 1960 that was ultimately
defeated by the economic crisis in the 1970s was further cemented by the new
regional plan from 1989 that brought back the principles of the original Finger
Plan while simultaneously emphasizing the need to connect the fingers with each
other (Capital Council 1989). The next twenty years saw the construction of new
large ring roads, speedy bus lines, and metro systems that cut across and con-
nected the fingers at various points so that people did not have to return all the
way into the city centre before they could connect with another finger towards
their destination. However, linking the fingers through the creation of cross-
cutting transport systems only confirmed the existence of the fingers, and there
continues to be a total ban on all forms of urban development in the green wedges.
Today, further urbanization in the palm of the hand is no longer possible, and
only minor and carefully balanced urbanization is permitted along the fingers as
long as it respects the principle of proximity to a train station (Ministry of the
Environment 2007). S-train stations that are connected by cross-cutting lines of
transportation have been given a new status as ‘hub stations’ around which
particular service and business functions are expected to emerge and cluster
(Ministry of the Environment 2013, 2017).
A new theme in regional planning is the creation and maintenance of
transport corridors on Zealand, where Copenhagen takes up the easternmost
region. According to a new state-sponsored plan (Ministry of the Environment
2017), the municipalities in Zealand are required to make a long-term reserva-
tion of land to enable future transport and technical infrastructure along two
corridors, one stretching from north to south Zealand, and another traversing
the island from east to west. If the Danish planning regime had been weak and
had allowed the development of urban sprawl, the creation of these two trans-
port corridors would have been impossible or would have required numerous
expropriations.
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Seventy years after the launch of the original Finger Plan, the regional plans
from 2005, 2007, 2013, and 2017 all feature ‘Finger Plan’ in their titles. In addition,
the ‘2007 Finger Plan’ talks about the Finger Plan as a celebrated cultural heritage
artefact that will exert a strong influence on future planning. The Finger Plan is as
influential as ever before, not least because it has been rearticulated as a key
parameter in the global knowledge economy. Originally the Finger Plan was seen
as a planning response to local challenges such as urban sprawl and soaring
unemployment. Now, it is seen as a major asset in global competition in which
the quality of the urban environment is a key parameter in the effort to attract
highly qualified people and innovative businesses (Ministry of the Environment
2007: 8–12).
A recent report invites citizens and stakeholders to debate the future develop-
ment of the capital of Copenhagen (Danish Urban Planning Lab 2017). The
opening sentence declares that: ‘The Finger Plan is central for the development
of the capital region’. The report goes on to list a number of challenges such as lack
of affordable housing, the need for enhanced mobility for skilled labourers,
demand for a liveable urban environment around the S-train stations, and the
need to protect biodiversity and secure access to green areas. While all of these
challenges call for new initiatives, they are all thought to be achievable within the
overall framework provided by the Finger Plan.
Why the Finger Plan Was Successful
The Finger Plan was formulated through an effective combination of planning
expertise and inclusive deliberation with stakeholders. It was implemented in an
almost frictionless way, it succeeded in avoiding urban sprawl and incoherent
urban layering, and it improved the living conditions of thousands of Copenha-
geners. A self-reinforcing feedback loop between the positive developments on the
ground and the political support for its core ideas secured the longevity of the
Finger Plan, which was gradually adapted to growth and new demands. In an
attempt to explain the multidimensional success of the Finger Plan, we will first
recapitulate the contextual factors that helped facilitate the successful formulation
and implementation of the Finger Plan, before looking at the inherent qualities
that contributed to its successful consolidation and adaptation.
Based on the analysis presented earlier, it is possible to identify a number of
contextual factors that were conducive to the conception and execution of the
Finger Plan and which help to explain its success. The first factor has to do with
the timing of the Finger Plan, which could not have been better. The imminent
end of the German occupation generated a huge enthusiasm for planning in
the new era of peace and prosperity which seemed to be just around the corner.
The negative, oppressive irrationality of the SecondWorld War was to be replaced
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by a positive, rational, and potentially liberating planning future. A window of
opportunity was opening (Kingdon 1984) and the moment was seized by a
dedicated group of architects and planners.
The second conducive factor was the high degree of professional autonomy
within the Danish welfare state, which allowed a new generation of skilled and
visionary planners to initiate the planning process, formulate an ambitious and
comprehensive plan, and slowly generate political support for their bold ideas.
Trust in the expertise of public sector professionals and their professional organ-
izations, and willingness to listen to and discuss their public value proposals,
certainly helped to get the Finger Plan off the ground.
The third factor spurring the development of the Finger Plan was the availabil-
ity of positive planning experiences from other countries that the planners
could translate to the local Danish environment. Inspiration for this exercise in
holistic planning and its careful analysis of empirical trends and contexts
came from England. The Finger Plan was greatly influenced by the planet-city
model that governed the expansion of the London metropolitan area. However,
foreign influences were adapted to the local geography so that the planet-city
model with its 360-degree span became a ‘finger-city’ model with only a 180+
degree span.
The fourth and final factor was the pre-existing recognition of the need to
preserve a number of green recreational areas, either through conservation or
through the introduction of zoning laws. This recognition added a new and
important item to the planning agenda that the Finger Plan could build on.
Indeed, ideas about easy access to green areas resonated well with the hygienic
welfare state discourse that called for ‘light, air and cleanliness’ (Schmidt and
Kristensen 1986). Ideally, citizens should live in light-filled housing, breathe fresh
air and live healthy, happy lives in well-planned suburbs. The Finger Plan clearly
inscribed itself within this discourse.
The success of the Finger Plan cannot be explained merely by reference to these
conducive contextual factors, however. We would therefore like to point out some
of the inherent qualities of the Finger Plan that played a decisive role in producing
and consolidating its supportive political constituency and adapting it to new
developments while sticking to its core ideas.
First of all, the Finger Plan built on a simple programme theory that was easy to
implement and generated the desired results. Urbanization should be directed
away from the inner city and along a number of fingers separated by green wedges.
Housing and local service functions should cluster around the stations on new
train lines that would provide fast and efficient transport to workplaces at the
roots of the fingers and in the inner city. Keeping the fingers thin would provide
easy access to green areas for all the local citizens, thus enhancing their quality of
life. Building the train lines and the supporting infrastructure in terms of radial
roads at the borders of the fingers proved to be relatively unproblematic, and the
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pressure on the green wedges was minimal due to the use of conservation and
zoning laws that provided legal support for the Finger Plan.
Second, the simplicity of the Finger Plan allowed it to be captured by a single
metaphor that provided an immediate and intuitive understanding of its content.
The finger metaphor helped to popularize the otherwise technical and complex
plan for the future urbanization of Copenhagen. The Finger Plan became a
cultural icon with widespread popular support. The strong image of the palm of
the hand resting on the inner city and the fingers spreading out in different
directions constituted a ‘boundary object’ (Star 2010) that all the relevant and
affected actors could contemplate and relate to, no matter where they came from.
This helped to foster a joint policy dialogue among a plethora of public and private
actors about the location, length, and thickness of the urban fingers, the prospects
for further expansion at the tips of the fingers, the need to regenerate housing and
business districts in the palm of the hand, and the future use of the land beyond
the reach of the fingers. The finger metaphor is subject to flexible interpretations
as the fingers are extended or shortened and new fingers are added.
This last observation brings us to the third and most important quality of the
Finger Plan, that is, its robustness. Drawing on recent discussions of robust policy
solutions (Ferraro et al. 2015; Haasnoot et al. 2013), we may say that urban
planning is robust when it succeeds in turning problems, conflicts, and demands
into design assets while simultaneously using modularity to enhance the future
adaptability and polyvalence of the designed solutions. Robust planning is needed
in the face of uncertainty arising from turbulence ‘where events, demands, and
support interact and change in highly variable, inconsistent, unexpected and
unpredictable ways’ (Ansell and Trondal 2018: 44–5). Planning contexts are
turbulent and planning strategies aiming for a high degree of robustness by
embracing the challenges and securing future adaptability provide an attractive
response to turbulence. While ‘protective’ strategies aim to avoid turbulence or
mitigate its effects by creating buffers, ‘resilience’ strategies aim to restore the
previous equilibrium state by enhancing local capacity to bounce back when
exposed to disruptive forms of turbulence. In addition, ‘robustness’ strategies
seek to engage with turbulence in a proactive way by creating a dynamic equilib-
rium that allows disruptive change to unfold within an adaptive system that is
capable of providing flexible responses to future challenges.
Robustness is a quality of policy solutions that helps to explain their success
in the long term. Policy-makers may succeed in generating popular and political
support for a new plan or policy solution that solves a pressing problem, but
its long-term success depends on its robustness. Let us look at two defining
elements of policy robustness in relation to the Finger Plan and see how they
help to explain its longevity. The first element concerns the ability of a public
policy to embrace turbulence by turning problems, conflicts, and demands into
design assets (Ferraro et al. 2015). The Finger Plan does that in several ways.
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Confronted with the rivalry between the local, regional, and national planning
authorities, and the lack of inter-municipal coordination, the Finger Plan gives
each of the planning authorities an important role in the comprehensive plan-
ning system. The state monitors and helps to finance the planning activities; the
regional authority coordinates between the municipalities traversed by the
fingers; and the municipalities focus on their own local planning efforts, such
as developing residential neighbourhoods and urban clusters around the S-train
stations. Everybody gets a say in the process and a piece of the cake. Moreover,
confronted with the conflict-generating zero-sum game between urbanization
and open land, the Finger Plan aims to turn the relationship between housing
development and the conservation of green areas into a positive-sum game.
It does so by insisting that easy access to recreational areas is key to ensuring the
quality of life of residents in the new urban fingers. Housing and green areas
form part of a higher level dialectical synthesis. Finally, confronted with the
paradox between the political preference for public transport and the inevitable
growth in private cars, the new train lines are supplemented with parallel roads
that can lead car traffic towards the inner city. This is no ‘either/or’ solution, but
rather caters for both scenarios.
The second element of robustness is the use of a modular design (Heaton
et al. 2013) to adapt a public policy to future turbulence and to rearticulate its
different elements within changing political frameworks that bring forth new
goals and aspirations. We have already seen how the fingers constitute modules
with sub-modular joints that can be extended, cut off, and multiplied in a highly
flexible manner in response to changing demands. The modules can also be
connected in new ways, for example through the construction of cross-cutting
lines of transportation. As such, modularity helps to keep future options open,
which is a key aspect of robustness (Padgett and Ansell 1993). Moreover, as time
passes, the original concern for economic growth, housing development, and
full employment becomes less and less important, while the environmental
concern for preserving open land and living close to S-train stations, and thus
being able to use public transport, increases. However, this is not the whole
story since the most recent development rearticulates the Finger Plan as an
important factor in attracting new businesses and smart people in the global
knowledge economy. As such, the Finger Plan appears to be polyvalent in the
sense that its different elements can be rearticulated and connected to different
political projects and visions.
To further justify the claim that robustness is important for the success of the
Finger Plan, let us look at a quote from one of the recent Finger Plans published by
the Ministry of the Environment:
The urban finger structure appears to be a highly robust structure that has
informed urban development in the metropolitan area since the first Finger
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 25/7/2019, SPi
   ‘ ’ 237
Plan emerged in 1947. It has created a remarkable connection between the
general functions of the city and the transport infrastructure and created a
cohesive recreational landscape that stretches well into the densely populated
urban areas. It has been able to adapt itself to changing magnitudes of growth
and to the significant changes in business, technology, prosperity and life forms
that we have encountered since the middle of the previous century.
(Ministry of the Environment 2007: 12; our translation)
This quotation clearly ties robustness both to the ability to unify the concern for
housing expansion and the preservation of green spaces, and to the ability to adapt
to quantitative and qualitative change.
The successful design, metaphorical branding, and modular adaptability of
the Finger Plan is first and foremost the result of efforts by dedicated, visionary,
and skilful planners. However, the planners would not have been able to
mobilize the necessary support for their planning ideas or to secure public
responsibility for their implementation and adaptation had it not been for the
early emergence and continued expansion of an elaborate system of collabora-
tive governance that constitutes the last of four inherent qualities of the suc-
cessful Finger Plan. From the very beginning, the architects and planners were
conscious of the risks of being insulated from the political and administrative
decision-makers, and they worked hard to communicate their ideas to the
different actors in the ‘authorizing environment’ (Moore 1995), which included
executive administrators, elected politicians, socio-economic interest organiza-
tions, and the general public. The bottom-up urban planning initiative had to be
firmly anchored both in a horizontal network of relevant and affected actors
from the state, economy, and civil society, and in a multi-level governance
system in which local, regional, and national authorities had to agree on the
overall strategy and division of labour.
The traditional system of top-down government gave way to a system of
collaborative governance (Ansell and Gash 2008; Emerson et al. 2012) that com-
bined professional planning expertise (craft work) with political strategizing and
popular support (political work). While the planners can be credited with taking
the initiative for the formation of this collaborative multi-level governance system
(Bache and Flinders 2004), the formal institutions of government gradually took
control over the planning process in the Copenhagen metropolitan area. They
played the role both of participants in networked negotiations and of meta-
governors that gave direction to the process and sought to align the different
actors. The planners became a core part of the formal government institutions. In
the process they lost some of their independent and autonomous status, although
the Danish Urban Planning Lab continues to exist and still orchestrates important
planning discussions.
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Learning from the Copenhagen Experience
Policy-makers who manage policy programmes that are not delivering the desired
results tend to look elsewhere to see if they can find inspiration for new and better
solutions. According to Rose (1991), they engage in lesson drawing, which
involves: (1) searching in time and space for promising alternative policy pro-
grammes; (2) abstracting the underlying cause-and-effect model in what is
observed; (3) creating a lesson or new programme for action; and (4) estimating
the consequences of adopting the lesson. There are limits to this kind of lesson
drawing. As Kingdon (1984) points out, policy success often rests on a good deal
of luck and the ability to exploit the timing of different events and favourable
opportunities in the environment. Moreover, successful policy programmes may
be difficult to reproduce in a new context with a different and perhaps less
favourable set of conditions (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996). The contextual con-
straints are particularly clear in the field of planning where it is extremely difficult,
and often impossible, to switch to a new urban master plan once the basic
infrastructure and neighbourhoods are established. However, planners respon-
sible for developing a new urban area may draw inspiration from successful policy
cases and engage in lesson drawing.
It would not take long for an urban planner or policy adviser to identify the
Finger Plan as a highly successful case of public planning in the face of rapid
urbanization. The question then becomes: What lessons can other prospective
planners draw from the Finger Plan? By way of conclusion, we will advance three
propositions that draw key lessons from the Finger Plan.
The first proposition is that the Finger Plan built on a match between socio-
economic challenges and local translation of inspiration from other countries,
while at the same time exploiting contingent events such as the optimistic post-
war sentiment to generate a breakthrough for comprehensive planning. This
proposition is based on the analysis of the contextual factors. It confirms Pollitt
and Bouckaert’s model for public governance reform that aims to balance rational
attempts to fit problems and solutions to each other while insisting on the
importance of less rational events that open a window of opportunity (Pollitt
and Bouckaert 2004).
The second proposition is that the robustness of the Finger Plan, which pertains
both to its ability to turn problems into opportunities and to its future adaptability
and polyvalence vis-à-vis new demands, developments, and political visions,
explains its longevity. In the case of the Finger Plan, adaptability is ensured
through modularity that enables flexible expansion that adds to the size and
complexity of the comprehensive planning system, but without compromising
its basic principles.
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The third proposition is that support for the well-crafted and robust Finger
Plan was ensured by the development of a system of collaborative governance that
combined horizontal relations and vertical connections. Multi-actor collaboration
enabled the visionary planners to sell their new and bold ideas to executive
administrators and elected politicians, and to anchor the implementation and
future adjustment of the Finger Plan in public authorities that had the money
and organizational capacity to make things happen. The collaborative system
of governance created a productive interface between craft work and political
work. Professional insights merged with political brokerage, communication, and
resource mobilization. The finger metaphor helps to create a boundary object that
all the different actors, including the general public, could relate to and discuss.
Successful public governance is often measured in terms of its cost efficiency
and its capacity for effective problem-solving. This chapter adds a new and
interesting evaluation criterion in terms of policy robustness. Although robustness
features prominently in a handful of social science contributions (Hood 1991;
Leifer 1991; Marshall 2008; Schoon 2008; Capano and Woo 2017), we need more
research on how public governance in general and planning in particular can
provide robust solutions in the face of turbulence, and how modularity may help
to enhance future adaptability and polyvalence. Concept building must be fol-
lowed by comparative case studies that allow us to understand the different forms
and aspects of robustness, and the role that modularity and other flexibility
enhancing mechanisms play in securing robustness.
References
Andersen, K. 2001. Ældre Byplanlæggere 1954–2000 (Copenhagen: Byplanhistorisk
Udvalg).
Andersen, L. B., C. Greve, K. K. Lausen, and J. Torfing. 2017. Offentlige Styringspar-
adigmer: Konkurrence og Sameksistens (Copenhagen: DJØF Publishers).
Additional version of this case
The case study outlined in this chapter is accompanied by a corresponding case
study from the Centre for Public Impact’s (CPI) Public Impact Observatory—
an international repository of public policies assessed for their impact using
CPI’s Public Impact Fundamentals framework. CPI’s framework provides a
way for those who work in or with government to assess public policies, to
understand why they were successful, so key lessons can be drawn out for
future policy work. The case can be easily located in the CPI repository at www.
centreforpublicimpact.org/observatory.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 25/7/2019, SPi
240   
Ansell, C. and A. Gash. 2008. ‘Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice’.
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 18(4), 543–71.
Ansell, C. and J. Trondal. 2018. ‘Governing Turbulence: An Organizational-
Institutional Agenda’. Perspectives on Public Management and Governance 1(1),
43–57.
Bache, I. and M. Flinders (eds). 2004. Multi-Level Governance (Oxford: Oxford
University Press).
Capano, G. and J. J. Woo. 2017. ‘Resilience and Robustness in Policy Design’. Policy
Sciences 50(3), 399–426.
Capital Council. 1989. Regionplan (Copenhagen: Capital Council).
Christiansen, P. M. and A.S. Nørgaard. 2003. Faste Forhold-Flygtige Forbindelser: Stat
og Interesseorganisationer i Danmark i det 20. Århundrede (Copenhagen: DJØF
Publishers).
Danish Urban Planning Lab. 2017. Hovedstaden 2030 (Copenhagen: Danish Urban
Planning Lab).
David, P. A. 1985. ‘Clio and the Economics of QWERTY’. American Economic Review
75(2), 332–37.
Dolowitz, D. and D. Marsh. 1996. ‘Who Learns What from Whom: A Review of the
Policy Transfer Literature’. Political Studies 44(2), 343–57.
Downs, A. 1998. ‘How America’s Cities are Growing: The Big Picture’. Brookings
Review 16(4), 8–12.
Elle, S. 2004. ‘Trafikplanlægningen I København 1954–2004’. In S. B. Jensen, J. Harvest,
and M. Briiel (eds). Københavns Skitse til en Generalplan 1954 (Copenhagen:
Byplanhistorisk Udvalg), pp. 33–8.
Emerson, K., T. Nabatchi, and S. Balogh. 2012. ‘An Integrative Framework for
Collaborative Governance’. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
22(1), 1–29.
Ferraro, F., D. Etzion, and J. Gehman. 2015. ‘Tackling Grand Challenges Pragmatic-
ally: Robust Action Revisited’. Organizational Studies 36(3), 363–90.
Forchhammer, O. 1936.Københavnsegnens GrønneOmråder (Copenhagen: Gyldendal).
Geddes, P. 1949. Cities in Evolution (London: Williams and Norgate).
Haasnoot, M., J. H. Kwakkel, W. E. Walker, and J. Maat. 2013. ‘Dynamic Adaptive
Policy Pathways: A Method for Crafting Robust Decisions for a Deeply Uncertain
World’. Global Environmental Change 23(2), 485–98.
Hajer, M. A. and H. Wagenaar (eds). 2003. Deliberative Policy Analysis: Understanding
Governance in the Network Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Hall, P. 1980. Great Planning Disasters (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson).
Hall, P. 1989. Urban and Regional Planning (London: Unwin Hyman).
Hansen, E. 2001. ‘Byplanlovene’. In K. Andersen (ed.),Ældre Byplanlæggere 1954–2000
(Copenhagen: Byplanhistorisk Udvalg), pp. 9–20.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 25/7/2019, SPi
   ‘ ’ 241
Heaton, L., F. Millerand, D. Delon, F. Schmitt, L. Marseault, and J. Deschamps. 2013.
‘Encouraging Open Community Innovation: Outils-Réseaux’s Modular Approach’.
In J. Lundström, M. Wiberg, S. Hrastinski, M. Edenius, and P. Ågerfalk (eds),
Managing Open Innovation Technologies (Berlin: Springer), pp. 93–106.
Hood, C. 1991. ‘A Public Management for all Seasons?’ Public Administration 69(1),
3–19.
Innes, J. E. and D. E. Booher. 2003. ‘Collaborative Policymaking: Governance
through Dialogue’. In M. Hajer and H. Wagenaar (eds), Deliberative Policy Analysis
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 33–59.
Innes, J. E. and D. E. Booher. 2010. Planning with Complexity (London: Routledge).
Jensen, S. A. 1990. Fingerplanen (Copenhagen: Byplanhistorisk Udvalg).
Jessop, R. D. 2002. The Future of the Capitalist State (London: Polity Press).
Johnson, M. P. 2001. ‘Environmental Impacts of Urban Sprawl’. Environment and
Planning 33(4), 717–35.
Kingdon, J. W. 1984. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (Boston: Little, Brown).
Kooiman, J. 2003. Governing as Governance (London: Sage).
Larsen, L. 2004. ‘Fingerplanen’. In S. Jensen, J. Harvest, and M. Briiel (eds),
Københavns Skitse til en Generalplan 1954 (Copenhagen: Byplanhistorisk Udvalg),
pp. 29–32.
Leifer, E. M. 1991. Robust Action (New York: Garland).
Lyager, P. 2004. ‘Generalplansforudsætninger’. In S. Jensen, J. Harvest, and M. Briiel
(eds), Københavns Skitse til en Generalplan 1954 (Copenhagen: Byplanhistorisk
Udvalg), pp. 5–16.
Marshall, G. 2008. ‘Nesting, Subsidiarity, and Community-Based Environmental Gov-
ernance Beyond the Local Scale’. International Journal of the Commons 2(1), 75–97.
Mikkelsen, J. K. 2004. ‘Hvor Langt Holdt Generalplanskitsen?’ In S. Jensen, J. Harvest,
and M. Briiel (eds), Københavns Skitse til en Generalplan 1954 (Copenhagen:
Byplanhistorisk Udvalg), pp. 33–8.
Ministry of the Environment. 2007. Fingerplan 2007 (Copenhagen: Ministry of the
Environment).
Ministry of the Environment. 2013. Fingerplan 2013 (Copenhagen: Ministry of the
Environment).
Ministry of the Environment. 2017. Fingerplan 2017 (Copenhagen: Ministry of the
Environment).
Ministry of the Environment. 2018. Fingerplan 2018 (Copenhagen: Ministry of the
Environment).
Moore, M. H. 1995. Creating Public Value: Strategic Management in Government
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
Nechyba, T. J. and R. P. Walsh. 2004. ‘Urban Sprawl’. Journal of Economic Perspectives
18(4): 177–200.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 25/7/2019, SPi
242   
Padgett, J. F. and C. K. Ansell. 1993. ‘Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici,
1400–1434’. American Journal of Sociology 98(6), 1259–1319.
Pierson, P. 1995. Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher and the Politics of
Retrenchment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Pierson, P. 2000. ‘Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics’.
American Political Science Review 94(2), 251–67.
Pollitt, C. and G. Bouckaert. 2004. Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis
(Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Primdahl, J., A. G. Busck, and C. Lindemann. 2006. Bynære Landbrugsområder i
Hovedstadsregionen 2004: Udvikling i Landbrug, Landskab og Bebyggelse
1984–2004 (Copenhagen: Center for Skov, Landskab og Planlægning).
Ravesteyn, N. V., W. Hornis, F. Verwest, and H. Thorborg. 2005. Het Gras bij de
Buren. De Rol van Planning bij de Bescherming van Groene Gebieden in Denemarken
en Engeland (Rotterdam: NAI Publishers).
Regional Planning Office. 1947. Skitseforslag til Egnsplan for Storkøbenhavn
(Copenhagen: Regional Planning Office).
Rørbech, J. 2011. Fingerplanen og Transportkorridorerne. https://erhvervsstyrelsen.dk/
sites/default/files/EndeligRrbechNotatomFingerplanogtransportkorridore.pdf.
Rose, R. 1991. ‘What is Lesson-Drawing?’ Journal of Public Policy 11(1), 3–30.
Schmidt, L. H. and J. E. Kristensen. 1986. Lys, Luft og Renlighed: Den Moderne
Socialhygiejnes Fødsel (Copenhagen: Academic Publishers).
Schoon, M. L. 2008. Building Robustness to Disturbance: Governance in Southern
African Peace Parks (Bloomington: Indiana University Press).
Sørensen, E. and J. Torfing. 2009. ‘Making Governance Networks Effective and
Democratic through Metagovernance’. Public Administration 87(2), 234–58.
Squires, G. D. (ed.). 2002. Urban Sprawl: Causes, Consequences and Policy Responses
(New York: Rowman & Littlefield).
Star, S. L. 2010. ‘This is Not a Boundary Object: Reflections on the Origin of a
Concept’. Science, Technology, and Human Values 35(5), 601–17.
Theisen, F. 2001. ‘Generalplanskitsen 1954’. In K. Andersen (ed.),Ældre Byplanlæggere
1954–2000 (Copenhagen: Byplanhistorisk Udvalg), pp. 21–3.
Torfing, J. 2010. ‘Local Forms of Governance in Denmark: The Revenge of the
Supplement’. Journal of Power 3(3), 405–25.
Vejre, H., J. Primdahl, and J. Brandt. 2007. ‘The Copenhagen Finger Plan: Keeping a
Green Space Structure by a Simple Planning Metaphor’. In B. Pedroli, A. Doord,
G. Blust, M. Paracchini, D. Washer, and F. Bunce (eds), Europe’s Living Landscapes
(Zeist: KNNV Publishing), pp. 310–28.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 25/7/2019, SPi
   ‘ ’ 243
13
The Norwegian Petroleum Fund
as Institutionalized Self-Restraint
Camilla Bakken Øvald, Bent Sofus Tranøy, and Ketil Raknes
Introduction: A Policy Success
The Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global (popularly known as the
Petroleum Fund) is the largest sovereign wealth fund in the world, with a total
value of nearly US$1000 billion (see Figure 13.1). The Norwegian state’s ability to
invest substantial amounts abroad combined with relatively moderate fiscal
spending compares favourably with other countries where governance structures
have been exposed to large resource-driven income streams. This macro-economic
regime is a shining beacon in an otherwise dark sea of misery tainted by the
‘resource curse’ (Sachs and Warner 1995; Holden 2013). In this chapter, we seek
to elucidate the story behind this success by zooming in on the actors, institutions,
and the learning process that were crucial to the establishment and evolution of
the fund.
In the OECD economic survey of Norway in 2018, the output growth and
the well-being of the population, even with sinking oil prices, is described as
‘a testimony to policies that insulate the country from volatile petroleum markets’
(OECD 2018: 4). The fund is crucial in funding the Norwegian welfare state; in
2018 transfers from the fund accounted for 18 per cent of the government
spending. The size of the fund and the continued high ranking of Norway in
reports such as the UN Human Development Report and the World Happiness
Report, means that the fund can be deemed a political success. At the macro-level
other economic variables tell the same story; the unemployment rate in Norway
has been considerably lower compared with other European countries during the
last decades (Report to the Storting No. 29 2016–17).
At the time the fund was formally established in 1990, Norway already had a
generous, universalistic welfare state and a several decade-long history of success-
ful export performance. In terms of programmatic assessment, the value propos-
ition motivating the creation of the fund was to successfully safeguard and
stimulate the economy and finance the welfare state simultaneously, without
one getting in the way of the other. The policy was based on a theory of change
which says that government spending can contribute to equitably distributed,
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beneficial social outcomes up to a certain point, but that total spending must be
tightly controlled to avoid overheating and undesirable structural change. The
policy instrument was a law creating a fund with a mandate to safeguard and build
wealth for future generations. Furthermore, at a later stage a rule-based economic
policy was added so as to gradually integrate an acceptable amount of petroleum
revenues into the domestic economy.
Our study suggests that in the fund’s first decade, programmatic success was
achieved at the expense of democratic procedural considerations. The deliberative
process whereby the institutional core of the fund was established was robust and
judicious in the sense that outstanding technical expertise and experience were
mobilized. On the other hand, the fund was not distinguished by its social
appropriateness or inclusiveness. To the contrary, the decision-making processes
were highly closed. Pivotal decisions were all made by a political and technocratic
elite comprising key actors from the two main parties and a few mandarins from
the Ministry of Finance. Other stakeholders were effectively excluded. Everything
was done behind closed doors and there was no broad-based deliberation with
regard to the fund’s policy goals and institutional arrangements. This policy style
prevailed at both critical junctures in 1990 and 1997 when the fund was estab-
lished and the institutional arrangements were made.
After 1997, when the fund started to grow, public debate around its goals and
investment strategies intensified. This forced the policy elites to make adjustments
with a view to securing the fund’s legitimacy and public support. Pressure on the
fledgling fund became especially notable when populist opposition parties from
both sides of the political spectrum began to argue for increased public spending.
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Figure 13.1 The market value of the Government Pension Fund Global, 1996–2017
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In response to these pressures, the first adjustment was to construct a fiscal rule
which states that transfers from the fund to the central government budget shall,
over time, follow the expected real return on the fund, thus enabling but at the
same time defining limits to short-term public spending from the fund’s resources.
Another key adjustment was to include ethical guidelines in the fund’s investment
strategy.
The gradual inclusion of the concerns of previously sceptical stakeholders and
the associated adjustments to the policy regime have successfully cemented the
political and public legitimacy of the fund. Today, the fund enjoys elite as well as
popular support—the coalition supporting the fund is both broad and deep. For
almost twenty years all governments (from both sides of the left–right divide) have
stuck to the fiscal rule. The two political parties that used to advocate populist
views on spending and ethical concerns respectively, the Progressive Party and the
Socialist Left Party, have both held the position of Minister of Finance during the
last decade and both have faithfully managed the established economic policy
regime without any attempts at implementing significant changes, indicating that
association with the fiscal rule enhances rather than diminishes the political capital
of voices that were highly critical when in opposition. None of the major corpor-
atist players have ever voiced any opposition to the fund, and popular support for
the regime is reflected in opinion data on attitudes to spending of ‘oil money’, with
a clear majority now agreeing that the government should not spend more
petroleum revenues than it currently does (see Figure 13.2).
In sum, the fund matches the definition of a policy success outlined in this
book. First, it has contributed to creating widely valued social outcomes, while
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Figure 13.2 Norwegian voters’ attitudes towards the usage of ‘oil money’ (1997–2013)
(in per cent)
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suggesting that the fund has been a lasting programmatic success, lending legit-
imacy to the institutional set-up. Second, over time the fund has come to enjoy
broad political support and has been a success for a considerable period even in
the face of changing circumstances. In fact, it could be argued that overall goal
attainment in terms of equitably shared beneficial social outcomes is greater than
was initially expected.
The history of the Petroleum Fund is to a large extent a history of unexpected
growth that led to new political challenges. The Norwegian experience is partly
a result of institutional factors such as democratic stability, a non-corrupt
bureaucracy, and a long-standing belief that natural resources belong to the
people as such and should benefit the whole population (Mehlum et al. 2006;
Holden 2013). However, such structural variables only tell part of the story.
When natural gas revenue started to pour into the Dutch economy in the 1960s,
the Netherlands was a comparable stable democracy with an effective state
bureaucracy and yet that country did not manage to integrate gas revenues in a
way that supported balanced economic growth and public value, causing what
has later been labelled the ‘Dutch disease’, one version of the ‘resource curse’
that can befall resource-rich countries (Corden and Neary 1982).
Furthermore, Norway was not a particularly shining example of good macro-
economic management in the two decades that preceded the establishment of the
fund in 1990. In the late 1970s, and again in the mid-1980s, the spending of both
real and expected oil revenue caused severe problems in the Norwegian economy
(Tranøy 2000; Lie and Venneslan 2010). And yet somehow the Norwegians
turned the situation around. In this chapter we examine how that could happen.
The fund can be seen as the ‘end result’ of a continuous political debate and a
process of social learning that began when substantial oil revenues first appeared
on the horizon in the early 1970s. We trace the gradually more path-dependent
process whereby the regime evolved and hardened into the solid structure we
judge it to be today.
The fund was established in 1990 when the Government Petroleum Fund Act
(Recommendation to the Odelsting No. 32 1989–90) was passed by a unanimous
Storting. At this point in time it was a mere theoretical construct, the fund had no
deposits, but expectations of increased petroleum revenues required a political
decision on how to organize and manage the fund. In 1997, the government
decided to delegate its daily management to Norges Bank and invest part of the
portfolio in the stock market (Stoltenberg 2016).
In this chapter we focus on the decisions from 1990 and onwards which cover the
choice and design of the fund, its implementation, and, finally, the adjustments and
maintenance of the fund (see the timeline in Figure 13.3). The institutional core
of the fund has not changed substantially since 1997 even as the institutional
structure gradually became more elaborate as new considerations were built into
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it. These two considerations are important in evaluating the process and political
success of the fund, and in the maintenance of the policy.¹
Context and Challenges
In 1962, the US oil company Phillips Petroleum applied for permission to explore
the seabed beneath the territorial waters of Norway. Norwegian authorities were
caught unawares by this sudden interest in their continental shelf. Norway did,
however, have a history of successfully managing natural resources at the inter-
section of national interests on one side and foreign capital and know-how on the
other. The Industrial Licence Act from the early twentieth century determined
that hydroelectric power ultimately belonged to the state, and the dominant
ideology was that revenue from natural resources should benefit the population
at large (Skredderberget 2015).
The political ambition to establish national control of this newly discovered
natural resource was made all the more challenging by the fact that Norway
possessed neither the capital nor the knowledge or technology to exploit potential
oil discoveries. Norwegian authorities needed to design a regime capable of
providing economic incentives for the international oil companies to invest in
developing expensive deep-sea technology, while at the same time securing
national industrial and economic interests. This balancing act was addressed by
means of a national petroleum policy approved in parliament in 1971, listing ten
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Figure 13.3 Timeline of the establishment of the Government Petroleum Fund
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oil industry, a general rule of bringing all petroleum ashore onto Norwegian soil,
and the establishment of a state oil company (Recommendation to the Storting
No. 294 1970–1).
The tax system for the petroleum sector is based on the notion that the
petroleum sector yields extraordinary revenue (i.e. the oil rent). The system has
evolved since the 1970s, but the main idea continues to be the same: to retain
incentives for the companies to invest in and produce oil, include the participation
of Norwegian industry in the process, and ensure that the government receives a
sizeable portion of the revenue (Lie and Venneslan 2010). At present the oil
companies have a special tax rate of 53 per cent, making the total level of taxation
on profits from oil 78 per cent. The other main source of income are the profits
from the export of oil and gas owned directly by the state (the State’s Direct
Financial Interest, SDFI, see Figure 13.4).
The main challenges included not only the production of oil, but equally
importantly the question of how to integrate rent-based revenue into an estab-
lished domestic order with previously established governance, production, and
distributional structure. The main pillars of this order were parliamentary dem-
ocracy, a strong economist-dominated technocracy, a state-dominated but mostly
privately-owned export sector based largely on hydroelectric power, corporatist
labour market institutions geared towards defending the competitiveness of the
export sector, and a generous, universalistic welfare state.
The combination of corporatist labour market institutions and a universalistic
welfare state is the core of what has become known as theNordic model—amode of
organizing the economy and society that has won international recognition for its
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Figure 13.4 The net government cash flow from petroleum activities, 1971–2017
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outcomes in a virtuous circle, driven forward by high levels of both intra-personal
trust and trust in governing institutions (Rothstein and Stolle 2003).
The economic challenges of large and temporary revenues from petroleum
resources were recognized from the very beginning. The idea of investing petrol-
eum revenues abroad was first mentioned in a White Paper in 1974 (Report to the
Storting No. 74 1973–4). The ambition was to analyse the dramatic potential
consequences of exploiting the significant petroleum-based fortune on the
Norwegian economy and society.
The original line of argument was that the people of Norway not only should
spend oil wealth on material goods, but that the state should also use it to help
build ‘a qualitatively better society’. The White Paper foreshadowed themes that
would later gain currency in other circles, such as environmental concerns,
encouraging more time for people to take care of each other, and other topics
traditionally considered ‘too soft’ for a finance ministry to espouse. The second
line of argument concerned how to introduce the proceeds of oil sales into the
domestic economy. Put differently, it was about how to build ‘a qualitatively better
society’ without incurring unacceptable costs in the form of an excessive rate of
structural change.
The idea of saving abroad was mentioned in the White Paper, but not debated
in the Storting. It was picked up again in a report from a government commission
in 1983 (Norwegian Official Report 1983: 27). It discussed the possibilities of a
buffer fund to avoid the negative effects of high volatility in oil prices. The report
presented plans that presaged many specifics of the current fund-based regime,
but at the time concluded the notion of a fund was not a realistic option.
As the 1980s progressed, investments and their corollary, oil and gas extrac-
tion income, grew at such a phenomenal rate that the idea of establishing a
fund gained currency, at least metaphorically. By 1989, both the Conservative
Party and the Labour Party supported the idea in their respective government
long-term programmes (Report to the Storting No. 83 1984–5 and Report to
the Storting No. 4 1988–9). When the Conservative Party won the 1989 elec-
tion, establishing a fund became part of the new government’s policy platform
(Lysebuerklæringen 4 October 1989).
The Design and Choice of a Fund
The overall challenge and objective were easily agreed upon, namely to integrate
petroleum revenues in a sustainable manner. The arguments were both structural
and cyclical: to maintain a viable export sector independent of the petroleum
sector and not to allow the national budgets to become too dependent on volatile
oil prices.
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The choice of policy instruments was more complicated. When the idea of a
Petroleum Fund gained traction in the late 1980s, the Ministry of Finance opposed
it ferociously. They feared that a Petroleum Fund might lead to increased domes-
tic spending outside the disciplining boundaries of the national budget (Lie and
Venneslan 2010). In the late 1980s, echoing both a banking crisis and falling oil
prices, the Norwegian economy experienced its worst crisis since the Second
World War. The budget deficit was substantial and the thought of future oil
revenues well exceeding what was desperately needed to balance the budget
seemed less relevant.
However, when Arne Skauge becameMinister of Finance in 1989, he instructed
the public service to start working on a proposition to the parliament on the
principles for a Petroleum Fund. The Ministry of Finance was not enthused by
the idea and advised against it. Facedwith this reluctance, Skaugewas adamant. He
made it clear that ‘there will be a Petroleum Fund even if I have to write the
mandate myself ’.² According to Skauge ‘the civil service has always been afraid of
politicians’ ability to invent new ways of spending money’. But there were
prudent ways to do so. For Skauge too, the threat of the ‘resource-curse’ loomed
large over the decision to establish a Petroleum Fund: ‘I was convinced that the
main principles of a Petroleum Fund had to be established before the money
started pouring in. Once the money was there, politicians and interest groups
from across the entire range would scramble to get money for their pet projects.’
In an internal memo, the Director General of the Ministry of Finance, Svein
Gjedrem, told his colleagues that the political signals concerning the creation of a
Petroleum Fund ‘were so strong that there is no way around this’ (Lie and
Venneslan 2010: 347).
The good news for the Ministry was that it had won the internal arguments
regarding the principles on which the Petroleum Fund was to be based. During the
1980s, a fault line appeared between advocates of an ambitious industrial policy
and those who prioritized fiscal responsibility. It pitted officials from the Ministry
of Finance against their counterparts at the Ministry of Industry, who wanted to
utilize a prospective Petroleum Fund to finance major industrial projects (Lie and
Venneslan 2010). There was support for the expansionist position among politi-
cians from both the Labour Party and the Conservative Party who voiced ideas on
the manner in which the Petroleum Fund could aid large national infrastructure
projects and the internationalization of Norwegian industry.
However, by the time the proposition to set up the Fund came up, the Ministry
of Finance had assumed full control of the main principles for its establishment.
All government net revenues from the petroleum sector should be transferred to
the Fund, and the Fund would be integrated in the ordinary government budget.
Consequently, the Ministry ensured that the money from the Fund could not be
used to finance agendas that were not prioritized in the regular budget. Finally, the
Government Petroleum Act made it clear that the wealth could only be invested
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abroad. According to Gjedrem, the message to the other ministries was clear: ‘This
reform will be handled by the Ministry of Finance. Special interests can keep their
hands off.’³
Skauge was trained as an economist and was well acquainted with the civil
service in the Ministry of Finance. He respected its macro-economic expertise and
followed its advice when it came to the principles for the Petroleum Fund. The
proposition went through the government without any noteworthy amendments.
And so, all government net revenues from the petroleum sector were to be
transferred to the Fund and any withdrawals from the Fund would be integrated
in the ordinary government budget. The Ministry thus ensured that proceeds from
the Fund could not be used to finance policy initiatives that had lost out in the
regular budgetary process.
The compromise between Labour Party and the Conservative Party on how to
handle the petroleum wealth echoes a string of compromises in Norwegian
politics between the left and right going back to the compromise between labour
and capital in 1935 (Tranøy 2010). Before the proposition was sent to parliament,
Skauge contacted his opposition counterpart Sigbjørn Johnsen, co-chairman of
the Labour Party’s Committee of Finance. Johnsen recalls the conversation as
having been cordial: ‘I told Arne not to worry and that the Labour Party would
support the government on this one. These broad compromises are a central part
of our political system.’⁴ The proposition sailed through the committee easily and
on 22 June 1990, the Government Petroleum Fund Act was unanimously
approved by the Storting, the Norwegian parliament.
Even though there had been little public debate and no inclusion of
powerful interest groups in the Fund’s creation, the debate in the Storting
revealed that a broad consensus was quickly forming behind its principles.
Eilif Meland, the financial spokesperson of the Socialist Left Party, compared
the Fund to the bee wax Odysseus had his sailors put in their ears to escape
the Sirens’ calls. The Fund should protect politicians from voters’ and interest
groups’ pressure to increase domestic spending on the back of the oil money
(although from 1996 onwards, when money had started flowing into the
Fund, the Socialist Left Party together with the Progressive Party would
lose some of its initial restraint and begin to argue for increased domestic
spending of oil money and contributed to populist pressure on the
government).
The Ministry of Finance was defined as the Fund’s formal manager, but the
intention was to invest any future revenue in bonds like the other currency reserves
held in Norges Bank. The choice of the central bank as manager of the Fund
provided an intentional arm’s-length distance from the owner and, combined
with strict guidelines, out of the reach of powerful interest groups. It was also
expected that a central bank had the broad range of knowledge and experience
required for managing a state-owned fund, says Tore Eriksen, one of the central
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bureaucrats in the Ministry of Finance: ‘We believed that Norges Bank had the
necessary understanding of the social responsibility a state-owned fund holds.’⁵
The mandate was a vote of confidence in Norges Bank but entailed considerable
challenges (Norges Bank Investment Management 2008). In functional terms, it
required that Norges Bank develop a commercial culture within its broader role
and tradition as a central bank. To meet the need, Norges Bank decided to
establish a new investment management unit. On 1 January 1998, Norges Bank
Investment Management (NBIM) was established as the operational investment
manager.
Implementation
Throughout the early 1990s, the Petroleum Fund remained a purely theoretical
construct that had no money in its account. The Norwegian economy experienced
a deep downturn at the time. The prospects of large petroleum revenues and a
budget surplus seemed remote. However, when the economy improved in the
mid-1990s, the Ministry of Finance made the first deposit in the Fund’s account in
Norges Bank in May 1996.
After that predictions of future growth in revenues rose rapidly. So did actual
revenues: the size of the Fund reached the NOK 100 billion mark as early as
1997. These revenues were higher than anticipated, and the Ministry of Finance
felt compelled to start thinking more seriously about long-term returns. Invest-
ing in bonds was a safe strategy with minimal risk, but expected returns were
low. There is a trade-off between risk and expected return. The Minister of
Finance at the time, Jens Stoltenberg, readily agreed that the Fund’s present
strategy did not get the balance right. He was convinced that the strategy should
include stock market investment, and persuaded the government, the parlia-
mentary group, and the parliament’s Standing Committee on Finance and
Economic Affairs.
The new investment strategy was presented in May 1997 (Report to the
Storting No. 2 1995–6). Norges Bank was given the managerial responsibility,
but the mandate came with strict guidelines from the Ministry of Finance stating
that between 30 and 50 per cent of the Fund’s assets should be invested in equity,
with a benchmark set by the Ministry and a strict ceiling on the possibilities to
deviate from the return on the benchmark portfolio.
The Conservative Party supported this investment strategy, but the
other political parties expressed concerns. The idea of the Norwegian state
‘speculating’ with state revenue in the international stock markets was an
unfamiliar notion to Norwegian politicians (Skredderberget 2015). The
Labour government did manage to cement the strategy during its term and in
September 1997 it lost the general election. The Christian Democratic Party,
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the Centre Party, and the Liberal Party were expected to take over after the
election and all of them had misgivings about the proposed investment strategy
(Stoltenberg 2016).
Enjoying support from both the Labour Party and the Conservative Party, there
was a parliamentary majority for the guidelines and investment strategy. Yet the
new minority government remained unconvinced, which frustrated Stoltenberg,
soon to be the new Labour Party leader, who had developed a sense of urgency
about the issue: ‘I felt we needed to hurry, we were losing money every day by not
investing in the stock markets.’⁶ Still in office as a caretaker minister while the new
coalition was being formed, Stoltenberg decided to move forward with the new
investment strategy and pushed it through the Storting, against advice from his
public servants that the topic should be left to the newly elected government. It
was a political coup, but skirted around the edges of constitutional propriety
(Stoltenberg 2016).
Maintenance and Adjustments
The mandate of the Fund is to safeguard Norwegian financial wealth for future
generations in a secure, efficient, responsible, and transparent way, within the
constraints laid down by the Ministry of Finance. In the early years all other
concerns were met with fierce rejections. The ethical issues addressed by NGOs
and some political parties were ignored. On the other hand, the growing populist
lobby to spend more money was less easily ignored.
On 17 March 2000, Jens Stoltenberg took office as Prime Minister. His cabinet
ran into serious headwinds almost immediately on the issue of the burgeoning
Petroleum Fund. Circumstances conspired against Stoltenberg: oil prices rose
steadily through 1999 and 2000, and at the same time the volume of Norwegian
oil production peaked. The Fund thus grew at a breath-taking pace. The visibility
of such a fortune in public savings changed the terms of the political debate in
Norway, fuelling the pressure to increase spending.
The state had a burgeoning kitty, yet refused to touch it. The right-wing
populist Progress Party saw an opportunity in this situation. There were urgent
needs, and plenty of petroleum revenue, why was the government so reluctant?
Every time there was a seriously sick child who had to wait for treatment, or a
piece of state-of-the-art potentially life-saving medical equipment lacking in a
Norwegian hospital, the Progress Party was on the case. When demanding
increased spending on any given objective, the Progress Party made a habit of
starting sentences with the phrase: ‘In (one of) the richest countries in the world, it
is a scandal that we cannot even afford . . . ’. This message was picked up by large
sections of the electorate. The Progress Party soared in the polls, while the Labour
Party suffered.
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The Ministry of Finance feared that without stricter guidelines, spending would
increase and was working on a plan for a gradual increase of oil money within the
national budget. If a ‘safety valve’ was not installed, the whole ‘dam’ was at risk of
breach. It was the nightmare for every finance official socialized into the virtues of
fiscal prudence. Something had to be done. Plans for tightening the guidelines
were prepared in great secrecy. Only a handful of bureaucrats in the economics
section of the Ministry of Finance were involved, along with Stoltenberg, the
Minister of Finance and two state secretaries. Several models for forecasting the oil
revenue and calculating the rate at which it should be phased into the economy
were discussed.
A considerable amount of time was spent on how to frame and communicate
the new fiscal rule in a manner that ordinary voters could grasp. Stoltenberg was
aware that he had to act as ‘the salesman’ for the new macro-economic regime:
‘My task was when we had concluded . . . to go out and get political approval in the
party, the parliamentary group, the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions
(LO) and from the public at large.’⁷ The high level of secrecy limited the inclusion
of opposition parties and interest groups in this process. However, Stoltenberg
chose to consult with LO, which has historically maintained close ties with the
Labour Party. The reason for consulting LO was based on LO’s gatekeeper role in
major political reforms. For Stoltenberg, LO was the only actor outside his inner
circle that he could trust.
The plans were presented in a White Paper published on 29 March 2001
(Report to the Storting No. 29 2000–1). The new fiscal rule’s assertion that the
annual non-oil deficit should, on average over the economic cycle, be limited to
4 per cent of the fund, was approved by a large parliamentary majority. At the time,
4 per cent was presumed to be the long-term real rate of return from the fund. The
target came with some discretionary manoeuvring room, though in a symmetrical
fashion so that spending could be above 4 per cent in a downturn and below at
times of strong demand and a positive output gap (see Figure 13.5).
At the same time, Norges Bank was released from its formal exchange
rate target and introduced a symmetrical inflation target of 2.5 per cent in its
place. The argument was that this would maximize currency stability, or at least
maintain as orderly a relationship as possible with the euro, Norway’s most
important trading partners’ currency. The analysis was that Norway needed an
inflation target slightly above that of the European Central Bank to ‘create room’
for the now planned-for phasing-in of petroleum-related revenues.
This whole manoeuvre came too late to help Stoltenberg in the elections in the
autumn of 2001, but it did strengthen the Fund’s legitimacy over time. In the
electoral survey of 2001, 56 per cent of respondents answered that they wanted
increased petroleum revenue spending, while 35 per cent supported contempor-
aneous spending levels. By 2009, the tables had turned: 53 per cent were satisfied
with spending levels, while 33 wished for higher spending levels. Since 2009,
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a majority of the Norwegian population have been satisfied with the level of
oil money in the state budget (see Figure 13.2). Thus, the fiscal rule was an
important adjustment to secure the Fund’s political legitimacy and achieve buy-in,
from the Progressive Party in particular. In 2013, Siv Jensen from the Progressive
Party became Minister of Finance, and during the preceding election campaign
the Progressive Party had already moderated its resistance against the fiscal rule.
As Minister of Finance, Jensen maintained the fiscal rule. Like her predecessors,
she has continued to praise the Fund and its achievements both in international
and national media. Slowly but surely, the Fund and its basic governance prin-
ciples had become institutionalized.
Yet there was another line of contention: the debate about engaging in ‘ethical’
or socially responsible investing. It had begun almost as soon as the Petroleum
Fund actually obtained money to invest. Initially Norges Bank was prone to
ridicule the idea and made it appear as the pipedream of ‘irresponsible’ civil
society and the left-of-Labour party, the Socialist Left Party (SV). Gradually,
however, the discourse changed. Two different processes help account for this.
One was set in motion by NGO’s drawing media’s attention to the Fund’s
investment in companies engaged in politically unattractive or even illegal busi-
ness, such as the production of landmines or child labour. It repeatedly provided
unpleasant media exposure for any Minister of Finance, prompting them to warm
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Figure 13.5 Government spending of oil revenue as measured by the structural, non-
oil budget deficit, and the expected real return of the Pension Fund in billion 2017
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NBIM’s peer community, the financial markets, where the idea of ethical investment
was gradually gaining a foothold.
In 2004, the Ministry of Finance adopted ethical guidelines for the management
of the Petroleum Fund, and established the independent Council on Ethics. The
role of the council is to evaluate whether or not the Fund’s investment in specified
companies is in compliance with its ethical guidelines. It makes detailed assess-
ments of individual cases and works in a thorough manner, inviting to its hearings
representatives from companies under review, and placing strict demands on
evidence before allowing itself to recommend divestment. The Council on Ethics
advises Norges Bank, which decides on the exclusion of companies or to place
companies on an observation list.
The ethical guidelines include two negative mechanisms; one is negative screen-
ing to prevent inclusion in the investment universe of companies that themselves,
or through entities under their control, manufacture weapons whose normal use
violates fundamental humanitarian principles. The other is a facility for divest-
ment from companies where owners systematically breach ethical norms: such
as gross or systematic violation of human rights, gross violations of individual
rights in war or conflict situations, severe environmental degradation, and gross
corruption.
The emphasis on responsible investments coincides with a strengthening trend
in international fund management; in many cases financial considerations reflect
ethical considerations. The argument is that sound financial investment is an
ethical obligation on a par with principles of socially responsible investment (SRI),
since the present generation has an obligation to future generations to maintain
and increase the wealth they will inherit.
The ethical and social strategy of the Fund has been reviewed several times.
A programme of positive selection directed towards green investment began in
2010. It has encouraged efforts to review both the climate change strategy and use
of financial havens by companies in which the Fund is invested. Thus, the ethical
and social strategies have been important for increasing public deliberation around
the Fund and gaining legitimacy among NGOs and civil society. There are several
examples of NGO-lobbying campaigns that have resulted in changes in the Fund’s
portfolio, for example the decision to divest from coal companies in 2015.
Assessing the Petroleum Fund
When we investigated the history of the Fund, a somewhat surprising finding
was the small number of players present at the table at the main decision points.
The decision-making process was much less consensual and inclusive than was to
be expected in a democracy with a strong corporatist tradition. The reform does
not sit well with the image of a corporatist democracy where organizations ‘take
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part in political processes and ensure important considerations are taken’ (Nordby
1999: 12).
The Labour Party, the Conservative Party, and the Ministry of Finance make up
the Petroleum Fund’s ‘iron triangle’, while interest groups and the smaller parties
were effectively kept out of the central decision-making processes. The history of
the Fund underscores the privileged role of the Ministry of Finance among the
Norwegian ministries (Slagstad 1998; Lie and Venneslan 2010). The closed and
exclusive process of the reform may, up to a point, be considered an effect of the
highly technical nature of the issues at stake.
The closed nature of the reform process secured programmatic success but the
exclusion of central stakeholders did, however, create challenges for the political
legitimacy of the Fund. The lack of inclusion facilitated both a populist and an
ethical backlash against the Fund. However, the construction of the fiscal rule and
the Council on Ethics respectively engaged and ‘pulled in’ critical stakeholders and
over time strengthened and grew the bipartisan consensus behind the principles of
the Fund. Thus, when studying policy successes, one should be aware of possible
trade-offs between programmatic success on the one hand and processual and
political success on the other hand.
The elite-driven decision-making in the first phase of the reform was moder-
ated by the more inclusive strategies followed at later stages in the reform. In
retrospect, the decision to draw up the guidelines for the Petroleum Fund as early
as in 1990 stands out as particularly fortunate. A political debate on how to deploy
the oil money was always going to be easier with an empty bank account than with
a burgeoning fund. Thus, the Petroleum Act of 1990 created a strong path
dependency that guided policy-makers through the later stages. New policy
instruments were developed and adjustments were made as new considerations
were built into the institutional structure. But the overarching policy goals of
growing the economy and the welfare state harmoniously through carefully
controlled spending growth have remained the same.
Framing and agenda-setting are often important variables when studying
political success (McCombs and Shaw 1972; Entman 1991). Our findings under-
score the importance of agenda-setting and framing for successful reform.
A reform is far more likely to be sustainable if the policy is understandable and
logical to the public, even when the motives behind the reform are highly complex
and theoretical. The fiscal rule corresponded well with established frameworks for
how Norway should exploit its national resources. When Stoltenberg launched the
fiscal rule, he used the metaphor of sustainable forest management to explain the
principle of the fiscal rule to the general public.
While Norway had the institutional capability for reform, it required effective
political leadership to capitalize on the opportunity and forge a new institutional
legacy that constrained the choices of future governments. In 1990, Skauge’s
decision to forge ahead with the Government Petroleum Fund Act against the
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advice of the Ministry of Finance’s mandarins was an important act of political
leadership. Jens Stoltenberg was the right man at the right moment both as
Minister of Finance in 1997 and Prime Minister in 2001. His implementation of
the investment strategy in 1997 was a silent coup, while the creation of the fiscal
rule in 2001 was the result of a strong alliance with the administrative elites in the
Ministry of Finance. In Stoltenberg, the top bureaucrats in the Ministry of Finance
had a partner who both understood them and shared their goals. Furthermore,
Stoltenberg moved on to become the pre-eminent salesman for the new macro-
economic regime for the remainder of his political career, and later considered the
crafting of the fiscal rule to be his finest moment in politics (Stoltenberg 2016).
The vision of the Norwegian Petroleum Fund for its investment portfolio is
eternity, and twenty-eight years is too soon to draw any definitive conclusions.
The Fund is invested in more than 9,000 companies in seventy-two countries
(Norges Bank Investment Management 2017). As a universal owner of 1.4 per cent
of the global stock market, the Fund is exposed to unexpected changes and potential
crises in the world economy. Another risk factor is the oil price, which is extremely
volatile and might reduce the profitable investments in the North Sea.
Even without these risk factors, the Fund has its limits. The real test of the fiscal
rule will come from 2020 onwards when the Norwegian state finances will come
under increasing pressure. As the number of elderly persons in Norway rises, so
will the need for health and care services. Even with a large Petroleum Fund it will
be impossible to avoid cuts in the national budget or unpopular tax increases in
order to finance healthcare for a rapidly ageing population (Report to the Storting
No. 29 2016–17).
So far, the fiscal rule has allowed politicians to shift an increasing stream of oil
money into the budget, but that will have to cease in the coming years (see
Figures 13.4 and 13.5). Furthermore, 2016 was the first time in the history of
the Fund that the public spending was larger than the oil sector revenue. Conse-
quently, the next twenty years will show whether Norwegian political leaders are
able to maintain the institutionalized self-restraint and secure the Petroleum Fund
for future generations.
Institutionalizing Self-Restraint in Public Policy:
Policy Transfer from Norway?
The Norwegian macro-economic regime, balancing current spending with long-
term interests, compares favourably to most other cases of large resource-driven
income streams. On the one hand, the Norwegian experience is a result of unique
factors. On the other hand, there are potential lessons to be learned. One way of
slicing our material with a view to identifying possible lessons is to distinguish
between macro-historical factors that are difficult to reproduce or change, and
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more micro-level organizational solutions and principles of financial management
that are more malleable.
Norway had unique institutional capabilities and traditions compared to many
other countries in similarly resource-rich circumstances. According to Rothstein
and Uslaner (2005), a long legacy of egalitarian distribution can at the same time
facilitate, and be reinforced by, universalistic welfare institutions which in turn
help build and solidify interpersonal as well as trust in institutions. In contrast
to this, most other countries with large oil revenues such as Nigeria, Russia,
Venezuela, and Saudi Arabia have political systems and political traditions that
are far from the Norwegian experience. As Rothstein and Uslaner (2005: 71)
observe: ‘Poor and inegalitarian countries thus find themselves trapped in a
situation of continuing inequality, mistrust, and dysfunctional institutions. High
levels of inequality contribute to lower levels of trust, which lessen political and
societal support for the state to collect resources for launching and implementing
universal welfare programs in an uncorrupted and nondiscriminatory way.’
Thus, in a developing country with high levels of inequality, it is much harder—
and probably less reasonable—to convince decision-makers not to invest the
revenue in domestic projects (Holden 2013), and we might add: projects that
will often favour one domestic group over another. Thus, The Economist is
probably right when it states that others could learn from the structures of the
fund ‘but would struggle to mimic the Nordic values that underpin them’ (The
Economist 2016).
The Norwegian government receives numerous requests from countries that
wish to learn from the Norwegian experience, and the Oil for Development
Programme was initiated in 2005. Through this programme, Norway shares its
experience in managing oil and gas resources and revenues. Relevant subjects
‘downstream’ include how the division of labour and chain of governance runs
between parliament, the Ministry of Finance, Norges Bank, and NBIM. Similar
lessons regarding the organization of the ‘upstream’ process are also sought-after
and taught. The demand for Norwegian lessons are not, however, restricted to oil
producers. As the theory of the resource curse assumes, the relevant level of
abstraction is probably neither petroleum nor energy, but resources. A case in
point is Chile which has established funds to manage revenues from the sale of
copper on world markets.
A less ambitious level of lesson-drawing is to move from cases to mechanisms.
One mechanism that we see as having contributed greatly to the success of the
Fund is related to discounting rates. Behavioural economics have shown that
humans tend to discount the future at a much higher rate than is normally
assumed by neoclassical economics. This has been taken advantage of by the
renowned behavioural economist Richard Thaler with his concept for private
pension plans, called ‘save more tomorrow’ (Thaler and Benartzi 2004). The
point is that it is much easier to get employees to agree to set aside more of future
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income increases than it is to make them take monies out of their current income.
Arne Skauge’s move when Norway was ‘broke’ in 1990 fits this logic perfectly. His
own words on this bear repeating: ‘the main principles of a Petroleum Fund had to
be established before the money started pouring in. Once the money was there,
politicians and interest groups from across the entire range would scramble to get
money for their pet projects.’⁸Organizing for restraint in boom times was an act of
foresight and self-discipline that contemporary policy-makers can continue to
look up to.
Notes
1. Building on the perspective of George and Bennett (2005), we have approached four
critical moments/phases in the development of the fund (1990, 1997, 2001, 2004) as
distinct case studies using multiple data collection methods. The material consists of
qualitative interviews, political memoirs, media coverage, official Norwegian reports,
White Papers, records of political decision-making processes, and parliamentary
debates. The original data collected for this chapter consisted of semi-structured
qualitative interviews (Kvale 1997; Alvesson and Sköldberg 2017) with nine political
and administrative leaders who played central decision-making roles at the various
decision points. The list of interviewees includes five former Ministers of Finance, one
former Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, and two former top bureaucrats in the
Ministry of Finance, one of whom later became governor of the Central Bank, while the
other had earlier served as economic advisor to the Prime Minister.
2. Source of Skauge quotes: A. Skauge, personal communication, 16 February 2017.
3. S. Gjedrem, personal communication, 27 February 2017.
4. S. Johnsen, personal communication, 14 March 2017.
5. T. Eriksen, personal communication, 28 February 2017.
6. J. Stoltenberg, personal communication, 6 October 2017.
7. J. Stoltenberg, personal communication, 6 October 2017.
8. A. Skauge, personal communication, 16 February 2017.
Additional version of this case
The case study outlined in this chapter is accompanied by a corresponding case
study from the Centre for Public Impact’s (CPI) Public Impact Observatory—
an international repository of public policies assessed for their impact using
CPI’s Public Impact Fundamentals framework. CPI’s framework provides a
way for those who work in or with government to assess public policies, to
understand why they were successful, so key lessons can be drawn out for
future policy work. The case can be easily located in the CPI repository at www.
centreforpublicimpact.org/observatory.
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14
New Zealand’s Economic Turnaround
How Public Policy Innovation Catalysed
Economic Growth
Michael Mintrom and Madeline Thomas
Introduction
On 14 June 1984, New Zealand’s Prime Minister, Sir Robert Muldoon, announced
a snap general election, to be held the following month. Muldoon, then in his
sixties, had served continuously as both Prime Minister and Minister of Finance
since 1975. As Prime Minister, Muldoon wielded significant power in his cabinet
and in the conservative National Party. His election announcement was calculated
to catch the more left-leaning Labour Party opposition off guard. But Muldoon’s
snap election announcement saw hubris triumph over astute political judgement.
On 14 July 1984, David Lange, a charismatic politician in his early forties, a lawyer
by profession with a quick and cutting wit, led the Labour Party to victory in an
electoral landslide.
Following the general election of July 1984, there was a broadly shared sense
that the country faced new possibilities. Those new possibilities were seized, but
in ways that many people did not expect. Significant public policy innovations
were introduced. In the process, considerable economic and political disruption
ensued. Disputes concerning economic management and social policy within the
Labour Party saw the National Party win the 1990 general election. The newly-
elected National Government broadly accepted the policy settings it inherited.
Policy development continued across the spectrum of government activities under
the direction of various Labour- and National-led governments over the subse-
quent decades. Nonetheless, the key public policies adopted between 1984 and
1990 remain in place and have been the foundation for later policy development.
A Policy Success?
Starting in 1984, David Lange and a very capable group of cabinet colleagues
introduced a comprehensive and intellectually coherent range of public policy
innovations. They had major impacts on the functioning of both the New Zealand
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economy and the New Zealand public sector. Here we discuss four areas of
innovation: (1) reduction of market interventions; (2) simplification of the tax
system and introduction of a goods and services tax; (3) creation of state-owned
enterprises and subsequent privatization efforts; and (4) introduction of inde-
pendence for the Reserve Bank in driving monetary policy. The success of public
policies can be assessed from a number of perspectives. These policy innovations
have now remained in place for decades. Thus, judged by endurance, they have
been highly successful. We also consider their success from programmatic, pro-
cess, and political perspectives.
From a programmatic perspective, the changes in economic policy were
intended to reduce government interventions in the economy and, in the process,
improve the government’s fiscal position. A highly coherent theory of change
guided the development of these policy innovations. After a relatively short time,
it was clear that the changes were producing beneficial outcomes. However, there
were adjustment costs. These manifest themselves most starkly in unemployment
figures, which rose during the 1980s, and took many years to decline.
From a process perspective, the policy innovations were well designed and
generally well managed. Changes to market interventions and taxes were able to
be implemented swiftly. In the case of the introduction of the goods and services
tax (GST), implementation was delayed to ensure it would work effectively.
Creation of state-owned enterprises took much more planning. The subsequent
privatization process did not always go smoothly. The change to monetary policy
was carefully planned and implemented. Reform of market interventions and the
creation of state-owned enterprises contributed to unemployment. Other than
this, there were limited negative consequences of these policy innovations.
From a political perspective, the story is more complicated. These policy
innovations generated losses for certain sectors of the economy, and those who
bore the brunt voiced their opposition. The government elected in 1984 was
returned to power in 1987 after a strong electoral win. However, shortly after-
wards, the governing coalition began to fragment. The epicentre of this fragmen-
tation was the relationship between Prime Minister David Lange and Minister of
Finance Roger Douglas. That relationship deteriorated as Roger Douglas pushed
to extend the logic of the limited state through extensive sale of government assets
and changes in social policy. David Lange pushed back, voicing his concern over
the social costs of the reforms that had already been adopted.
The story we tell has been told before in different ways. Economists have tended
to view the innovations positively. Using a set of key indicators, they have shown
that the policy changes were both dramatic in how they halted specific past
practices and significant in the positive impacts they delivered (Bollard 1994;
Brash 1996; Evans et al. 1996). In contrast, various assessments have viewed these
policy reforms negatively. In such interpretations, the changes have been con-
sidered as unnecessarily radical, given prevailing economic conditions at the time
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they began (Goldfinch and Malpass 2007). The policy innovations have also been
construed as following too slavishly the predominant international fashion in
economic thinking at that time (Larner 1997; Goldfinch 1998). Others have
pointed to both the economic and social costs of adjustment and have suggested
the changes did more damage than good (Kelsey 1997; Dalziel 2002). Still others
have noted how the policy innovations served to reduce the reach of the state and
have suggested that the end result was a significant redistribution of power into
the hands of globalized financial elites (Easton 1997; Jesson 1999).
Our contribution involves analysing the economic turnaround as a public
policy success. We take as our starting point the comprehensive assessments
provided by well-placed economic observers of this period (Bollard 1994; Evans
et al. 1996). We acknowledge the critiques. The reforms contributed to significant
short-term stress in the New Zealand economy in the form of increased unemploy-
ment. This had highly damaging effects on vulnerable individuals, families, and
communities. In addition, aspects of the privatization process were poorly
handled. Where we depart from the critics is in our view of plausible alternative
reform paths. No critical assessment has posited a counterfactual set of reforms
that would have been achievable and more desirable than the chosen path. Paul
Dalziel (2002) comes closest to offering such an assessment—but that assess-
ment discounts the seriousness of the imbalances in the New Zealand economy
in mid-1984.
We next contextualize New Zealand’s economic situation prior to 1984 and
outline the four key policy innovations implemented between 1984 and 1990. In
the decades since the reform period, these reforms have acquired strong political
legitimacy. They have been accepted by successive governments embracing a
range of different philosophical perspectives concerning good political and eco-
nomic management.
Context, Challenges, and Agents of Reform
Many commentators have described the New Zealand economy in 1984 as
dysfunctional due to excessive government interventions. David Lange quipped
that under the Muldoon government, ‘We ended up being run very similarly to a
Polish shipyard’ (Lange as quoted in New Zealand Herald 2005). That was an
exaggeration (Goldfinch and Malpass 2007). Nonetheless, it has now been clearly
documented that the economy at that time was subject to many unsustainable
policies (Bollard 1994; Evans et al. 1996). They emerged from a specific historical
period, running from the end of the SecondWorldWar through to the mid-1970s.
During that period, New Zealanders enjoyed high living standards relative to
citizens of other countries (Easton 1997; Greasley and Oxley 2000). Policy
approaches taken during those years of prosperity, which had seemed beneficial
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to the country at the time, proved damaging when applied by Muldoon during his
time as Prime Minister and Minister of Finance. His approach to economic
management became out of step with the new orthodoxy in economic thinking
that had been emerging internationally since the early 1960s. (Overviews of that
new orthodoxy have been produced by, among others, Friedman 1962, 1977;
Greenspan 2008; and Yergin and Stanislaw 2002.)
It is useful to review the contextual factors and policy choices that created the
economic and government management challenges the incoming Fourth Labour
Government faced in 1984. New Zealand became wealthy during the twentieth
century through the export of meat, wool, and dairy products (Hawke 1985). Most
of those products were supplied to Great Britain. As early as the Great Depression,
political leaders in New Zealand recognized there were risks in this economic
model. Whenever the economy of Great Britain weakened, the New Zealand
economy weakened too. In response, governments acted to safeguard the
New Zealand economy. One such action involved promoting the development
of a significant manufacturing sector. By placing high tariffs on imported items,
the government provided protection to fledgling industries. The strategy was quite
successful. Nonetheless, high tariffs made many imported goods expensive to
consumers. The grumbling this caused was delayed largely because the overall
economy was doing well. Those people who desired imported goods over domes-
tic substitutes were prosperous enough to pay the higher prices that the tariffs
created. The result was bearable so long as average incomes were relatively high.
New Zealand developed a comprehensive welfare state during the twentieth
century. This was built on systems established earlier (Oliver 1988; Mintrom and
Boston 2019). Compulsory public education was introduced in the late nineteenth
century. This was followed by the creation of systems to support public health.
Rudimentary measures to provide income support to the most needy also dated
back to the nineteenth century. Following the Great Depression, these forms of
social security were expanded to include an unemployment benefit. During the
years of growing prosperity after the Second World War, elements of the welfare
state were expanded. In the 1970s, two expensive additions were made. The first
was the introduction of the Domestic Purposes Benefit to support solo parents
who could not participate in the workforce. Introduced in 1973, this was primarily
a benefit for unmarried mothers and it resulted in far less adoptions of children
born out of wedlock. The second addition was the creation of National Super-
annuation in 1977, under Muldoon’s National Government. This was a generous
pension payable from general taxes to all people over a designated age of retire-
ment. It was not means tested. As the welfare state expanded over several decades,
the government bureaucracy needed to maintain it also grew incrementally.
Consequently, many systems of service provision were built around approaches
established long before the middle of the twentieth century. Inefficiencies were
noted (Polaschek 1958). However, there was no political appetite for reform.
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Beginning in the mid-1970s, New Zealand started to experience levels of
unemployment that were unusual, given it had enjoyed decades of full employ-
ment. This unemployment was driven by several factors. With Great Britain
joining the European Community in 1973, the long-guaranteed market for
New Zealand agricultural exports shrunk. Reduced export earnings dampened
demand for local manufactured products. Unemployment rose among unskilled
agricultural workers and unskilled factory workers. The international oil shocks of
1973–4 and 1978–9 further adversely affected the New Zealand economy. Being
highly dependent on foreign oil supplies, New Zealand was susceptible to the
sharp price increases instigated by the OPEC oil cartel. In response, the National
Government led by Robert Muldoon took various actions. The most significant
was the introduction of a major infrastructure building programme. Announced
in 1977 under the label ‘Think Big’, the programme was intended to deliver
two positive effects for New Zealand. First, it was expected to further insulate
the New Zealand economy from international market changes. The logic was that
if the country produced more domestic energy and switched to the use of energy
sources that the country had in abundance—such as natural gas and hydroelectricity—
then susceptibility to the adverse effects of international shocks would decline.
The second intended effect was to create more work, in the same way that
infrastructural projects in the 1930s had made use of surplus labour and kept
many households afloat during the Great Depression. However, the extra
employment generated by these projects was modest, due to significant advances
in construction technology over prior decades.
New Zealand government revenues throughout the twentieth century were
based primarily upon company and income taxes. Over years of economic
prosperity, incremental increases in marginal income tax rates were judged
broadly acceptable. By the late 1970s, high income earners were subject to a
marginal tax rate of 66 cents in the dollar. As economic conditions worsened
in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Muldoon government began imposing
new, highly targeted forms of taxation as revenue-raising initiatives. These
produced various economic distortions. The National Government used other
regulatory actions to address growing inflation. These included the imposition
in 1982 of a general freeze on wages and prices. Efforts were also made to fix
interest rates.
By 1984, the New Zealand economy was subject to extensive government
intervention. There was a popular but expensive welfare state. The government
ran many businesses associated with the delivery of infrastructure. In addition, the
government was continuing to administer an elaborate system of tariffs on
imported goods, and various forms of financial subsidies to the manufacturing
and agricultural sectors. Individuals and households were feeling the effects
of high taxes and various regulations intended to moderate the effects of
New Zealand’s long-term decline in economic prosperity. Despite it all, the
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economy was performing poorly. Policy actions that might have worked during a
time of economic prosperity were no longer having positive effects. Sentiment
grew that the government was exercising too much control over economic activity.
In describing this background, it is useful to note two other matters. First,
during the early 1980s, the attention of many New Zealanders and their politicians
was absorbed not by issues of economic performance and management but by two
other public issues. These were New Zealand’s sporting contacts with South Africa
and the country’s stance on nuclear warfare. A tour of New Zealand by the South
African Springboks rugby team in 1981 had generated high levels of political
unrest. Sporting contact with South Africa was viewed as lending support to that
country’s apartheid regime. By allowing that tour to continue, Robert Muldoon
had gained many detractors (Fougere 1989). While the National Party subse-
quently won the election of 1981, they returned to power with a slim majority in
parliament. With respect to nuclear issues, many New Zealanders were concerned
that defence alignments with the United States were forcing the country to
support a repellent form of weaponry. The Labour Party made clear in the early
1980s that, should it become the government, it would declare New Zealand to be
nuclear free (Clements 2015).
The second matter to note concerns the development of alternative conceptions
of economic management. Significantly, economic management was not at all
central to the political campaign rhetoric or the party leader debates that took
place in the month leading up to Election Day 1984. David Lange, who was about
to lead the Labour Party to electoral victory has been clear on this. ‘The fact of it is
that Labour went into the election without an agreed economic policy’ (2005: 163).
He has elaborated.
Our [Labour Party] differences over economic policy were not played out in
public in the way we had argued about the nuclear-free policy. Towards the end
of 1983 [Roger] Douglas [who was the party’s finance spokesperson and would
become the Minister of Finance after the July 1984 election] produced an
economic policy package. . . . It was by any test a radical document. . . . I remem-
ber being surprised but not in the least perturbed. I expected him to think outside
the square. The package was a long way from becoming policy. It would go to
caucus and policy council and it would be thrashed about at the party conference
in the second half of 1984. (Lange 2005: 162–3)
The anticipated debate never happened. The Douglas proposals received mixed
responses in the party. A rival view was put forward that acknowledged the need
for economic adjustment but assumed that the government would continue to
play a leading role in economic activity. Geoffrey Palmer, who was deputy leader
of the Labour Party and who would become Deputy Prime Minister after the July
1984 election, wrote a short paper to reconcile different viewpoints. When the
snap election was called, Palmer’s paper became the party’s default policy.
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How the Labour Party struck upon its economic policy tells us something about
lack of agreement within the party and the parliamentary caucus from the outset.
There are other details worth noting. Most importantly, the economic policy
package presented by Roger Douglas was informed by advice he had received
from the Treasury. When David Lange assumed leadership of the Labour Party in
February 1983, he appointed Roger Douglas as his shadow Minister of Finance.
Lange ‘expected him to prepare for the day when the Muldoon government would
be gone’ (Lange 2005: 154). As shadow Minister of Finance, Roger Douglas had a
direct line of communication with the Treasury and its senior staff from February
1983. At this time, the Treasury had established a group of analysts in a division
called Economics II. This division was led by Roger Kerr and it comprised
between ten and fifteen economists. Many of them had postgraduate degrees in
economics and broadly supported the Chicago School view that limited govern-
ment and reliance on market processes were key to economic efficiency. Roger
Kerr established a culture within Economics II whereby efforts to address chal-
lenging policy questions would begin with careful reading of relevant analysis in
current economics journals. Through a long-established process of ‘rotation’ of
economic analysts every few years across divisions of Treasury, the culture of the
organization was such that analysts well beyond Economics II were informed by
this approach to working on economic issues. Roger Kerr was key to creating a
think tank atmosphere in Treasury and emphasizing the importance of clear
expression in the presentation of policy advice. (Kerr left the Treasury in 1986
to lead the New Zealand Business Roundtable, a think tank that would have
considerable influence on economic policy for the next two decades.)
New Zealand’s economic problems were connected to a highly interventionist
form of economic management. The changing global economic context and the
rise of free-market economic orthodoxy suggested such policy mechanisms were
out-dated. People in and around New Zealand government, including Roger
Douglas and Treasury officials, recognized this.
Policy Design and Choice
When David Lange and his fellow cabinet members were sworn into office, all
were aware that drastic change was needed in the role played by government in the
New Zealand economy. In those days, the New Zealand dollar was fixed at a
constant level against the United States dollar, with that level being determined by
the government of the day. During the brief election campaign, talk arose that the
New Zealand dollar was over-valued and that a Labour Party electoral victory
would be followed by a significant devaluation. Speculators began to sell NZ
dollars and buy foreign currency, with the intention of selling that foreign
currency at a profit once devaluation had occurred. Sell off of the NZ dollar forced
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the government to draw down its foreign capital reserves. Following the Labour
Party victory, senior officials from the Reserve Bank and Treasury advised that
currency trading should be curtailed until a devaluation had taken place. Robert
Muldoon reluctantly agreed to demands from the incoming government to
immediately devalue the NZ dollar by 20 per cent. This action stemmed the losses
from the government’s foreign capital reserves. But the crisis made clear that old
ways of doing things were not sustainable. Roger Douglas (1993: 17), who was
about to assume the role of Minister of Finance in the new government, later
grouped the fixed exchange rate and the run on the dollar with a range of other
government interventions in the economy that ‘brought us to our knees in 1984’.
The Labour Party delivered on an election promise and held The Economic
Summit Conference at Parliament Buildings over three days in September 1984.
It was attended by representatives from government departments, the trade union
movement, the business community, the primary production sector and social,
community, and other groups. David Lange chaired the event. The Summit
produced a communiqué unanimously endorsed by all delegates. It stated: ‘The
conference agrees that sound economic management must have five basic policy
objectives—sustainable economic growth, full employment, price stability, exter-
nal balance and an equitable distribution of income—while fully respecting social
and cultural values and avoiding undue environmental costs’ (ESC Secretariat
1984: 302–3). At the same time, the participants exhibited distinct differences in
what they cared most about (Dalziel 1986). This was an early indicator of the
dilemmas David Lange would confront as Prime Minister.
A significant programme of public policy innovation was about to occur. Here,
we discuss: (1) market interventions; (2) taxation; (3) state-owned enterprises
and privatization; and (4) monetary policy. An unusual degree of intellectual
effort went into policy design at this time. Throughout the period 1984–90, the
New Zealand Treasury was the most influential source of policy advice to the
government. All of the initiatives to be discussed had their origin in deliberations
between Roger Douglas, as Minister of Finance, and Treasury officials. Of the
relationship between Douglas and the Treasury, David Lange observed, ‘Theirs
was a perfect marriage’ (Lange 2005: 192). Treasury analysts showed a great desire
to engage with relevant literature and to seek insight from colleagues in other
departments and from external experts as they pursued their planning work.
Further, many policy proposals were developed in ways that allowed for high
levels of public consultation. Debate within cabinet and associated cabinet com-
mittees was vigorous. Evidence for the careful policy design work this entailed is
most readily found in the Treasury’s post-election briefing papers produced in
1984 and 1987.
The Treasury’s post-election briefing papers of 1984 were subsequently made
public as Economic Management. This book provided an intellectually coherent
blueprint for how the incoming government could go about implementing
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economic reforms. Most importantly, the message of the briefing papers was that
market mechanisms tended to be superior to administrative systems for efficiently
allocating resources in society. The papers proposed that efforts be made to
promote greater efficiency in many areas of government activity. It was suggested
that this could be done by reform of taxation and by having government entities
operate consistent with the practices of private sector firms.
The Treasury produced another highly influential set of briefing papers for
the incoming government in 1987. Titled Government Management, the 1987
document discussed the role and limits of government and desirable ways to
restructure the public sector. In addition, it provided a thorough discussion of
appropriate directions for reform of social policy and reiterated many points made
in 1984’s Economic Management concerning appropriate management of the
macro-economy. Christopher Hood in his classic 1991 article on the New Public
Management (NPM) said of Government Management that it ‘comes closest to a
coherent NPM “manifesto”, given that much of the academic literature on the
subject either lacks full-scale elaboration or enthusiastic commitment to NPM’
(Hood 1991: 6).
Market Interventions
While David Lange was chairing the Economic Summit Conference and engaging
in various prime ministerial activities outside the economic domain, Roger
Douglas was working with the Treasury on the government’s first budget,
delivered in November 1984. This budget made provision for the phased reduc-
tion of tariff protections for import-substituting industries and removal of a range
of tax concessions and subsides for the farming sector. The wage and price
freeze introduced in 1982 was to end. By announcing these policy changes,
Roger Douglas revealed a preference for having markets and prices direct the
allocation of resources in the economy, rather than arbitrary systems of govern-
ment interventions. Consistent with this theme, Douglas announced that a
comprehensive review of the tax system would be undertaken in 1985, paving
the way for widening the tax base. He said that greater efficiency would improve
New Zealand’s economic performance but would not necessarily ensure that the
benefits would be shared fairly. Therefore, he announced that the government
would carry out a longer-term review of social policies to protect vulnerable
groups and guaranteed adequate access to resources. (Subsequently, a Royal
Commission on Social Policy was established in 1986.) The budget included a
package to provide substantial immediate relief to low-income families with
dependent children. It also increased most other benefits and allocated more
funds to education and healthcare. The budget introduced a surcharge on the
additional income earned by superannuitants. This was unpopular with the
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 25/7/2019, SPi
272   
elderly. However, it confirmed that the government was willing to remove pockets
of privilege.
Taxation
The Fourth Labour Government recognized that the taxation system it inherited
encouraged misallocation of resources. Too much weight was placed on the direct
taxation of personal incomes. Because the overall tax base was narrow, average
and marginal income tax rates were high. There was a view that this regime was
encouraging tax avoidance and tax evasion. The government’s long-term objective
was to simplify the tax system, broaden the tax base, and flatten the tax scale.
Significant tax design work ensued, drawing on expertise both within and outside
of government. In 1986, all wholesale sales taxes were abolished, and replaced with
a broad-based value-added tax (the Goods and Services Tax) with a single rate of
10 per cent (raised in 1989 to 12.5 per cent). The Goods and Services Tax (GST)
included everything except financial services in the tax net. This was done in
recognition that only by taking this approach would economic distortions be
avoided and the compliance costs involved in collecting the tax be minimized.
At the same time, cuts were made in the rate of income tax: an earlier five-rate
scale was cut to three rates, the highest rate being 48 cents in the dollar, down from
66 cents. This scale was simplified even more in 1988 with a two-rate scale of
24 per cent and 33 per cent. The company tax rate was reduced from 48 per cent
to 33 per cent, in recognition of the desirability of having the company tax rate
equal to the top personal rate. The overall effect of these measures was to reduce
the proportion of tax revenues derived from income taxes. Consequently,
New Zealand’s tax structure came to be viewed internationally as one for the
least distortionary.
State-Owned Enterprises and Privatization
When the Fourth Labour Government assumed office, the government owned
and operated many services that could potentially operate in private hands, or at
least in a business-like fashion. These services included the Bank of New Zealand,
Air New Zealand, an international shipping line, and all electricity generation and
distribution facilities. During its time in power, the Fourth Labour Government
established such activities as state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In its 1984 briefing to
the incoming government, Economic Management, the Treasury had given initial
advice regarding the merits of placing some government activities on a more com-
mercial footing. At this time, other governments around the world had begun to step
back from the control and ownership of many previously state-owned and operated
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assets. For example, under Margaret Thatcher’s leadership, the Conservative
government in Britain was then implementing a major programme of commer-
cialization and privatization of government activities (Abromeit 1988; Jenkinson
and Mayer 1988). Roger Douglas (1993: 178) recalled:
My first attempt to obtain agreement on a comprehensive approach to State-
owned enterprise reform was in May 1985. I wanted to transform them into
competitive State-owned businesses by removing their monopoly status wher-
ever possible, and transferring any of their non-commercial obligations to other
government agencies. Managers could then become personally accountable for
SOE performance.
The view was that many government activities that could and should operate on a
commercial basis and face competition were actually a drain on public resources.
Further, those presiding over them lacked accountability for their decisions.
In December 1985, the government announced the principles it would apply
to SOEs in the future. These principles were subsequently incorporated into
legislation. The Attorney General and Deputy Prime Minister, Geoffrey Palmer,
developed an umbrella statute to streamline the reform process. This became the
State-Owned Enterprises Act, adopted in December 1986, and which came into
effect in April 1987. At that time, nine government entities became SOEs. In
December 1987, Roger Douglas announced the government’s intention of sig-
nificantly reducing its debt position through a programme of asset sales. During
the next two years, major privatizations included the Bank of New Zealand,
Petrocorp, New Zealand Steel, the New Zealand Shipping Corporation, State
Insurance, and Telecom.
The changing status of these operations certainly resulted in greater effi-
ciency. This was manifest in both lower production costs and improvements
in customer services. There were two downsides. First, the privatization process
did not run smoothly in several instances. We discuss this in the section
‘Problems with Privatization’. Second, the promotion of more efficient oper-
ations in several large industries contributed in the short term to increased levels
of unemployment. These two matters tended to obscure many of the benefits
that resulted for New Zealand from the state-owned enterprises and privatiza-
tion agenda (Brash 1996).
Monetary Policy
Following the exchange rate crisis of July 1984, the Fourth Labour Government
was keen to develop policy approaches that would, as Roger Douglas put it,
‘Muldoon proof ’ key aspects of monetary policy (quoted in Brash 1996: 14).
Two actions were taken towards this goal, both of which removed much of the
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potential for any government to capriciously intervene in the workings of the
broader monetary system.
In March 1985, Roger Douglas announced that the New Zealand dollar
would be floated. This was a significant move. It followed discussions between
the Reserve Bank and the Prime Minister and cabinet (Lange 2005: 207). If the
New Zealand dollar had been floating in 1984, the exchange rate crisis of July 1984
would never have happened. Under the change, the Reserve Bank would no longer
announce official buy and sell rates for the New Zealand dollar. The Reserve Bank
was not required to withdraw completely from the market. It was still instructed to
act to meet the government’s requirements for foreign exchange. This was
important for debt servicing. The Bank could also monitor market trends and
developments through minor market dealings. It also retained the option of
entering the market during episodes of undue volatility to smooth exchange rate
fluctuations (Reserve Bank of New Zealand 1986: 14).
In May 1989, the government introduced the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bill
into parliament where it was passed unanimously. This legislation was world-
leading with respect to the level of independence that it accorded to the Reserve
Bank. In subsequent years, many governments developed legislative frameworks
for their central banks that were closely informed by the New Zealand model
(Bernanke and Mishkin 1997). The legislation was based on several key principles.
It was acknowledged that monetary policy can affect the rate of inflation. How-
ever, monetary policy should not be manipulated to promote faster rates of
growth or to sustain higher levels of inflation. The Reserve Bank Act explicitly
stated that monetary policy must be used for the sole task of ‘achieving and
maintaining stability in the general level of prices’. In practice, written Policy
Target Agreements are signed between the Minister of Finance and the Bank’s
Governor. This target was generally kept in the range of 0 to 2 per cent per annum.
The framework has proven very successful. Since its enactment, inflation in
New Zealand has been kept under tight control—a major improvement over the
situation in the period from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s.
Delivery, Legitimacy, and Endurance of the Reforms
The public policy innovations introduced by the Fourth Labour Government
(1984–90) have stood the test of time. While unemployment continued to rise
during the government’s term in office, inflation was slowly brought into check.
Likewise, the government’s debt situation slowly came under control, although
little debt reduction happened prior to 1990. Here, we discuss the delivery,
legitimacy, and endurance of the innovations.
All the innovations endured—including the privatization of government assets,
which was the most controversial. With the exception of the privatization
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programme, they were accorded a high degree of legitimacy from the outset. It was
well understood that market interventions had become burdensome and fre-
quently ineffectual during the Muldoon years. While the removal of subsidies to
the farming sector brought a share of pain, that pain was relieved by removal of
many import protections. The move to a more independent Reserve Bank came
after several years of a floating New Zealand dollar, which was also viewed as a key
element of market liberalization. It was non-controversial.
With respect to changes in the taxation system, the flattening of the income
tax scale was generally viewed favourably. Some members of the Labour Party
expressed concern that this was benefiting the wealthy and middle class over
the lower classes. But this was a minority view. Likewise, there were inevitable
complaints about the introduction of the goods and services tax. However, the
comprehensive nature of the tax, and efforts made to compensate the worst-off
consumers via incremental adjustments in welfare benefits ensured that the
grumbling rapidly dissipated. The creation of state-owned enterprises also
acquired rapid legitimacy. While it added to unemployment levels, the move to
achieve greater efficiency in these organizations also resulted in improved service
provision for citizen-consumers.
The privatization programme was much more problematic. That is because
asset sales can be complicated—implementation challenges were greater in this
element of the reforms than in any other discussed above. A fair amount of
privatization was initiated before 1990, and the National Government elected in
1990 continued the programme. This suggests that, overall, privatization was a
policy success. But it created major debate within the Labour government and the
Labour Party. Further, while this initiative was underway, Roger Douglas was
strongly advocating in cabinet for major changes to social policy. In this, he was
spurred on by advice from the Treasury, as illustrated in Government Manage-
ment (Treasury 1987). David Lange’s serious misgivings regarding the merits of
privatization and radical proposals for changes to social policy created a rift
between Lange and Douglas.
Problems with Privatization
During his budget speech in parliament in June 1987, Roger Douglas announced a
programme of asset sales to reduce government debt. Earlier in the year, an
experiment with partial privatization had occurred, when the government allowed
the Bank of New Zealand to raise capital through selling shares to the public.
Reflecting concerns within the broader Labour Party, David Lange was uneasy
with this new development in the policy innovations that Roger Douglas was
introducing. Following the Labour government re-election in August 1987,
Lange made changes in his cabinet designed to reduce Roger Douglas’s influence.
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While Douglas remained Minister of Finance, those who had supported him as
associate finance ministers were moved to other portfolios. One of those was
Richard Prebble, who became Minister for State Owned Enterprises. Other elem-
ents of the cabinet changes were designed to protect the social policy portfolios
from major reform efforts.
As Minister for State Owned Enterprises, Richard Prebble received his advice
from the Treasury and he remained close in his engagements with Roger Douglas.
Given Douglas’s prior announcement to privatize assets, it now fell to Prebble to
preside over the process of getting various SOEs ready for sale. Concerned by how
asset sales might be perceived by the Labour Party and the broader public, in
November 1988, David Lange moved to establish a review of the privatization
process. His view was that ministers needed to be distanced from the process, to
avoid perceptions of undue influence and corruption. When Richard Prebble
refused to consult the Labour Party over the sale of the Shipping Corporation,
Lange removed him from his role as Minister for State Owned Enterprises. In a
subsequent television interview, Prebble said that Lange was acting like a dictator.
The inevitable happened: Lange sacked Prebble from the cabinet. The privat-
ization process continued. Views on how it faired are mixed. Jarrod Kerr and
colleagues (2007) provide a positive assessment, noting that the asset sales greatly
increased the size and value of the New Zealand share market, and that those who
bought shares in privatized companies tended to receive better returns than the
market average. Others have been more critical. For example, Brian Gaynor
(2000) has suggested that the government could have received more revenue
from its various partial and full asset sales had it managed the sales process
more carefully. A common view is that several wealthy New Zealanders and
their companies benefited greatly from the privatization process at the expense
of the government and taxpayers (Jesson 1999). Certainly, there was a degree of
exuberance and naivety about early aspects of the process. A fair assessment
would be that some sales were poorly managed. The government needed to rely
upon third parties to coordinate sales. This did not always go well. But there was
also a lot of learning during the implementation process, which stretched over
more than a decade.
The Government Falls Apart, The Reforms Endure
Although few significant changes were made to social policy during the period
from 1984–90, discussion of social policy became a further site of significant
contestation within the Fourth Labour Government. Roger Douglas and Treasury
advisers went to great lengths to dominate social policy discussions. When
Douglas launched the privatization programme in December 1987, he also
announced plans to reduce the income tax to a flat rate and to introduce a
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Guaranteed Minimum Family Income (GMFI). This announcement was viewed
as cutting across more consultative efforts regarding the direction of social
policy—most notably the work of the Royal Commission on Social Policy. In
January 1988, David Lange curtailed the flat tax and GMFI changes. From then
on, tensions between David Lange and Roger Douglas precipitated the demise of
the Fourth Labour Government.
After Richard Prebble’s sacking from cabinet in November 1988, the next
month David Lange accepted Roger Douglas’s reluctant resignation. In August
1989, when his Labour caucus colleagues voted for Roger Douglas to return to
cabinet, David Lange resigned as Prime Minister. The reform agenda of the Fourth
Labour Government ended. Former Deputy Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer
became Prime Minister, lasting in the role for little over a year. He was succeeded
by Mike Moore in September 1990. The next month, Moore led the Labour Party
into the general election. The Labour Party lost in a landslide to the National
Party. Once acrimony between Lange and Douglas boiled over into cabinet, the
Fourth Labour Government lost confidence in itself and, inevitably, the confi-
dence of the electorate.
The election of 1990 was not so much a referendum on the appropriateness
of the Fourth Labour Government’s public policy innovations. Rather, it was a
referendum on what politicians could now most effectively lead the government
into the future. Even though a new government came to power in 1990, it did
nothing to overturn the policies that Labour had introduced. Indeed, the new
National Government took those policies as foundations and built upon them.
Analysis and Conclusions
In the early 1980s, global events and the New Zealand government’s responses
to them drove the country towards economic collapse. Debt, inflation, and
unemployment grew. To address the crisis, the Fourth Labour Government
introduced public policy innovations in the style of what came to be called the
New Public Management. The innovations set New Zealand on a path towards
much improved economic conditions. Since then, governments displaying a
variety of ideological commitments faced opportunities to abandon the innov-
ations. While there has certainly been evolution and adjustment, the policies
introduced in those years remain in place. That said, as a small trading nation,
New Zealand will always be vulnerable to changing global market conditions. The
policy innovations clarified what actions might be taken to maintain broadly
positive economic conditions in the face of continuous challenges.
Given the unique nature of New Zealand democracy, its location, and its
economic foundations, care must be taken in drawing lessons for other countries
from this policy success. In closing, we suggest several lessons for policy designers.
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Periods can arise when those in power are unwilling to make policy changes, even
when evidence suggests change is necessary. When this happened in New Zealand
in the early 1980s, key advisers kept working at developing their arguments for
why change was needed and what changes would be most appropriate. They
prepared for a change of government. The relationship between the Treasury
and Roger Douglas was fundamental.
The case also seems to support the view that policy innovation occurs when
political actors take advantage of windows of opportunity (Kingdon 1995). In
1984, it was clear that old ways of managing the economy were no longer working.
There was no hope that economic circumstances would improve by doing more of
what had been done in the past. What makes this case particularly interesting is
that when we stand back from the cut-and-thrust of the politics of the period, we
see a major battle of ideas was in play. New ideas about how to govern an economy
were rapidly implemented. The short-term benefits that came from the policy
innovations were sufficient to sustain their political legitimacy. That legitimacy
ensured the innovations remained in place and could subsequently deliver longer-
term benefits.
This case also underscores that sound policy innovation takes time. Time is
required to determine appropriate directions forward and to consult about design
issues. Through listening and working with others—even those who might have
strong objections to a proposal—it is possible for advocates of change to improve
policy design and build a strong coalition to support change. The converse is also
true. Trying to win debates without listening closely to others can derail change
efforts and generate mistrust. Lost trust can be difficult to regain. The policy
innovations discussed here certainly exhibited intellectual coherence. However,
intellectual coherence is not a substitute for building and maintaining a powerful
advocacy coalition.
Given the pressures that central figures in the Fourth Labour Government
confronted, and other pressures that they created for themselves by pursuing a
fast-paced reform programme, perhaps it was inevitable that various forms of
interpersonal acrimony would develop. Further, given that the Labour Party had
many members who continued to believe in the power of government to do good
things in society, in retrospect it is hardly surprising that big clashes occurred in
cabinet. It is fruitful to reflect on this. What approaches to policy discussion, the
implementation of the privatization programme, and overall political manage-
ment might have allowed this government to serve for longer? Looking back,
Roger Douglas took the view that moving fast on multiple policy fronts was the
only way to secure fundamental changes. However, subsequent New Zealand
governments have achieved important reforms while moving more slowly and
working to ensure implementation is well managed. For example, the National-led
coalition of 2009–17 established a new programme of privatization of government
assets. Important work was done that drew on lessons from the past and that met
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considerable success. This suggests moving fast is not the only game in town.
Careful implementation planning is just as important as careful policy design.
The policy innovations introduced from 1984–90 also demonstrate that achiev-
ing success in one area of policy innovation can sometimes lay strong foundations
for achieving success in others. The reformers in New Zealand learned a lot about
how the operations of the core public service could be improved through placing
state trading activities on a commercial footing. They desired to transfer those
lessons to social policy design. However, that pursuit of intellectual coherence was
undercut by lack of sophistication in the assessment of the political feasibility of
such an agenda.
Notwithstanding the significant bumps in its trajectory, New Zealand’s eco-
nomic turnaround has been a major public policy success. Innovative public
policy changes catalysed economic growth. In the process, much was learned
about the role of government in the economy, how government might be effect-
ively managed, and how advisory systems might be structured to attend both to
present challenges and the stewardship for the future. While problems certainly
arose, the principles of policy design pursued during this reform period continue
to be of relevance in many areas of public policy, well beyond those we have
discussed.
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15
Germany’s Labour Market Policies
How the Sick Man of Europe Performed
a Second Economic Miracle
Florian Spohr
Introduction: A Sick Man’s Recovery
Not even two decades ago Germany was widely derided as ‘the sick man of the
Euro’ (The Economist 1999). A ‘slow-motion country’ (Franz and Immerfall
2003), stagnant, and ridden by political paralysis in reforming its permanent
problem (Trampusch 2003), the rigid labour market. Times have changed, and
Germany has since been praised as an ‘economic superstar’ (Dustmann et al. 2014),
a ‘jobs miracle’ (Krugman 2009), and a ‘labour market miracle’ (Burda and Hunt
2011). It has come to be held up as a ‘strong referencemodel for other countries’ and
for ‘effective, evidence-based policymaking’ (Rinne and Zimmermann 2013: 18, 19).
How has this big change of fortune and reputation been achieved? This chapter
tells the story of how the turnaround was the product of a combination of structural
reforms from 2002 onwards and short-term measures in face of the global recession
starting in 2008. Both sets of measures reinforced one another, as they both followed
an approach of ‘putting work first’ (i.e. maximizing employment).
The prioritization of employment implied a paradigm shift in Germany, which
had a long-standing reputation as a passive welfare state. The step change
towards active and rapid integration into work as a policy priority was triggered
by the so-called Hartz reforms, implemented between 2002 and 2005. Job search
assistance and monitoring gained importance, whereas ineffective job creation
schemes were abolished or reduced. These activation-focused reforms success-
fully tackled structural unemployment and increased the overall employment
rate. They strengthened Germany’s economic resilience during the 2008 eco-
nomic crisis, though crucial in mitigating the impact of the recession on
Germany’s labour market were the short-time work allowance, a time-limited
state subsidy, and instruments of working-time flexibility at the firm level to
adjust working hours to match a decline in demand, as well as two closely
spaced stimulus packages in 2008 and 2009.
The German success story is one of good reform crafting, political leadership,
and astute macro-economic crisis management benefiting from the fortuitous
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circumstances in which it occurred. It is also a tale of winners and losers. The next
section will discuss the substantive thrust as well as the contested nature of
German labour market policies. A political assessment of the Hartz reforms
classifies them as a conflicted success, one that was shaped by significant contest-
ation between supporters and opponents and yet enjoyed broad public support
and legitimacy (for the measures taken during the recession).
Assessment: A Conflicted Success
The change in German labour market policies was underpinned philosophically
by the ‘work first’ approach that has made inroads into macro-economic theory
and policy since the 1990s. The approach is defined by its overall philosophy that
any job is a good job and that the best way to succeed in the labour market is to
join it. Employment is both the goal and the expectation (Brown 1997). The goal
to lower unemployment and to increase employment meant a paradigm shift in
German welfare state’s policy philosophy, which traditionally had been domin-
ated by income maintenance concerns. High unemployment had long been
addressed by taking surplus labour out of the labour market using early retirement
schemes, and shifting the unemployed to benefits and programmes that did not
conduce towards swift reintegration into the labour market (Eichhorst et al. 2006).
Programmatic Assessment
Programmatically the German labour market policies of the 2000s were a great
success to the extent that they delivered on their core purpose: they significantly
enhanced employment, reduced unemployment, and continued to do so even
during the 2008 economic crisis. The Hartz reforms’ explicit focus on integration
into work increased the overall matching efficiency and the flexibility of the
German labour market. By enhancing commodification, the degree to which
individuals are dependent on the market for income and compensation (Esping-
Andersen 1990), more unemployed took up less-paid work (Bonin 2013: 148),
which resulted in smaller wage pressure during collective negotiations. Combined
with a decrease in collective agreements this led to an average reduction of 2 per cent
of unit labour costs in Germany between 2000 and 2007, compared with an
average increase of 22 per cent amongst all other OECD countries in the same
period (Dingeldey 2007; Caliendo and Hogenacker 2012; Mohr 2012). These
measures resulted in a decrease of unemployment that started in 2005 and that
became even more impressive when it continued following the global recession of
2008/9. Figure 15.1 highlights Germany’s remarkable record when compared to
that of the average of the EU fifteen states.
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The reforms enabled the effective tackling of unemployment even during the
worst recession in post-war history which acted as a major test for the economy’s
robustness (Rinne and Zimmermann 2013). Stronger incentives to work and
better matching between labour demand and supply in the period before the
recession were considered as one of the main reasons for the mild increase in
unemployment during this time (Caliendo and Hogenacker 2012). In addition,
stimulus packages, the short-time work allowance, and instruments to increase
working-time flexibility proved to be successful, both from an economic and
socio-political point of view (Bothfeld et al. 2012). By enabling German firms to
retain skilled workers and securing individuals’ on-the-job skills, these measures
were in line with a work first approach. Subsequently, the positioning of German
firms on a global scale recovered and Germany experienced its highest levels of
employment ever (Hassel 2015), spurred on by the rising employment rates of










































































































Figure 15.2 Germany’s employment rates, 1998–2016 (percentage of population)
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Process Assessment
In terms of process assessment, Germany’s labour market policies successfully
contrast the difficulty of accomplishing significant change in public policies.
Historical institutionalism assumes initial choices to increase the cost of adopting
once-possible alternatives; formal and informal ‘veto-points’ tend to lock existing
policy arrangements into place and push reform agendas in the direction of
incremental adjustments to existing arrangements (Pierson 2001). The processual
success was to disrupt path dependency and incrementalism by circumventing
stalemate in the corporatist policymaking with the convening of a commission, the
Hartz Committee, to prepare a reform of the labour market. Although the restruc-
turing of policy design processes enhanced the problem-solving capacity, it reduced
procedural justice since social partnership negotiations serve the legitimization of
government actions; governments especially incorporate trade unions into policy-
making and implementation for their own political support (Hassel 2009).
Political Assessment
In political assessment terms, Germany’s labour market reforms were not a
complete but more like a ‘conflicted success’ (McConnell 2010). Their passage
and impacts were heavily contested between supporters and opponents, part-
icularly their goals of recalibration and cost containment in labour market
policies. While business and employer associations as well as conservative and
liberal parties supported the Hartz reforms, unions, social welfare organizations,
leftist parties, and parts of the public criticized social cutbacks. The case suggests
that unambiguous, balanced, un-muddied policy success is hard to achieve in the
‘new politics of the welfare state’, where restructuring ‘generally requires officials
to pursue unpopular policies that must withstand the scrutiny of both voters and
well-entrenched networks of interest groups’ (Pierson 1996: 143–4).
Not only does a trade-off between different success dimensions exist (in our case
programmatic at the cost of process and political performance), but perspectives
necessarily differ. Success is subjective; there is a high level of conflict over whether
the policy has succeeded or failed. Depending on whether the focus is on the success
resulting from specific measures such as the lowering of unemployment rates, or the
failures associated with their outcomes such as a growing low-wage sector, sup-
porters and critics portray the paradigm change initiated with the Hartz reforms as
either a ‘blessing’ (Straubhaar 2012) or a ‘misery’ (Dörre 2013). The assessment
differs between scholars focusing on macro-economic effects who argue that a more
flexible German labour market was necessary (Krugman 2009; Straubhaar 2012;
Bonin 2013) and those focusing on social impacts assessing them as a ‘producer of
poverty’ (Butterwegge 2015) and a ‘working-poor trap’ (Unger 2015).
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Identifying the winners and losers of the last two decades of German labour
market policies is a complex task. While economy overall and employers are clearly
on the winning side, labour market outsiders also benefited from measures such as
job placements and counselling (made available to the unemployed without the
right to claim social insurance benefits). Until 2005, the granting of active measures
was according to the principle of equivalence between contributions and benefits
restricted to (former) labour market participants who qualified for social insurance-
based schemes (Gronbach 2012: 47–8). In the conservative welfare regime (Esping-
Andersen 1990), labour market insiders benefit from such a status-preserving
policy—even at the cost of higher job entry barriers for outsiders (Klenk 2012).
The Hartz reforms’ partial deviation from the conservative regime (Spohr 2016)
placed formerly well-earning unemployed in a worse position. Germany’s elaborate
schemes of status-protecting income replacement were reduced to twelve months,
respective eighteen months for older unemployed. However, job insiders, in par-
ticular skilled workers in the manufacturing sectors, benefited from the short-term
allowance and the stimulus packages aiming at job security.
Endurance Assessment
Conflicted success is still a ‘success’ in the sense that policy norms and instru-
ments survived intact (McConnell 2010: 58–61). Indeed, until now the most
controversial parts of the Hartz IV law have not been terminated or substantially
changed and no fundamental revision of the work first paradigm has occurred.
The relative robustness of success can also be illustrated by highlighting the fact
that during the economic recession, unions and employer organizations were
reincorporated into policymaking to build a broad political coalition. The social
partners’ rapid consensus to implement the short-time work allowance is regarded
as a fundamental criterion for the success of this measure, since it was embedded
in other flexibility strategies at the firm level (Bogedan 2012; Eichhorst and
Weishaupt 2013). So, over time, both the inclusiveness (a process component)
and breadth and depth of the societal legitimacy (a political component) of
German labour market policies have improved. The overall endurance of success
can therefore be rated highly.
Policy Narrative: A One-Two Punch on Unemployment
Stalemate: German Labour Market Policies in the 1990s
German Labour market policies have traditionally been shaped by values and
characteristics of the Bismarckian social security system. Since this model is
primarily financed by contributions, it pursues an equivalence of contributions
and benefits. In doing so, the German welfare state is a prime example of the
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conservative welfare regime, for which the preservation of social status is central
(Esping-Andersen 1990). This manifested itself most clearly in its dualist system
of unemployment benefits, where entitlements varied according to an applicant’s
previous employment record. While those without entitlement to social insurance
benefits received the means-tested Sozialhilfe (social benefit), previously perman-
ently employed were granted generous income-oriented benefits of long duration.
For up to thirty-two months of unemployment, the contribution-based Arbeitslo-
sengeld (unemployment benefit) functioned as wage substitution and was followed
by the Arbeitslosenhilfe (unemployment assistance), an income-oriented benefit
usually notably above the social benefits.
The pronounced status-preserving function of German labour market
policies had four adverse consequences for the integration of the unemployed
into work. First, linking unemployment benefits to the former salary set a high
reservation wage, which some economists and politicians assume to dampen
incentives to take up work although no empirical findings prove this lock-in
effect (Bothfeld et al. 2012: 342). Second, the unemployed were only obliged to
take up work matching their qualifications and experience. The principle of
occupational protection defined the suitable job an unemployed had to accept as
more or less adequate to the position held before. Third, policies aimed to
secure employment of the contribution payer perceived as (male) breadwinner.
During periods of rising unemployment, the priority was on excluding certain
groups from the labour market. Early retirement schemes lowered employment
rates of the elderly, and tax advantages for married sole earners acted as incentives
for one spouse to not work (Heinze 2006: 53). These measures curtailed
market participation of the elderly and women (see Figure 15.2). Fourth, employ-
ment promotion and labour market protection focused on (male) skilled workers.
The downside of this approach is growing social inequality and labour market
segmentation between regular and discontinuously occupied persons, particularly
a near-permanent exclusion of low qualified labour (Bothfeld et al. 2012).
Whereas at the beginning of the 1990s unemployment was relatively low in
Germany, it rose between 1991 and 1998 from 5.5 to 9.8 per cent, which was
particularly concerning since the EU average level of unemployment remained
constant at the same time. This relative deterioration could mainly be attributed to
the consequences of the German reunification in the year 1990. The originally West
German labour market regulation that was adopted after unification excluded large
parts of East Germany’s often low-skilled workforce, since their productivity growth
lagged behind their wage growth (Heinze 2006). In this unique situation, a massive
expansion of job creation schemes and short-time work were regarded as a necessity
to compensate the economic losers of Germany’s reunification. That attempt,
however, brought no large-scale reintegration into the labour market (Heinelt and
Weck 1998; Heinelt 2003).
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A low employment rate in combination with high expenditures on labour
market policies increased non-wage labour costs in Germany’s contribution-
based unemployment insurance system. High labour costs represent a competitive
disadvantage in the European Common Market and act as a barrier for labour
market outsiders by hampering the expansion of employment in the low-wage
sector. For example, the slow growth of jobs in the service sector was considered as
a reason that a large part of the population remained inactive (Heinze 2006) and
may have contributed to an increase in long-term unemployment from 3.1 per cent
in the year 1993 to 4.7 per cent five years later.
Concerns about the state of the labour market dominated Germany’s 1998
federal election campaign. After sixteen years the coalition of Christian Democrats
(CDU/CSU) and Liberals (FDP) led by Chancellor Helmut Kohl that had overseen
unification was voted out of office and replaced by a coalition of Social Democrats
(SPD) and the Greens. In his new government’s first policy statement, Chancellor
Gerhard Schröder (SPD) named the high unemployment rate the most pressing
and painful problem (Schröder 1998) and promised to reduce the number of
unemployed from 4.2 million to less than 3.5 million within his first term.
Unemployment policy was now Chefsache, and the necessary reform effort
would be driven by the Chancellery.
Grouped around the German Chancellery were the main advocates of work first
policies who touted labour market reform as the solution to the problems of low
employment, high expenditures on benefits, and the absence of incentives and
assistance for the unemployed to find work (Spohr 2015, 2016). The so-called
‘Blair/Schröder manifesto’—co-authored by Schröder and British Prime Minister
Tony Blair, made a first attempt to set a ‘new supply-side agenda for the left’. It
gave priority to ‘investment in human and social capital’ in combination with
policies according to ‘the principle of rights and responsibilities going together’.
Long-term unemployed were expected to reintegrate into the labour market.
Additional policies to ‘make work pay’ for individuals and families as well as the
introduction of a low-wage sector were announced (Blair and Schröder 1999).
However, the defined goals of equal opportunity, social integration, and full
employment challenged the Bismarckian perception of a status-preserving wel-
fare state. Labour market deregulation and the principle that social rights
entail the duty to reintegrate into work were new at the time in Germany.
Hence, the Blair/Schröder manifesto met with resistance from sections of
Schröder’s own Social Democratic party, the unions, and the public (Schmidt
2000; Heinelt 2003). The critics focused on preserving existing jobs through
high dismissal protection and by reducing labour supply via early retirement—
even though this raised entry barriers for outsiders (Klenk 2012). The size and
vehemence of the backlash led Chancellor Schröder to a momentary retreat.
This was part of a pattern. Particularly in Germany, where the broad middle
class’s sense of entitlement protects the welfare state from radical reforms
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(Merkel 2001), efforts to reduce expenditure by cutting benefits or tightening
eligibility can threaten broad voting blocs. The political costs of adopting radical
reforms were considerable, and hence incremental, path-dependent policy evo-
lution was the norm (Pierson 2001).
The corporatist structure of Germany’s prevailing policy style formed another
hurdle for deep policy change. German corporatism is characterized by large
interest organizations cooperating amongst themselves and with ministers, par-
liamentarians, members of the civil service, and representatives of interest groups.
Particularly in labour market policy, proposals for change are more often than
not pre-cooked and smoothed over in negotiations between trade unions and
employer groups. Public policymaking in effect becomes a function of bargaining
between the social partners rather than the political programme of the govern-
ment of the day. Those ‘social partners’ naturally only reach settlements that are to
their mutual advantage (Lehmbruch 1979; Czada 2003).
Initially, Schröder’s red-green coalition government relied on this established
pattern of policymaking and proposed a tripartite social pact, the Bündnis
für Arbeit (Alliance for Jobs). As part of crafting this pact, the Chancellery set
up a benchmarking group to identify proposals for an enhancement of the
employment rate. The group suggested to widen the low-wage sector by introdu-
cing non-tariff zones, and to strengthen the incentives to take up low-paid jobs by
tightening eligibility and integrating the two types of benefit schemes for long-
term unemployed (Arbeitslosenhilfe and Sozialhilfe) on a low level (Fels et al.
1999). Fearing an erosion of standard wages (Patzwaldt 2007), the unions vetoed
these proposals. In general, given the social pact’s goal of cost containment, the
proportional interest representation of government, unions, and employers in the
pact’s steering committee resulted in a permanent stalemate. The social partners
were simply unwilling to make concessions (Schmid 2003), revealing the institu-
tional limitations of corporatist bargaining: despite the growing need for deep
reform, none was forthcoming.
This stalemate persisted throughout the coalition’s first four-year term. Although
the Chancellery was aware that much more needed to be done in labour
market policy, in the run-up to the 2002 federal elections no one in the coalition
was willing to touch this political ‘hot potato’. This confirmed Tufte’s (1978)
assumption that cutbacks are mostly made after elections, while before them
governments are prone to implement social policies to the benefit of voters (see
also Vis 2010, 2016).
A First Punch: The Hartz Reforms
In a situation where welfare state restructuring requires governments to pursue
policies that are unpopular among voters and interest groups, timing is important.
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At certain times, circumstances may make it much easier to get a policy adopted
than at others. Such a ‘window of opportunity’ when change is possible (Kingdon
2003; Zahariadis 2007) opened in January 2002. Uncovered manipulated statistics
in the Federal Labour Office (FLO) caused a political scandal (Vermittlungsskan-
dal) and highlighted labour market policies to be ineffective. The FLO had falsified
its success rate, claiming it had found work for around half of the unemployed
while in fact it had only placed less than one in five of its clients into work.
A subsequent investigation found that 70 per cent of employment cases were
being mishandled (Gaskarth 2014: 10).
This high-profile scandal provided Chancellor Schröder with both the incentive
and the momentum to momentarily circumnavigate corporatist structures and
seize the initiative on labour market policy. He convened a blue-ribbon commis-
sion to prepare a reform of the FLO. The so called ‘Hartz Committee’ (after its
chair Peter Hartz, a human resources executive at the Volkswagen AG and a well-
known advocate of new employment programmes) became the key actor in the
policy design process. Ostensibly coordinated by the Ministry of Labour, overall
control of the Committee’s work remained at the Chancellery, operating discreetly
in the background (Schmid 2003).
The Hartz Committee helped to circumvent the veto-prone corporatist policy
formulation. The recent scandal had delegitimized the social partners who were
involved in the implementation of policies and in the administration of the
FLO. Although some members of the commission were employed by the peak
bodies of unions and employers, they were handpicked by the Chancellery and
Peter Hartz. They were selected according to whether they took a sanguine view of
free market forces, were willing to compromise, and agreed to not represent the
interests of their associations. Notably, the two most important employers’ organ-
izations, the German Confederation of Employers’ Associations (BDA) and Fed-
eration of German Industry (BDI), as well as the German Confederation of Trade
Unions (DGB) were not included. The incorporation of technical expertise and
reduced participation of interest groups enabled a more evidence-based approach
to design policies that had been consistently rejected by organized interests within
the Bündnis für Arbeit. The other side of the coin of this more constrained and
top-down approach was that key stakeholders felt excluded and claimed the
process lacked legitimacy.
In June 2002, Peter Hartz released interim conclusions to test the public opinion.
On the wings of broadly positive responses in mass media, among economic actors
and in academia, Schröder announced that the Hartz Committee’s concepts would
be inscribed into law, even before the commission had drawn up its full report.
The final report was released six weeks before the 2002 election. Its thirteen
‘innovation modules’ recommended a shift towards an activating labour
market policy aiming at a rapid integration into work (Kommission Moderne
Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt 2002). Schröder campaigned on his
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commitment to the Hartz reform package, announcing if he were to be re-
elected Chancellor, it would be a key component of the coalition agreement in
the case of re-election. It proved to be a vote-winner: indeed, public support for
the Hartz Concept contributed to what ended up as surprising electoral victory
of the red-green coalition.
The decision-making process was shaped by a steering group formed to force
the reforms through including Chancellor Schröder, Peter Hartz, and Wolfgang
Clement, head of the new Ministry of Economics and Labour. Strategic conces-
sions to the unions and to the conservative majority in the Bundesrat—Germany’s
upper house representing the federated states (Länder)—ensured the bills’ unusually
speedy passage (Spohr 2015: 193–4). At the same time, the reform package was
carefully sequenced; those measures that were politically and technically easiest to
implement were adopted first to enhance momentum and create ‘quick wins’
(Gaskarth 2014).
The Hartz agenda was legislated in four laws. The first and the second law came
into effect on 1 January 2003. Hartz I introduced stricter availability criteria by
redefining the concept of ‘reasonable employment’. Its interpretation meant that
the long-term unemployed had to accept almost any job offer regardless of their
former living standards or their achieved educational status. In addition, the
burden of proof determining whether a job offer was reasonable was reversed: it
was no longer the employment agency making the case for the reasonableness of
the job offered; instead the client had to demonstrate its unreasonableness. At the
same time, Hartz I increased the support for vocational education and deregu-
lated temporary work by setting up Personal-Service-Agenturen (staff services
agencies) operating as temporary employment agencies to place unemployed
with employers. Hartz II introduced new schemes to subsidize employment in
short-term and part-time roles (Minijobs and Midijobs) with higher thresholds
for taxes and social insurance payments for employees and less worker protec-
tion, as a means to encourage employers to hire more staff. A grant for entre-
preneurs, known as Ich-AG (Me, Inc.), was introduced to encourage unemployed
people to start their own businesses.
The first two Hartz laws had an ambivalent impact. Although more long-term
unemployed took up work and the low-wage sector expanded as intended,
temporary work, Mini- and Midijobs hardly built a bridge into regular employ-
ment (Beckmann 2019), but rather forced people into low-wage jobs, thus leading
to a growing number of ‘working poor’.
Hartz III came into effect on 1 January 2004 and reformed job centres according
to the New Public Management philosophy to put a stronger emphasis on job
search. It increased the number of employment agents significantly to improve
job placement. This organizational restructuring enabled a better matching of
unemployed with measures supporting job search and training. It has since come
to be regarded as one of the most impactful reforms (Bonin 2013).
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The most controversial element of the reforms and the main reason for the
conflicted nature of its success came into effect with Hartz IV on 1 January 2005.
The maximum duration of the insurance-based unemployment benefit (Arbeit-
slosengeld I) was reduced to eighteen months for persons older than 55 and twelve
months for regular unemployed. Since then, only the short-term unemployed
receive an earnings-related benefit at 60–67 per cent of their previous net income,
depending on family status, and the long-term unemployed were only entitled to
the tax-funded and means-tested Arbeitslosengeld II (ALG II, commonly known as
Hartz IV ), which integrated the former Arbeitslosenhilfe and Sozialhilfe into a new
unemployment benefit at the level of basic social assistance. For people in this
category any job offer could be deemed reasonable. ALG II is means-tested,
including property value, which serves as an additional incentive to take up
lower paid jobs before falling into long-term unemployment. Especially among
the highly qualified, this contributed to a significant decline in short-term
unemployment (Clauss and Schnabel 2008).
Hartz IV became the symbol for the break with the principles of the Bismarck-
ian ‘social insurance state’. While the Christian-Democratic and Liberal oppos-
ition parties and employers supported the reforms, trade unions and welfare
organizations protested against cuts in unemployment benefits. Opposition was
strongest in East Germany where the long-term unemployed had been entitled to
relatively high and unlimited earnings-related benefits, a legacy of GDR-era full
employment policies. The flat-rate benefit ALG II was perceived as a severe loss of
entitlement (Eichhorst et al. 2006). Voter discontent with the Hartz reforms
eventually resulted in a significant decline in political support for the Social
Democrats and in the autumn of 2005 the red-green government was defeated
in general elections.
The period following the passage and implementation of the Hartz I–IV laws
was characterized by ongoing programme evaluation as well as abortive attempts
to wind back certain measures. In 2007, the so-called ‘grand coalition’ of Christian
Democrats and Social Democrats led by Chancellor Angela Merkel extended the
maximum duration of the insurance-based Arbeitslosengeld I for the elderly up to
twenty-four months. Although the government justified the move as a necessary
correction in the interest of social justice, it also reconfirmed its commitment to
the work first approach by introducing wage subsidies of up to 50 per cent and
one-year grace periods for firms hiring unemployed of over 50 years of age.
Effective programme evaluation underpinned periodic fine-tuning of the reforms.
The Labour Market Instruments Reorientation Act (Gesetz zur Neuausrichtung
der arbeitsmarktpolitischen Instrumente) of 21 December 2008 reduced the
range of policy instruments and made them more manageable for employment
agencies. Job creation and rotation schemes that had had little impact
were terminated; other measures that had shown potential were reinforced.
Successful instruments for temporary work, activation and job placement were
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merged in a single measure (Maßnahmen zur Aktivierung und beruflichen
Eingliederung, § 45 SGB III). A new budget for job search assistance (§ 45 SGB
III) was introduced, uniting existing support to take up vocational training or
work (Oschmiansky and Ebach 2012; Rinne and Zimmermann 2013).
A Second Punch: Tackling Recession
Following the Hartz reforms the German labour market made impressive
progress in reducing unemployment. Long-term unemployment decreased
whereas employment of elderly workers increased (as shown in Figures 15.1
and 15.2). Low-skilled labour became more productive. These developments put
the economy into a relatively strong position when in late 2008 the crisis hit the
country (Rinne and Zimmermann 2012). The ‘Great Recession’ of 2008–9 was the
worst global recession since the ‘Great Depression’ in the 1930s. It caused a
general economic decline, particularly in North America and Europe, and
changed the context of German labour market policies. The first consequences
became visible in Germany’s main economic pillars: exports and manufacturing.
At the end of 2008, order volumes in the metal and the chemical industry declined
dramatically by 35 and 20 per cent respectively (Haipeter 2012: 392–3) and posed
a threat to Germany’s fledgling economic recovery.
The government reacted in November 2008 with a relatively modest
stimulus package of 11.8 billion euros. It included tax reliefs for firms and private
households to stabilize consumption and an extension of the short-time
work allowance (Kurzarbeitergeld) from twelve to initially eighteen months. The
short-time work allowance is a time-limited state subsidy from the Federal
Employment Agency to adjust working hours due to a cyclical decline in demand.
Its extension was appreciated by employers as well as unions, since it had
proven to be effective in past crises. Given the speed and depth of the global
economic downturn, unions demanded another stimulus package just weeks after
the first one was announced. They suggested a scrapping bonus for old passenger
cars to stimulate consumers to buy new ones (Brenke 2010; Eichhorst and
Weishaupt 2013).
In December 2008, a crisis summit was held to stem the tide. For the first time
in years the government resurrected the corporatist scenario and invited top
officials from employers’ associations and unions as well as senior corporate
leaders to the Chancellery. This Konjunkturgipfel was designed to incorporate
the social partners in the policy design, but stopped short of trying to revive old-
style social pacts as an institutionalized pattern of policymaking. No mutual
commitments or regular consultations ensued from the summit (Rehder 2009:
270; Haipeter 2012). The main purpose of the summit was to orchestrate a show of
unity and dramatize that the crisis was being managed responsibly.
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At the peak of the crisis, unions and employer associations formed an
alliance of convenience to achieve a superordinate goal: maintain Germany’s
industrial strength while securing employment. The global recession mainly
affected Germany’s export-oriented manufacturing sector, where skilled labour
in the best-managed and successful companies had become increasingly scarce.
Against the broader background of population ageing and expected future short-
ages of skilled labour, firms had a strong interest in retaining their qualified
workforce even while exports were momentarily falling. This aligned with the
unions’ lobbying for measures to secure employment and to stimulate demand
while riding out the crisis (Haipeter 2012: 391–3; Rinne and Zimmermann 2012).
Capitalizing on this convergence, in January 2009 the government launched a
second stimulus package, worth 50 billion euros. It encompassed public invest-
ment in education, training, and infrastructure. The duration of the short-time
work allowance was expanded to twenty-four months and restructured with the
Federal Employment Agency footing half of the social insurance contributions
bill. In addition, a car allowance rebate system (Abwrackprämie, ‘cash for clunk-
ers’) subsidized the acquisition of new cars, supporting car manufacturers on a
global scale with a particular focus on the protection of skilled workers in export-
oriented industries. This measure alone is estimated to have saved at least 20,000
jobs (Eichhorst and Weishaupt 2013: 321–2; Hassel 2015: 119).
However, the crucial labour market policy in mitigating the recession’s impact
was short-term employment, a policy that had been used immediately after
German reunification to curb rising unemployment (Heinelt and Weck 1998;
Schmid 2017). Its theory was that keeping people in jobs contributes to the
maintenance of skills, because a longer time in unemployment devalues human
capital. The same logic was applied in 2009. To improve employees’ employability,
the short-time work allowance was constructed in a way that costs for firms were
lowest when short-term employment was combined with qualification measures
(Bogedan 2012). At its peak, 1.14 million workers were protected from unemploy-
ment through the scheme, mostly in the manufacturing sector (Seeleib-Kaiser
2015: 192).
German firms also did their share of the work, which proved crucial to
Germany’s exceptional labour market performance during the economic crisis.
They chose to keep rather than shed labour. Drawing on a suite of flexible labour
market instruments that had evolved incrementally over the past thirty years,
firms had some margin for manoeuvre in using internal flexibility to protect their
investment in skilled workers (Caliendo and Hogenacker 2012: 13; Reisenbichler
and Morgan 2012). Accordingly, at the peak of the crisis, in May 2009, nearly one
million workers in the metal industry (more than one in four) were in short-term
employment (Haipeter 2012: 399).
The short-time work allowance and the instruments of working-time flexibility
are estimated to have preserved between 600,000 (Brenke 2010: 45; Eichhorst
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and Weishaupt 2013: 322) and 1.2 million jobs (Haipeteter 2012: 401). From the
employees’ perspective, these measures helped them keep their jobs. From
the firms’ perspective, it had a long-term positive effect on unit labour costs.
With demand bouncing back by 2010, German firms were in a great position to
step in, and the German economy experienced the highest employment levels ever
(Hassel 2015: 120–1).
Conclusions: Lessons, and Challenges
What broader insights and lessons emerge from the German experience in
labour market policy? It should be acknowledged that policy mixes like the
Hartz reforms—activating the unemployed, improving their employability, and
making low-skilled labour productive—had already been implemented quite
successfully in social democratic Scandinavian welfare states such as Denmark
and Sweden as well as in liberal Anglo-Saxon systems such as the United Kingdom
and the United States since the 1980s. Clearly, these work first measures have
proved to be transferable across different economic contexts, and for that reason
both the European Employment Strategy and the OECD Jobs Strategy promote
them.
The second part of the German success story—its measures taken during the
economic crisis—is more contingent upon its pre-existing economic model
(Hassel 2015). This limits how broadly this strategy can be applied to other
countries where conditions such as an export-oriented economy and a system of
industrial relations that prioritizes job security over wage increases do not apply.
Tariff policies regulations taken by the social partners before the crisis enabled
firms to keep their workforce, but such options for a collective reduction or
redistribution of work time do not exist in many other countries. In addition, it
is doubtful whether securing jobs through a flexible management of working time
would have proved sustainable and effective had the crisis not been cut short by
the export-driven upswing since the second half of the year 2009. Thus, astute
macro-economic crisis management went hand in hand with considerable luck,
which cannot be replicated (Haipeter 2012: 402; Knuth 2015).
Despite these limitations in generalizing this case as a blueprint for labour
market policy success, four lessons might be drawn for policy design, political
management, and policy leadership. The first lesson is to implement a policy idea,
not an ideological dogma. Neither ‘austerity’ nor ‘deregulation’ has been at the
centre of the reforms. Actually, money spent on labour market policies has not
been reduced but redistributed from passive benefits to job seeker services
and activating measures for the unemployed and other target groups (Spohr
2015: 200). The deregulatory component of the Hartz reforms (e.g. the cutting
of dismissal protection) was modest and was not essential to their success. Indeed,
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the Hartz reforms have mostly been about bringing people into real work rather
than keeping them on benefits or occupied in public employment and training
programmes. The same goes for ‘austerity’measures: there were no spending cuts
for their own sake, but rather adjustments and consolidation of previous spending
levels (Rinne and Zimmermann 2013; Knuth 2015). At the same time, there was
purposeful, growth-oriented public investment. Even though economic liberals
warned against repetition of the failures of a Keynesian policy when the first calls for
stimulus packages occurred (e.g. Straubhaar et al. 2009), the German government
successfully implemented a ‘virtually Keynesian employment policy’ (Schmid 2017:
14) in line with its Hartz-led work first approach. Its crisis measures were generally
short-term, closely monitored, and included education and training. The use of
public resources to foster growth was successful because it was combined with
structural labour market reforms.
A second lesson is that flexible adjustment of the policy instrument mix makes
an important contribution to reaching the overall policy objectives (Sabatier and
Weible 2007). Ongoing programme evaluation provided early warning of inef-
fective policy instruments, which were then duly terminated, reduced in scope, or
eclipsed by shifting the weight of the effort towards other instruments (Rinne and
Zimmermann 2013: 17–19). It was of fundamental importance for Germany’s
labour market success to adjust instruments to changing circumstances and new
information once the new paradigm was put into practice. As Chancellor Schröder
had observed early on, ‘trial and error is an important principle here. It seems to
become even more important when we see how complex these industrialized
societies are these days’ (Fröhlich 2000: 140). This gave licence to a preparedness
to correct even recently implemented measures. Today, hardly any of the instru-
ments introduced with Hartz I and Hartz II are being applied, as Germany’s
economic circumstances have changed.
Third, to secure success over time a ‘strategic centre’ with a stable guiding
coalition of key actors is important (Rüb et al. 2009). The modernist faction of the
red-green coalition grouped around the German Chancellery acted as a policy
entrepreneur (Kingdon 2003; Zahariadis 2007), advocating work first policies as
solutions for the problems of the German labour market of the late 1990s. After
theVermittlungsskandal opened a window of opportunity to set a work first agenda,
it began to act as a strategic centre steering the policy vision towards realization.
Policy continuity was enhanced in the switchover to the grand coalition following
the 2007 elections by the SPD holding on to the labour market portfolio. Olaf
Scholz, who as the Social Democrats’ secretary general had campaigned for the
Hartz reforms, became minister of labour and social affairs. He acted as the main
driver of prolonging the short-term employment allowance and setting up the
car allowance rebate scheme. Acting in tandem with Frank-Walter Steinmeier,
who had risen from head of the Chancellery under Schröder to deputy-
chancellor in Merkel’s grand coalition government, Scholz imposed the stimulus
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 25/7/2019, SPi
’    297
packages, deftly sidestepping concerns from parts of Merkel’s CDU/CSU, the
senior coalition partner.
Fourth, strategic sequencing of processes is an important precondition for
introducing reforms in difficult structural and institutional contexts. Dismantling
the corporatist structures had to take place before the ‘adhocratic’ structure of the
Hartz Committee could gain the weight that it did. Unusually in German politics,
the composition of the Hartz Committee was not about inclusion and consensus
but about expertise and a will to compromise—a logic of selecting players in
collaborative problem-solving efforts that is more conducive to policy innovation
(Crosby et al. 2017). Once the work first paradigm was enshrined in the Hartz
reform laws, it became important to reincorporate the social partners to enhance
the legitimacy of the new policies and to ensure their effective implementation.
Furthermore, Germany’s job miracle also resulted from the timely reactivation of
old corporatist practices and virtues during the economic recession (Haipeter
2012). The broad alignment of labour and capital that was forged in 2008–9
helped to avert a labour market crisis through rapid consensus to implement
the short-time work allowance (Bogedan 2012: 139; Eichhorst and Weishaupt
2013: 313).
Can the German success continue? We should not forget that the case por-
trayed here has been a conflicted success. Even to date, there is no societal
consensus on the core objectives of labour market policies, and there is a wide-
spread sense of injustice. The new normal of basic income support and the duty to
reintegrate into any work jars with long-held normative principles of status
preservation and contribution-equivalence in the German welfare state. The silent
shift in values implicit in the Hartz reforms was never satisfactorily legitimized
(Eichhorst et al. 2006; Bothfeld et al. 2012). Today, more than five million German
workers are in precarious jobs. Temporary work—Mini- and Midijobs—and the
subsidizing of low wages with social benefits have contributed to one of the
world’s fastest growing low-wage sectors. It has proven to be a working poor
trap (Unger 2015), and the jury is still out on the effectiveness of subsequent
compensatory measures—such as the introduction of a statutory minimum wage
(Knuth 2015).
A further challenge over the next decades lies in the potential clash between
technological change demanding a large supply of workers with new skill sets and
the ageing of the German population which will reduce overall labour supply
substantially (Caliendo and Hogenacker 2012). Hence, German labour market
policies need to further improve general qualification and employability of the
workforce, also regarding the medium- and long-term impacts of the demographic
‘jolt’ resulting from the 2015–16 refugee inflows, which present yet another major
contingency testing the robustness of Germany’s labour market policies. The
Hartz reforms focused primarily on job integration and the stimulus packages
during the economic crisis preserved and enhanced the skills of workers already
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employed. Labour market access is a necessary but not sufficient condition for
social integration (Bothfeld et al. 2012: 343). Sustained investment in human-
capital oriented policies will be needed to keep the former sick man healthy in
future, and to lift the prospects of the hard core of two million unemployed whose
predicament continues to cast a shadow over the German job miracle.
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Healing the Ozone Layer
The Montreal Protocol and the Lessons and Limits
of a Global Governance Success Story
Frederike Albrecht and Charles F. Parker
Introduction
TheMontreal Protocol—the international regime designed to protect the stratospheric
ozone layer—has widely been hailed as the gold standard of global environmen-
tal governance and is one of the few examples showing that international
institutional cooperative arrangements can successfully solve complex trans-
national problems. Although the stratospheric ozone layer still bears the impacts
of ozone depleting substances (ODSs), the problem of ozone depletion is on its
way to being solved and the ‘ozone hole’ has started healing due to the protocol.
What explains this success and what can we learn from it in tackling other
complex global environmental problems such as climate change?
The ozone layer is crucial to protecting the earth from the sun’s ultraviolet
radiation and is essential for absorbing ultraviolet B radiation, which, in large
amounts, could seriously harm all plant, human, and animal life (Solomon 2008).
In response to scientific evidence that man-made chemicals, chlorofluorocarbons
(CFCs), posed a serious threat to stratospheric ozone the nations of the world first
negotiated a framework convention, the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protec-
tion of the Ozone Layer, and then, in response to new scientific evidence that
confirmed the Antarctic ‘ozone hole’, added a regulatory agreement, the 1987
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. The Montreal
Protocol has dramatically reduced ozone-depleting chemicals and the ozone layer
has been projected to recover by the end of the century, although some recently
discovered challenges may demand further amendments.
In this chapter, we examine how the Montreal Protocol was designed and
implemented in a way that has allowed it to successfully overcome a number of
challenges that most international environmental regimes must face: how to
attract sufficient participation, how to promote compliance and manage non-
compliance, how to strengthen commitments over time, how to neutralize or co-opt
potential ‘veto players’, how to make the costs of implementation affordable, how to
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leverage public opinion in support of the regime’s goals, and, ultimately, how to
promote the behavioural and policy changes needed to solve the problems and
achieve the goals the regime was designed to address. We will conclude that while
some of the reasons for the Montreal Protocol’s success, such as access to available
and affordable ODS substitutes, are not easy to replicate, there are many other
elements of this story that can be utilized when thinking about how to design
solutions to other transnational environmental problems.
Assessing the Montreal Protocol
There is a strong case that the Montreal Protocol has performed well on all four
dimensions of policy assessment used in this volume. To date, the protocol has
been a programmatic success in achieving its stated objectives and has made
progress towards achieving its overarching goals, which were to protect human
health and the environment against the adverse effects of activities that deplete
the ozone layer. As a result of their protocol obligations, countries have phased
out 98 per cent of ODS globally compared to 1986 levels (Ministry for the
Environment and Stats NZ 2017: 46). In 2014, the US National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) found that, after a peak in the year 2000,
the atmospheric abundance of many ODSs had sunk under 1980 levels and
predicted that the CFCs abundance would also fall below the levels of 1980
before 2050. This positive development can be connected directly to the Mon-
treal Protocol (NOAA 2014). The worldwide production of ODSs has plum-
meted from some 1.2 million tons in 1986 to 80,000 tons in 2006 to being nearly
eliminated in 2016 at 23,000 tons. Global ODS consumption has seen a similar
trend dropping from 1.3 million tons in 1986 to 86,000 tons in 2006 and 22,000
tons in 2016 (UNEP Ozone Secretariat 2018). In fact, according to the Ozone
Secretariat, in absence of the protocol, global CFC consumption would have
been about 3 million tons in 2010 and would have reached 8 million tons in
2060, which would have resulted in a 50 per cent depletion of the ozone layer by
2035 (UNEP Ozone Secretariat 2018).
In sum, there is strong scientific evidence that the Montreal Protocol is indeed
reaching the objectives it was designed to address. Achieving the objective to
phase out ODSs is illustrative of its programmatic success. In addition, one of the
goals of the policy, to close the ‘ozone hole’, is well on its way to be achieved. In
2018, researchers at NASA showed for the first time, through satellite observa-
tions, that the ‘ozone hole’ is recovering due to the reduction of chlorine from
ODSs as a direct result of the Montreal Protocol (Strahan and Douglass 2018).
The second goal of the Montreal Protocol, improving public health by
decreasing skin cancer risk, also has been deemed a success (Chipperfield et al.
2015). Although annual rates of new skin cancers in the USA and Europe are still
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increasing (CDC 2018; Boyle et al. 2004), we cannot attribute these numbers
solely to the ozone layer because there are more factors than ozone depletion
that affect skin cancer risk, e.g. the increased usage of tanning beds. Assessment
models ran by scholars that took into account the difference between the ozone
layer with and without the protocol’s regulations, estimate that roughly 2 million
cases of skin cancer will be prevented annually by the year 2030 due to the
Montreal Protocol (van Dijk et al. 2013). This suggests that there is already a
positive public health effect due to action taken under the protocol, and this
effect should increase in the future. Thus, the Montreal Protocol appears to have
delivered on its goal of reducing skin cancer risks and protecting human health,
adding to its programmatic success.
This evidence illustrates that the Montreal Protocol is clearly making progress
in achieving its objectives to protect the ozone layer through a phase-out of ODSs.
In addition to the ODS reduction achievements, the Ozone Secretariat also points
to a number of other important accomplishments, including high compliance
rates, the successful utilization of scientific evidence as a basis for policy decisions,
the delivery of health, climate, and environmental benefits, and utilization of the
financial mechanisms to support developing countries in achieving their reduc-
tion obligations (UNEP Ozone Secretariat 2015).
Politically the protocol has succeeded in attracting the participation and sup-
port of a broad coalition of developed and developing countries. The strong global
commitment to the protocol is underscored by the fact that it has achieved
universal support and has been ratified by 197 parties. Being part of the protocol
had positive effects on countries’ reputation and political capital because the
ozone depletion posed a risk for environment and public health that was shared
globally. By implication, contributing to eliminating this risk would also provide
globally shared environmental and public health benefits. The Montreal Protocol
has also succeeded, after initial opposition, in winning the support of industry
(Parson 1993: 46). By providing a stable and predictable framework that allowed
industry to transition away from ODSs to newer, less harmful, and affordable
substitutes the protocol has been good for industry and the environment
(Haq et al. 2001: 134–5; Rae 2012).
In process terms, the structure and management of negotiations contributed to
reaching a strong and innovative international regulatory agreement. The flexible
design, system for implementation, and compliance procedures of the Montreal
Protocol have created effective processes that have contributed to its success in
attracting universal participation, increasing its ambition over time, and achieving
stated objectives. The flexible design that operates according to the precautionary
principle resulted in setting stringent ODS abatement targets before the science
was conclusive and allowed ambition to be increased once the science indicated
that stronger action was needed. The inclusion of trade sanctions against
non-parties and the provision of financial incentives to developing countries
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encouraged countries to join the protocol and helped to rather quickly achieve full
participation.
The protocol ensured that all parties had the financial and practical possibility
to implement its required provisions, such as enacting national controls, by
granting a certain degree of freedom during the process and offering financial
help to developing countries. Hence, the process could be perceived by all
participants as sufficiently fair and legitimate to encourage participation and
compliance. The protocol’s non-compliance procedures have made it possible to
utilize both positive incentives, such as funding and technical assistance, as well
as the threat to cut off funding or enact sanctions to encourage adherence with
its obligations. Not only have the initially agreed upon ODSs been successfully
phased out, the protocol, aided by provisions for regular meetings and scheduled
expert assessments and treaty reviews, has also undergone several amendments
which added new substances to be phased out over time. The implementation of
these amendments is another dimension of the procedural success of the policy.
In terms of endurance, the protocol has repeatedly succeeded in adapting and
updating its objectives and instruments. To remain effective over time, environ-
mental regimes must be able to adjust and adapt to changing circumstances that
occur after the initial agreement. The Montreal Protocol has proven to be adept at
responding to new information and challenges by strengthening its provisions
(Young 2011). Annual meetings combined with periodic scientific assessments
and treaty reviews have facilitated a process that has allowed the Montreal
Protocol to update its targets and increase its ambition while maintaining political
support among its members. The protocol’s Meeting of the Parties (MOP) has
acted repeatedly to accelerate phase-out schedules for individual ODSs already
covered and by adding additional chemicals to the list of those covered under the
terms of the agreement as soon as more ambitious goals became economically and
politically feasible (Andersen and Sarma 2002; Parson 2003). Its control provi-
sions were strengthened through five amendments, which accelerated phase-outs
and added additional substances, adopted in London (1990), Copenhagen (1992),
Montreal (1997), Beijing (1999), and Kigali (2016).
Adding new families of chemicals to the list of those scheduled for phase-out
under the Montreal Protocol requires a decision on the part of the MOP and
acceptance on the part of member states. This stringent requirement has not been
an obstacle to strengthening commitments. Moreover, the initial success of the
agreement appears to have shaped virtuous cycles that have lowered the cost of
compliance through institutionalized deliberation and adjustment routines
during the MOPs. The Montreal Protocol now covers some 100 hazardous
chemicals. Interestingly, some of the ODSs are greenhouse gases (GHG) that
also contribute to climate change and the implementation of and compliance to
the Montreal Protocol was so successful that research found the Montreal Proto-
col to have had more benefits for climate change mitigation than the Kyoto
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Protocol (Velders et al. 2007). It has been estimated, for example, that the total
climate change mitigation through GHG reduction provided by the Montreal
Protocol was ten to twenty times more effective than the reduction from the
Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period (Xu et al. 2013). It has also been
claimed that a reduction of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) through the Montreal
Protocol could prevent up to 0.5°C temperature increase by 2100 through
substantial GHG emissions reduction (Zaelke et al. 2018). HFCs, which had
not been addressed in the protocol previously, have been taken up under the
latest developments of the MOP. An amendment to phase down HFCs was
adopted in 2016 in Kigali, Rwanda (Bergeson 2017). The ratification of the
Kigali Amendment by the member states is currently ongoing and it will enter
into force in 2019 (European Commission 2017). By August 2018, 42 out of 197
member states had accepted or ratified the amendment.
The Challenge: Healing and Protecting a Global
Open Access Resource
Solving vexing transnational problems such as stratospheric ozone depletion
requires states to agree to the nature of the problem, negotiate an agreement to
solve the problem, and then make the agreement work. Past experience and
research on international cooperation and efficacy of global institutions demon-
strates this is difficult to do effectively for a variety of reasons (Miles et al. 2002;
Breitmeier et al. 2006; Young 2011). There is the sheer complexity of many
transnational issues. Multilateral negotiations on issues such as ozone depletion
or climate change often involve over 190 countries and touch on a wide range of
issues in multiple policy areas. And then there is the difficulty of agreeing to a
negotiating agenda (Young 1991): even when most states agree that an issue is
important, they often have conflicting views on how the problem should be
framed and which solutions should be pursued. Also, there are the various
configurations of interests among the parties and the challenges this presents to
burden sharing. Determining what is fair can be difficult to agree on and there are
often multiple views regarding what is equitable (Keohane and Oppenheimer
2016). Veto players and public opinion can be complicating factors to reaching
an agreement and then making it work once agreed. The difficulties of cooper-
ation are also compounded by multiple levels of uncertainty. Actors don’t know at
the outset whether proposed solutions will work, whether the costs of cooperation
will be worth the benefits, nor whether other states will actually honour the
commitments they make. Finally, once an agreement is reached, if it is to succeed
it must attract a sufficient number of key states to participate, states must honour
the commitments they have made and comply with the agreement’s rules (Parker
2001, 2013).
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The degradation of the ozone layer presented a classic common pool resource
problem. Healing and protecting it from further degradation would only be
successful if these underlying collective action problems could be solved on a
global level: all large-scale producers and consumers of ODSs (namely CFCs and
halons) needed to commit to a global cooperative solution. The atmosphere is a
resource that all actors, nation-states and industries have open access to. However,
to the extent it is used, i.e. through the emission of ODSs, the resource is affected
and degrades continuously. In the absence of a comprehensive governance
arrangement it was impossible to exclude actors from harming the ozone layer
through emissions of ODSs negatively affecting global society (Epstein et al. 2014).
Hardin (1968) famously claimed that common pool resources of this type
will always be overused and ultimately destroyed due to rivalry in consumption
and the non-excludability of users. He predicted that the rational interests of
involved actors to maximize their own benefits will increase the use of the
resource to its destruction. To this day researchers remain sceptical as to
whether the international society is capable of sidestepping this tragedy of the
commons in relation to global open access resources, such as the earth’s
atmosphere (Araral 2013).
In the case of the ozone layer, the resource’s very attributes complicate the
situation and the search for a workable solution (Agrawal 2003; Epstein et al.
2013). First, the ozone layer is of global importance but effectively invisible. It is
also highly mobile, implying that the emission of ODSs does not result in direct
local consequences while also making it difficult for involved parties to see clear
benefits for any efforts to protect and heal the ozone layer. In addition, because it
takes a long time for the ozone layer to recover from the effects of ODSs, the value
of potential, but distant, benefits may not motivate participating actors that desire
more immediate gains (Epstein et al. 2014). While these resource characteristics
make it potentially more difficult for countries to become motivated to engage
in global cooperation and reduce emissions, they also highlight the fact that only
a truly global solution (without free riders) can solve the problem, as shifting
emissions to other, non-participating countries would undermine the effective-
ness of any non-comprehensive regime.
The main actors involved in the process of finding a governance arrangement
that would restrict the emission of ODSs for the protection of the ozone
layer included nation-states and international organizations including NGOs,
the European Economic Community (EEC), and, since 1972, the United Nations
Environmental Programme, which went on to host many meetings and initiatives
in this area. The industrial sector, notably in the form of ODS producers, also
participated in the negotiations. The interests of these actors diverged widely.
Some aimed for an international agreement, others felt national regulations alone
would be sufficient, and some rejected the proposition that a policy to protect the
ozone layer was needed at all.
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Different clusters of nation-states were influential in shaping, or resisting, the
negotiations to address ozone depletion. The lead states in the process, Canada,
Finland, Norway, Sweden, and the United States, eventually formed a coalition to
push aggressively for a global policy to reduce ODSs (Wettestad 2002). Many of
these countries implemented national regulations comparatively early on, partly
in collaboration with their industrial sectors. In the United States, for example,
domestic politics, environmental concerns, and pressure from a major lawsuit had
put ozone protection on the political agenda, which motivated American negoti-
ators to push for a strong global agreement (Parson 1993).
Due to the economic importance of ODS chemicals, there was also a number
of countries that opposed a control regime. Producer countries, represented by
the European Economic Community (whose position was controlled by France,
Italy, and the UK), Japan, and the Soviet Union formed one potential veto
coalition. Another potential veto coalition was composed of several large devel-
oping countries, such as Brazil, China, India, and Indonesia, which wanted the
option to produce ODSs in the future. Crafting an agreement that would be
supported by all these factions was a tall order. UNEP and its Executive Director,
Mostafa Tolba, played a central role in overcoming these obstacles by repeatedly
organizing international meetings and providing a forum for negotiations. As we
will discuss, Tolba’s leadership was instrumental in helping the various countries
reach consensus through informal deliberations in the final stages of negoti-
ations (Andersen and Sarma 2002).
The Road to Montreal
The Role of Scientific Evidence
Concerns about the potential depletion of the ozone layer by human activities
were first raised in the early 1970s in relation to supersonic transport. Although
initial scientific studies on stratospheric chlorine in Europe and the United States
did not arrive at definitive conclusions, they attracted public attention and a policy
debate ensued over ozone. One of the controversies and disagreements between
actors regarded how much scientific certainty was needed to justify policy action
to protect the ozone layer (Parson 2003). In the following years, attention shifted
from supersonic transport to the role of CFCs and their potential negative impact
on the ozone layer. Early studies, such as Molina and Rowland’s (1974) discovery
of the effect of ODSs on the ozone layer, found that ozone was negatively affected
by CFCs in the stratosphere, but did not quantify or predict the loss in ozone yet.
This research prompted a rapid increase in scientific attention and spurred policy
responses in Canada, the European Economic Community, Sweden, and the
United States to restrict the use of CFCs, mainly in aerosols (Andersen and
Sarma 2002; Parson 2003). Between 1978 and the final negotiations that led to
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the Montreal Protocol, the scientific evidence and predictions of ozone depletion
varied significantly. Predicted ozone layer depletion ranged from 15 per cent in
1978 to 3–5 per cent in 1982.
Scientific knowledge can be an important factor in informing policy-makers
about the severity of an emerging problem and contributing the needed pressure
to overcome collective action problems (Epstein et al. 2014). However, before a
firm scientific consensus is reached, users of a common pool resource will often
resist regulation and offer competing interpretations of uncertain knowledge
(Stern 2011). This was certainly the case in the debate over ozone protection
and made the establishment of international controls extremely difficult. The
variation in scientific estimates regarding potential depletion allowed several
countries to reject the necessity of an international policy regulating ODS use.
For example, the United Kingdom was sceptical whether regulation over a longer
period would be necessary as ozone layer depletion estimates had been reduced
between 1978 and 1982. Japan also repeatedly rejected any proposal to protect the
ozone layer until further scientific evidence had been compiled (Andersen and
Sarma 2002).
A breakthrough in the public debate and in the negotiations was achieved
when research provided additional hard evidence that ozone depletion was a
threat to the environment and public health. In 1985, the scientific discovery of
the so-called ‘ozone hole’ demonstrated that the loss of ozone was much larger
than could be accounted for with existing scientific models (Farman et al. 1985;
Solomon et al. 1986). This discovery served as a dramatic focusing event and the
resulting increase in global public attention to the problem of ozone depletion
created a sense of urgency about the need for a robust global policy solution.
Support among the General Public and Industry
In addition to key nation-states and environmental NGOs, the coalition that
formed around what would eventually become the Montreal Protocol also
included other actors, such as specific industrial producers of ODSs, which helped
to create broad public legitimacy for the agreement. In the case of ozone depletion,
most of the industrial sector opposed CFC controls initially, but after 1986
industries themselves started to call for controls. When one of the leading CFC
producers, the US chemical giant DuPont (25 per cent global market share in the
mid-1980s), decided to support the phasing out of many chlorofluorocarbons and
halons this made a big difference in reaching an agreement and to later efforts to
accelerate phase-out schedules under the protocol (Parson 1993).
In addition, increasing scientific evidence and the discovery of the ‘ozone hole’
created an international public discourse on the issue and how to address it.
Already in the late 1970s, researchers provided evidence that ‘a decline of ozone
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 25/7/2019, SPi
    311
by 1 per cent would ultimately lead to a 4 per cent increase in skin cancer
incidence’ (Andersen and Sarma 2002: 49). In combination with the detection
of a hole in the ozone layer, the connection between a damaged ozone layer and
increased risk for skin cancer sparked international debate. Ozone depletion
became framed as a matter of public health (Armstrong 1994; Martens 1998).
Fears for a dramatic rise in the incidence of melanomas and glaucoma connected
to increased exposure to solar radiation as a result of the thinning of the ozone
layer were an important factor that created public support for an agreement to
protect and heal the ozone layer. Ultimately, the damaged ozone layer became a
‘hot crisis’ (Ungar 1998: 510) in the media and among the general public. This
upped the ante for governments. Signing up to the protocol morphed from a
political liability (opposed by big corporate interests) into a political asset (now
supported by important segments of industry, research, the healthcare sector, and
the public at large), thus lowering the threshold for doing so and locking in the
commitment once it had been made (Patashnik 2008).
The Protocol Design and Negotiation Process
Sweden, Finland, and Norway took a prominent role in the early negotiations and
drafted the Nordic Proposal that aimed at eliminating the use of certain CFCs in
non-essential aerosols in 1983. This first proposal was the draft which would be
developed into the Montreal Protocol over the following four years. The proposal
met with both support (Denmark, United States, and Australia) and opposition
(Japan and United Kingdom). In 1985, twenty countries and the EEC signed the
Vienna Convention, the first international agreement on the protection of the
ozone layer. But the framework refrained from imposing any reduction obliga-
tions on the parties and instead served the purpose of providing monitoring and
data exchanges regarding the ozone layer (Skjaerseth 1992). Article 2b laid out
future efforts to be taken by parties of the convention, which consisted of
cooperation to achieve legislative and administrative measures to protect and
heal the ozone layer (Andersen and Sarma 2002).
In the meantime, the Nordic countries had formed the Toronto Group together
with Canada and the United States to draft a new proposal which suggested a
reduction of the total CFC use in non-essential aerosols. The proposal was met
with criticism from the EEC, which countered the draft with a suggestion to not
restrict regulations on aerosols and instead regulate the total use and production
of specific CFCs. A debate emerged between the EEC and the Toronto Group on
which measures were appropriate, during which both parties accused each other’s
proposals of failing to solve the actual problem of ozone depletion. By March
1985, the situation around these different approaches had not improved. Negoti-
ations on the proposal had not progressed significantly and ‘[d]espite many
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attempts to take at least a first step to control CFCs, the governments failed to
agree on anything concrete’ (Andersen and Sarma 2002: 64).
The impasse had to be broken. The various camps jockeyed for position and in
the following two years, a number of additional proposals were drafted by the
EEC, Canada, the United States, and the Soviet Union. The EEC advocated cutting
the total production of CFCs by 20 per cent. Canada suggested a global ODS
emissions limit that would be allocated proportionally to countries depending on
their population and gross national product. The United States suggested a freeze
on consumption instead of production of CFCs, followed by a phased reduction of
95 per cent (Parson 1993). This proposal was supported by the Nordic countries
and Switzerland. The Soviet Union suggested controlling the production of certain
CFCs and freezing CFC production no earlier than in the year 2000 (Andersen
and Sarma 2002).
A breakthrough in the negotiations was reached in 1987. One of the main
drivers to reach a consensus was Mostafa Tolba, the then Executive Director of
UNEP. He was largely responsible for a proposal draft in 1987 that summarized
control measures without demanding commitment from parties. Tolba empha-
sized the importance of informal consultations, which he used to work up a draft
proposal, as he found that during informal discussions representatives were more
willing to rethink the positions of their governments. Emerging interpersonal
respect and trust among representatives over time also made negotiations easier
(Andersen and Sarma 2002).
Following Tolba’s draft proposal, more than fifty countries, multiple industry
organizations, environmental NGOs, the UN, and a host of other actors took part
in the final, intense, negotiations in 1987 which concluded with an agreement.
Compromises were reached, for example, to make compliance with the agreement
easier for countries where future CFC production had already been planned, such
as the Soviet Union, Japan, and Luxembourg. Five CFCs and three halons fell
under the agreement in the Montreal Protocol. The decision to focus on the
production and consumption of chemicals instead of their use in different sectors
made it possible for actors such as Japan to find alternatives for their most
commonly used ODSs while reducing other gases.
The Montreal Protocol sought to achieve a reduction of both production and
consumption by 50 per cent of the aforementioned ODSs. In 1990, this objective
was upgraded to achieving a total phase-out of these ODSs by the year 2000. The
protocol furthermore offered special conditions to developing countries in order
to not harm progress in their development. The repeated international negoti-
ations, debates on various drafts for a proposal, and the compromises in the final
agreement to accommodate the specific needs and interests of particular countries
can be assessed as a successful policy process (Andersen and Sarma 2002). One
year after the protocol’s entry in force, in 1990, it had been signed by fifty-eight
parties that accounted for 90 per cent of the global CFC and halon production and
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consumption. Over time, additional countries joined and at present the Montreal
Protocol has achieved the universal ratification of 197 parties.
A crucial aspect of the Montreal Protocol was its success in overcoming
collective action problems. Widespread participation was vital, because if the
agreement was to work no substantial consumers or producers of ODSs could
remain outside the agreement. To prevent the relocation of production facilities to
countries that did not join the protocol and to create an incentive for participa-
tion, the deal included trade provisions. These provisions restricted trade in CFCs
and ODSs with non-parties (Wettestad 2002). There was in-built momentum for
change (Patashnik 2008): once the main producing countries joined the protocol,
it was only a matter of time before all countries had to join or risk not having
access to key chemicals. In 1990, the parties also decided to establish a Multilateral
Fund to encourage developing countries to join the process by providing them
with financial and technical support to phase out their use of ODSs (Andersen and
Sarma 2002).
How the Protocol Gained Its Strength
The Montreal Protocol would not be a true success story without key elements
that facilitated its implementation and earned it widespread legitimacy for its
policy obligations. First, universal ratification has prevented free riding. Second,
high levels of compliance with the phase-out obligations have been achieved by
virtually all member states. ODSs (CFCs, halons, carbon tetrachloride, methyl
chloroform, and clorobromomethane) reached a 98 per cent phase-out by 2010
(which was the scheduled goal); the remaining 2 per cent are hydrochlorofluoro-
carbons (HCFCs). For HCFCs, the current goal is to achieve phase-out by 2020,
which is an acceleration of the previous deadline of 2030 (UNEP Ozone
Secretariat 2015).
Coping with Compliance Challenges and Costs
Compliance has been described as the Achilles’ heel of international environmen-
tal regimes (Young 2011). Those who are opposed to the creation of a regime, or
participation in one, often cite the high costs involved with implementation to
justify their opposition. Technological innovation can often provide a solution.
Once a regime is in place and those actors involved in implementation begin to
give attention to how to do so efficiently, innovations can emerge that make
compliance less costly than initially expected. The ozone regime is a good example
of this (Haq et al. 2001). Producers found affordable alternatives for many ODSs
and these replacements sometimes turned out to be less expensive than the
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original chemicals. The efficiencies that were realized in the initial implementation
of the protocol have paved the way to making it easier to strengthen commit-
ments, even those that were the subject of contentious bargaining at the outset.
Research on environmental cooperation has emphasized the importance of moni-
toring and enforcement mechanisms as essential attributes to promote compliance
with agreements that govern common pool resources, such as the atmosphere
(Ostrom 1990; Stern 2011). In addition, procedures to facilitate communication
and deliberation among the partners of common pool resource governance
arrangements increase the likelihood of overcoming collective action problems
and preventing the free riding of actors who might attempt to use the resource
without complying with the agreed upon rules (Ostrom 1990, 2010). These basic
assumptions can also be found in relation to research on international regimes,
which has highlighted the importance of an institutional design that includes
both management and enforcement features to help encourage compliance
(Parker 2001).
The ‘management’ approach has stressed the importance of transparency,
dialogue among the agreement’s parties, dispute resolution procedures, and tech-
nical and financial assistance to promote compliance. The ‘enforcement’ approach
has stressed monitoring activities in conjunction with potent sanctions. Overall,
the management approach has been found to maximize compliance better in
some settings than enforcement, even in regulatory regimes (Chayes and Chayes
1995; Young 2011). Ideally, to get the best of both worlds, multilateral agreements
should be equipped with mechanisms that provide incentives (resource carrots)
for compliance while applying strong sanctions (costly sticks) for non-compliance
(Parker 2011).
A study of the Montreal Protocol’s non-compliance procedures found that
its implementation committee was most effective when the management and
enforcement approaches to compliance were blended (Victor 1998). ‘Manage-
ment avoids the most severe and unproductive antagonism, but the credible threat
of tougher actions, including sanctions, helps ensure cooperation, especially when
dealing with parties who are unswayed by management alone’ (Victor 1998: 139).
Thus, the mechanisms utilized to promote compliance with the agreement’s
obligations have been effective and illustrate further why the protocol is both a
procedural and programmatic success.
Assistance for Developing Countries
Making financial assistance available to member states that agreed to strengthen
their commitments under the Montreal Protocol was a crucial factor that facili-
tated the commitment and political support of developing countries. In the case of
the Montreal Protocol, financial arrangements are available to provide assistance
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 25/7/2019, SPi
    315
to those willing to strengthen their commitments. In 1990, an amendment was
added, which created the Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund as a way to help
developing countries (known as Art. 5 parties) to shift to non-ODSs or to pursue
development without relying on ODSs. Thus, the regime fairly distributed costs
and prevented developing countries being forced to act as free riders due to
restricted compliance capacity. It has also increased the inclusion and participa-
tion of partners, facilitating the maintenance of the maximum winning coalitions
that are generally associated with successful international environmental regimes
(Young 2011).
Distributed Leadership
The effective exercise of different modes of leadership (Parker and Karlsson 2014),
including scientific, political, and entrepreneurial leadership, from a number of
key actors has been a crucial determinant in the Montreal Protocol’s success.
Scientific leadership has been important in pinpointing the effect of ODSs on the
stratosphere and in identifying the core environmental and public health issues
that were at stake. Authoritative scientific reports on these threats have repeatedly
provided an impetus for action for negotiators and the parties. For example,
reports exposing the probable health impacts of the loss of stratospheric ozone
that came out during the mid-1980s had a strong effect on the provisions that
were included in the 1987 Montreal Protocol and, as new scientific evidence
became available, on the subsequent amendments to the agreement that acceler-
ated the phase-out schedules and added additional ODSs for elimination.
Political leadership was taken by a diverse group of actors at different stages.
The Nordic countries, led by Sweden, were particularly influential in launching
the process to negotiate an international agreement to protect the ozone layer
(Parson 1993: 37). Throughout the process, the Nordics, along with like-minded
countries such as Canada, New Zealand, and Switzerland, were continuously
involved in drafting proposals and coordinating diplomatic efforts to reach a
deal (Wettestad 2002: 160–1). The United States was also an important leader.
In the early stages, the United States primarily provided intellectual and scientific
leadership on the issue of ozone depletion. Then, starting in 1986, after domestic
decisions to reduce CFC use, the United States exerted its diplomatic muscle by
taking a strong leadership role in the negotiations (Parson 1993; Wettestad 2002).
Finally, entrepreneurial leadership by UNEP’s leader Tolba, as we have dis-
cussed above, proved pivotal in achieving agreement on the Montreal Protocol. In
the post-creation phase, the Ozone Secretariat has assumed the entrepreneurial
leadership mantle and has skilfully worked to ensure the successful implementa-
tion of the agreement and to help facilitate adjustments that have increased the
agreement’s scope and ambition. It has done so by organizing informal and formal
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meetings of the parties, proposing draft language for treaty amendments, forming
review panels, and involving itself in reporting and compliance issues (Wettestad
2002: 162). In sum, the Ozone Secretariat’s role has contributed to the creation of
positive feedback loops that have facilitated repeated adjustments in the policy
demands of the protocol in a manner that enabled fair access for all parties to
participate and influence the process, while at the same time helping the parties
deliver on their obligations.
Lessons Learned and Future Challenges
Social science research on collective action problems and common pool resources
in the 1960s and 1970s was largely occupied with pointing out the difficulty, and
even impossibility, of cooperation among diverse groups of actors and predicted
a tragic fate for public access resources. The negotiations, the agreement, and
the implementation of the Montreal Protocol nevertheless demonstrates that it is
feasible to overcome collective action problems (e.g. Hardin 1968; Olson 1971)—
even on a global scale, even when the resources in question are difficult to
understand, and even if the measurable effects of policies enacted to address the
problem have relatively long time horizons before their benefits are apparent.
The protocol effectively addresses the governance of the atmosphere as a global
public access resource. The international negotiations surrounding climate change
and greenhouse gas emissions must also address the governance of the atmos-
phere, and the Montreal Protocol provides an instructive case in point on how to
overcome collective action problems, bring together heterogeneous actors to reach
a common agreement, prevent free riding, and adjust to new scientific realities.
There are factors, however, that limit the Montreal Protocol’s applicability to
other environmental challenges such as confronting climate change. First, the
reduction of ODSs was comparatively simple; it involved controlling a set of
specific industrial gases for which substitutes were available and the alternatives,
which were quickly developed, also proved to be cheaper than the harmful
substances they replaced. Reducing greenhouse gas emissions to address the
problem of climate change is considerably more complex and will require more
far-reaching societal transitions involving the energy, transport, and agricultural
sectors, among others. Moreover, each sector contains powerful veto actors, such
as the fossil fuel industry. Second, key countries with major ODS producing
industries actively supported an agreement and provided leadership. In contrast,
the international effort to address climate change has lacked leaders that are
widely seen to be acting for the common good to solve the problem of global
warming (Parker et al. 2015). Third, with regard to the problem of stratospheric
ozone depletion, the issues of impact, fairness, and equity were clear and fairly
easy to address. The effects of ozone depletion are spread across the globe and all
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countries are affected. Moreover, the normal North–South divide between the
developed and developing world, which we see, for example, with climate change,
has not been at play to the same extent here. The developed world is in just as
much immediate risk due to ozone depletion and the Multilateral Ozone Fund can
provide the capacity-building help and funding that keeps the costs of involve-
ment for developing countries affordable (Wettestad 2002).
That said, there are lessons that are potentially relevant for other transnational
environmental challenges, even ones for which we do not have simple techno-
logical solutions. An interesting aspect of the Montreal Protocol success story is
how the accumulation of scientific evidence served as a catalyst for cooperation
both for reaching a deal and for increasing ambition and strengthening com-
mitments over time. It illustrates the importance and potential impact of scien-
tific knowledge for forging collective solutions to environmental challenges.
Regarding implementation, the Montreal Protocol provides good examples of
fruitful strategies to facilitate compliance and build confidence through a cali-
brated combination of management and enforcement approaches. Moreover,
although it will be far more difficult to accomplish for the reasons laid out above,
climate change will ultimately need to be solved by finding substitutes for fossil
fuels and providing financial help for the least able countries. This will not be
easy and time will tell if the Paris Agreement and the Green Climate Fund are up
to this epic challenge.
How then should we assess the international effort to address the challenge of
ozone depletion? Has the Montreal Protocol saved the ozone layer for all time?
Until recently, assessments of ozone depletion were very optimistic about healing
the entire ozone layer. The 2014 scientific assessment identified a stable ozone
column since the year 2000 and predicted a full recovery of the ozone layer by the
end of the century (WMO et al. 2014). Scholars also found clear evidence that the
depletion of the ozone layer would have been worse without the Montreal
Protocol (Chipperfield et al. 2015). In addition, the latest evidence shows that
the protocol has been successful in starting the healing process needed to repair
the ozone hole (Strahan and Douglass 2018).
However, recent research has identified that the ozone column is declining
again between the latitudes 60ºN and 60ºS, i.e. most of the world, where potential
harm due to more intense UV radiation may be dramatic (Ball et al. 2018).
Explanations range from an alteration of atmospheric circulation through climate
change that shifts ozone, to negative effects of very short-lived chemicals found in,
e.g. solvents and degreasing agents, which are not addressed by the Montreal
Protocol (Hossaini et al. 2017; Ball et al. 2018). One of these damaging chemicals
is even used to produce ODS replacements (Hossaini et al. 2017). These results,
and the accompanying scientific uncertainty, require further investigation and
raise questions concerning whether the overall impressive achievements of the
protocol, so far, will be sufficient to repair the ozone layer as projected.
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To date, theMontreal Protocol has been a programmatic, political, and procedural
success that has, moreover, endured over time. It has achieved the specific
objectives it set for itself by phasing out many harmful substances and it has
contributed to the closing of the Antarctic ozone hole. However, although it
clearly has had positive impacts on public health and in addressing ozone deple-
tion, a complete recovery of the ozone layer has yet to be secured. Nonetheless, the
Montreal Protocol’s successful track record of adjusting ambition in light of new
scientific evidence, if it continues, suggests that the prospect of eventually healing
the ozone layer is still within reach.
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